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PREFACE.

Several years ago the writer printed for the use of his

class a brief coarse of lectures on Partnership. A wider de-

mand for them having sprung up, they have been revised

and reprinted in the hope that they may be useful to stu-

dents elsewhere. They pretend to be nothing more than

the mere elements of the subject, and the endeavor has been

to keep them in small compass. The citation of authorities

has been purposely limited to the leading and most readily

PREFACE.

accessible cases, and those cited have been selected rather

as illustrations of the text than as authorities for it. Much

statement of cases in the text has been avoided, because the

lectures were designed to be used and were in fact used in

connection with a volume of selected cases upon the subject.

It is assumed that the study of Agency will precede that

of Partnership, and some knowledge- of the former subject

has been constantly taken for granted. If the style at times

seems to be didactic, the circumstances of the original com-

position will serve as an explanation.

FlX>TD R.
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the mere elements of the snbject, and the endeavor has been
to keep them in small compass. The citation of authorities
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~sible cases, and those cited have been selected rat her
as illustrations of the text than as authorities for it. Much
statement of cases in the text has been avoided, because the
lectures were designed to be used and were in fact. used in
connection with a volume of selected cases upon the subject.
It is assumed that the study o! Agency will p~ooede that
of Partnership, and some knowledge. of the former subject
has been constantly taken for granted. If the style at times
seems to be didactic, the circumstances of the original com·
position will serve as SJ> explanation.
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INTRODUCTION.

Relation to other subjects. The law of Partnership, of

which we are now to begin the study, is one of the most in-

teresting and important branches of commercial law. It

appropriately follows the law of Agency, of which it is often

said to be a part. It belongs to that class of personal rela-

tions, heretofore spoken of, which are created, not by law,

but by the contract of the parties.

Historical. It is of ancient origin. It was known to the

Eomans and highly developed. It was adopted and regu-

lated by statutes in the commercial cities of Europe, and

was from thence engrafted upon the English common law.

Since its incorporation into the latter system it has lost many

INTRODUCTION.

of its former characteristics and has acquired others which

were entirely unknown to it in its origin.

Bibliographical. It has been treated by many writers

among English writers by Archbold, Collyer, Dixon, Fox,

Lindley and Pollock; and among American writers by

Bates, Parsons (Theophilus), Parsons (James) and Story.

The leading text-books now in use in this country are Bates
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on Partnership, a recent and very excellent American work

in two volumes; Ewell's Lindley, an American edition of

the leading English work, in two volumes, and highly valu-

able; "Wentworth's Lindley, an excellent edition in one vol-

ume ; and Parsons (T.) on Partnership, a concise but excellent

one volume work, of which a new edition has recently been

xxxvii

Relation to other subjects.- The law of Partnership, of
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appropriately follows the law of Agency, of which it is often
said to be a part. It belongs to that class of personal relations, heretofore spoken of, which are created, not by law,
but by the contract of the parties.
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Romans and highly developed. It was adopted and regulated by statutes in the commercial cities of Europe, and
was from thence engrafted upon the English common law.
Since its incorporation into the latter system it has lost many
of its former characteristics and has acquired others which
were entirely unknown to it in its origin.

Bibliographical.- It has been treated by many writers among English writers by Archbold, Collyer, Dixon, Fox,
Lindley and Pollock; and among American writers by
Bates, .Parsons (Theophil~s), Parsons (James) and Story.
The leading text-books now in use in this country are Bates
on Partnership, a recent and. very excellent American work
in two volumes; Ewell's Lindley, an American edition of
the leading English work, in two volumes, and highly valna ble; Wentworth's Lindley, an excellent edition in one volume; and Parsons (T.) on Partnership, a concise but excellent
one volume work, of which a new edition has recently been
xxxvii

INTBODUOTIOir.

INTRODUOTION.

issued ; and Story on Partnership. The subject of Limited

Partnership has also been treated by Mr. Bates, in a sep-

arate volume.

Codification. In England and several of the states the

law of partnership has been, to a greater or less extent, re-

duced to the form of a statute. These statutes or codes are

issued; and Story on Partnership. The subject of Limited
Partnership has also been treated by Mr. Bates, in a separate volume.

of course authoritative in their respective jurisdictions, but

they furnish elsewhere an excellent subject of study in com-

parison with common-law rules. The most important of

these statutes are given in Appendix A.

xxxviii
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these statutes a.re given in Appendix A.
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CHAPTEK L

DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTION

g 1. Partnership defined.

2. The essential elements.

'

'

& Partnership a contract rela-

tion.

4 Is it a distinct entity?

5. The commercial conception of

partnership.

THE LAW . OF PARTNERSHIP.

6. How a partnership differs

from a corporation.

7. Intermediate associations.

8. Joint tenancy and co-owner-

ship.

9. Joint purchasers of goods for

CHAPTER L

resale.

10, 11. Defectively organized cor-

porations.

DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS.

13. Promoters of companies.

13,14. Contemplated partnerships.
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15. Classification of partnerships.

16. Classification of partners.

1. Partnership defined. Partnership is a legal rela-

tion, based upon the express or implied contract of two or

more competent persons to unite their property, labor or

skill in carrying on some lawful business as principals for

their joint profit. The persons so united are called partners.

The term copartnership is sometimes used to designate the

relation, and the term copartners to designate the parties.

The partners collectively are often called the^m.

Any attempt to frame a satisfactory definition of part-

§ 8. Joint tenancy and co-owner§ L Partnership defined.
' ship.
I. The essential elements.
9.
Joint
purchasers of goods for
& Partnership a contract relaresale.
tion.
10, 11. Defectively organized cor4:. Is it a. distinct entity?
Ii. The commercial conception of
porations.
.
partnership.
12. Pro~oters of companies.
6. How a partnership differs 13, 14. Contemplated partnerships.
15. Classification of partnerships.
from a corporation.
7. Intermediate associations.
16. Classification of partners.

nership is probably a somewhat hazardous undertaking

This is partly owing to the difficulty inhering in any attempt

at defHition, but it is chiefly attributable to the fact thav

the legal conception of partnership has not always been clear

and definite, and that the legal test for determining thr

existence of the relation has varied from time to time. Mr.

Justice lindley, in his admirable treatise upon the subject, 1

l Lindley on Partnership (Ewell's ed.), voL I, p. 1.

1

§ 1. Partnership defined.-Partnership is a legal relation, based upon the express or implied contract of two or
more competent persons to unite their property, labor or
skill in carrying on some lawful business as principals for
tJieir foint profit. The persons so united are called pMtners.
The term copartnership is sometimes used to designate the
relation, and th~ ·copMflners to designate the parties.
The partners collectively are often called the fem.
Any attempt to frame a satisfactory definition of part.
nership is probably a somewhat hazardous undertaking
This is partly owing to the difficulty inhering in any attempt
at defhition, but it is chiefly attributable to the fact tha\i
the legal conception of partnership has not always been cleal"
· and definite, and that the legal test for determining th~
existence of the relation has varied from time to tiine. Mr.
Justice Lindley, in his admirable treatise upon the subjeatt1

I

1 Lindley on Partnership

1

(Ewell's ed.), vol

~

p. l.

..

-

2.]

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

§ 2.]

LA..W OF PARTNERSHIP.

declines to attempt a definition, saying that to frame one

" which shall be both positively and negatively accurate is

possible only to tliose who, having legislative authority, can

adapt the law to their own definition." He collects, how-

ever, no fewer than nineteen definitions which have been

given by other writers; and some of the most important of

these are reproduced in the foot-note. 1

2. Same subject The essential elements. These

several definitions vary in minor particulars, but from them

all at least the characteristic elements of partnership may be

gathered. Thus

declines to attempt a. definition, saying that to frame one
"which shall be both positively and negattvely accurate is
possible only to those who, havin·g legislative authority, can
adapt the law to their own definition." He collects, however, no fewer than nineteen definitions which have been
given by other writers; and some of the most important of
these are reproduced in the foot-note. 1

1. It is an unincorporated association or legal relatio

2. It is created not by law but by the agreement of the

parties.

1 * A partnership is the contract

relation subsisting between per-

sons who have combined their prop-

erty, labor or skill in an enterprise
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or business as principals for the

purpose of joint profit." Bates.

"Partnership, as between the

parties themselves, is a voluntary

§ 2. Same subject -The essential elements. - These
several definitions vary in minor particulars, but from them
all at least the characteristic elements of partnership may be
gathered. Thus 1. It is an unincorporated associatfon or legal relation.(S G
2. It IS ·c reated not by law but by the agreement of the
parties.

.

.

contract between two or more per-

sons for joining together their

money, goods, labor and skill, or

any or all of them, under an under-

standing that there shall be a com-

munion of profit between them,

and for the purpose of carrying on

a legal trade, business or advent-

ure." Collyer.

"Partnership, often called copart-

nership, is usually defined to be a

voluntary contract between two or

more competent persons to place

their money, effects, labor and skill,

or some or all of them, in lawful

commerce or business, with the

understanding that there shall be

a communion of the profits thereof

between them." Story.

"We define partnership as the

combination by two or more per-

sons of capital, or labor, or skill,

for the purpose of business for their

common benefit." Parsons.

The latest editor of Mr. Parsons'

book, Mr. Beale, substitutes the fol-

lowing: "Partnership is a legal

entity formed by the association

of two or more persons for the pur-

poro of carrying on business to-

gether and dividing its profits be-

tween them."

The new English " Partnership

Act" defines the relation thus:

" Partnership is the relation which

subsists between persons carrying

on a business in common with a

view of profit."

See, also, the remarks of Sir

George Jessel, M. R., in Pooley v.

Driver (1876), Law Reports, 5 Ch.

Div. 458, Ames' Cases on Partner-

ship, 87; and the case of Queen v.

Robson (1885), 16 Q. B. Div. 137,

Paige's Cases on Partnership, 11.

1 "A partnership is the contract
relation subsisting between persons who have combined their property, labor or skill in an enterprise
or business as principals for the
purpose of joint profit." -Bates.
"Partnership, as between the
parties themselves, is a voluntary
contract between two or more persons for joining together their
money, goods, labor and skill, or
any or all of them, under an under·
standing that there shall be a oommunion of profit between them,
and for the purpose of carrying on
a legal trade. business or adventure." - Collyer.
"Partnership, often called copartnership, is usually defined to be a
voluntary contract between two or
more competent persons to ·place
their money, effects, labor and skill,
or some or all of them, in lawful
commerce or business, with the
und~rstanding that there shall be
a communion of the profits thereof
between them." -Story.

"We defi11e partnership as the
combination by two or more persons of capital, or labor, or skill,
for the purpose of business for their
common benefit." -Parsons.
The latest editor of Mr. Parsons'
book, Mr. Beale, substitutes the following: . "Partnership is a legal
entity formed by the association
of two or more persons for the purpm:3 of carrying on business t.ogether and dividing its profits between them."
The new English "Partnership
Act" defines the relation thus:
"Partnership is the relation which
subsists between persons carrying
on a business in common with a
view of profit."
See, also, the remarks of Sir
George Jessel, M. R., in Pooley v.
Driver (1876), Law Reports, 5 Cb.
Div. 458, Ames' Cases on Partnership, 87; and the case of Queen v.
Robson (1885), 16 Q. ;B. Div. 137,
Paige's Cases on Partnership, 11.

f

)
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DEHNITION8 AJSTD DISTINCTIONB. [ 3.

3. It requires two or more competent parties.

DEFINITIONS A.ND DISTINCTIONS.
4. It involves the establishment of a common stock, fund

[§ 3.

or capital of some sort by the union of the several contribu-

3. It requires two or more competent parties.
4. It involves the establishment of a common stock, fund
or capital of some sort by the union of the several contributions of t_he parties.
5. It contemplates the transaction of some lawful business, trade or occupation, which the parties are to own and
carry on as principals.
6. The purpose of the union_is the pecuniary gain of the
members.1
In several of the definitions, partnership is spoken of as a.
contract. It is, however, rather the result of the contract
than the contract itself; it is the relation or -association
which the contract creates.

tions of the parties.

5. It contemplates the transaction of some lawful busi-

ness, trade or occupation, which the parties are to own and

carry on as principals.

6. The purpose of the union is the pecuniary gain of the

members. 1

In several of the definitions, partnership is spoken of as a

contract. It is, however, rather the result of the contract

than the contract itself; it is the relation or association

which the contract creates.

3. Is a contract relation. Partnership is a contract

relation and not a status. 2 In this respect it resembles

agency. It is created, limited, regulated and terminated, as

between the parties themselves, by their contract. The law

does not create partnership, or arbitrarily presume its ex-

istence. 1 As has been seen in the study of agency, 4 author-
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ity in one person to bind another as his agent is sometimes

said to be created by law; but this is not true in the law of

partnership. One individual may, it is true, be held liable

to particular persons as a partner, by estoppel, but this lia-

bility, as will be seen hereafter, 8 is limited to those only in

1 An association organized, not nership. Agency, he asserts, is not

for gain, but for the accomplish- a status but a contractual relation,

ment of some social or religious while partnership is the reverse,

purpose, as, for example, a Young It is believed, however, that the

Men's Christian Association, is not two relations are alike contractual,

a partnership. Queen v. Robson 3 Phillips v. Phillips (1863), 49 I1L

(1885), 16 Q. B. Div. 137; Paige's 437, Paige's Cas. 15; Re Gibbs' Es-

Partnership Cases, It See, also, tate (1893), 157 Pa. 59, 27 AtL Rep.

7, post. 383, 22 L. R, A. 276. Compare

8 Bates on Partnership, vol. I, 2. Phillips v. Phillips, supra, with

Mr. James Parsons, in his work on Ratzer v. Ratzer (1877), 28 N. J. Eq.

the Principles of Partnership (Bos- 136.

ton, 1889), 101, does indeed de- * Mechem on Agency, 1, 83.

dare the contrary, distinguishing Post, 7t

in this respect agency and part-

3

ic)-

§ 3. Is a contract relation.- Partnership is a contract
relation and not a status.2 In this respect it resembles
agency. It is created, limited, regulated and terminated, as
between the parties themselves, by their contract. The law
does not ·create partnership, or arbitrarily presume its existence.1 . As has been seen in the study of agency,• authority in one person to bind another as his agent is sometimes
said to be created by law; but this is not true in the-law of
partnership. One individual may, it is true, be held liable
t o particular persons as a partner, by estoppel, but this liability, as will be seen hereafter,11 is limited -to those only in
nership. Agency, he a~serts, is not
a status but a contractual relation,
while partnership is the reverse.
It is believed, however, that the
two relations are alike contractual
3 Phillips v. Phillips (1863), 49 fil
437, Paige's Cas. 15; Re Gibbs' Estate (1893), 157 Pa. 59, 27 Atl. Rep.
383, 22 · L. R. A. 276. Compare
Phillips v. Phillips, supra, with
Ratze:r v. Ratzer (1877), 28 N. J. Eq.

l An association organized, not
for gain, but for the accomplishment of· some social or religious
purpose, as, for example, a Young
Men's Christian Association, is not
a partnership. Queen v. Robson
(1885), 16 Q. B. Div. 137; Paige's
Partnership Cases, 11. See, also,
§ 7,post.
.J Bates on Partnership, vol I, § 2.
Mr. James Parsons, in his work on
the Principles of Partnership (Boston, 1889), § 101, does indeed declare the contrary, distinguishing
in this respect agency and part-

136.

'Mechem on Agency, §§ 1, 82.

•Post,§ 71.
3

4, 5.] LAW OF PABTNEBSHIP.

whose favor the estoppel operates, and does not make such

§§ 4, 5.]

LAW OF P ABTNERSHIP.

individual an actual partner, nor amount to the general

creation of a partnership between him and those with whom

he was reputed to be associated. As a general rule there

can be no partnership where the parties have not by their

agreement created one.

4. Is a partnership a distinct entity? A partnership

is sometimes said to be a legal entity separate and distinct

from the persons composing it, but from a legal standpoint

this can be true only in a limited sense. For most purposes

the law regards only the individuals who occupy the rela-

whose favor the estoppel operates, and does not make such
individual an actual partner, nor amount to the general
creation of a partnership between him and those with whom
he was reputed to be associated. .As a gener3.l. rule there
can be no partnership where the parties have not by their
agree~ent created one. ·

tion ; though by statute in many states the partnership itself

is regarded by the law as a distinct entity for a few special

purposes, as in the case of taxing acts, acts providing for the

filing of chattel mortgages, and, occasionally, acts permit-

ting process to run against the partnership as such. 1 In

most other cases, when the partnership is spoken of as a

separate, legal entity, having its own property, creditors

and the like, little more is meant as a legal proposition than
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that the partners as such have special rights and liabilities

which are worked out through their partnership relation. 2

5. Same subject The commercial conception of part-

nership. The commercial conception of a partnership is

1 See Faulkner T. Hyman (1886), well grasped by the old Roman

143 Mass. 53; Robertson v. Corsett lawyers, and which was partly

(1878), 39 Mich. 777; Fitzgerald v. understood in the courts of equity.'

Grimmell (1884), 64 Iowa, 261; And in a very recent case the

Walker v. Wait (1878), 50 Vt 668. court of appeals of New York, than

* In Meehan v. Valentine (1891), which no court has more Rtead-

145 U. S. 611, the court, referring fastly adhered to the old form of

to the case of Pooley v. Driver, stating the rule, has held that a

L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 458, says: " In the partnership, though not strictly a

case last above cited Sir George legal entity as distinct from the

§ 4:. Is a partnership a distinct entity !-A partnership
is sometimes said to be a legal entity separate and distinct
from the persons composing it, but from a legal standpoint
this can be true only in a limited sense. For most purposes
the law regarqs only the individuals who occupy the relation; though by statute in many states the partnership itself
is regarded by the law as a distinct entity for a few special
purposes~ as in the case of taxing acts, acts providing for the
filing of chattel mortgages, and, ·o?casionally, acts permit- l(~
ting process to run ~gainst the partnership as such.1 In
most other cases, when the partnership is spoken of as a
separate, .legal entity, hav~ng its own property, creditors
and the like, little more is meant as a legal proposition than
that the partners as such have special rights and liabilities
which are worked out through their partnership relation. 2

.

Jesselsaid: ' You cannot grasp the persons composing it, yet being

notion of agency, properly speak- commonly so regarded by men of

ing, unless you grasp the notion of business, might be so treated in in-

the existence of the firm as a sepa- terpreting a commercial contract,

§ o. Same subject-The commercial conception of part·
nership.- The commercial conception of a partnership is

rate entity from the existence of Bank of Buffalo v. Thompson, 121

the partners; a notion which was N. Y. 280."

1 See Faulkner T. Hyman (1886),
142 Mass. 53; Robertson v. Corsett
(1878), 39 Mich. 777; Fitzgerald v.
Grimmell (1884), 64 Iowa, 261;
Walkerv. Wait (1878), 50 Vt. 668.
2 In Meehan v. Valentine (1891),
145 U. S. 611, the court, referring
to the case of Pooley v. Driver,
L. R. 5 Ch. Piv. 458, says: "In the
case last a.hove cited Sir George
Jessel said: 'You cannot grasp the
notion of agency, properly speaking, unless you grasp the notion of
the existence of the firm as a. sepa.rate entity from the existence of
the partners; a notion which was

.

well grasped by the old Roman
lawyers, and which was partly
understood in the courts of equity.'
· And in a very recent case th&
court of appeals of New York, than
w.hich no court has more ~teadfastly adhered to the old form of
stating the rule, has held that a
partnership, though not strictly a
legal entity as distinct from the
persons composing it, yet being
commonly so regarded by men of
business, might be so treated in in·
terpreting a commercial contract..
Bank of Buffalo v. Thompson, 121
N. Y. 280."
4.
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DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. [ 5.

undoubtedly different. " Commercial men and accountants,"

DEFINITIONS A.ND DISTINCTIONS.

[§ 5.

says Mr. Justice Lindley, " are apt to look upon a firm in

the light in which lawyers look upon a corporation, i. $., as

a body distinct from the members composing it, and having

rights and obligations distinct from those of its members.

Hence, in keeping partnership accounts, the ftrjn is made

debtor to each partner for what he brings into the common

stock, and each partner is made debtor to the firm for all

that he takes out of that stock. In the mercantile view,

partners are never indebted to each other in respect of part-

nership transactions, but are always either debtors to or

creditors of the firm. . . . The partners are the agents

and sureties of the firm : its agents for the transaction of its

business ; its sureties for the liquidation of its liabilities so

far as the assets of the firm are insufficient to meet them.

The* liabilities of the firm are regarded as the liabilities of

the partners only in case they cannot be met by the firm

and discharged out of its assets. But this is not the legal

notion of a firm. The firm is not recognized by lawyers as
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distinct from the members composing it." l

Though the legal and the mercantile views are thus dis-

tinct, there is in many quarters a growing tendency to in-

corporate the mercantile conception in the legal theory as

largely as the inherent nature of the partnership will per-

mit ; and though the practical consequences of the changed

conception are usually not pronounced, it often aids in a

clearer conception of the relative rights and powers of the

firm collectively and the partners as individuals. 2

1 Lindley on Partnership (Ewell's ceiving order is made against the

2d Am. edL), voL I, p. 110. firm, and the case has been argued

2 But there is great practical dif- as though the firm had a separate

fieulty in completely adopting the existence as distinguished from

mercantile theory. Thus in Ex the individual members of the

parte Beauchamp (1894), 1 Q. B. 1, firm; in other words, as if it were

where a receiving order in bank- a corporation having a separate ex-

ruptcy had been made against a istence from the individuals which

firm composed of an adult and an compose it. It is no such thing,

infant, Kay, L. J., said: "The re- and the rules [permitting proceed-

undoubtedly different. "C~mmercial men.and accoun~ants,"
~ys Mr. Justice Lindley, "are apt to look upon a firm in
the light in which lawyers look upon a corporation, i. 6., as
a body distinct from the members composing it, and having
rights and obligations distinct from those of its members.
Hence, in keeping partnership accounts, the .for.m is made
debtor to each partner for what he brings into the common
stock, and each partner is ma~e debtor to · the firm for all
that he takes out of that stock. In the mercantile view, .
partners are .never indebted to each other in respect of partnership transactions, but· are always either debtors to or
creditors of the 'firm. . • . The partners are the agents
and sureties of the firm: its agents for the transaction of its
business; its sureties for the liquidation of its liabilities so
far as the assets of the firm are insufficient to meet them.
Th~ liabilities of the firm are regarded as the liabilities of
the partners only in case they cannot be met by the firm
and discharged out of its assets. But this is not the legal
notion of a firm. The firm is not recognized by lawyers as
distinct from the members composing it." 1
Though the legal and the merc~ntile views are thus distinct, there is in many quarters a growing tendency to in- .
corporate the mercantile conception in the legal theory as
largely as the inherent nature of the partnership will permit; and though the practical consequences of the changed
·OOnception are usually not pronounced, it often aids in a
dearer conc.eption of the relative rights and powers of the
firm collectively and the partners as individuals.2
1 Lindley on Partnership (Ewell's
2d A~ ed.), vol I, p. 110.
2 ~ut there is great pr.actical difficulty in completely adopting the
mercantile theory. Thus in Ex
parte Beauchamp.(1894), 1 Q. B. 1,
where a receiving order in bankruptcy had been made against a
firm composed of ·a n adult and an
infant, Kay, L. J., said: "The re-

ceiving order is made against the
firm, and the case has been argued
as though the firm had a separate
existence as distinguished from
the individual members of the
firm; in other words, as if it were
a corporation having a separate existence from the individuals which
compose it. It is no such thing,
and the rules [permitting proceed5

LAW OF PAETNEESHIP.

6. How a partnership differs from a corporation.

§ 6.]

LAW Oi' PARTNERSHIP.

A partnership differs in material respects from a corporation.

A partnership is a voluntary, unincorporated association

of individuals whose legal relation is based upon their agree-

ment, and needs no special statutory authority to give it

force and effect. They continue to act in this relation as

individuals. They sue and are sued only in their individual

names. The death of one operates usually to terminate the

relation. The transfer of the interest of one has usually the

same effect, and operates, not to introduce the transferee

into the relation, as a party to it, but merely to give him

such share as his transferrer would have upon a dissolution.

Each partner is, in general, personally responsible for all the

debts of the partnership, notwithstanding that he has fully

paid in to it his agreed contribution.

A corporation, on the other hand, is a distinct legal entity,

created by some express legislative authority, either special

to the particular case or general in like cases. It acts in its

corporate capacity only, without regard to the individuals
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who compose it. It may sue and be sued in its own name.

The death of one or more corporators does not dissolve it.

One corporator may transfer his share without affecting the

corporate existence, and his transferee may take his place

in the corporation, which proceeds without regard to changes

in the personnel of the corporators. One corporator, having

paid his subscription, is not usually subject to any further

personal responsibility for the debts of the concern. In these

characteristics of limited liability, facility of transfer, and

ings in the firm name] do not mean 57 Ga. 229; Chambers v. Sloan, 19

anything of the kind. Under the Ga. 84.) So in a late case in New

rules, facilities have been given for York Jones v. Blun (1895), 145

proceeding against a firm in the N.Y. 333 the court, notwithstand-

firm name, for this simple reason ing what was said in Bank of Buf-

that it is not always easy to find f alo v. Thompson, supra, points out

out who who are the partners in a that it is only for certain purposes

firm." (See, also, Drucker v. Well- that the partnership may be re-

house (1888), 82 Ga. 129, 8 S. E. Rep. garded as an entity.

40, 2 L. R. A. 328 ; Harris v. Visscher,

6

§ 6. How a partnership differs from a corporation.-.
A partnership di:ffers in material respects from a corporation.
A partnership is a voluntary, unincorporated association
of individuals whose legal relation is based upon their agreement, and needs no special statutory authority to give it
force and effect. They continue to act in this relation as
individuals. They sue and are sued only in their individual
names. · The death of one operates usually to terminate the
relation. The transfer of the interest of one has usually the
same effect, and operates, not to introduce the transferee
into the relation, as a party to it, but merely to give him
such share as his transferrer would have upon a dissolution.
Each partner is, in general, personally responsible for all the
debts of the partnership, notwithstanding that he has fully
paid in to it his agreed contribution.
A corporation, on the other hand, is a distinct legal entity,
created by some express legislative authority, either special
to the particular case or general in like cases. It acts in its
corporate capacity only, without regard to the individuals
who compose it. It may sue and be ued in its own name.
The death of one or more corporators does not dissolve it.
One corporator may transfer his share without affecting the
corporate existence, and his transferee may take his place
in the corporation, which proceeds without regard to changes
in the personnel of the corporators. One corporator, having
")( J( paid his subscription, is not usually subject to any further
/.., personal responsibility for the debts of the concern. In these
characteristics of limited liability, facility of transfer, and
ings in the firm name] do not mean
anything of the kind. Under the
rules, facilities have been given for
proceeding against a firm in the
firm name, for this simple reasonthat it is not always easy to find
out who who are the partners in a
firm." (See, also, Drucker v. Wellhouse (1888), 82 Ga. 129, 8 S. E. Rep.
40, 2 L. R. A. 328; Harris v. Visscher,

57 Ga. 229; Chambers v. Sloan, 19
Ga. 84.) So in a late case in New
York - Jones v. Blun (1895), 145
N. Y. 333-the court, not;withstanding what was said in Bank of Buf·
falo v. Thompson, supra, points out
that it is only for certain purposes
. that the partnership may be re·
garded as an entity.
6
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DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. [ 7, 8.

immunity from dissolution by death, are found the leading

DEFINITIONS AND DISTINOTIONS. ·

[§§ 7, 8.

inducements to the formation of corporations.

7. Intermediate associations. In many of the states,

statutes have provided for the organization of associations

partaking more or less of the characteristics of both partner-

ships and corporations. Thus, there are joint-stock companies,

immunity from dissolution by death, are found the leading
inducements to the formation of corporations.

which usually are simply partnerships with transferable

shares; partnership associations, limited, which are usually

but a crude form of corporation; and limited partnerships,

which are partnerships having one or more general members

subject to the usual liabilities of partners, and also one or

more special partners whose liability is limited to the amount

contributed. The legal peculiarities of these several types

will be more fully considered in later chapters.

In addition to these are other bodies, not statutory,. and

not organized for the purpose of pecuniary profit, which are

sometimes sought to be held liable as partnerships, but which

are not such in fact. Of these the unincorporated social

clubs, committees, lodges, fraternal societies, Christian asso-
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ciations, granges and co-operative associations, are common

examples. Such bodies are not partnerships, nor is the lia-

bility of a member to be determined by the law of partner-

ship, but by that of principal and agent those, and those

only, being liable as principals who have expressly or im-

pliedly authorized acts to be done in their behalf, or who

have subsequently ratified them. 1

8. Joint-tenancy and co-ownership. Joint-tenants

and co-owners are not thereby partners. 2 They differ in

v. Hector (1836), 2 Ag. 45; Davison v. Holden (1887),

Mees. & Wels. 172; Todd v. Emly 55 Conn. 103, 3 Am. St. Rep. 40,

(1841), 7 id. 427; a C., 8 id. 505; La- Mechem's Gas. on Ag. 47; Burt v.

fond v. Deems (1880), 81 N. Y. 507; Lathrop (1883), 52 Mich. 106.

Eioabaum v. Irons (1843), 6 Watts 2 See 1 Ldndley on Partn. (Ew-

& Serg. (Pa.) 68, 40 Am. Dec. 540; ell's 2d Am. ed.), p. 52; Dunham v.

Ash v. Guie (1881), 97 Pa. St 493, Loverock (1893), 158 Pa. St. 197, 27

89 Am. Rep. 818, Mechem's Gas. on AtL Rep. 990, 38 Am. St Rep. 838.

§ 7. Intermedfate associations ..- In .many of the states,
statutes have provided for the organization. of associations
partaking more or less of the characteristics of both partnerships and corporations. Thus, there are joilnt-stock companiea,
which usually are simply partnerships with transferable
shares; partnersh:ip associations, lilmited, which are usually
but a crude form of corporation; and limited partnerships,
which are partnerships having one or more general members
subject to the usual liabilities of partners, and also one or
more special partners whose liability is limited to the amount
contributed. The legal peculiarities of these several types
will be more fully considered in later chapters.
In addition to these are other bodies, not statutory,. and
not organized for the purpose of pecuniary profit, which are
sometimes sought to be h~ld liable as partnerships, but which
are not such in fact. Of these the unincorporated social
clubs, committees, lodges, fraternal societies, christian associations, granges and co-operative associations, are common examples. Such bodies are not partnerships, nor is the liability of a member to be determined by the law of partnership, but by that of principal and agent- those, and those
only, being liable as principals who have expressly or impliedly authorized acts to be done in their behalf, or wh~
have subsequently ratified thein.t§ 8. J oint·tenancy and co-ownership .. - Joint-tenants
and co-owners a e not thereby partners. 2 They differ in
1 Flemyng v. Hector {1836), 2
Mees. & Wela. 172; Todd v. Emly
(1841), 7 id. 427; S. C., 8 id. 505; Lr
fond v. Deems (1880), 81 N. Y. 507;
Ei~baum v. Irons (1848), 6 Watts
& Serg. (Pa.) 68, 40 Am. Dec. 540;
.A.sh v. Guie (1881), 97 Pa. St. 493,
89 Am. Rep. 818, Mechem's Cas. on

Ag. 45; Davison v. Holden (1887),
55 Conn. 103, 3 Am. St. Rep. 40,
Mechem's Cas. on Ag. 47; Burt v.
Lathrop (1883), 52 Mich. 106.
2 See 1 Lindley on Partn. (Ew·
ell's 2d Am. ed.), p. 52; Dunham v•
Loverock (1893), 158 Pa. St. 197, 27
AtL Rep. 990, 38 Am. St. Rep. 838.
7

8.] LAW OF PAKTNBBSHIP.

many particulars, of which the following are the most im-

§ 8.]

LAW 011' P.A.RTNEBSHIP.

portant:

1. Co-ownership is not necessarily the result of an agree-

ment to create it, 1 while partnership is. 3

2. Co-ownership does not necessarily involve community

of profit or loss,* while partnership does. 4

3. One co-owner may, without the consent of the others,

assign his interest in such a way that his assignee will as-

sume his relations to the other co-owners, 8 but one partner

cannot do this.' X > ^

4. One co-owner is not as such the agent of the others, 7

while a partner is. 8

5. One co-owner has no lien on the common property for

expenses or outlays, or for what may be due from the oth-

ers as their share of a common debt, 9 while a partner has

such a lien. 10

Other distinctions exist, but these are sufficient to illus-

trate the differences.

But while the legal distinction between partnership and
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co-ownership as such is thus clearly defined, it is possible

that the co-owners may so deal with their common prop-

erty as tc assume very nearly, if not entirely, the attitude of

partners. Thus, when they employ it in business with a

view to profit, and divide such profits between them, part-

nership may result. 11 Even the division of the gross proceeds

of the employment of their common property was formerly

deemed sufficient to render them liable as partners, though

this view is now generally abandoned, as will be seen in a

later section. 13 Until, however, it appears that they have

i Lindley on Partnership, supra. Lindley, supra; Goeil v. Morse

See ante, 3; post, 43. (1879), 126 Mass. 480.

1 Lindley, ubi supra. 10 g ee p OS ^ g 2 78.

See post, 46-48. u See post, 53; Butler Savings

Lindley, ubi supra. Bank v. Osborne (1893), 159 Pa. St.

9 See post, 29. 10, 28 AtL Rep. 163, 89 Am. St

7 Lindley, supra. Eep. 665.

See post, 164. See post, 56, 57.

many particulars, of which the following are the most important:
1. Co-ownership is not necessarily the result of an agreement to create it,1 while partnership is.2
2. Go-ownership does not necessarily involve community
of profit or loss,3 while partnership does.'
3. One co-owner may, without the consent of the others,
assign his interest in such a way that his assignee will assume his relations to the other co-owners,6 but one partner
cannot do this.• X' )( 1
4. One co-owner is not as such the agent of the others,7
while a partner is.'
5. One co-owner has no lien on the comm.on property for
expenses or outlays, or for what may be due from the others as their share of a common debt,9 while a partner has
·
such a lien. 10
Other distinctions exist, but these are sufficient to illustrate the differences.
But while the legal distinction between partnership and
co-ownership as such is thus clearly defined, it is possible
that the co-owners may so deal with their common property as k assume very nearly, if not entirely, the attitude of
partners. Thus, when they employ it in business with a
view to profit, and divide such profits between them, partnership may result. 11 Even the division of the gross P!Oceeds
of the employment of their common property was formerly
deemed sufficient to render them liable as partners, though
thls view is now generally abandoned, as will be seen in a
later section.12 Until, however, it appears that they have
1 Lindley

on Partnership, aupra.

ante,§ 3; post,§ 43.
a Lindley, ubi supra.
• See post, §§ 46-48.
• Lindley, ubi supra.
1 See post, § 29.
T Lindley, supra.
•See post, § 164.
2 See

a

•Lindley, supra; Goell v. Morse
(1879), 126 Mass. 480.
10 See post, § 278•
11 See post, § 53; Butler Savings
Bank v. Osborne (1893), 159 Pa. St.
10, 28 Atl Rep. 163, 89 Am. St.
Rep. 665.
lJ See post, §§ 56, 57.
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DEiTNrnoNs AND DISTINCTIONS. [ 9, 10.

changed their position to that of partners, their relation as

DEFINITIONS AND DISTINOTIONS.

[§§ 9, 10.

co-owners will be presumed to continue. 1

9. Joint purchasers of goods for resale. 2 If several

persons jointly purchase goods for resale, with a view to

divide the profits arising from the transaction, a partnership

may thereby be created. 8 X But persons who join in the pur-

chase of goods, not for the purpose of selling them again

and dividing the profits, but for the purpose of dividing the

goods themselves, are not partners, and are not liable to third

persons as if they were. 4 And even though they purchase

for the purpose of resale, their agreement may show that no

partnership was intended, as where they expressly deny to

each the ordinary attributes of partnership, such as the power

of either to sell without the concurrence of the other. 6 X X

10. Defectively-organized corporations. Whether per-

sons are to be held liable as partners who have engaged in

business in pursuance of an unsuccessful attempt to organize

a corporation is a question upon which the authorities are

in conflict. It is contended, on the one hand, that where
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the association has done business and entered into contracts

as a corporation, the individuals composing it cannot, in case

it appeal's that no corporation really existed, be personally

liable, because they have never contracted as individuals or

intended to be bound as such. To hold them liable as part-

.changed their position to that of parbers, their relation as
co-owners will be presumed to continue.1
§ 9. Joint purchasers of goods for . resalP-.2- I f several
persons jointly purchase goods for resale, with a view to
divide the profits arising from the transaction, a partnership
may thereby be created. 3 X'But persons who join in the purchase of goods, not for the purpose of selling them again
and dividing the profits, but for the purpose of dividing the
goods themselves, are not partners, and are not liable to third
persons as if they were.' And even though they purchase
for the purpose of resale, their agreement may show that no
partnership was intended, as where they exp!essly deny to
each the ordinary attributes of partnership, such as the power
of either to sell without the concurrence of the other. 6 ><" 7

ners would be to hold them upon a contract which they never

1 Dunham v. Laverock, supra; 6 Goell v. Morse (1879), 126 Mass.

Butler Savings Bank v. Osborne, 480. Here two men bought a horse

supra. for the purpose of resale at a profit,

2 The language of Mr. Justice but it was agreed that either one

Lindley, E well's 2d Am. ed., p. 54, who should have possession of the

is here substantially adopted. horse should feed him at his own

1 Reid v. Hollinshead (1825), 4 expense, and, though each was to

Barn. & Or. 867, Ames' Cas. on endeavor to find a purchaser,

Partn. 29. neither was to sell without the

4 Coope v. Eyre (1788), 1 H. Blacks, concurrence of the other. They

87; Hoare v. Dawes (1780), 1 Doug, were held to be tenants in conv

371; Gibson v. Lupton (1832), 9 mon and not partners.

Bing. 297.

§ 10. Defectively·organiied corporations.-Whether persons are to be held liable as partners who have engaged in
business in pursuance of an unsuccessful attempt to organize
a corporation is a question upon which the authorities are
in conflict. It is contended, on the one hand, that where
the association has done business and entered into contra<;ts
as a corporation, the individuals composing it cannot, in case
it appears that no corporation really existed, be personally
liable, because they have never contracted as individuals or
intended to be bound as such. To hold them liable as partners would be to hold them upon a contract which they never
1 Dunham v. Loverock, supra;
6 Goell v. Morse (1879), 126 Mass.
Butler Savings Bank v. Osborne, 480. Here two men bought a horse
supra.
for the purpose of resale at a profit,
2 The language of Mr. Justice but it was agreed that either one
Lindley, Ewell's .2d Am. ed., p. 54, who should have possession of the
is here substantially adopted.
·horse should feed him at his own
I Reid v:. Hollinshead (1825), 4 expense, and, though each was to
Barn. & Cr. 867, Ames' Cas. on endeavor to find a purchaser,
Partn. 29.
neither was to sell without the
'Coope v. Eyre (1788), 1 H. Blacks. concurrence of the other. They
87; Hoare v. Dawes (1780), 1 Doug. were held to be tenants in com871; Gibson v. Lupton (1832), 9 mon and not partners.
Bing. 297.
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11.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

made or intended to make. On the other hand, it is con-

§ 11.]

LAW OJ' PARTNERSHIP.

tended that the parties must have intended to become liable

in some way, and inasmuch as they have failed to bind them-

selves as a corporation, it must be assumed that they are

liable as partners that it is only through the fact that they

are corporators and not partners that they escape personal

liability ; and hence if the corporate shield fails, the individ-

ual liability necessarily arises.

11. Same subject The true test. The true test, it

is believed, according to the weight of modern authority, is

to be found in the nature of the facts which have operated

to prevent complete incorporation. There can be no corpo-

ration without legislative authority. Hence, if there be no

statute at all which authorizes such an incorporation as that

made or intended to make. On the other hand, it is contended that the parties must have intended to become liable
in some way, and inasmuch as they have failed to bind themselves as a corporation, it must be assumed that they are
liable as partners - that it is only through the fact that they
are corporators and not partners that they escape personal
liability; and hence if the corporate shield fails, the individual liability necessarily arises.
·

attempted, or if, though there is the semblance of a statute,

it is really void as being repugnant to the constitution, and

therefore is no statute in legal contemplation, the attempted

incorporation wholly lacks the vital element which would

have given it effect, and the association of individuals, which
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could not possibly be a corporation, will be deemed in law a

partnership. 1 It confessedly is not a corporation de jure;

and it cannot even be deemed a corporation de facto, because

it never could have been one de jure, and no one can be es-

topped from so alleging.

Where, however, there was ample legislative authority,

and the only difficulty is that the statutory formalities have

not been fully complied with, an obviously different ques-

tion is presented. If the associates have endeavored in good

faith to comply with the requirements, and have done busi-

ness as a corporation, there is ample reason why third per-

sons who have dealt with the association on that footing

should be estopped from denying its corporate existence.

The state which prescribed the formalities may indeed com-

plain of their non-observance; but until it does so, third per-

sons should not be permitted to interfere. Until the state

i Eaton v. Walker (1889), 76 Mich. 579, 43 N. W. Repv 638, 6 L, R A. 102L

. 10

§ 11. Same subject-The true test.-The true test, it
is believed, according to the weight of modern authority, is
to be found in the nature of the facts which have operated
to prevent complete incorporation. There can be no corp<r
ration without legislative authority. Hence, if there be no
statute at all which authorizes such an incorporation as that
attempted, or if, though there is the semblance of a statute,
it is really void as being repugnant to the constitution, and
therefore is no statute in legal contemplation, the attempted
incorporation wholly lacks the vital element which would
have given it effect, and the association of individuals, which
could not possibly be a corporation, will be deemed in law a
partnership. 1 It confessedly is not a corporation de fure;
and it cannot even be deemed a corporation defaato, because
it never could haye been one de jure, and no one can be estopped froin so alleging.
Where, however, there was ample legislative authority,
and the only difficulty is that the statutory formalities have
not been fully complied with,- an obviously different question is presented. If the associates have endeavored in good
faith to comply with the requirements, and have done business as a corporation, there is ample reason why third persons who have dealt with the association on that footing
should be estopped from denying its corporate existence.
The state which prescribed the formalities may in~eed complain of their non-observance; but until it does so, third persons should not be permitted to interfere. Until the state
1 Eaton v. Walker (1889), 76 Mich. 579,

10

43 N. W. Rep. 638, 6 L. R. A. 102.
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DEFECTIONS AND DISTINCTIONS.

[11.

DEFINITIONS AND DISTINarIONS.

[§ 11.

has acted in the matter the weight of modern authority re-

gards the association as at least a corporation de facto, and

its members are not liable as partners. 1

The authorities which sustain this rule do not by any

means concede that the formalities prescribed may lightly

be ignored. There must be an actual and bonafide attempt

at compliance, and without this the de facto corporation will

not exist. 2

J Finnegan v. Noerenberg

(Knights of Labor Bldg. Ass'n)

(1893), 52 Minn. 239, 53 N. W. Rep.

1150, 38 Am. St. Rep. 552, 18 L. R A.

778, Paige's Gas. on Partn. 24; Sni-

has acted in the matter the. weight of modern authority re-gards the association as at least a corporation defacto, and
its members are not liable as partners.1
The authorities which sustain this rule do not by any
means concede that the formalities prescribed may lightly
be ignored. There must be an actual and bona fide attempt
at compliance, and without this the defacto corporation will
not exist.2

der's Sons' Co. v. Troy (1890), 91

Ala. 224, 8 So. Rep. 658, 24 Am. St.

Rep. 887, 11 L. R A. 515; American

Salt Co. v. Heidenheimer (1891),

80 Tex. 344, 15 S. W. Rep. 1038, 26
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Am St. Rep. 743; Rutherford v.

Hill (1892), 22 Oreg. 218, 29 Pac.

Rep. 546, 29 Am. St. Rep. 596, 17 L.

R, A. 549; Fay v. Noble (1851), 7

Gush, (Mass.) 192; Ward v. Brig-

ham (1879), 127 Mass. 24, Paige's

Gas. on Partn. 20; Planters' Bank v.

Padgett (1882), 69 Ga. 159; Gartside

Coal Co. v. Maxwell, 22 Fed. Rep.

197; Re Gibbs' Estate (1893), 157 Pa.

St. 59, 27 AtL Rep. 383, 22 L. R. A. 276.

8 Certain of the cases declare that

there must be a " substantial " com-

pliance with the formalities, or a

compliance . in all " material re-

spects." Kaiser v. Lawrence Sav-

ings Bank (1881), 56 Iowa, 104, 41

Am. Rep. 85; Mokelumne Hill

Mining Co. v. Woodbury (1859), 14

CaL 424, 73 Am. Dec. 658; Hurt v.

Salisbury (1874), 55 Ma 310; Bige-

low v. Gregory (1874), 73 111. 197,

Paige's Gas. on Partn. 28. But, as

is pointed out in Re Gibbs' Estate

(1893), 157 Pa. St. 59, 27 AtL Rep. 383,

22 L. R. A. 276, "where there has

been a substantial compliance with

the law, the corporation is, of

course, de jure." So, in Finnegan

v. Noerenberg, cited in the preced-

ing note, the court say: "A sub-

stantial compliance will make a

corporation de jure. But there

must be an apparent attempt to

perfect an organization under the

law. There being such an appar-

ent attempt to perfect an organi-

zation, the failure as to some

substantial requirement will pre-

vent the body from being a corpo-

ration dejure; but, if there be .user

pursuant to such attempted organi-

zation, it will not prevent it being

a corporation de facto." The stat-

ute may, however, make strict

compliance with some or all of the

requirements a condition prece-

dent to the acquisition of any cor-

porate power, and in such cases

there cannot be even a de facto

J Fin n e g an
v. Noerenberg 22 L. R. A. 276, "where there has
(Knights of Labor Bldg. Ass'n) been a substantial compliance with
(1893); 52 Minn. 239, 53 N. W. Rep. the law, the corporation is, of
1150, 38 Am. St. Rep. 552, 18 L. R. A. course, de jure." So, in Finnegan
778, Paige's Cas. on Partn. 24; Sni- v. Noerenberg, cited in the precedder's Sons' Co. v. Troy (1890), 91 ing note, the court say: "A sub.
Ala. 224, 8 So. Rep. 658, 24 Am. St. · stantial compliance will make a
Rep. 887, 11L.R;A.515; American corporation de Jure. But there
Salt Co. v. Heidenheimer (1891), must ·be an apparent attempt to
80 Tex. 344, 15 S. W. Rep. 1038, 26 . perfect an organization under the
Am St. Rep. 743; Rutherford v. law. There being such an apparHill (1892), 22 Oreg. 218, 29 Pac. ent attE:'.mpt to perfect an organiRep. 546, 29 Am. st. Rep. 596, 17 L. zation, the failure as to some
R. A. 549; Fay v. Noble (1851), 7 substantial requirement will preCush. (Mass.) 192; Ward v. Brig- . vent the body from being a corpoham (1879), 127 Mass. 24, Paige's ration de jure; but, if there be ,user
Cas. on Partn. 20; Planters' Bank v. pursuant to such attempted organiPadgett (1882), 69 Ga. 159; Gartside zation, it will not prevent it being
Coal Co. v. Maxwell, 22 Fed. Rep. a corporation de facto:" The stat197; Re Gibbs' Estate (1893), 157 Pa. ute may, however, make strict
St. 59, 27 AtlRep. 383, 22 L.R.A. 276. compliance with some or all of the
2 Certain of the cases declare that requirements a condition precethere must be a" substantial" com- dent to the acquisition of any corpliance with the formalities, or a porate power, and in such cases
compliance . in all "material re- there cannot be even a de facto
spects." ' Kaiser v. Lawrence Sav- corporatio~ without compliance.
ings Bank (1881), 56 Iowa, 104, 41 Jones v.Aspen Hardware Co. (1895),
Am. Rep. 85; Mokelumne Hill - Col - , 40 Pac. Rep. 457, 29 L.
Mining Co. v. Woodbury (1859), 14 R. A. 143. And in many of the
Cal 424, 73 Am. Dec. 658; Hurt v. cases, such as those first cited in
Salisbury (1874), 55 Mo. 310; Bige- this note, express prohibitions exlow v. Gregory (1874), 73 Ill. 197, isted against commencing business
Paige's Cas. on Partn. 28. But, as as a corporation until .certain reis pointed out in Re Gibbs' Estate quirements, like the filing of the
(1893), 157 Pa. St. 59, Z1 Atl Rep. 383, articles, were complied with.
11

12, 13.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

The requisites, then, of the de facto corporation are these:

~§

12, 13.]

LAW OJI' P A.RTNERSHIP.

1. A valid law under which a corporation with the powers

assumed might lawfully be created; 2. An actual and lona

fide attempt to comply with the prescribed requirements ;

and 3. The exercise of corporate powers in pursuance of

such attempt.

12. Promoters of companies. Promoters of corpora-

tions are not partners. Though engaged in endeavoring to

secure the organization of a company to carry on business

for pecuniary profit, their immediate object is not the trans-

action of business for mutual gain, and they do not fall

The requisites, then, of the defacto corporation are these:
1. A valid law under which a corporation with the powers
.assumed might lawfully be created; 2. An actual and bona
fide attempt to comply with the prescribed requirements;
and 3. The exercise of corporate powers in pursuance of
such attempt.

within the definition or the purposes of partnership. 1

13. Contemplated partnerships. A mere intention to

form a partnership does not constitute one. Persons, there-

fore, who are merely contemplating a future partnership, or

who have simply entered into an agreement to thereafter

become partners, cannot be held liable as partners, nor have

they the rights of partners as between themselves. Before

this result can ensue the executory agreement must have
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been executed. As declared in one case, 2 " A marked dis-

tinction exists in law between an agreement to enter into the

§ 12. Promoters of companies.-P.romoters of corporations are not partners. Though engaged in endeavoring to
secure the organization of a company to carry on business
for pecuniary profit, their immediate object is not the transaction of business for mutual gain, and they do not fall
within the definition or the purposes of partnership.1

copartnership relation at a future day and a copartnership

actually consummated. It is an elementary principle that

a partnership in fact cannot be predicated upon an agree-

ment to enter into a copartnership at a future day unless it

be shown that such agreement was actually consummated.

In the language of the text-books, the partnership must be

* launched.' To constitute the relation, therefore, the agree-

ment between the parties must be an executed agreement.

So long as it remains executory the partnership is inchoate,

not having been called into being by the concerted action

necessary under the partnership agreement. It is undoubt-

1 See Reynell v. Lewis (1846), 15 835, 24 Pa& Rep. 681, 9 L. R.^ A

Mees. & Welsby, 517 ; Capper's Case 455. See, also, Buzard v. Me Anulty

(1851), 1 Sim. (N. S.) 178. (1890), 77 Tex. 438, 14 a W. Rep. 138

2 Reed v. Meagher (1890), 14 Cola

§ 13. Contemplated partnerships.-A mere intention to
form a partnership does not constitute one. Persons, there-fore, who are merely contemplating a future partnership, or
who have simply entered into an agreement to thereafter
become partners, cannot be held. liable as partners, nor have
they the rights of partners as between themselves. Before
this result can ensue the 'e xecutory agreement must have
been executed. As declared in one case,2 "A marked distinction exists in law between an agreement to enter into the
copartnership relation at a future day and a copartnership
actually consummated. · It is an elementary principle that
.a partnership in fact cannot be predicated upon an agre&
ment to enter into a copartnership at a future day unless it
be shown that such agreement was actually consummated.
In the language of the text-books, the partnership must be
'launched.' To constitute the relation, therefore, the agreemen~ between the parties must be an executed agreement.
So long as it remains executory the partnership is inchoate,
not having been called into being by the concerted action
necessary under the partnership agreement. It is iindoubt1 See Reynell v. Lewis (1846), 15 835, 24 Pac. Rep. 681, 9 L R; A
Mees. & W elsby, 517; Capper's Case 455. See, also, Buzard v. McAnulty
(1851), 1 Sim. (N. S.) 178.
(1890), 77Tex.488,14: S. W. Rep.138
2 Reed v. Meagher (1890), 14 Colo.

12
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DEFnsnnoNS AND DisimcrnoNS. [ 14, 15.

edly true that a partnership inprc&senti, may be constituted

DKFLIUTIONS AND DIBTINOTIONS.

[§§ 14, 15...

by an agreement if it appears that such was the intention

of the parties. But where it expressly appears that the

arrangement is contingent, or is to take effect at a future

day, it is well settled that the relation of partners does not

exist, and that, if one or more of them refuse to perform the

agreement, there is no remedy between the parties except a

suit in equity for specific performance, or an action at law

for the recovery of damages, should any be sustained."

14:. Same subject. The mere time of executing the

articles is not conclusive, for persons may become partners

at once, if such is the intention, even though partnership

articles are thereafter to be executed. The test is the in-

tention. If it is the intention that the parties are not to

become partners until the terms have been agreed upon and

edly true that a partnership i;n, prmsen"ti may be constituted'
by an agreement ff it appears that such was the intention
of the parties. But where it expressly appears that the
arrangement is contingent, or is to take effect at a future·
day, it is well settled that the relation' of partners does not
exist, ~nd that, if one or more of them refuse to perform the
agreement, there is no remedy between the parties except a .
.suit in equity for specific performance, or an action at law
for the recovery of damages, should any be sustained."

articles executed, the partnership will not come into exist-

ence until that time, unless the condition is waived; but if

the terms have been agreed upon, the execution of the

articles, or the performance of other conditions, may be
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postponed or waived, and such a waiver may be presumed

where the parties actually begin business as partners before

the conditions have been performed. 1

15. Classification of partnerships. Partnerships are

sometimes classified as ordinary partnerships, limited partr

nerships, and joint-stock companies. The peculiarities of the

latter have been already noticed. Ordinary partnerships

may be divided into (1) universal, (2) general, and (3) special

or particular partnerships, a classification corresponding

to that of agency, and based upon substantially the same

distinctions. An universal partnership is one in which all

the property and services of the parties are united, and all

profits, however made, are for their joint benefit. A gen-

eral partnership is one created for the purposes of some

iCook v. Carpenter (1861), 34 Vt kins v. Hunt (1843), 14 N. EL 205*

121, 80 Am. Dec. 670; Hartman v. Paige's Cas. on Partn. L

§ 14. Same subject.-The mere. time of executing the:
_articles is not conclusive, for persons may become partners.
at once, if such is the intention, even though partnership ·
articles are thereafter to be executed. The test is the intention. If it is the intention that the parties are not to become partners until the terms have been agreed upon and
articles executed, the partnership will not come into existence until that time, un]ess the condition is waiv.ed; but n·
- the terms have been agreed upon, the execution of the
articles, or the performance of other conditions, may be
postponed or waived, and such a waiver may be presumed
where the parties actually begin business as partners before·
the conditions have been performed.1

Woehr (1867), 18 N. J. Eq. 383; At-

13

§ Hi. Classification of partnerships.- Partnerships are ·
sometimes classified as ordinary partnerships, liinited partr
nerships, and.jointrstock companies. The peculiarities of the ·
latter have been already noticed. Ordinary partnerships
may be divided into (1) universal, (2) general, and (3) special
or paTticular partnerships,- a classification corresponding
to that of agency, and based upon substantially the same ·
distinctions. An universal partnership is one in which all ·
the property and services of the parties. are united, and all
pro.fits, however made; are for their joint benefit. A gen.eral partnership is one created for the purposes of some1 Cook v. Carpenter (1861), 34 Vt. kins v. Hunt (1843), 14: N. H.
121, 80 Am. Dec. 670; Hartman v. Paige's Cas. on Partn. 1.
Woehr (1867), 18 N. J. Eq. 383; At-

13

205-s~

16.] LAW Off PAJiT^ERSHIP.

general kind of business, or of a number of kinds of business.

§ 16.]

LAW OB P ABTNERSHIP.

A special or particular partnership is one created for a single

transaction or adventure.

It has been thought that an universal partnership could

exist only in theory, but several cases have occurred in this

country of partnerships which were practically universal.

In any event, however, the evidence must be clear to estab-

lish such an unusual relation. 1

16. Classification of partners. In limited partnerships

the partners are either (1) general, or (2) special, the former

standing in the attitude of an ordinary partner, and the

latter occupying a peculiar position, prescribed by statute,

with a liability limited to his contribution.

In ordinary partnerships, partners may be classified as

(1) active and ostensible; (2) secret or dormant, and (3) nom-

inal.

An ostensible partner, sometimes called a public partner,

is one who is held out and known as a partner. An active

partner is one who actually participates in the conduct of
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the business. He is usually an ostensible one, but is not nec-

essarily so. A partner may be unknown or concealed and

yet active in the management of the business; or he may be

both concealed and passive as to the conduct of the busi-

ness. In the former case he is said to be a secret partner,

and in the latter case he is called a silent or dormant part-

ner. A nominal partner is a person apparently a partner

but not really so. A person who leaves an existing firm is

often called a retiring partner, while one who enters such a

firm is called an incoming partner.

iSee United States Bank v. Bin- (1848), 20 Vt 479, 50 Am. Dec. 54:

ney (1828), 5 Mason (U. a a C.), 183; Goesele v. Bimeler (1852), 14 How.

Lyman v. Lyman (1829), 2 Paine (U. S.) 589; Gray T. Palmer (1858),

(U. S. C, C.), 11; Rice v. Barnard 9 CaL 616.

14

general kind of business, or of a number of kinds of business.
A special or particular partnership is one created for a single
transaction or adventure.
It has been thought that an universal partnership could
exist only in theory, but several cases have occurred in this
country of partnerships which were practically universal.
In any event, however, the evidence must be clear to establish such an unusual relation.1

§ 16. Classification of partners.-In limited partnerships
the partners are either (1) general, or (2) special, the former
standing in the attitude of an ordinary partner, and the
latter occupying a. peculiar position, prescribed by statute,
with a liability limited to his contribution~
In ordinary partnerships, partners may be classified as
(1) active and ostensible; (2) 8ecret or dorman·t, and (3) nom-

inal.

.

An ostensible partner, sometimes called a public partner,
is one who is held out and known as a partner. An active
partner is one who actually participates in the conduct of
the business. He is usually an ostensible one, but is not necessarily so. A partner may be unknown or concealed and
yet active in the management of the business; or he may be
both concealed and passive as to the conduct of the business. In the former case he is sa~d to be a aearet partner,
and in the latter case he is called a silent or dormant partner. A nominal partner is a person apparently a partner
but not really so. A person who leaves an existing firm is
often called a retiring partner, while one who enters such a
firm is called an incoming partner.
1 See United States Bank v. Binney (1828), 5 Mason (U.S. C. C.), 183;
Lyman v. Lyman (1829), 2 Paine
(U. S. C. C.), 11; Rice v. Barnard

(1848), 20 Vt. 479, 50 Am. pee. 54:
Goesele v. Bimeler (1852), 14 How.
(U.S.) 589; Gray v. Palmer (1858),

9 Cal 616.

14
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CHAPTER IL

FOB WHAT PURPOSES A PARTNERSHIP MAY BE CREATED.

19. Purposes illegal in part

20. Effect of illegality.

17. May be created for carrying

on any lawful business.

18. But not for purposes unlaw-

ful or opposed to public

CHAPTER IL

policy.

17. For any lawful business. It is the general rule,

analogous to that of agency, that a partnership may be created

for the purpose of carrying on any lawful business, and that

whatever the individual partners might lawfully do if acting

separately and in their own behalf, they may lawfully do in

partnership. Thus, there may be a partnership for carrying

on not only every lawful kind of trade or commerce, but also

for farming, mining, lumbering, manufacturing, and the like.

FOR WHAT PURPOSES A PARTNERSHIP MAY BE CREATED.

§ 1'7. May be created for carrying § 19. Purposes illegal in part..
on any lawful business.
20. Effect of illegality.
18. But not ~or purposes unla wful or opposed to public
policy.

Professional occupations like that of the lawyer, physician, ^tX****

dentist and architect may also be carried on in partnership, . v*c

and there may be a partnership for buying and selling land. 1 .
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18. Not for purposes unlawful or opposed to public

policy. But, as in the case of agency, there are many pur-

poses for which the relation cannot lawfully be created.

Thus, a trjistj)ersonal to one individual cannot be executed

by a partnership; public oflBces^jsannot be held in partner- \

ship; and^partnership cannot be lawfully created for the

doing of anything which is illegal, immoral or opposed to

public policy. Partnerships, therefore, for the purpose of

carrying on a gambling establishment; to speculate in "fut-

ures ; " to stifle or prevent competition ; to carry on a for-

bidden occupation ; to hinder or delay creditors ; to carry

on trade with belligerents in time of war; to carry on trade

in violation of the navigation laws; and the like, are void.*

1 Chester v. Dickerson (1873), 54 v^Babcock (1892), 95 CfoL 470, 30

§ 17. ·For any lawful business.- It is the general rule,
analogous to that of agency, that a partnership may be created
for the purpose of carrying on any lawful business, and that
whatever the individual partners might lawfully do if acting
separately and in their own behalf, they may lawfully do in
partnership. Thus, there may be a partnership for carrying
on not only eyery lawful kind of trade or commerce, but also
for farming, mining, lumbering, manufacturing, and· the like.
Professional occupations like that of the lawyer, physician,
. dentist and architect may also be carried on in partnership,
and there may be a partnership for buying and selling land.1

N. Y. 1, 13 Am. Rep. 550; Flower v. Pac. Rep. 605, 29 Am. St Rep. 133.

Barnekoff (1890), 20 Oreg. 137. ?5 161* R. A. 745.

Pac. Rep. 370, 11 L. R. A. 149: Bajs '*See (xaston T. Drake (1879), 14

15

§ 18. Not for purposes unlawful or opposed to public
policy.- But, as in the case of agency, there are many purposes for which the relation cannot lawfully be created.
Thus, a t~ personal to one il!dividual cannot be executed "-'
by a J?!rtn~rship; public offices_cannot be held in partnership; and a partnership cannot be lawfully created for the
doing of anything which is illegal, immoral or opposed to
public policy. Partnerships, therefore, for the purpose of
carrying on a gambling establishment; to speculate in "futures; " to stifle or prevent competition; to carry on a forbidden occupation; to hinder or delay creditors; to carry
on trade with belligerents in time of war; to carry on trade
in violation of the navigation laws; and the like, are void.2
I Chester v. Dickerson (1873), 54 v~abcock (18921 95 Cal. 479, 30
N. Y.1, 13 Am. Rep. 550; Flower v. Pac. Rep. 605, 29 Am. St. Rep. 183,
Barnekoff (1890), 20 Oreg. 137. 25 16 LR. .A. 745.
Pae. Rep. 370, 11 LR. A.149: Ba.Les
i S8e Gaston v. Drake (1879), 14

15

19, 20.] LAW OF PABTNEKSHIP.

19. Purposes illegal in part. A partnership may be

§§ 19, 20.]

LA.W OF P ABTNERSHIP.

organized for a lawful purpose, and yet one or more of its

undertakings may be illegal, or it may seek to accomplish

lawful ends by unlawful means. Li such cases the unlaw-

ful part only, if it can be separated from the residue, will

be affected by the illegality ; if it cannot be separated, the

whole must be regarded as unlawful 1

20. Effect of illegality. Courts will not enforce con-

tracts having for their purpose or tending to promote illegal

objects. The members of an illegal partnership cannot sue

to enforce any contract tainted by the illegality, but actions

may be brought against the members of such a partnership

§ 19. Purposes illegal in part.-A partnership may beorganized for a lawful purpose, and yet one or more of its
undertakings may be illegal, or it may seek to accomplish
lawful ends by unlawful means. I n such cases the unlawful part onl ·' if it can be separated from · the residue, will
be affected by the illegality; if it cannot be separated, the
whole must be regarded as unlawful.1

by a person who did not participate in the illegality. As

f ( between themselves, the law usually leaves the members of

<J an illegal partnership where it finds them, refusing to aid

either party. Courts will not, therefore, enforce contribu-

tion or compel an accounting of their illegal affairs ; 2 though

if they have themselves wound up the affairs and agreed

upon the account, it is held in some cases that the courts
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will then compel the partner having the funds in his pos-

session to pay over to his partner the latter's agreed share,

even, though such funds were acquired in unlawful dealings. 3

The weight of authority, however, denies relief in these

cases as well as in the others. 4

Nev. 175, 33 Am. Rep. 548; Davis 706, Paige's Partn. Gas. 96; Read v.

v. Gelhaus (1886), 44 Ohio St. 69; Smith (1883), 60 Tex. 379, Paige's

Hunter v. Pfeiffer (1886), 108 Ind. Partn. Gas. 91.

197; Watson v. Fletcher (1850), 7 8 Brooks v. Martin (1864), 2 WaR

Gratt. (Va.) 1; Watson v. Murray (U. S.) 70; Crescent Ins. Co. v.

(1872), 23 N. J. Eq. 257; King v. Bear (1887), 23 Fla. 50, 11 Am. St.

Winants (1874), 71 N. C. 46& Rep, 33L

iSee Dunham v. Presby (1876), Sykes v. Beadon (1879), 11 Ch.

120 Mass. 285; Anderson v. Powell Div. 170; Snell v. Dwight (1876),

(1876), 44 Iowa, 20. 120 Mass. 9; Jackson v. McLean

'Hunter v. Pfeiffer (1886), 108 (1889), 100 Mo. 130, 13 S. W. Rep.

Ind. 197; Gould v. Kendall (1884), 393; Wood worthy. Bennett, supra,

15 Neb. 549; Wood worth v. Ben- Hunter v. Pfeiffer, supra; Craft v,

nett (1870), 43 N. Y. 273, 3 Am. Rep. McConoughy (1875), 79 I1L 346.

16

§ ~O. Effect of illegality.- Conrts will not enforce contracts having for their purpose or tending to promote illegal
objects. The members of an illegal partnership cannot sue
to enforce any contract tainted by the illegality, but actions
may be brought against the members· of such a partnership
by a person who did not participate in the illegality. As
between themselves, the law usually leaves the members of
an illegal partnership where it finds them, refusing to aid
either party. Courts will not, therefore, enforce contribution or compel an accounting of their illegal affairs; 2 though
if they have themselves wound up the affairs and agreed
upon the account, it is held in some cases that the courts
will then compel the partner having the funds in his possession to pay over to his partner the latter's agreed share,
even. though such funds were acquired in unlawful dealings.1
The weight of authority, however, denies relief in these
cases as well as in the others.'
Nev. 175, 33 Am. Rep. 548; Davis
v. Gelhaus (1886), 44 Ohio St. 69;
Hunter v. Pfeiffer (1886), 108 Ind.
197; Watson v. Fletcher (1~50), 7
Gratt. (Va.) 1; Watson v. Murray
(1872), 23 N. J. Eq. 257; King v.
Winants (1874), 71 N. C. 469.
1 See Dunham v. Presby (1876),
120 Mass. 285; Anderson v. Powell
(1876), 44 Iowa, 20.
s Hunter v. Pfeiffer (1886), 108
Ind. 197; Gould v. Kendall (1884),
15 Neb. 549; Woodworth v. Bennett (1870), 48 N. Y. 273, S Am. Rep.

706, Paige's Partn. Cas. 96; Read T.
Smith (1883), 60 Tex. 379, Paige's
Partn. Cas. 91.
I Brooks v. Martin (1864), 2 Wall
(U. S.) 70; Crescent Ins. Co. v.
Bear (1887), 23 Fla. 50, 11 Am. St..
Rep. 331.
'Sykes v. Beadon (1879), 11 Ch.
Div. 170; Snell v. Dwight (1876), ·
120 Mass. 9; Jackson v. McLean
(1889), 100 Mo. 130, 13 S. W. Rep.
393; Woodworth v. Bennett, BUpra;
Hunter v. Pfeiffer, supra; Craft T ,.
McConoughy (1875), 79 Ill 346.
16
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V

CHAPTEK HL

WHO MAY BE PARTNERS.

21. In general, any person com-

petent to contract.

22. Aliens as partners.

23. Infants as partners.

24. Insane persons as partners.

25. Married women as partners.

26. Corporations as partners.

CHAPTER ill.

27. Firms as partners.

28. How many partners there

WHO MAY BE PARTNERS.

may be.

29. Of the delectus personarum.

80. Of sub-partnerships.

21. In general, any person competent to contract.

As a general rule, any person may be a partner who is capa-

ble of entering into contracts. If he has the legal ability in

his own right and in his individual capacity to transact the

business contemplated, he may unite with another person to

carry on that business in partnership.

§ ,21. In ·general, any person com- § 26. Corporations as partners.
27. Firms as partners.
petent to contract.
22. Aliens as partners.
28. How many partners there
23. Infants as partners.
maybe.
29. Of the delectus personarum.
24. Insane persons as partners.
25. Married women as partners.
30. Of sub-partnerships.
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This being the general rule, it is unnecessary to pursue it

further in respect of normal persons, but in regard to those

who labor under some general disability, more particular

mention is desirable. Thus

22. Aliens as partners. Aliens who are subjects of na-

tions which are at peace with each other may enter into

partnership, but not alien enemies. Upon the breaking out

of war between their respective countries, however, their

capacity is terminated, and their partnership, as will be seen,

is suspended if not dissolved. 1

23. Infants as partners. An infant may be a partner, 8

but his contract of partnership is voidable, and he may

interpose his infancy as a defense against personal liability

as a partner. During the continuance of the relation, how-

1 See post, 250. v. Fair (1879), 42 Mich. 134. He

§ 21. In general, any person competent to contract.As a general rule, any person may be a partner who is capable of entering into contracts. If he has the legal ability in
his own right and in his individual capacity to transact-the
business contemplated, he may unite with another person to
carry on that business in partnership.
This being the general rule, it is unnecessary to pursue it
further in respect of normal persons, but in regard to those
who labor under some general disability, more particular
mention is desirable. Thus -

2 Bush v. Linthicum (1882), 59 Md, may be the general partner in a

344; Adams v. Beall (1887), 67 Md. limited partnership. Continental

63, 1 Am. St. Rep. 379; Dunton v. National Bank v. Strauss (1893), 137

Brown (1875), 31 Mich, 182; Osburn N. Y. 148, 553, 32 N. E. Rep. 1066.

2 17

§ 22. Alieus as partners. -Aliens who are subjects of nations which are at peace with each other may enter into
partnership, but not alien enemies. Upon the breaking out
of war between their respective countries, however, their
capacity is terminated, and their partnership, as will be seen,
is suspended if not dissol ved.1
§ 23. Infants as partners. - An infant may be a partner,1
but his contract of partnership is voidable, and he may
interpose his infancy as a defense against personal liability
as a partner. During the continuance of the relation, how1 See

post, § 250.

v. Farr (1879), 42. Mich. 134.. He
Linthicum (1882), 59 Md. may be the general partner in a
344; Adams v. Beall (1887), 67 Md. limited partnership. Continental
53, 1 Am. St. Rep. 379; Dunton v. National Bank v. Strauss (189..,?), 137
Brown (1875), 31Mich.182; Osb-llrn N~ Y. 148, 553, 32 N. E. Rep. 1066.
2
17
2 Bush v.

23.] LAW OF PABTNERSHIP.

ever, he has all of the rights and powers of a partner. Thus,

§ 23.]

LAW 011' PARTNERSHIP.

ne has equal right, with his copartner, to the possession of

the assets of the firm; he may collect and pay debts; and

may make contracts in the firm name, which, though he

may repudiate liability, will be binding upon his adult co-

partners and upon the partnership assets. 1 He is entitled to

an accounting and to his share of the profits like other pa'rt-

ners after the payment of the debts.

He may disaffirm his contract of partnership and avoid per-

sonal liability as a partner either to his copartner * or third

persons;' but, notwithstanding such disaffirmance, it is held

that his interest in the partnership property remains liable

to the partnership debts, 4 and if he has paid money for the

privilege of being admitted into the business, he cannot, it

is held, after continuing in the business for a period, volun-

tarily withdraw and recover back what he has paid, unless

it was procured from him by fraud. 6 The adult partner

cannot repudiate" firm contraTrt^lhade by the infant on the

ground of the latter's incapacity, but if he has been induced

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:17 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

1 See Bush v. Linthicum, supra, 529. 10 So. Rep. 62; Bixler v. Kresge

and other cases cited in this sec- (1895), 169 Pa. St 405. 32 AtL Rep. 414,

tion. 47 Am. St. Rep. 920. Although there

2 Thus his infancy is a good de- seems to be some difference of opin-

fense to his copartner's action for ion, the weight of authority is to

contribution. Neal v. Berry (1893), the effect that the infant may dis-

86 Me. 193, 29 A tl. Rep. 987. Whether affirm personal contracts and con-

the infant may disaffirm a partner- tracts respecting personal property

ship obligation to a third person before as well as after he arrives at

without also repudiating the part- maturity. See Adams v. Beall;

nership relation itself seems to be Folds v. Allardt; Dunton v. Brown,

ever, he has all of the rights and powers of a partner. Thus,
.ne has equal right, with his copartner, to the possession of
the assets of the firm; he may collect arid pay debts; and
may make contracts in the firm name, which, though he
may repudiate liability, will be binding upon his adult copartners and upon the partnership assets.1 He is entitled to
an accounting and to his share of the profits lik" other partners after the payment of the debts.
He may disaffirm his contract' of partnership and avoid personM liability as a partner either to his copartner 1 or third
persons; 3 but, notwithstanding such disaffirmance, it is held
that his interest in the partnership property remains liable
to the partnership debts,' and if he has paid money for the
privilege of being admitted into the business, he cannot, it
is held, after continuing in the business for a period, voluntarily withdraw and recover back what he has paid, unless
it
s" procured from him by fraud. 5 The adult partner
cannot repu ia e rm con r
made by the infant on the
ground of the .latter's incapacity, but if he has been induced

·-

disputed, It is held that he may do supra, and Shirk v. Shultz, post.

so, in Mehlhop v. Rae (1894), 90 Lovell v. Beauchamp, 1894, Ap.

Iowa, 30, 57 N. W. Rep. 650. Miller Cas. 607; Bush v. Linthicum, supra;

v. Sims (1834), 2 Sill (S. C.), 479, is Shirk v. Shultz (1887), 113 Ind. 571

contra. Yates v. Lyon (1874), 61 N. Y. 344;

1 Bush v. Linthicum, supra; Folds Pelletier v. Couture (1889), 148 Mass.

v. Allardt (1886), 35 Minn. 488, 26 269, 18 N. E. Rep. 400, 1 L. R. A. 863.

N. W. Rep. 201; Mehlhop v. Rae Adams v. Beall (1887), 67 Md. 53, .

(1894), 90 Iowa, 30, 57 N. W. Rep. 1 Am. St. Rep. 879. But see Spar-

650 ; Foot v. Goldman (1891), 68 Miss, man v. Keim (1880), 83 N. Y. 245.

18

1 See Bush v. Linthicum, supra,
and other cases cited in this seotion.
2 Thus his infancy is a good de!ense to his copartner's action for
contribution. Neal v. Berry (1893),
86 Me. 193, 29 A tl Rep. 987. Whether
the infant may disaffirm a. partnership obliga.tion to a third person
without also repudiating the partnership relation itself seems to be
disputed, It is held that he may do
so, in Mehlhop v. Rae (1894), 90
Iowa, 30, 57 N. W. Rep. 650. Miller
v. Sims (1834), 2 Itill (S. C.), 47'9, is

529, 10 So. Rep. 62; Bixler v. Kresge
(1895), 169 Pa. St. 405, 32 Atl Rep. 414,
47 Am. St. Rep. 920. Although there
seems to be some difference of opinion, the weight ot authority is to
the effect that the infant may di&
affirm personal contracts and contracts respecting personal property
before as well as after he arrives at
maturity. See Adams v. Beall;
Folds v. Allardt; Dunton v. Brown,
supra, and Sliirk v. Shultz, poat.
'Lovell v. Beauchamp, 1894, AP. .
Cas. 607; Bush v. Linthicum, supra;
Shirk v. Shultz (1887), 113 Ind. 571 1
contra.
Yates v. Lyon (1874), 61 N. Y. 344;
a Bush v. Linthicum, supra; Folds Pelletier v. Couture (1889), 148 Mass.
v. Allardt (1886), 35 Minn. 488, 26 269, 1~ N. E. Rep. 400, 1L.R. ·A.863.
N'. W. Rep. 201; Mehlhop v. Rae
& Adams v. Beall (1887), 67 Md. 53, .
(1894), 90 Iowa, 30, 57 N. W. Rep. 1 Am. St. Rep. 879. But see Spar·
650; Footv. Goldman (1891), 68 Miss. man v. Keim (1880), 83 N. Y. 245.
18
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WHO MAT BE PARTNERS. [ 24, 25.

to enter into the partnership by the infant's fraudulent rep-

WHO MAY BE P ARTNERB.

[§§ 24, 25.

resentation that he is of age, he may dissolve the partnership ,.

for that reason. <X~x f\ Q~*

After he becomes of age, the infant partner may ratify the

partnership transactions and thus become liable for obliga-

tions incurred during his minority. His ratification need

not be express unless a statute so requires, but may be in-

ferred from his acts and conduct, as from his dealing with

the subject-matter of the contract after attaining majority.

Whether his continuing to act as a partner after becoming

of age is of itself enough to constitute a ratification has

been doubted. 1 In actions by and against the partnership,

the infant partner should usually be made a party, though

the English and many of the American courts have held it

improper to make an infant partner a defendant in an ac-

tion against the firm.*

24:. Insane persons as partners. The partnership con-

tract of an insane person, like his other contracts, is void-

able ; but if the other party was ignorant of the insanity, and
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the contract has been executed and appears to be fair, the

contract of an insane person cannot be set aside unless the

parties can be restored to their original condition. 1

25. Married women as partners. At common law, a

married woman was incapable of making contracts, except

where she had a separate estate or except where her husband

was a convicted felon, or was an alien enemy and abroad, or

to enter into the partnership by the infant's fraudulent representation that he is of age, he ma dissolve th~ artnership
for that reason. ~
After he becomes of age, the infant paPtner may ratify the
partnership transactions and thus become liable for obligations incurred during his minority. His ratification need
not be express unless a statute so requires, but may be inf erred from his acts and conduct, as from his dealing with
the subject-matter of the contract after attaining majority.
Whether his continuing to act as a partner after becoming
of age is of itself enough to constitute a ratification has
been doubted. 1 In actions . by and against the partnership,
the infant partner should usually be made a party, though
the English and many of the American courts have held it
improper to make an infant partner a defendant in an action against the :firm.2

when husband and wife were judicially separated. Her ca-

pacity to enter into partnership was subject to the same

limitations. In most of the states her incapacity to make

1 Upon the question of ratifica- notes; Osburn v. Farr (1879), 42

tion, see Salinas v. Bennett (1890), Mich. 134.

33 & C. 285, 11 S. E. Rep. 968; Dana See Behrens v. McKenzie (1867),

v. Stearns (1849), 3 Cush. (Mass.) 23 Iowa, 333, 92 Am. Dec. 428; Fay

372. v. Burditt (1882), 81 Ind. 433, 42

2 See 1 Chitty on Pleading, pp. Am. Rep. 142. As to the effect of

14 and 50, and notes; 1 Lindley on subsequently occurring insanity

Partn. (2d Am. ecL, Ewell), 74 and upon the partnership, see post,

246.

19

§ 24:. Insane persons as partners.-The partnership contract of an insane person, like his other contracts, is voidable; but if the other party was ignorant of the insanity, and
the contract has been executed and appears to be fair, the
contract of an insane person cannot be set aside unless the
parties can be restored to their original condition.1
~

§ 25. Married women as partners.- At common law, a ·

married woman was incapable of making contracts, except
where she had a separate estate or except where her husband
was convi~ted felon, or was an alien enemy and abroad, or
when husband and wife were judicially separated. Her ·capacity to enter into partnership was subject to the same
limitations. In most of the states her incapacity to make

a

1 Upon the question of ratification, see Salinas v. Bennett (1890),
83 S. C. 285, 11 S. E. Rep. 968; Dana.
v. . Stearns (1849), 3 Cush. (Mass.)
372.
s See 1 Chitty on Pleading, pp.
14 and 50, and notes; 1 Lindley on
Partn. (2d Am. ed., Ewell), 74 and

notes; Osburn v. Farr (1879), 42
Mich. 134.
a See Behrens v. McKenzie (1867),
23 Iowa, 333, 92 Am. Dec. 428; Fay
v. Burditt (1882), 81 Ind. 433, 42
Am. Rep. 142. As to t he effect of
subsequent.ly occurring insanity
upon the partnership, see post,
§ 246.
19

26.]

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

§ 26.]

LAW Oi' P .ABTNERSHIP.

contracts has been more or less removed by statute, and she

may enter into partnership with persons other than her hus-

band under substantially the same conditions which now ap-

ply to any other of her contracts. 1 She could not, at common

law, be a partner with her husband, and, even under the mod-

ern statutes, the same disability still continues in most states. 2

26. Corporations as partners. A corporation has, as

such, no implied power to enter into partnership either with

an individual, a firm, or another corporation.* Authority

for this purpose must be expressly conferred. 4 But, within

contracts has been more or less removed by statute, and she
may enter into partnership with persons other than her husband under substantially the same conditions which now apply to any other of her contracts.1 She could not, at common
law, be a partner with her husband, and, even under the modern statutes, the same disability still continues in most states.~

its corporate power, a corporation and an individual may so

contract as to incur a joint liability without actually enter-

ing into partnership. 5

dale (1892), 46 III Ap. 454; Lane v.

Bishop (1893), 65 Vt 575, 27 AtL

Rep. 499. In Tennessee, see Theus

v. Bugger (1893), 93 Tenn. 41, 23

S. W. Rep. 135. In Maine, see
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Bird Co. v. Hurley (1895), 87 Me.

579, 33 AtL Rep. 164

'Whittenton Mills v. Upton

§ 26. Corporations as partners.- A corporation has, as
such, no implied power to enter into partnership either with
an individual, a firm, or another corporation.' Authority
for this purpose must be expressly conferred.' But, within
its corporate power, a corporation and an individual may so.
contract as to incur a joint liability without actually entering into partnership.6

(1858), 10 Gray (Mass.), 582, 71 Am.

Bee. 681; People v. Sugar Refining

Co. (1890), 121 N. Y. 582, 18 Am. St^

Rep. 843, 9 L. R. A. 33; Gunn v.'

Railroad Co. (1885), 74 Ga. 509;

Hackett v. Multnomah Ry. (1885),

12 Oreg. 124, 6 Pac. Rep. 659, 53

Am. Rep. 327; Mallory v. Oil

Works (1888), 86 Tenn. 598, 8 & W.

Rep. 396; Morris Run Coal Co. v.

Barclay Coal Co. (1871), 68 Pa. St.

173, 8 Am. Rep. 159.

4 Butler Y. , American Toy Co.

(1878), 46 Conn. 136.

6 In Cleveland Paper Co. v. Cour-

ier Co. (1887), 67 Mich. 152, 84

N. W. Rep. 556, the court say : " A

corporation may. in furtherance of

the object of its creation, contract

with an individual, tliough the ef-

fect of the contract may be to im-

v. Winterstein (1892), 94

Mich. 230, 53 N. W. Rep. 932, 18

L. R. A. 515. Contra, in South

Carolina, Vannerson v. Cheatham

(1894), 44 S. C. , 19 S. E. Rep. 614

'That she cannot be a partner

with her husband, see Artman v.

Ferguson (1888), 73 Mich. 146, 16

Am. St. Rep. 572, 2 L. R. A. 343; Gil-

kerson-Sloss Com. Co. v. Salinger

(1892), 56 Ark. 294, 16 L. R. A. 526, 35

Am. St. Rep. 105; Seattle Board of

Trade v. Hayden (1892), 4 Wash.

263, 16 L. R. A. 530, 31 Am. St. Rep.

919; Fuller v. McHenry (1892), 83

Wis. 573, 18 L. R. A. 512; Bowker

v. Bradford (1885), 140 Mass. 521;

Payne v. Thompson (1886), 44 Ohio

St. 192; Scarlett v. Snodgrass (1883),

92 Ind\262; Carey v. Burrnss (1882),

20 W.Va. 571, 43 Am. Rep. 790.

That she may be a partner with

her husband, see Suan v. Caffe

(1890), 122 N. Y. 308, 25 N. E. Rep.

488, 9 L. R. A. 593; Louisville R.

Co. v. Alexander (1894), Ky. ,

1 Vail v. W interstein (1892), 94 dale (1892), 46 Ill Ap. 454; Lane v..
Mich. 230, 53 N. W. Rep. 932, 18 Bishop (1893), 65 Vt. 575, 27 Atl
L. R. A. 515. Contra, in South Rep. 499. In Tennessee, see Theus
Carolina, Vannerson v. Cheatham v. Dugger (1893), 93 Tenn. 41, 28
(1894), 44 S. C. - , 19 S. E. Rep. 614. S. W. Rep. 135. In Maine, see2 That she cannot be a partner Bird Co. v. Hurley (1895), 87 Me.
with her husband, see Artman v. 579, 33 AtL Rep. 164.
Ferguson (1888), 78 Mich. 146, 16
a Whittenton Mills v. Upton
Am. St. Rep. 572, 2 L. R. A. 848; Gil- (1858), 10 Gray (Mass.), 582, 71 Am.
kerson-Sloss Com. Co. v. Salinger Dec. 681; People v. Sugar Refining(1892), 56 Ark. 294, 16 L. R. A. 526, 35 Co. (1890), 121 N. Y. 582, 18 Am. St.
Am. St. Rep. 105; Seattle Board of Rep. 843, 9 L. R. A. 33; Gunn
Trade v. Hayden (1892), 4 Wash. Railroad Co. (1885), 74 Ga. 509;
263, 16 L. R. A. 530, 81 Am. St. Rep. Hackett v. Multnomah Ry. (1885),.
919; Fuller v. McHenry (1892), 83 12 Oreg. 124, 6 Pac. Rep. 659, 53
Wis. 573, 18 L. R. A. 512; Bowker Am. Rep. 327; Mallory v. Oil
v. Bradford (1885), 140 Mass. 521; Works (1888), 86 Tenn. 598, 8 S. W.
Payne v. Thompson (1886), 44 Ohio Rep. 396; Morris Run Coal Co. v.
St. 192; Scarlett v. Snodgrass (1883), Barclay Coal Co. (1871), 68 Pa. St.
92 Ind.,262; Carey v. Burmss (1882), 178, 8 Am. Rep. 159.
20 W. Va. 571, 43 Am. Rep. 790.
'Butler v. , American Toy Co.
That, she may be a partner with (1878), 46 Conn. 136.
her husband, see Suan v. Caffe
6 In Cleveland Paper Co. v. Colli'
(1890), 122 N. Y. 808, 25 N. E. Rep. ier Co. (1887), 67 Mich. 152, 84
488, 9 L. R. A. 593; Louisville R. N. W. Rep. 556, the court say: "A
Co. v. Alexander (1894), - Ky. - , corpora tion may, in furtherance of
27 S. W. Rep. 981; Belser v. Tus- the object of its creation, contract
cumbia Banking Co. (1895), - Ala. with an individual, t hough the ef·
- , 17 So. Rep. 40; Dressel v. Lons- feet of the contract may be to im20

v:
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WHO MAY BE PAKTNEK8. [ 27-29.

WHO MAY BE PARTNERS.

27. Firms as partners. Two or more firms may enter

[§§ 27-29.

into partnership, and a firm may also enter into partnership

with an individual. As respects third persons, the associat- *^X

§ 27. Firms as partners.-Two or more firms may enter

ing firms ordinarily lose their separate identity, and each

member of each firm is liable as a partner in the joint firm;

but as between themselves, for the purposes of accounting

and the division of profits or losses, the respective firms may

l>e regarded as the partners. 1

28. How many partners there may be. In the ab-

sence of a statute fixing the limit, the partnership may be

composed of any number of partners, though there must,

of course, be more than one. 3

29. Of the delectus personarum. Partnership being

founded on the agreement of the parties, and being a rela-

into partnership, and a firm m~y also enter into partnership
with an individual. As respects third persons, the associating firms ordinarily lose their separate identity, and each
member of each firm is liable as a partner in the joint firm;
but as between themselves, for the purposes of accounting
and the division of profits or losses, the respective firms may
be regarded as the partners.1

tion demanding mutual confidence and trust, it is clear that

§ 28. How many partners there may be.-In the ab-

a person cannot become a member of a firm without the

consent of the other members. Hence, one partner cannot

introduce a third person into the firm without the consent

of the others,* nor upon the death of one partner can his

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:17 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

personal representative become a partner with the surviv-

ors, except with their consent. 4 A sale of one partner's in-

sence of a statute fixing the limit, the partnership may be
composed of" any number of partners, though there must, ·
of course, be more than one.2

terest does not, therefore, make his transferee a partner, but

dissolves the firm. 5

Consent to the admission of new partners or, in case of

death, of the personal representative, may be given in ad-

vance, as by being stipulated for in the partnership articles.

To the rule requiring this choice of persons (delectus per-

sonarum) there are two exceptions one

pose upon the company the liability 652 ; Raymond v. Putnam (1862), 44

of a partner." N. H. 160.

Un re Hamilton (1880), 1 Fed. Stirling v. Heintzman (1880),

Rep. 800; Simonton v. McLain 42 Mich. 449.

(1885), 37 La, Ann. 663; Bullock v. Love v. Payne (1880), 73 Ind. 80,

Hubbard (18631. 23 CaL 495. 8, 3 Am. 88 Am. Rep. 111.

Dec. 130; Meyer v, Krohn (1885), See post, % 245.

lf9-mT574, 2 N. E. Rep. 495; Mea- * See post, 2i3.

dor v. Hughes (1879), 14 Bush (Ky.),

§ 29. Of the delectus personarnm.-Partnership being
founded on the a$reement of the parties, and being a relation demanding mutual confidence and trust, it is clear that
a person cannot become a member of a firm without the
consent of the other members. Hence, one partner cannot ·
intro<l.uce a third person into the firm without the consent
of the others,1 nor upon the death of one partner can his
personal representative become a partner with the survivors; except with their consent.' A sale of one partner's interest does not, therefore, make his transferee a partner, but
dissolves the firm. 6
Consent to the admission of new ·partners or, in case of
death, of the personal representative, may be given in advance, as by being stipulated for in the partnership articles.
To the rule requiring this choice of persons (flelectua personarum) there are two exceptions - one JW'~ally sta&uto;y,

M

pose upontbe company the liability 652; Raymond v. Putnam (1862), 44
N. H. 160.
1 In re Hamilton (1880), 1 Fed.
2 Stirling v. Heintzman (1880),
Rep. 800; Simonton v. McLain 42 Milch. 449.
(1885), 37 ,La. Ann. 663; Bullock v.
1Love v. Payne (1880), 7S Ind.80,
IJ_ubbard (1863), 23 Cat 495. §3 Am. S8 Am. Rep. 111.
Dec. 130; Meyer• v. Krohn (1885),
'See post, § 245.
1 ~it 574, 2 N. E. Rep. 495; Mea6 See post, § 243.
dor v. Hughes (1879), 14 Bush (Ky.),
ll .

of a partner."

30.] LAW OF PABTNKESHIP.

md the other customary, viz., joint-stock companies and

§ 30.J

LAW OF PARTNERS.HIP.

lining^partnerships. In these a transfer of one partner's

share or hisHeath does not operate as a dissolution, but his

transferee or representative may be received as a partner. 1

30. Of sub-partnerships. One or more of the partners

of a firm, less than the whole number, may unite with a third

person to form a partnership as to the interest of such part-

ner or partners. Such a partnership is frequently called a

nd the other customary, viz., joint,stock companies and
mmmg artnerships. In these a transfer of one partner's
share or his death does not operate as a dissolution, but his
transferee or representative may be received as a partner. 1

sub-partnership, and the third person so associating with the

partner is often called a sub-partner. " A sub-partnership,"

§ 30. Of sub-partnerships.- One or more of the_partners

says Mr. Justice Lindley, 2 "is, as it were, a partnership within

a partnership; it presupposes the existence of a partnership

to which it is itself subordinate." It has all of the character-

istics of a partnership as between the immediate parties to

it, but the third person does not thereby become a partner

in the original firm,* he is not liable as such to creditors of

the original firm, 4 and he has no right of accounting as a

partner against the original firm, but only against such mem-

bers of it as united with him to form the sub-partnership.'
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i Kahn v. Smelting Co, 102 U. S. the assets as to give him the right

641; Skillman v. Lachman (1863), to an accounting upon dissolution.

23 CaL 198, 83 Am. Dec. 96, and Nirdlinger v. Bernheimer (1892),

note; Harris v. Lloyd (1891), 11 133 N. Y. 45, 30 N. E. Rep. 561. "A

Mont. 390, 28 Am. St. Rep. 475. sub-partnership does not in fact

* Lindley on Partnership (Ewell's exist where- one party furnishes

2d Am. ed), voL L p. 48. all the capital, receives all the

'Setzerv. Beale (1882), 19 W. Va. profits, and owns all the assets.

274; Meyer v. Krohn (1885), 114 111. Such an arrangement lacks all the

574, 2 N. E. Rep. 495. See Miller v. essential elements of a partnership.

Rapp (1893), 135 Ind. 614, 35 N. E. The ostensible partner, in such

Rep. 963. case, -may be held liable to third

of a firm, less than the whole number, may unite with a third
person to form a partnership~ to the interest of such partner or partners. Such a partnership is frequently called a
sub-partnership, and the third person so associating with the
partner is often called a sub-partner. "A sub-partnership,"
says Mr.Justice Lindley,2 "is, as it were, a partnership within
a partnership; it presupposes the existence of a partnership
to which it is itself subordinate." It has all of the characteristics of a partnership as between the immediate parties to
it, but the third person does not. thereby become a partner
in the original firm,1 he is not liable as such to creditors of
the original firm,' and he has no right of accounting as a
partner against the original firm, but only against such mem·
hers of it as united with him to form the ~uh-partnership.'

* Burnett v. Snyder (1880), 81 N. parties on the ground that he has

Y. 550, 37 Am. Rep. 527; Riedeburg held himself out as a partner, and

v. Schmitt (1888), 71 Wis. 644, 34 they have treated him as such;

N. W. Rep. 336; Setzer v. Beale but he has no interest which will

(1882), 19 W. Va. 274. Contra, Fitch entitle him to an accounting, or to

v. Harrington (1859), 13 Gray any action at law or in equity

(Mass.), 468. 74 Am. Dec. 641. against the other party." Webb v.

* The sub-partner may, however, Johnson (1893), 95 Mich, 325, 54

acquire such a vested interest in N. W. Rep. 947.

22

1 Kahn v. Smelting Co., 102 U. S. the assets as to give him the right
641; Skillman v. Lachma.n (1863), to an acQounting upon dissolution.
23 Cal 198, 83 Am. Dec. 96, and Nirdlinger v. Bernheimer (1892),
note; Harris v. Lloyd (1891), 11 183 N. Y. 45, 30 N. E. Rep. 561. "A
Mont. 390, 28 Am. St. Rep. 475.
sub-partnership does not in fa.ct
I Lindley on Partnership (Ewell's exist where. one party furnishes
2d Am. ed.), vol I, p. 48.
aJl the capital, · receives all the
aSetzer v. Beale (1882), 19 W. Va. profits, . and owns aU the asset&
274; Meyer v. Krohn (1885), 114 Ill Such an arrangement lacks all the
574:, 2 N. E. Rep. 495. See Miller v. essential elements of a partnership.
Rapp (1893), 135 Ind. 614, 35 N. E. The ostensible partner, in such
Rep. 963.
case,. may be held liable to third
•Burnett v. Snyder (1880), 81 N. parties on the ground that he has
Y. 550, 37 Am. Rep. 527; Riede burg held himself out as a partner, and
v. Schmitt (1888), 71 Wis. 644, 34 they have treated him as such;
N. W. Rep. · 336; Setzer v. Beale but he has no interest which will
(1882), 19 W. Va. 274. Contra, Fitch entitle him to an accounting, or to
v. Hai;rington (1859), 13 Gray any action at law or in equity
(Mass.), 468, 74 Am. Dec. 641.
against the other party." Webb v.
6The sub-partner may, however, Johnson (1893), 95 Mich. 325, 54
acquire such a vested interest in N. W. Rep. 947.
'
22
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CHAPTER IV.

OB' THE CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP AND THE EVIDENCE

THEREOF.

31. No particular formalities re-

quired.

32. How contract affected by

the statute of f rauds.

83. The consideration for the

contract.

34. When the contract takes ef-

fect.

35. Question of partnership one

of mixed law and fact.

36. The means of proof.

37. The burden of proof.

X V 31. No particular formalities required. No particu-

lar formalities are required in entering into the contract of

partnership. By the common law, no official act or cere-

mony is necessary ; sealed instruments are not required, and,

except in those cases within the operation of the statute of
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frauds, a written contract, though desirable, is not essential.

Express agreement is not necessary, neither is it essential

that the parties shall have had a conscious intention to be-

f yy come partners. The relation may grow out of transactions

and dealings in which the word " partnership " was never

uttered ; if the acts or contracts of the parties in law create

partnership, that relation will ensue, even though the parties

did not have that result consciously in mind, or though it

was consciously in their intention to avoid partnership. 1

32. How affected by the statute of frauds. Under

the fourth section of the statute of frauds, an agreement to

form a partnership in the future, which by its terms is not

to be performed within one year, or an agreement for a

present partnership to continue for more than a year from

its commencement, is void if not in writing; though, in

either case, if the parties have acted upon the agreement

1 Jacobs v. Shorey (1868), 48 N. H. 100, 97 Am. Dec. 586.

* 23

33, 34:.] LAW OF PABTNEBSHIP.

§§ 33, 34.]

and become partners, their relation will be treated as a park

LAW OB' P ABTNE.BBBIP.

nership at will. 1

With respect of partnerships in lands, there is some con-

flict as to the application of the statute. A few cases hold

that such a partnership cannot be created without writing;

but the great weight of modern authority is to the effect

that writing is not required, and also that if a partnership

is shown to exist it may be proved by parol evidence that

its property consists of land. 2

33. Consideration for the contract. The contract of

partnership, like other agreements, requires to be founded

upon some consideration in order to be binding.* Any con-

tribution in the shape of capital or labor, or any act which

may result in liability to third persons, is sufficient for the

purpose. 4 The mutual covenants and contributions of the

•

and become partners, their relation will be treated as a part.
nership at will.1
With respect of partnerships in lands, there is some conflict as to the application of the statute. A few cases hold
that such a partnership cannot be ~reated without writing;
but the great weight of modern authority is to the effect
that writing is not required, and also that if a partnership
is shown to exist it may be proved by parol evidence that
its property consists of land.2 ,

parties are the usual consideration. Their contributions

need not, of course, be equal, for the members must be their

own judges of the adequacy of the consideration. Neither

is it necessary that the losses shall be shared equally or at
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all ; for, as will be seen, 5 one partner may lawfully indem-

nify the other against loss by the enterprise.

34. When the contract takes effect. As has been al-

ready seen, 6 a mere intention to form a partnership does not

create one; that intention must in some way be given legal

operation. It is not, of course, essential that formal instru-

ments shall be executed, and it may be found to have been

the intention of the parties to launch the partnership at

iWahlv.Barnum (1889), 116 N.Y. v. McCray (1875), 51 Ind. 358, 19

87, 22 N. E. Rep. 280, 5 L. R. A. Am. Rep. 735; Flower v. Barnekoff

623; Morris v. Peckham (1883), 51 (1890), 20 Ore. 132, 25 Pac. Rep. 370,

Conn. 128, Paige's Partn. Gas. 114 11 L. R. A. 149.

2 See Bates v. Babcock (1892), 95 See Mitchell v. O'Neale (1869), 4

Cal 479, 39 Am. St. KepTT5Qfi.L! Nev. 504, Paige's Partn. Cas. 6.

R^ A^745; (Jhester^v. Dickerson <1 Lindley on Partnership (2a

§ 33. Consideration for the contract.- The contract of
partnership, like other agreements, requires to be founded
upon some consideration in order to be binding.1 Any contribution in the shape of capital or labor, or any act which
may reslilt in liability to third persons, is sufficient for the
purpose.' The 'mutual covenants and contributions of the
parties are the usual consider~tion. Their contributions
need not, of course, be equal, for the members must be their
own judges of the adequacy of the consideration. Neither
is it necessary that the losses shall be shared equally or at
all; for, as will be seen,5 one partner may lawfully indemnify the other against loss by the enterprise.
1

(1S7ST 54 N. Y. 1, 13 Am. Rep. Am. ed., Ewell), 63.

550; Richards v. Grinnell (1884), 63 See post, 51.

Iowa, 44, 50 Am. Rep. 727; Holmes See ante, 13. 14

24

§ 34:. When the contract takes . effect.- As has been already seen,6 a mere intention to form a partnership does not
· create one; tha~ intention must in some way be given legal
operation. It is not, of course, essential that formal instruments shall be executed, and it may be found to have been
the intention of the parties to launch the partnership at
1 Wahl v. Barnum (1889), 116 N. Y.
87, 22 N. E. Rep. 280, 5 L. R. A.
623; Morris v. Peckham (1883), 51
Conn. 128, Paige's Partn. Cas. 114.·
2 See Bates v. Babcock (1892), 95

Cat 479, 29 Am. St. Rep. nJ3. 16.L.
R: A: '145; Chester v. Dickerson
(1-girnr, 54 N. Y. 1, 13 Am. Rep.
550; Richards v. Grinnell (1884), 63
Iowa, 44, 50 Am. Rep. 727; Holmes

v. McCray (1875), 51 Ind. 858, 19
Am. Rep. 735; Flower v. Barnekoff

(1890), 20 Ore. 132, 25 Pao. Rep. 870,
11 L. R. A. 149.
a See Mitchell v. OtNeale (1869), 4
Nev. 504, Paige's Partn. Ca& 6.
' 1 Lindley on Partnership (2a
Am. ed., Ewell), 68.
6 See post, § 51.
6 See ante, §§ 13: 14.
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CONTRACT OF PABTNEKSHIP EVIDENCE. [ 35.

CONTRA.OT OF P .ABTNEBSHIP -

once, notwithstanding the fact that regular partnership ar-

EVIDENOR.

[§ 35.

ticles are afterwards to be prepared. 1

"Well-drawn partnership articles will name the day upon

which the partnership is to begin ; but in the absence of

such a stipulation, or of any articles whatever, recourse

must be had to other evidence. Presumptively in such

cases the date of the commencement will be the day on

which the agreement is fully and definitely consummated ; J

but the express stipulation of the parties, or the circum-

stances attending the case, may show either that the part-

nership is to have a retroactive operation, or that it is not to

be deemed to be in force until some event has Happened or

some precedent condition has been complied with. 8 Con-

ditions of the latter sort, however, may be waived, and will

be held to be so where the partnership is actually launched

before the contemplated time arrives. 4 So, also, where the

arrangement contemplates action at once and continuously,

a present partnership may exist, though some incidents re-

main to be determined later. 5
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35. Question of the existence of a partnership one

of mixed law and fact. The question whether a partner-

ship exists in a given case is one of mixed law and fact.

What constitutes a partnership is a question of law ; whether

in the given case such facts exist as in law constitute a part-

nership is a question of fact if the facts are not admitted ;

if the facts are admitted, it is a question of law. 6 Whether

a written instrument produced creates a partnership is a ques-

tion of construction, for the court. 7

1 See ante, 14, Crawford (1895), 127 Mo. 356, 30 & W.

'See Guice v. Thornton (1884), Rep. 163.

once, notwithstanding the fact that regular partnership articles are afterwards to be prepared.1
Well-drawn partnership articles will name the day upon
which the partnership is to begin; but in the absence of
such a stipulation, or of any articles whatever, recourse
must be had to other evidence. Presumptively in such
cases the date of the commencement will be the day on
which the agreement is fully and definitely consummated; 2
but the express stipulation of the parties, or the circumstances attending the case, may show either that the partnership is to have a retroactive operation, or that it is not to
be deemed to be in force until some event has nappened or
some precedent condition has been complied with.1 Conditions of the latter sort, however, may be waived, and will
be held to be so where the partnership is actually launched
before the contemplated time arrives.' So, also, where the
arrangement contemplates action at once and continuously,
a present partnership may exist, though some incidents remain to be determined later.5

76 Ala. 466. 4 See First National Bank v. Cody

See Reed v. Meagher (1890), 14 (1893), 93 Ga. 127, 19 S. E. Rep. 831.

§ms. ;Question

of the existence of a partnership one

Colo. 335, 24 Pac. Rep. 681, 9 L. R. 'See Kerrick v. Stevens (1884),

A. 455; National Bank v. Cringan 55 Mich. 167, 20 N. W. Rep. 888.

(1895), Va. , 21 S. E. Rep. 820; Morgan v. Farrel (1889), 58 Conn.

Latta v. Kilbourn (1893), 150 U. S. 418, 18 Am. St. Rep. 282.

524, 37 L. Ed. 1169, 14 Sup. Ct Rep. 'Boston Smelting Co. v. Smit'i

801; Queen City Furniture Co. v. (1880), 13 R. L 27, 43 Am. Rep. 3

25

Qf mixed law and fact.-The question whether a partnership exists in a given case is one of mixed law and fact.
·What constitutes a partnership is a question of law; whether
in the given case such facts exist as in law constitute a partnership is a question of fact if the facts are not admitted;
if the facts are admitted, it is a question of law.6 Whether
a written instrument produced creates a partnership is a question of construction for the court. 7
1 See

ante,§ 14.

Guice v. Thornton (1884),
76 Ala. 466.
a See Reed v. Meagher (1890), 14
Colo. 335, 24 Pac. Rep. 681, 9 L. R.
A. 455; National Bank v. Cringan
(1895), - Va. - , 21 S. E. Rep. 820;
Latta v. Kilbourn (1893), 150 U. S.
524, 37 L.. E<l 1169, 14 .Sup. Ct. .Rep.
201; ·Queen City Furniture Co. v.
2 See

Crawford (1895), 127 Mo.356, 30 S. W,
Re,p. 163.
'See First National Ball.k v. Cody
(1893), 93 Ga. 127, 19 S. E. Rep. 831.
5 See Kerrick v. Stevens (1884),
55 Mich. 167, 20 N. yv. Rep. 888.
6 Morgan v. Farrel (1889), 58 Conn.
4:13, 18 Am. St. Rep. 282.
1 Boston Smelting Co. v. Smit'•
(1880), 13 & L 27, 43 Am. Rep. S

25

36.] LAW OF PABTNEESHIP.

36. Means of proof. As between the alleged partners

§ 36.]

LAW OB' PARTNERSHIP.

themselves, the existence of the partnership may be proved

by the partnership articles, if any ; if not, by informal writ-

ings, letters, the partnership books, the conduct and admis-

sions of the parties, or by any other matters tending to prove

the fact in controversy, and brought home to the party to

be charged. 1

As to third persons, the existence of the partnership and

the persons who compose it may be proved by conduct, ad-

missions or other kinds of parol evidence, even though there

were partnership articles. 2

The testimony of the parties themselves as to the facts is,

under modern rules, admissible either to prove or disprove

the alleged partnership. 1

It may also be proved by the conduct or admissions of the

parties sought to be charged ; 4 but the acts or admissions of

one person are not admissible to prove another to be a part-

ner, unless the latter is in some way shown to be responsible

for them or to have acquiesced in them. 5 The existence of
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the partnership or the persons composing it cannot be proved

by general reputation, rumor or hearsay. 6

1 See Greenleaf on Evidence, voL the party sought to be held caused

II,475 et seq.; Lindley on Part- or permitted to appear. Morgan

nership (EwelTs 3d Am. ed.), voL I, v. Farrel (1890), 58 Conn. 413, 20

p. 80 et seq. AtL Rep. 614, 18 Am. St. Rep. 382.

* 1 Lindley on Partnership (Ew- 6 The declarations or admissions

ell's 2d Am. ed.), 87; 2 Greenleaf, of one person that another is his

479. partner are not admissible to prove

1 First National Bank v. Conway that fact against the latter person,

(1886), 67 Wis. 210, 30 N. W. Rep. unless he has in some way author-

215. ized or assented to such declara-

Reed v. Cremer (1886), 111 Pa. tions. Vanderhurst v. De Witt

St 482, 56 Am. Rep. 295, where it is (1892), 95 CaL 57, 30 Pac. Rep. 94, 20

§ 36. Means of proof.- As between the alleged partners
themselves, the existence .of the partnership may be proved
by the partnership articles, if any; if not, by informal writings, letters, the partnership books, the conduct and admissions of the parties, or by any other matters tending to prove
the fact in controversy, and brought home to the party to
be charged.1
.
As to third persons, the existence of the partnership and
the persons who compose it may be proved by conduct, admissions or other kinds of parol evidence, even though there
·
were partnership articl~s.2
The testimony of the .p arties themselves as to the facts is,
under modern rules, admissible either to prove or disprove
the alleged partnership.1
It may also be proved by the conduct or admissions of the
parties sought to be charged;' but the acts or admissions of
one person are not admissible to prove another to be a partner, unless the latter is in some way shown to be responsible
for them or to have acquiesced in them.6 The existence of
the partnership or the persons composing it cannot be proved
· by general reputation, rumor or hearsay.6

said that the partnership may be L. R. A. 595; Dutton v. Woodman

established by the several admis- (1852), 9 Gush. (Mass.) 255, 57 Am.

sions of all those who were alleged Deo. 46; Graf ton Bank v. Moore

to compose it, or by the admissions (1842), 13 N. H. 99, 88 Am. Dec. 47a

of one and the acts and declara- 6 Brown v. Cmndall (1835), 11

tions of the othera But the facts Conn. 92; Bo wen v. Rutherford

relied upon must be those which (1871), 60 III 41, 14 Am. Rep. 25;

1 See

Greenleat on Evidence, voL the party sought to be held caused
or permitted to appear. Morgan•
v. Farrel (1890), 58 Conn. 413, 20
AtL Rep. 614, 18 Am. St. Rep. 282.
6 The declaratiop.s or admissions
of one person that another is his
partner are not admissible to prove
a First National Bank v. Conway that fact against the latter person,
(1886), 67 Wis. 210, 30 N. W. Rep. unless he has in some way author·
215.
ized or assented to such declara'Reed v. Cremer (1886), 111 Pa. tions. Vanderhurst v. De Witt
St. 482, 56 Am. Rep. 295, where it is (1892), 95 Cal 57,' 30 Pac. Rep. 94, 20
said that the partnership may be L. R. A. 595; Dutton v. Woodman
established by the several admis- (1852), 9 Cush. (Mass.) 255, 57 Am.
sions of all those whowere alleged Dec. 46; Grafton Bank v. Moore
to compose it, or by the admissions (1842), 18 N. H. 99, 88 Am. Dec. 478.
of one and the acts and d~claraGBrown v. Cmndall (1835), 11
tions of the others. But the facts Conn. 92; Bowen v. Rutherford
relied upon must be those which (1871), 60 Ill 41, 14 Am. Rep. 25;
98

Il, § 475 et seq.; Lindley on Partnership (Ewell's 2d Am. ed.), vol I,
p. 80 et seq.
11 Lindley on Partnership (Ewell's 2d Am. ed.), 87; 2 Greellleaf,
§ 479.
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OONTKAOT OF PARTNEBSHIF EVIDENCE. [ 37.

In seeking to establish partnership from acts and conduct,

OONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP a wide range of evidence is allowed to put before the jury

EVIDENOE.

[§ 37.

all the facts and circumstances relating to the connection of

the alleged partner with the affair, and the method of trans-

acting the business.

37. Burden of proof. The burden of proving the ex-

istence of the partnership and who were the partners com-

posing it rests usually upon the party alleging it. 1 Where,

however, its existence is shown or admitted, a presumption

of its continuance ordinarily arises which casts upon the

In seeking to establish partnership from acts and conduct,
a wide range of evidence is allowed to put before the jury
all the .facts and circumstances relating to the connection of
the alleged partner with the affair, and the method of transacting the business.

party alleging its termination the burden of showing that

fact, including the giving of proper notice where that is nec-

essary.*

Cook v. Slate Co. (1880), 36 Ohio St Ky. 525, 9 S. W. Rep. 838; Dunham

135, 38 Am. Rep. 568; Potter v. v. Loverock (1893), 158 Pa. St 197,

Greene (1858), 9 Gray (Masa), 309, 88 Am. St. Rep. 838.

69 Am. Dec. 290. 'See post, 263.

See Ldeb v. Craddock (1888), 87
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§ 37. Burden of proof.- The burden of proving the existence of the partnership and who were the partners composing it rests usually upon the party alleging it. 1 Where,
however, its existence is shown or admitted, a presumption
of its continuance ordinarily arises whjch casts upon the
party alleging its termination the burden of showing that
fact, including the giving_of proper noti~e where that is neoessary.2
Cook v. Slate Co. (1880), 86 Ohio St. Ky. 525, 9 S. W. Rep. 838; Dunham
135, 38 Am. Rep. 568; Potter v. v. Loverock (1893), 158 Pa. St. 197,
Greene (1858), 9 Gray (Mass.), 809, 88 Am. St. Rep. 838.
2 See post, § 263.
69 Am. Dec. 290.
1 See

·Lieb v. Craddock (1888), ff1

gr

CHAPTER V.

WHAT ACTS AND CONTRACTS CREATE A PARTNERSHIP.

38. How question arises.

89. Partnership inter se and as to

third persons.

L OF TRUE PARTNERSHIPS.

40. True partnerships, how classi-

fied.

41. Of partnerships expressly in-

tended.

CHAPTER V.

42. Of partnerships not expressly

intended.

iS, 44 Legal intention of parties

WHAT ACTS AND CONTRACTS CREATE A PARTNERSHIP.

controls.

4& Tests of intention to form

partnership.

48-48. Sharing both profits

and losses.

49, 50. Sharing profits, noth-

ing being said about losses.

losses.
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iL Sharing profits, but not

52. Partnerships in profits

only.

63. Sharing gross returns.

64 Tests of intention Sharing

losses only.

IL OF QUASI-PARTNERSHIPS.

55. Of partnerships as to third

persons.

1. Of Sharing Profits.

66, 57. Profit-sharing formerly

the test of partnership.

58-60. Of the case of Cox v. Hick-

man.

61. Effect of Cox v. Hickman in

England.

63-68. Effect of Cox v. Hickmau

in United States.

2. Of Holding Out as a Partner.

69. Person may become liable as

a partner by holding out.

70. What facts must exist

f 88.

§ M. Tests of intention -Sharing
How question arises.
89. Partnership inter seand as to
losses only.
third persons.
n 01!' QUASI-PA.RTNERSHIPS.
L 01!' TRUE p A.RTNBRSHIPS.
55. Of partnerships as to third
40. True partnerships, how classipersons.
. fled.
1. OJ Sharing Projit&
U. Of partnerships expressly in56, 57. Profit-sharing formerly
tended.
the test of partnership.
.12. Of partnerships not expressly
· 58-60. Of the case of Cox v. Hickintended.
man.
AS, 44. Legal intention of parties
61. Effect of Cox v. Hickman in
controls.
England.
ili. Tests of intention to form
62-68. Effect of Cox v. Hickman
partnership.
in United States.
'6-48. Sharing both profits
2. OJ Hokling Out as a Partner.
and losses.
4i, 50. Sharing profits, noth69. Person may become liable as .
ing being said about losses.
a partner by holding out.
51. Sharing profits, but not
70. What facts must exist.
losses.
'11. Who may enforce liabil12. Partnerships in profits
ity.
only.
'12. -The evidence admissible.
53. Sharing gross returns.
'13. -The effect.

71. Who may enforce liabil-

ity.

72. The evidence admissible.

7a The effect.

38. How question arises. The question as to the exist-

snce of a partnership between given individuals may arise in

two classes of cases :

1. Where the parties themselves allege that they intended

partnership.

2. Where the parties or some of them allege that they did

not intend partnership.

§ 38. How question arises.- The question as to the exist·
~nee

of a partnership between given individuals may arise in ·
two classes of cases:
1. Where the parties themselves allege that they intended
partnership.
2. Where the parties or some of them allege that they did
not intend partnership.

39. Partnerships inter sese and as to third persons.

It is, in general, true that as between the parties to the al-

28

§ 39. Partnerships inter sese and as to third persons.It is, mgeneral, true that as between the parties to the al#
28
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WHAT ACTS CBEATK A PABTNEBSHIP. [ 40, 41.

xeged relation there can be no partnership if they did not

WHAT ACTS CREATE A PARTNERSHIP.

[§§ 40, 41 ..

intend one, and that as to third persons there can be no part-

nership if there was none as between the alleged partners

themselves. Notwithstanding this general rule, it is equally

true, as will be hereafter seen, that there are two apparent

exceptions to it :

v * 1. Persons may be held, notwithstanding a contrary in-

tention, to have made a contract which in law constitutes

them partners as between themselves; and

2. A person who is not actually a partner may be held

liable to third persons as though he were a partner where

he has so conducted himself as to reasonably induce such

third persons to rely upon the assumption that he was a

partner.

It will be obvious that these two cases are very different ;

in the first all the parties are held to be partners as between

themselves, while in the second a person may be held liable

as a partner when in fact, between him and the persons with

whom he is thus assumed to be a partner, no intention to be
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partners existed. The first form, or the partnership inter

sese, is therefore the only true partnership. This has led to

a classification into, 1, true partnerships, and 2, g"i&m-part-

nerships.

L OF TBUB PARTNERSHIPS.

40. True partnerships, how classified. It will be evi-

dent that true partnerships also may be divided into two

classes : 1. Where a partnership was expressly intended ; and

2. Where the parties did not expressly intend to become

partners, but the law holds that the contract which they in-

tentionally made does create a partnership between them,

and which thus becomes, indirectly, an intentional partner-

ship, because the law always presumes that parties intended

the legal result of their intentional acts. These two classes

will be separately considered.

41. Of partnerships expressly intended. Cases of this

nature can ordinarily occasion but little difficulty. If it be

ieged relation there can be no partnership if they did not
intend one, and that as to third persons there can be no partnership if there was none as between the alleged partners.
themselves. Notwithstanding this general rule, it is equally
true, as will be hereafter seen, that there are two apparent.
exceptions to it:
1. Persons may be held, notwithstanding a contrary intention, to have made a contract which in law constitutes
them partners as between themselves; and
2. A person who is not actually a partner may be held
liable to third persons as though he were a partner where
he has so conducted himself as to reasonably induce such
third persons to rely upon the assumption that he was a
partner.
It will be obvious that these two cases are very different;
in the first all the parties are held to be partners as between
themselves, while in the second a person may be held liable
aa a partner when in fact, between him and the persons with
whom he is thus assumed to be a partner, no intention to bepartners existed. The first form, or the partnership inter
sese, is therefore the only true partnership. This has led to.
a classification into, 1, true partnerships, and 2, quasi-partnerships.
·
L OF TRUE p ABTNERSHIPS..

_ § 4:0. True partnerships, how classified.- It will be evi·
dent that true partnerships also may be divided into · two.
classes: 1. Where a partnership was expressly intended; and
2. Where the parties did not expressly intend to become
partners, but the law holds that the contract which they intentionally made does create a partnership between them,.
and which thus becomes, indirectly, an intentional partnership, because the law always presumes that parties intended
the legal result of their intentional acts. These two classes
will be separately
. considered.

.

§ 4:1. Of partnerships expressly intended.-Cases of this.
nature can ordinarily occasion but little difficulty. If it be. 2a

42.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

admitted that the parties intended to be partners, their in

§ 42.]

LA.W 011' P .A.RTNERBHIP.

tention can rarely fail of effect. Cases, however, are not

infrequent in which the parties, intending to create a part-

nership and expressly naming their relation such, have still

been held not to have created one because they had failed

to attach to their relation the necessary incidents of partner-

ship ; as, for example, where their contract leaves them with-

out any community of interest in the business or profits. 1

It may also be that an instrument designed to constitute

partnership articles is so defectively drawn as to create some

other relation, as a co-ownership or a corporation; but un-

less some other distinct relation is thus expressly created,

persons who have intended to be partners, and who have

acted as such, will be deemed to be partners notwithstand-

ing defective instruments.

42. Of agreements held to create partnership inter

sese when that was not intended. The question whether

a partnership has in fact been created between two or more

persons, part or all of whom deny it, may arise in a great
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variety of cases. It is constantly arising as between the al-

leged partners and third persons who are seeking to hold

them liable as such, and this phase of the question presents

the most difficulty and gives rise to the greatest amount of

litigation.

admitted that the parties intended to be partners, their in
tention can rarely fail of effect. Cases, however, are not
infreq.uent in which the parties, intending to create a partnership and expressly naming their relation such, have still
been held not to have created one because they had failed
to attach to their relation the necessary incidents of partnership; as, for example, where their contract leaves them without any community of interest in the business or profits.1
It may also be that an instrument designed to constituto
partnership articles is so defectively drawn as to create some
other relation, as a co-ownership or a corporation; but unless some other distinct relation is thus expressly created,
persons who have intended to be partners, and who have
acted as such, will be deemed to be partners notwithstanding defective instruments.

1 Thus, in Sailors v. Nixon-Jones community of interest in the busi-

Co. (1886), 20 I1L App. 509,^Paige's ness or profits, they are not part-

Par tn. Cas. 39, it is said: "The fact ners in fact or in law. Parsons on

§ 4:2. Of agreements held to create partnership inter
sese when that was not intended. -The question whether

that the parties to such relation Partnership, 91. A partnership

themselves call it a partnership inter se must result from the in-

will not make it so. Where the tention of the parties as expressed

question of partnership is to be de- in the contract, and they cannot

termined from a contract between be made to assume toward each

the parties to it, the relation must other a relation which they have

be found from the terms and pro- expressly contracted not to as-

visions of the contract, and even sume. The terms of the agree-

though parties intend to become rnent,' where there is one, fixes the

partners, yet, if they so frame the real status of the parties toward

terms and provisions of their con- each other."

tract as to leave them without any

30

a. partnership has in fact been created between two or more
persons, part or all of whom deny it, may arise in a great
variety of cases. It is constantly arising a.s between the ~1leged partners and third persons who are seeking to hold
them liable as such, and this phase of the question presents
the most difficulty and gives rise to the greatest amount of
litigation.
I Thus, in Sailors v. Nixon-Jones
Co. (1886), 20 ill App. 509,J>aige's
Partn. Cas. 39, it is said! "The fact
that the parties ·to auch relation
themselves call it a partnership
will not make it so. Where the
question of partnership is to be determined from a contract between
the parties to it, the relation must
be found from the terms and provisions of the contract, and even
though parties intend to become
partners, yet, if they so frame the
terms and provisions of their contract as to leave them without any

community of interest in the business or profits, they are not partners in fact or in law. Parsons on
Partnership, 91. A partnership
inter se must result from the intention of the parties as expressed
in the contract, and they cannot
be made to assume toward each
other a relation which they have
expressly contracted not to assume. The terms of the agreement, where there is one, fixes the
real status of the parties toward
each other."

80
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WHAT ACTS CREATE A PARTNERSHIP. [ 43.

The question, however, may and often does arise as be-

WHAT A.OTB ORE.A.TE A

P.A.RTNEI~HIP.

rn 43.

tween the alleged partners themselves. As between these

parties, the question usually arises in one of two classes of

cases: 1. Where an affair in which they have been in some

way concerned has proven to be profitable, and one or more,

alleging partnership, seek to compel an accounting, as part-

ners, from the others, who deny it; and 2. Where such an

enterprise has proved disastrous, and one or more alleg-

ing partnership seek to enforce contribution as partners

from the others, who deny that any such relation existed.

Other cases may, of course, arise where one or more claim

other rights or powers as partners against the others, but

the two classes of cases stated are the most common.

43. Legal intention of parties controls, Partnership,

as has been seen, is the result of the express or implied

agreement of the parties, and there can be no partnership

either as between the parties themselves or as to third per-

sons where the parties have not by their acts or contracts

created one. When, therefore, the parties themselves, or
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some of them, deny that they -intended to form a partner-

ship, it becomes necessary to determine what is the legal

The question, however, may and often does arise as be.
tween the alleged partners themselves. As between these
parties, the question usually arises in one of two classes of
cases: 1. Where an affair in which they have been in some
way concerned has proven to be profitable, and one or more,
alleging partnership, seek to compel an accounting, as partners, from the others, who deny it.; and 2. Where such an
enterprise has proved disastrous, and one or more alleging partnership seek to enforce contribution as partners
from the others, who deny that any such relation existed.
Other cases may, of course, arise where one or more claim
other rights or powers as partners against the others, but
the two classes of cases stated are the most common.

effect of their acts and contracts. In dealing with this ques-

tion, it must be borne in mind that it is the legal intention

of the parties rather than their expressed or declared inten-

tion which controls. The law presumes that the parties

intend the legal consequences of their voluntary acts and

contracts. If, therefore, they intend the acts or contracts,

they intend also, in contemplation of law, the legal effect of

those acts and contracts. 1 Whether, then, the question arises

1 Thus in Duryea v. Whitcomb contract could not be varied by

(1858), 31 Vt. 393, Paige's Partn. their riot supposing it to be what

Cas. 58, the court say: "If their it was. The further statement in

contract was for a partnership the report that they did not intend

by necessary legal construction to form a partnership seems incon-

( which we have found that it was), sistent with the other facts. . . .

and they intended to make the Probably the fair construction of

contract (and this appears from the report is that the parties were

the report), the legal effect of their not aware of the legal. extent and

81

§ 43. Legal intention of parties controls.-Partnership,
as has been seen, is the result of the express or implied
agreement of the parties, and there can. be no partnershipeither as between the parties themselves or as to third persons-where the parties have not by their acts or contracts
created one. When, therefore, the parties themselves, or
some of theni, deny that they .intended to form a partnership, -it becomes necessary to determine what is the legal
effect of their acts and contracts. In dealing with this question, it must be borne in mind that it is the kgal intention
of the parties rather than their ewpressed or declared intention which controls. The law presumes that the parties
intend the legal consequences of their voluntary acts and
contracts. If, therefore, they intend the acts or contracts,
they intend also, in contemplation of law, the legal effect of
those acts and contracts. 1 Whether, then, the question arises
1 Thus in Duryea v. Whitcomb contract could not be varied by
(1858), 31 Vt. 393, Paige:s Partn. their not supposing it to be what
Cas. 58, the court say: "If their it was. The further statement in
contract was for a partnhship the report that they did not intend
by necessary legal construction to form a partnership seems incon(which we have found that it was), sistent with the other facts. •••
and they :ntended to make the Probably the fair construction of
contract (and tliis appears from the report is that the parties were
the report), the legal effect of their not aware of the legal.extent and
81

44.] ' LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

§ 44.]

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

between the parties themselves, or between the parties and

third persons, if the legal effect of their acts and contracts

is the creation of a partnership, the parties will be deemed

partners, notwithstanding their denial of an intention to be-

come such. The law gathers their intention from their acts

and contracts at the time, rather than from their contempo-

raneous or subsequent assertions. Greater effect may, how-

ever, be given to the expressed intentions of the parties

when the question arises between themselves only, than

where third persons are concerned. The latter cannot be

presumed to know of the declared intention, and must there-

fore be left to judge by the legal intention which the outward

acts and contracts of the parties manifest. In doubtful cases,

too, of either sort, the expressed intention may be of conse-

quence, and may even turn the scale in accordance with it.

44. Same subject. Keeping these distinctions in view,

it is then true, as the rule is frequently declared, that

whether a partnership has been created depends upon the

real indention of the parties. If their agreement is in writ-
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ing, its true construction must be ascertained. If it is not

in writing, then the intention of the parties must be gathered

from their words and conduct. What the parties have called

themselves is not conclusive, for if they have stipulated for

what is a partnership in fact, then even their express agree-

ment that they should not be partners would not prevent

the legal operation of their stipulations. 1 If, on the other

obligation of the contract into Paige's Partn. Cas. 46, after calling

which they entered. As the con- attention to the fact that in that

tract imports a partnership, we case the parties manifestly had no

must hold, in the absence of any purpose to become partners, it is

express stipulation and of any said by Cooley.J.: "In general this

other circumstances to show the should be conclusive. If parties

contrary, that they intended to ere- intend no partnership the courts

ate the relation which the contract should give effect to their intent,

expresses." See, also. Chapman v. unless somebody has been deceived

jflughes (1894), 1U4 (Jal. bus. ' by their acting or assuming to act

l Th'us ill liUBfcher v. Bush (1881), as partners; and any such case

45 Mich. 188, 40 Am. Rep. 465, must stand upon its peculiar fact-

32

between the parties themselves, or between the parties and
third persons, if the legal effect of the.fr acts and contracts
is the creation of a partnership, the parties will be deemed
partners, notwithstanding their denial of an intention to become such. The law gathers their intention from their acts
and contracts at the time, rather than from their contemporaneous or subsequent assertions. Greater effect may, however, be given to the expressed intentions of the parties
when the question arises between themselves only, than
where third persons are concerned. The latter cannot be
presumed to know of the declared intention, and must therefore be left to judge by the legal intention which the outward
acts and contracts of the parties manifest. In doubtful cases,
too, of either sort, the expressed intention may be of consequence, and may even turn the scale in accordance with it.

«.

§
Same subject.- Keeping these distiuctions in view,
it is then true, as the rule is frequently declared, that
whether a partnership has been created depends upon the
real intention of the parties. If their agreement is in writing, its true construction must be ascertained. If it jg not
in writing, then the intention of the parties must be gathered
from their words and conduct. What the parties have called
themselves is not conclusive, for if they have stipulated for
what is a partnership in fact, then even their express agreement that they should not be partners would not prevent
the legal operation of their stipulations.1 If, on the other
obligation of the contract into Paige's Partn. Cas. 46, after calling
which they entered. As the con· attention to the fact that in that
tract imports a partnership, we case the parties manifestly had no
must hold, in the absence of any purpose to become partners, it is
express stipulation and of any said by Cooley, J.: "In general this
other circumstances to show the should be conclusive. If parties
contrary, that they intended to ere- intend no partnership the courts
ate the relation which the contract should give effect to their intent,
upresses." See, also! Chapngn v. unless somebody has been deceived
.Hughes (1894), 104 Cal. 962. . ..- by their acting or assuming to act
lThus m £€!€Cher v. Bush (1881), as partners; and any such case
45 "Mich. 188, 40 Am. Rep. 465, must stand upon .it.a peculiar fact.P
32
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WHAT ACTS CREATE A PARTNERSHIP. [ 4:5, 46.

hand, their acts and contracts do not in law create a part-

WHAT .A.01'8 ORE.A.TB .A. PARTNERSHIP.

nership, the fact that they have expressly called it such will

[§§ 45, 46.

not avail. 1

hand, their acts and contracts do not in law create a partnership, the fact that they have expressly called it such will
not avail.1

V 45. Tests of intention to form partnership. While

the intention of the parties is thus, in general, the control-

ling inquiry, there are a number of methods by which the

courts have endeavored to ascertain what that intention

was. Keeping in mind the definition that the partnership

relation is based upon the agreement of the parties to unite

~

their property, labor, capital or skill in carrying on business

the intention of the parties is thus, in general, the controlling inquiry, there are a number of methods by which the
courts have endeavored to ascertain what that intention
was. Keeping in mind the definition that the ·partnership
relation is based upon the agreement of the parties to unite
their property, labor, capital or skill in carrying on business
as principals for their joint profit, each being at the same
time both principal of and agent for the other, several of the
tests which are commonly applied to · aid in determining
when such an agreement exists may be noticed~ Among
these are-

as principals for their joint profit, each being at the same

time both principal of and agent for the other, several of the

tests which are commonly applied to aid in determining

when such an agreement exists may be noticed. Among

these are

46. I. Agreements to share both profits and losses.

An agreement between two or more persons to unite their

property, labor or capital to establish and carry on a busi-

ness, in which business they are to have a community of in-
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terest which they are to own in common, in which each is

to be a principal owner or proprietor as distinguished from

a mere agent, clerk or creditor and the profits and losses

of which they are to share because they are such owners,

principals or proprietors, is the typical form of partnership.

Such an agreement creates a partnership between the parties

as a matter of law.

and upon special equities. It is, the substance of the arrangement

nevertheless, possible for parties to shows them to be inapplicable,

intend no partnership and yet to But every doubtful case must be

form one. If they agree upon an solved in favor of their intent,

arrangement which is a partner- otherwise we should carry the doo-

ship in fact, it is of no importance trine of constructive partnership

that they call it something else, or so far as to render it a trap to the

that they even expressly declare unwary. Kent, C. J., in Post v.

that they are not to be partners. Kimberly, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 470, 504."

The law must declare what is the l Sailors v. Nixon-Jones Co., 20

legal import of their agreements, IU. Ap. 509, Paige's Partn. Cas. 39.

and names go for nothing when

8 33

§ 4:5. Tests of intention to form partnership.-While

XX

§ 4:6. I. Agreements to share both profits and losses.An agreement between two or more persons to unite their
property, labor or capital to establish and carry on a business, in which business they are to have a community of interest- which they are to own in common, in which each is
to be a principal owner or proprietor as distinguished from
a mere agent, clerk or creditor - and the profits and losses
of which they are to share because they are such owners,
principals or proprietors, is the typical form of partnership.
Such an agreement creates a partnership between the parties
as a matter of law.
and upon special equities. It is, the substance of the arrangement
nevertheless, possible for parties to shows them to be inapplicable.
intend no partnership and yet to But every doubtful case must ~
form one. .If they agree upon an solved in favor of their intent,
arrangement which is & partner- otherwise we should carry the do<>
ship in fact, it is of no importance trine of constructive partnershfp
that they call it something else, or so fa.r &s to render it a trap to tile
that they even expressly declare unwary. Kent, C. J., in Post v.
that they are not to be partners. Kimberly, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 470, 504."
The law must declare what is the
I Sailors v. Nixon-Jones Co., 20
legal import of their agreements, Ill. Ap. 509, Paige's Partn. Cas. SQ.
and names go for nothing when
8
~-

47, 48.1 LAW OF PAETNEKPHIP.

47. Same subject. Agreements, however, which pro-

sent all of these characteristics occasion no difficulty, and

§§ 47, 48.)

LAW OF P .A.RTNEReRIP.

the question of partnership is easily and certainly solved.

The difficulty arises in those cases which unfortunately

but naturally constitute the great majority of those submit-

ted to lawyers or courts for determination in which some

of these elements only are discernible, while others are not

apparent at all or are to be extracted from a mass of more

or less conflicting facts and circumstances. In such cases,

the elements which do appear are not necessarily conclusive,

and it is both unwise and dangerous to seize upon them as

sufficient ; they are evidence merely, and, as such, are more

or less convincing according as they fit in with the remain-

ing elements discovered.

Of this nature is the mere element of sharing profits and

losses. It certainly furnishes strong evidence that the par-

ties have united as principals for their joint profit, if any,

and in the absence of anything to show that the profits and

losses were to be shared on some other basis than that of
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principals in the business, it would usually be deemed con-

clusive. But it may still be shown that they were to share

the profits and losses in some other capacity, and the evi-

dence of partnership is thereby weakened if not dispelled.

Where both parties contribute goods, or money to buy

goods, for a common stock, in which they thus acquire a

joint interest, then an agreement for a division of the profit

and loss furnishes the strongest evidence of a partnership ;

and the same is true where each is to contribute services.

48. Same subject. The evidence is also strong where

one furnishes money or property and the other furnishes

services, though it is less strong in this case than in the

others, because the parties have not necessarily a joint in-

terest in the property, and the sharing in profits and loss

may be but one means of compensating the second party for

his services. Still less strong is the evidence where, though

the parties are to share profits and losses in the sale of

84

§ 4-7. Same subject.- Agreements, however, which pr&
sent all of these characteristics occasion no difficulty, and
the question of partnership is easily and certainly solved.
The difficulty arises in those cases-which unfortunately
but naturally constitute the great majority of those submitted to lawyers or courts for determination - in ·which aoms
of these elements only are discernible, while others are not
apparent at all or are to be extracted from a mass of more
or less conflicting facts and circumstances. In such cases,
the elements which do appear are not necessarily conclusive,
and it is both unwise and dangerous to seize upon them as
sufficient; they are evidence merely, and, as such, are more
or less convincing ~ccording as they fit in with the remaining elements discovered.
Of this nature is the mere element of sharing p:rofits and
losses. It certainly furnishes strong evidence that the parties have united as principals for their joint pI:ofit, if any,
and in the absence of anything to. show that the profits and
losses were to be shared on some other basis than that of
principals in the business, it would usually be deemed conclusive. But it may still be shown that they were to share
the profits and losses in some other capacity, and the evidence of partnership is thereby weakened if not dispelled.
Where both parties contribute goods, or money to buy
goods, for a common stock, in which they thus acquire a
join.t interest, then an agreement for a division. of the profit
and loss furnishes the strongest evidence of a partnership;
and the same is true where each is to contribute services.
§ 48. Same snbjeet.-The evidence is also strong where
one furnishes money or property and the other ~rnishes
services, though it is less strong in this case than in the
others, b.ecause the parties have not necessarily a joint interest in the property, and the sharing in profits and loss
may be but one means of compensating the second party for
his services. Still less strong is the evidence where, though
the parties are to share profits and losses in the sale of
84
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WHAT ACTS OEBATK A PABTNEBSHIP. [ 49.

WHAT ACTS ORR.ATE A PARTNERSHIP.

goods, each one retains the individual title or control of his

[§ 49.

contribution.

To constitute a partnership, therefore, there must be

goods, each one retains the individual title or control of his
contribution.
To constitute a partnership, therefore, there must be
added to the evidence of this one element of sharing profits
and losses, the further evidence that the parties who so
shared in such profits and losses were also principal proprietors in the business from which such profits or losses
ensued, and that such sharing was because they stood in the
relation of such principal proprietors and not in some other
relation.1
·

added to the evidence of this one element of sharing profits

and losses, the further evidence that the parties who so

shared in such profits and losses were also principal pro-

prietors in the business from which such profits or losses

ensued, and that such sharing was because they stood in the

relation of such principal proprietors and not in some other

relation. 1

49. II. Agreements to share profits, nothing being

said abont losses. It not infrequently happens that, while

the element of profit sharing is clearly evident, the question

of sharing losses appears to have been ignored. The failure

or omission to provide for the losses may have been acci-

dental or intentional. If it was accidental merely, it is ordi-

narily of little consequence, because the law will supply the

omission if the other elements are present. 2 But if the omis-

sion was intentional, it challenges inquiry, though it may
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not be conclusive. Ordinarily one who shares the profits of

the business because he is a principal therein, must, for the

1 Spaulding v. Stubbings (1893), such profits must be shared as the

86 Wis. 255, 56 N. W. Rep. 469, 39 result of the adventure or enter-

Am. St. Rep. 888; Culley v. Edwards prise, in which both are interested,

(1884), 44 Ark. 423, 51 Am. Rep. 614; and not simply as a measure of

Boston Smelting Co. v. Smith (1880), compensation (Cogswell v. Wilson,

13 R L 27, 43 Am. Rep. 3; Clifton 11 Ore. 372);" and ."where it ap-

v. Howard (1886), 89 Mo. 192, 58 Am. pears that there is community of

Rep. 97; Howze v. Patterson (1875), interest in the capital stock, and

53 Ala. 205, 25 Am. Rep. 607. In a also a community of interest in the

recent case in Oregon (Flower v. profits and loss, there it is clear an

Barnekoff (1890), 20 Ore. 137, 11 L. actual partnership exists between

R. A. 149), it is said: "Partnership the parties. Berthold v. Goldsmith,

and community of interest inde- 24 How. (U. S.) 541."

_,)(

§ 49. II. Agreements to share· profits, nothing being
said about losses.- It not infrequently happens that, while
the element of profit sharing is clearly evident, the question
of sharing losses appears to have been ignored. The failure
or omission to provide for the losses may have been accidental or intentional. If it was accidental merely, it is ordinarily of ~ittle consequence, because the law will supply the
omission if the other elements are present. 2 But if the omission was intentional, it challenges inquiry, though it may
not be conclusive. Ordinarily one who shares the profits of
the business because he is a principal therein, must, for the

pendently considered are not al- 2 gee Quinn v. Quinn (1889), 81

ways the same thing, nor is a mere CaL 14, 22 Pac. Rep. 264; Wipper-

oommunity of interest sufficient; man v. Stacy (1891), 80 Wis. 345, 50

but ther must be an agreement N. W. Rep. 336.

to share the profits and loss, and

35

1 Spaulding v. Stubbings (1893),
88 Wis. 955, 56 N. W. Rep. 469, 89
Am. St. Rep. 888; Culley v. Edwards
(1884), 44 Ark. 423, 51 Am. Rep. 614;
Boston Smelting Co. v. Smith (1880),
18 R. L 27, 43 Am. Rep. 3; Clifton
v. Howard (1886), 89 Mo. 192, 58 Am.
Rep. 97; Howze v. Patterson (1875),
53 Ala. 205, 25 Am. Rep. 607. In a
recent case in Oregon (Flower v.
Barnekoff (1890), 20 Ore. 137, 11 L.
R. A. 14.9), it is said: "Partnership
and community of interest independently considered are not always the same thing, nor is a mere
community of interest sufficient;
but then must be an agreement
to share the profits and loss, and

such profits must be shared as the
result of the adventure or enterprise, in which both are interested,
and not simply as a measure of
compensation (Cogswell v. Wilson,
11 Ore. 372);" and ." where it appears that there is community of
interest in the capital stock, and
also a community of interest in the
profits and loss, there it is clear an
actual partnership exists between
the parties. Berthold v. Goldsmith,
24 How. (U.S.) 541."
2 See Quinn v. Quinn (1889), . 81
Cal 14, 22 Pac. Rep. 264; Wipperman v. Stacy (1891), 80 Wis. 345, 50
N.. W •. Rep. 336.
85

50.]

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

§ oo.J

LA.W OF PARTNERSHIP.

same reason, share the losses also if loss results. Bat it is

possible that one may share the profits of a business without

being a proprietor therein. The facts must therefore be in-

vestigated further, and it must be ascertained why and in

what relation the profits are to be received.

50. Same subject. Pursuing the investigation, if it be

found that the parties have contributed to form a joint stock

or capital of property or skill or labor, and have in the busi-

same reason, share the losses also if loss results. Rut it is
possible that one may share the profits of a businegg without
being a proprietor therein. The facts must therefore be investigated further, and it must be ascertained why and in
what relation the profits are to be received.

ness a community of interest, then an agreement to share

profits furnishes very strong evidence of partnership. But

if one party only is to supply the stock or capital, the case

is not so clear, though it is not conclusive. If, notwith-

standing the fact that one is to furnish all the capital in the

first instance, it still appears that the parties are to own the

business in common, or are to have a common interest in or

power of control over it, there is then the community of in-

terest which ordinarily constitutes partnership ; * but if there

1 This distinction is very clearly
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illustrated in such cases as Magov-

ern v. Robertson (1889), 116 N. Y.

61, 22 N. E. Rep. 398, 5 L. R. A. 589,

where the parties held liable as part-

ners had not only a right to share in

the profits but had also, by the ex-

press terms of the contract, an in-

terest in the stock and business to

the extent of their loans and in-

§ 50. Same subject.- Pursuing the investigation, if it be
found that the parties have contributed to form a joint stock
or capital of property or skill or labor, and have in the business a community of interest, then an agreement to share
profits furnishes very strong evidence of partnership. But
if one party only is to supply the stock or capital, the case
is not so clear, though it is not conclusive. If, notwith..
standing the fact that one is to furnish all the capital in the
first instance, it still appears that the parties are to own the
business in common, or ·are to have a common interest in or
power of control over it, there is then the community of interest which ordinarily constitutes partnership; 1 but if there-

dorsements. "Persons," said the

court, "having a proprietary in-

terest in a business and in its prof-

its are liable as partners to credit-

ors." To like effect, because the

alleged clerk was not only to have

a share of the profits as compensa-

tion, but was also to have an in-

terest in the stock and business

itself: Sawyer v. First National

Bank (1894). 114 N. C. 13, 18 S. E.

Rep. 949; Hackett v. Stanley (1889),

115 N. Y. 625, 22 N. E, Rep. '745;

and because the alleged leaner of

money was also to have an in-

terest in and control over the busi-

ness: Spaulding v. Stubbingo (1893),

86 Wis. 255, 56 N. W. Rep. 469, 39

Am. St. Rep. 888.

Care must therefore be taken to

discriminate between the cases of

alleged loans with a share of the

profits by way of interest, and a real

partnership disguised as a loan; for

if it appears that the transaction is

a mere device to obtain the advan-

tages of a partnership without the

responsibilities, it will be held tc

be a partnership whatever the par-

ties may have called it The test

is usually to be found, according

to the later cases, in the powers of

control of the alleged lender. Has

he any voice or part in controlling

the management of the businese

as a principal therein? Has he, by

86

1 This distinction is very clearly and because the alleged loaner of
illustrated in such cases as Magov- money was also to have an inern v. Robertson (1889). 116 N. Y. terest in and control over the husi·
61, 22 N. E. Rep. 398, 5 L. R. A. 589, ness: Spaulding v. Stubbinga (1898)..
wherethepartiesheldliableaspart- 86 Wis. 255, 56 N. W. Rep. 469, 89
ners had not only a right to share in Am. St. Rep. 888.
the profits but had also, by the exCare must therefore be taken topress terms of the contract, an in- discriminate between the cases ofterest in the stock and business to alleged ~oans with a share of th6
the extent of their loans and in- profits by way of interest, and a reaJ
dorsements. "Persons," said the partnership disguised as a loan; for
court. "having a proprietary in- if it appears that the transaction is
terest in a business and in its prof- a mere device tO obtain the advanits are liable as partners to credit- tages of a partnership without ths
ors." To like effect, because the responsibilities. it will be held t<J
alleged clerk was not only to have be a partnership whatever the par·
a share of the profits as compensa- ties may have .called it. The test
tion, but was also to have an in- is usually· to be found, according
terest in the stock and business to the later cases. in the powers ot
itself: Sawyer v. First National control of the alleged lender. Has
Bank (1894). 114 N. C. 13, 18 S. .E. he any voice or part in controlling
Rep. 949; Hackett v. Stanley (1889), the management of the businesp;
115 N. Y. 625, 22 N. E. Rep.• 745; as a principal therein? Has he, by
86
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WHAT ACTS CREATE A PAKTNERSHIP.

[50.

is to be no coowncrship of the business and one is to receive

WIU.T ACTS OBBA.TB A PARTNERSHIP.

[§ 50.

his share of the profits in some other capacity than as a prin-

cipal proprietor, as, for example, if he is to receive it as com-

pensation for his services, there is no partnership. Plainly,

also, one who has a share of the profits in another's business

by way of commission merely, or in lieu of salary, or as rent,

or as interest on loans, is not '* partner with the owner of

that business. 1 To make them such, there must be here, as

virtue of the arrangement, such

an interest in the business that he

can be regarded both as principal

and agent for the others? See Ro-

senfield v. Haight (1881), 53 Wis.

260, 40 Am. Rep. 770; Richardson

to be no ov-ownershipof the business and one is to receive
bis share of the profits in oome other capacity than as a principal proprietor, as, for example, if he is to receive it as compensation for his services, there is no partnership. Plainly,
also, one who has a share of the profits in another's business
by way of commission merely, or in lieu of salary, or as rent,
or as interest on loans, is not .~ partner with the owner of
that business. 1 To make them such, there must be here, as
jg

v. Hughitt (1879), 76 N. Y. 55, 32

Am. Rep. 267; Leggett v. Hyde

(1874), 58 N. Y. 272, 17 Am. Rep.

244; Hackett v. Stanley (1889), 115
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N. Y. 625; and especially, Waver ly

Nat Bank v. Hall (1892), 150 Pa.

St. 466, 30 Am. St. Rep. 823, and

Magovern v. Robertson (1889), 116

N. Y. 61, 5 L. R. A. 589. So care

must be taken to discriminate be-

tween a real lease of premises and

a partnership disguised under the

form of a lease; for if the charac-

teristics of a partnership are pres-

ent, it will be held to be such re-

gardless of what the parties may

have called it. Webster v. Clark

(1894), 34 Fla. 637, 16 So. Rep. 601,

43 Am. St. Rep. 217, 27 L. R. A. 126.

1 See Sodiker v. Applegate (1884),

24 W. Va. 411, 49 Am. Rep. 252;

Beecher v. Bush (1881), 45 Mich.

188, 40 Am. Rep. 465, Paige's Partn.

Gas. 46: McDonnell v. Battle House

Co. (1880), 67 Ala. 90, 43 Am. Rep.

99; Harvey v. Childs (1876), 28 Ohio

St 319, 22 Am. Rep. 387; Thayer v.

Augustine (1884), 55 Mich. 187, 54

Am. Rep. 361; Morgan v. Farrel

(1890), 58 Conn. 414, 20 Atl. Rep.

614, 18 Am. St. Rep. 282; Waverly

Nat Bank v. Hall (1892), 150 Pa.

St. 466, 24 AtL Rep. 665, 30 Am. St

Rep. 823; Boston Smelting Co. v.

Smith (1880), 13 R. L 27, 43 Am.

Rep. 8; Parchen v. Anderson (1885),

5 Mont 438, 51 Am. Rep. 65; Cul-

ley v. Edwards (1884), 44 Ark 423,

51 Am. Rep. 614; Waggoner v.

First Nat Bank (1894), 43 Neb. 84,

61 N. W. Rep. 112. In respect of

sharing profits by way of compen-

sation for services, it was said in

Sodiker v. Applegate (1884), 24

W. Va. 411, 49 Am. Rep. 252, supra:

" In all cases there must be a par-

ticipation as principals. If the per-

sons merely occupy the relation of

principal and agent, employer and

employee or factor, no partnership

can be predicated upon the fact

that such agent, employee or fac-

tor receives a part or share of the

profits for his service or other ben-

virtue of the arrangement, such
.an interest in the business that he
can be regarded both as principal
and agent for the others? See Rosenfield v. Haight (1881), 53 Wis.
260, 40 Am. Rep. 770; Richardson
v. Hughitt (1879), 76 N. Y. 55, 82
Am. Rep. 267; Leggett v. Hyde
{1874), 58 N. Y. 272, 17 Am. Rep.
244; Hackett v. Stanley (1889), 115
N. Y. 625; and especially, Waverly
Nat. Bank v. Hall (1892), 150 Pa.
St. 466, 30 Am. St. Rep. 823, and
Magovern v. Robertson (1889), 116
N. Y. 61, 5 L. R. A. 589. So care
must be taken to discriminate between a real lease of premises and
a partnership disguised under the
form of a lease; for if the charaoteristics of a partnership are present, it will be held to be such regardless of what the parties may
have called it. Webster v. Clark
(1894), 34 Fla. 637, 16 So. Rep. 601,
43 Am. St. Rep. 217, 27 L. R. A. 126.
1 See Sodiker v. Applegate (1884),
24 W. Va. 411, 49 Am. Rep. 252;
Beecher v. Bush (1881), 45 Mich.
188, 40 Am. Rep. 465, Paige's Partn.
.Cas. 46; McDonnell v. Battle House
Co. (1880), 67 Ala. 90, 42 Am. Rep.
99; Harvey v. Childs (1876), 28 Ohio
St. 319, 22 Am. Rep~ 387; Thayer v.
Augustine (1884), 55 Mich. 187, 54
Am. Rep. 361; Morgan v. Farrel

(1890), 58 Conn. 414, 20 Atl. Rep.
~14, 18 Am. St. Rep. 282; Waverly
Nat. Bank v. Hall (1892), 150 Pa.
St. 466, 24 AtL Rep. 665, 30 Am. St.
Rep. 823; Boston Smelting Co. v.
Smith (1880), 13 R. L 27, 43 Am.
Rep. 8; Parchen v. Anderson (1885),
5 Mont. 438, 51 Am. Rep. 65; Culley v. Edwards (1884), 44 Ark. 423,
51 Am. Rep. 614; Waggoner v.
First Nat. Bank (1894), 43 Neb. 84,
61 N. W. Rep. 112. In respect of

sharing profits by way of compen·
sation for services, it was said in
Sodiker v. Applegate (1884), 24
W. Va. 411, 49 Am. Rep. 252, supra:
"In all cases there must be a participation as principals. If the persons merely occupy the relation of
principal and agent, employer and
employee or factor, no partnership
can be predicated upon the fact
that such agent, employee or faotor receives a part or share of the
profits for his service or other benefits conferred. This proposition
is illustrated by numerous cases,
among which are the following:
Berthold v. Goldsmith, 24 How•
(U. S.) 542; Burckle v. Eckhart, 1
Denio (N. Y.), 341; Bowyer v. Anderson, 2 Leigh (Va.), 550; Chapline v. Conant, 8 W. Va. 507, 100
Am. Dec. 766; Dils v. Bridge, 23
W. Va. 20; Hanna v. Flint, 14 CaL
87

51, 52.] LAW OF PABTNEESHIP.

in the former case, a community of interest in the business

§§ 51, 52.]

LA.W 01' P A.RT.NERSHIP.

itself as principals, each one being at once principal of and

agent for the others.

51. III. Agreements to share profits with express

stipulation against losses. Agreements are sometimes

made by which, though all are to share in the profits, some

in the former case, a community of interest iln the business
itself as principals, each one being at once principal of and
agent for the others.

of the parties are expressly to be protected against loss.

Such an agreement may constitute a partnership if the other

elements are present. It is lawful for the partners, as be-

tween themselves, to stipulate that one or more of them

shall be indemnified against loss, though such a stipulation

cannot affect the liability of the partners so indemnified to

third persons. 1

52. IV. Partnership in profits only. It is not indis-

pensable that there shall be a common stock or fund of

goods, land or other tangible property. The contributions

of one or both of the partners may be simply skill or expe-

rience or capacity to labor. Even if tangible property is

necessary to the transaction of the business, it is not essen-
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tial that it shall be owned by all or any of the partners. It

may be hired from a stranger, or one partner may supply

its use to the firm, retaining the title in himself. It may be

. § 51. III. Agreements to share profits with express
stipulation against losses.- Agreements are sometimes
made by which, though all are to share in the profits, some
of the parties are expressly to be protected against loss.
Such an agreement may constitute a partnership if the other
elements are present. It is lawful for the partners, as between themselves, to stipulate that one or more of them
shall be indemnified against loss, though such a stipulation
cannot affect the liability of the· partners so indemnified to
third persons.1

also that the contract contemplates a division only in case

there are profits made, and that, if there are no profits, the

expenses or losses are to be borne by one only or by both in

their individual capacity. Each of these cases, and others

of like kind which are legally possible, contemplate co-

ownership only in the results of the enterprise rather than

in the enterprise itself or the means of conducting it, and

they are frequently spoken of as partnerships in the profits

only.

73; Morgan v. Stearns, 41 Vt 397." 7 Ala. 761; Consolidated Bank v.

See, also, Buzard v. Bank of Green- State (1850), 5 La. Ann. 44; Baxter

ville (1886), 67 Tex. 83, 60 Am. Rep. 7. v. Hart (1894), 104 CaL 344, 87 Pae.

1 See Brown v. Tapscott (1840), 6 Rep. 941 ; Robbins v. Laswell (1862),

Mees. & Welsby, 119, Ames' Partn. 27 III 365, Paige's Partn. Cas. 7a

Cas. 468; Pollard v. Stanton (1845),

38

§ 52. IV. Partnership in profits only.- It is not indispensable that there shall be a common stock or fund of
goods, land or other tangible property. The contributions .
of one or both of the partners may be simply skill or experience or capacity to labor. Even if tangible property is
necessary to the transaction of the business, it is not essential that it shall be owned by all or any of the partners. It
may be hired from a stranger, or one partner may supply
its use to the firm, retaining the title in himself. It may be
also that the contract contemplates a division only in case
there are profits made, and that, if there are no pro.fits, the
expenses or losses are to be borne by one only or by both in
their individual capacity. Each of these cases, and others
of like kind which. are legally possible, contemplate . oo- .
ownership only in t.he results of the enterprise rather than
in the enterprise itself or the means of conducting it, and
they are frequently spoken of as partnerships in the profits
only.
73; Morgan v. Stearns, 41 Vt. 397."
See, also, Buzard v. Bank of Greenville (1886), 67 Tex. 83, 60 .km. Rep. 7.
l See Brown v. Tapscott (1840), 6
Mees. & Welsby, 119, Ames' Partn.
Cas. 468; Pollard v. Stanton (1$.45),

7 Ala. 761; Consolidated Bank v.
State (1850), 5 La. Ann. 44; Baxter
v. Hart (1894), 104 Cal 344, 87 Pac.
Rep. 941; Robbins v. Laswell (1862),
27 Ill. 365, Paige's Partn. Cas. 79.
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WHAT ACTS CREATE A PABTNEBSHIP. [ 53.

Such a partnership differs from others in degree only and

not in kind. To the extent of the community of interest

WHAT AOT8 OREATB .A. :PABTNERSHIP.

[§ 53.

whether it be in profits only or more there is a partner-

ship with its incident rights and liabilities. 1

53. V. Agreements to share gross returns. Persons

who contribute property or funds for a common enterprise

and agree to share the gross returns of that enterprise in

proportion to their contributions, but who severally retain

the title to their respective contributions, are not thereby

Such a partnership differs from others in degree only and
not in kind. To the extent of the community of interestwhether it be in pro.fits only or more-there is a partnership with its incident .r ights and liabilities.1

rendered partners. They have no common stock or capital,

and no community of interest as principal proprietors in the

business itself from which the proceeds are derived.

Thus, co-owners who divide the earnings of a chattel are

not partners ; nor . are sailors who divide the products of a

voyage; or persons farming land on shares; or two or more

coach-owners who pay their own expenses but divide the

gross receipts of their respective lines of coaches in propor-

tion to the respective earnings of each line ; or two or more

railroad companies who unite to form a continuous line of
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carriage, each paying its own expenses but dividing the re-

ceipts in proportion to the length of their respective lines j

or the lessee and the manager of a theater who share the

gross receipts ; or workmen who build a chattel in common

and divide the receipts; or persons one of whom furnishes

a mill or a brick-yard and the other supplies the labor and

materials to operate it and who divide the product; or per-

sons who unite to buy land or chattels to be sold and the

profits divided ; or persons one of whom furnishes a plant

or outfit while the other runs it, the profits being divided.

Neither is a person a partner who leases property for a

share in the gross receipts, as where one lets a hotel or a

vessel or machinery, receiving a share of the returns as rent.*

* See Robbins v. Laswell (1862X Jones (1861), 29 N. J. L. 270, Paige's

27 I1L 365, Paige's Partn. Cas. 79; Partn. Cas. 70.

Stevens v. Faucet (1860), 24 I1L 483, *See French v. Styling (1857), 2

Paige's Partn. Cas. 64; Voorhees v. Com. B. (N. S.) 357, Ames* Cases on

§ 53. V. Agreements to share gross returns.- Persons
who contribute property or funds for a common enterprise
and agree to.share the gross returns of that enterprise in
proportion to their contributions, but who severally retain
the title to their respective contributions, are not thereby
rendered partners. They have no common stock or capital,
and no community of interest as principal proprietors in the
business itself from which the proceeds are derived.
Thus, co-owners who divide the earnings of a chattel are
not partners; ·nor .are sailors who diyide the products of a
voyage; or persons farming land on shares; or two or more
coach-owners who pay their own expenses but divide the
gross receipts of their respective lines of coaches in proportion to the respective earnings of each line; or two or more
railroad companies who unite to form a continuous line of
carriage, each paying its own expenses but dividing the receipts in proportion to the length of their respective lines;
or the lessee and the manager of a theater who share the
gross receipts; or workmen who build a chattel in common
and divide the receipts; or persons one of whom furnishes
a mill or a brick-yard and the other supplies the labor and
materials to operate it and who divide the product; or persons who unite to buy land or chattels to be sold and the
pro.fits divided; or persons one of whom furnishes a plant
or out.fit while the other runs it, the pro.fits being divided.
Neither is a person a partner who leases property for a
share in the gross receipts, as where one lets a hotel or a
vessel or machinery, receiving a share of the returns as rent.2
1 See Robbins v. Laswell (1862), Jones (1861), 29 N. J. L. 270, Paige's
27 Ill 365, Paige's Partn. Oas. 79; Partn. Cas. 70.
Stevens v. Faucet (1860), 24 Ill 483,
zSee French v. Styring (1857), 9
Paige's Partn. Ca& 64; Voorhees v. CoJ.D. B. (N. S.) 357, Ames' Cases on
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LAW OF PAKTNEBSHIP.

§§ 54, 55.]

LAW OJ' P ARTNEBSHIP.

54. TI. Agreements to share losses only. An agre&

ment to share losses or expenses only does not usually con-

stitute a partnership. Thus, an agreement between two

railroad companies that any injury to persons or goods on

the line of either shall be borne by the company on whose

road it occurs, and that when the place of injury cannot be

determined the loss shall be borne by both in the propor-

tions in which they share the through rates for carriage,

does not make the companies partners. 1

II. OF QFASI-PARTNERSHIPS.

55. Of partnerships as to third persons. "Whenever

there is a partnership as between the parties, and this, as

Partn. 41 (dividing the earnings of

a race-horse) ; Mair v. Glennie (1815),

§ 54:. VI. Agreements to share losses only .-An agre&
ment to share losses or expenses only does not usually con·
stitute a partnership. Thus, an agreement between two
railroad companies that any injury to persons or goods on
the line of either shall be borne by the company on whose
road it occurs, and that when the place of injury cannot be
determined the loss shall be borne by both in the proportions in which they share the through rates for carriage,
does not make the companies partners.1

4 Maule & SeL 240 (sailors); Cham-

pion v. Bostwick (1837), 18 Wend.

(N. Y.) 175, 31 Am. Dec. 376; East-

man v. Clark (1873), 53 N. H. 276,

II. OF QuAsr-PARTNERSHIPS.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:17 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

16 Am. Rep. 192 (coach-owners);

Irvin v. Railroad Co. (1879), 92 III

103, 34 Am. Rep. 116 (railroad com-

panies); Lyon v. Knowles (1863), 3

§ 55. Of partnerships as to third persons.-Whenever
there is a partnership as between the parties,- and this, as

Best & Sm. 556 (theater); Hawkins

v. Mclntyre (1873), 45 Vt 496 (work-

men); Nelms v. McGraw (1890), 93

Ala. 245, 9 So. Rep. 719; Robinson

v. Bullock (1877), 58 Ala. 618 (mill);

Lament v. Fullam (1882), 133 Mass.

583 (brick-yard); Bruce v. Hast-

ings (1868), 41 Vt 380; Munson v.

Sears (1861), 12 Iowa, 172 (land

cases). But there may be a part-

nership in buying land to sell

again. See Flower v. Barnekoff

(1890), 20 Ore. 137, 11 L. R. A. 149;

Bates v. Babcock (1892), 95 CaL 479,

29 Am. St. Rep. 13a Goell v. Morse

(1879), 126 Mass. 480 (chattel to be

resold)! Quackenbush v. Sawyer

(1880), 54 CaL 439 (circus run by one

and income divided); Beecher v.

Bush (1881), 45 Mich. 188, 40 Am.

Rep. 465; O'Donnell v. Battle House

Co. (1880), 67 Ala. 90, 42 Am. Rep. 99;

Miles Co. v. Gordon (1894), 8 Wash.

442, 36 Pac. Rep. 265 (hotel cases);

Cutler v. Winsor (1828), 6 Pick.

(Mass.) 335, 17 Am. Dec. 385 (ves-

sel); Day v. Stevens (1883), 88 N. C.

83, 43 Am. Rep. 732; Putnam v.

Wise (1841), 1 Hill (N. Y.), 234, 37

Am. Dec. 309; Donnell v. Harshe

(1877), 67 Mo. 170; Reynolds v. Pool

(1881), 84 N. C. 37, 37 Am. Rep. 607;

Blue v. Leathers (1853), 15 I1L 82.

Partn. 41 (dividing the earnings of
arace-horse); Mairv.Glennie(1815),
4 Maule & Sel 240 (sailors); Champion v. Bostwick (1837), 18 Wend.
(N. Y.) 175, 31 Am. Dec. 376; Eastman v. Clark (1873), 53 N. H. 276,
16 Am. Rep. 192 (coach-owners);
Irvin v. Railroad Co. (1879), 92 Ill
103, 34 Am. Rep. 116 (railroad companies); Lyon v. Knowles (1863), 3
Best & Sm. 556 (theater); Hawkins
v. Mcintyre (1873), 4-0 Vt. 496 (workmen); Nelms v. McGraw (1890), 93
Ala. 245, 9 So. Rep. 719; Robinson
v. Bullock (1877), 58 Ala. 618 (mill);
Lamont v. Fullam (1882), 133 Mass.
583 (brick-yard); Bruce v. Hastings (1868), 41 Vt. 380; Munson v.
Sears (1861), 12 Iowa, 172 (land
cases). But there may be a partnership in buying land to sell
again. See Flower v. Barnekoff
(1890), 20 Ore. 137, 11 L. R. A. 149;
Bates v. Babcock (1892), 95 Cat (79,
29 Am. St. Rep. 133. Goell v. Morse
(1879), 26 Mass. 480 (chattel to be
resold) Quackenbush v. Sawyer

Paige's Partn. Cas. 87 (farming on

shares); Hagenbeck v. Arena Co.

(1893), 59 Fed. Rep. 14; Pulliam v.

Schimpf (1893), 100 Ala. 862. 14 So.

Rep. 488 (land-owner who furnishes

site, and show or shooting-gallery

proprietor who furnishes means of

amusement, and divide proceeds).

1 See Aigen v. Railroad Co. (1882^

182 Mass. 423; Irvin v. Railroad Co.

(1879), 92 I1L 103, 34 Am. Rep. 116.

40
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(1880), 54 Cal 439 (circus run by one
and income divided); Beecher v.
Bush (1881), 45 Mich. 188, 40 Am.
Rep. 465; O'Donnell v. attle House
Co. (1880), 67 Ala. 90, 42 Am. Rep. 99;
Miles Co. v. Gordon (1894), 8 Wash.
442, 36 Pac. Rep. 265 (hotel cases);
Cutler v. Winsor (1828), 6 Pick.
(Mass.) 335, 17 Am. Dec. 385 (vessel); Day v. Stevens (1883), 88 N. C.
83, 43 Am. Rep. 732; Putnam v.
Wise (1841), 1 Hill (N. Y.), 234, 37
. Arn. Dec. 309; Donnell v. Harsha
(1877), 67 Mo.170; Reynolds v. Pool
(1881), 84 N. C. 37, 37 Am. Rep. 607;
Blue v. Leathers (1853), 15 Ill 32.
Paige's . Partn. Cas. 87 (farming on
shares); Hagenbeck v. Arena Co.
(1893), 59 Fed. Rep. 14; Pulliam v.
Schimpf (1893), 100 Ala. 862. 14 So.
Rep. 488 (land-owner who furnishes
site, and show or shooting-gallery
proprietor who furnishes means of
amusement, and divide proceeds).
1 See Aigen v. Railroad Co. (1882}
182 Mass. 423; Irvin v. Railroad Co.
(1879), 92 I1L 103, 34 Am. Rep. 116.
40
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WHAT ACTS CREATE A PARTNERSHIP. [ 56.

has been seen, is the only true partnership, there is also

necessarily a partnership as to third persons, with its inci-

WHAT A.OTB OREA.TE A P.ARTNERSHIP.

[§ 56.

dental rights and liabilities.

It is, however, entirely settled that a given individual

may be made subject to the liabilities of a partner when in

fact, as between himself and the persons with whom he was

supposed to be a partner, no partnership existed or was in-

tended. This presumed relation is sometimes spoken of as

a partnership as to third persons to distinguish it from the

partnership between the parties ; but it is strictly not a part-

nership at all, for it does not follow because one person is

held liable to another as a partner that the same conclusion

involves a finding that, as between himself and his alleged

partners, a partnership existed with its consequent rights

and obligations.

Two main grounds of liability as a partner to third per-

sons have been insisted upon and require consideration. One

was that of sharing profits,, and the other that of holding

oneself out as a partner.
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1. Of Sharing Profits.

56. Sharing profits was formerly a ground of liabil-

ity to third persons as a partner. It was laid down at an

early period in England, in two cases, Grace v. Smith, 1 and

Waugh v. Carver, 8 which have since become famous in the

law of partnership, that all persons who shared the profits

of a business were liable as partners therein, although as

between themselves no partnership existed or was contem-

plated.

The rule and the reason given for it are well illustrated

in the second of these cases. It appeared that one Carver

and his son, who were established in business at Gosport, had

has been seen, is the only true partnership,- there is also
necessarily a partnership as to third persons, with its incidental rights and liabilities.
It is, however, entirely settled that a given individual
may be made subject to the liabilities of a partner when in
fact, as between himself and the persons with whom he was
supposed to be a partner, no partnership existed or was intended. This presumed relation is sometimes spoken of as
a partnership as to third persons to distinguish it from the
partnership between the parties; but it is strictly not a partnership at all, for it does not follow because one person is
held liable to another as a partner that the same conclusion
involves a finding that, as between himself and his alleged
partners, a partnership existed with its consequent rights
and obligations.
Two main grounds of liability as a partner to third persons have been insisted upon and require consideration. One
was that of sharing profits,. and the other that of holding
oneself out as a partner.

entered into an agreement with one Giesler, who was to es-

tablish himself in the same line of business at Cowes, by

1. Of Sharing Profit&.

i Grace v. Smith (1775), 2 Wm. * Waugh v. Carver (1793), 2 H.

Blackstone, 998, Ames* Partn. Gas. Blackstone, 235, 2 Smith's Lead.

1, Paige's Partn. Gas. 36. Gas. 1316, Ames' Partn. Gas. 6.
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§ 56. Sharing profits was formerly a ground of liabil·
tty to third persons as a partner.- It was laid down at an
early period in England, in two cases, Grace v. Smith,1 and
Waugh v. Carve:r,2 which have since become famous in the
law of partnership, that all persons who shared the profits
of a business were liable as partners therein, although as
between themselves no partnership existed or was contemplated.
The rule and the reason given for it are well illustrated
in the second of these cases. It appeared that one Carver
and his son, who were established in business at Gosport, had
, entered into an agreement with one Giesler, who was to establish himself in the same line of business at Cowes, by
lGrace v. Smith (1775), 2 Wm.
tWaugh v. Carver (1793), 2 H.
Blackstone, 998, Ames' Partn. Cas. Blackstone, 235, 2 Smith's Lead.
t. Paige's Partn. Ca& 36.
Cas. 1316, Ames' Partn. Cas. 6.
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56.] LAW OF PABTNEKSHIP.

which the concerns were to co-operate in transacting busi-

§ 56.]

LAW OF P A.RTNERSHIP.

ness. It was expressly stipulated that neither concern was

to be liable for the losses of the other, and that each was to

be separate and distinct from the other, but once in each

year the parties were to get together and divide in certain

proportions the proceeds of the business of both concerns.

Giesler incurred indebtedness in his own name, for which it

was sought to make the Carvers responsible as partners.

Lord Chief Justice Eyre, who delivered the opinion of thfe

court, admitted that it was " plain upon the construction of

the agreement, if it be construed only between the Carvers

and Giesler, that they were not, nor even meant to be, part-

ners." " They meant each house to carry on trade without

risk of each other, and to be at their own loss. Though

there was a certain degree of control at one house, it was

without an idea that either was to be involved in the conse-

quences of the failure of the other, and without understand-

ing themselves responsible for any circumstances that might

happen to the loss of either. That was the agreement be-
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tween themselves. But the question is whether they have

not, by parts of their agreement, constituted themselves part-

ners in respect to other persons. The case, therefore, is

reduced to the single point, whether the Carvers did not

entitle themselves and did not mean to take a moiety of the

profits of Giesler's house, generally and indefinitely as they

should arise, at certain times agreed upon for the settlement

of their accounts. That they have so done is clear upon the

face of the agreement; and upon the authority of Grace v.

Smith, 1 he who takes a moiety of all the profits indefinitely

1 In Grace v. Smith, the facts her it was dissolved and due notice

were that Grace had sued Smith was given. On the dissolution it

alone as a secret partner with one was agreed that all the stock in

Robinson, for goods delivered to trade and debts due the firm should

the latter, who became bankrupt be transferred to Robinson; that

in 1770. It appeared that on March Smith was to have back 4,200

80, 1767, Smith and Robinson had which he brought into the busi-

formed a partnership for seven ness, and 1,000 for profits up to

years, but in the following Novem- that time; that Smith was to per-

43

which the concerns were to co-operate in transacting business. It was expressly stipulated that nei~her concern was
to be liable for the losses of the other, and that each was to
be separate and distinct from the other, but once in each
year the parties were to get together and divide in certain
proportions the proceeds of the business of both concerns.
Giesler incurred indebtedness in his own name, for which it
was sought to make the Carvers responsible as partners.
Lord Chief Justice Eyre, who delivered the opinion of th~
court, admitted that it was "plain upon the construction of
the agreement, if it be construed only between the Carvers
and Giesler, that they were not, nor even meant to be, partners." "They meant each house to carry on trade without
risk of each other, and to be at their own loss. Though
there was a ce~tain degree of control at one house, it was
without an idea that either was to be involved in the consequences of 't he failure of the other, and without understanding themselves responsible for any circumstances that might
happen to the loss of either. That was the agreement between themselves. But the que~tion is whether they have
not, by parts of their agreement, constituted themselves partners in respect to other persons. The case, therefo re, is
reduced to the single point, whether the Carvers did not
entitle themselves and· did not mean to take a moiety of the
profits of Giesler's house, genera1ly and indefinitely as they
should arise, at certain times agreed upon for the. settlement
of their accounts. That they have so done is clear upon the
face of the agreeme~t; and upon the authority of Grace v.
Smith,1 he who takes a moiety of all the profits indefinitely
1 In Grace v. Smith, · the facts
were that Grace had sued Smith
alone as a secret partner with one
Robinson, fOr goods delivered to
the latter, who became bankrupt
in 1770. It appeared that on March
30, 1767, Smith and Robinson had
formed a partnership for seven
years, but in the following Novem-

her it was dissolved and due notice
was given. On the dissolution it
was agreed that all the stock in
trade and debts due the firm should
be transferred to Robinson; that
Smith was to have back £4,200
which he brought into the business, and £1,000 for profits up to
that time; that Smith was to per·

42
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WHAT ACTS CKEATB A PAETNERSHIP.

shall, by operation of law, be made liable to losses, if losses

WHAT A.OTB CREATE A P ABTNEBSHIP.

[§ 57.

arise, upon the principle that, by taking a part of the profits,

he takes from the creditors a part of that fund which is the

proper security to them for the payment of their debts.

That was the foundation of the decision in Grace v. Smith,

and I think it stands upon the fair ground of reason." The

Carvers were therefore held liable.

57. Same subject. It does not seem to have occurred

to the court that the profits are not the fund, that is, the

only or chief fund to which the creditors may resort, be-

mit 4,000 to remain as a loan to

Robinson for seven years at five

per cent, and an annuity of 300

shall, by operation of law, be made liable to losses, ·if losses
arise, upon the principle that, by taking a part of the profits,
he takes from the creditors a part of that fund which is the
proper security to them for the payment of their debts.
That was the foundation of the decision in Grace v. Smith,
and I think it stands upon the fair ground of reason." The
Carvers were therefore held liable.

per annum, for all which Robinson

gave bond to Smith. Smith after-

wards made further advances until

the whole indebtedness amounted

to 7,000, for which a new bond

§ 57. Same subject.- It does not seem to have occurred
to the court th_a t the profits are not the fund, that is, the
only or chief fund to which the creditors may resort, b~
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was given. The plaintiff contended

that this arrangement made Smith

a secret partner, but he was held

not to be so liable. Said De Grey,

u. J. : " The only question is, What

constitutes a secret partner? Every

uian who has a share of the profits

of a trade ought also to bear his

snare of the loss. And if any one

cakes part of the profit he takes a

part of that fund on which the

creditor of the trader relies for his

payment. If any one advances or

lends money to a trader it is only

lent on his general personal secu-

rity. It is no specific lien upon the

profits of the trade, and yet the

lender is generally interested in

those profits; he relies on them for

repayment. And there is no dif-

ference whether that money be

lent de novo or left behind in trade

by one of the partners who retires.

And whether the terms of- that

loan be kind or harsh makes also

no manner of difference. I think

the true criterion is to inquire

whether Smith agreed to share the

profits of the trade with Robinson,

or whether he only relied on those

profits as a fund of payment; a dis-

tinction not more nice than usually

occurs in questions of trade or

usury. The j ury have said that this

is not payable out of the profits,

and I think there is no foundation

for granting a new trial" Gould,

J., of same opinion. Blackstone, J. :

" Same opinion. I think the true

criterion (when money is advanced

to a trader) is to consider whether

the profit or premium is certain and

defined, or casual, indefinite, and

depending on the accidents of

trade. In the former case it is a

loan (whether usurious or not is

not material to the present ques-

tion), in the latter a partnership.

The hazard of loss and profit is not

equal and reciprocal, if the lender

can receive only a limited sum for

mit £4,000 to remain as a loan to
Robinson for seven years at five
per cent. and an annuity of £300
per annum, for all which Robinson
gave bond. t.o Smith. Smith afterwards made further advances until
the whole indebtedness amounted
to £7,000; for which a new bond
was given. The plaintiff contended
that this arrangement made Smith
a secret partner, but he was held
not to be so liable. Said De Grey,
ti J.: "The only question is, What
'OOtlstitutes a secret partner? Every
Ulan who has a share of the profits
of a trade ought also to bear his
snare of the loss. And if any one
takes part of the profit he takes a
t>art of that fund on which the
creditor of the trader relies for his
payment. If any one advances or
lends money t.o a trader it is only
lent on his general personal security. It is no specific lien upon the
profits of the trade, and yet the
lender is generally interested in
those profits; he relies on them for
repayment.. And there is no di!·
ference whether that money be
lent de novo Ol' left behind in trade
by one of the partners who retires.
A.nd wheth~r the terms of· that

loan be kind or harsh makes also
no manner of difference. I think
the true criterion is to inquire
whether Smith agreed to share the
profits of the trade with Robinson,
or whether he only relied on those
profits as a fund of payment; a distinction not more nice than usually
occurs in questions of trade or
usury. The jury have said that this
is not payable out of the profits,
and I think there is no foundation
for granting a new trial" Gould,
J., of sam~ opinion. Blackstone, J.:
" Same opinion. I think the true
criterion (when money is advanced
to a trader) is to consider whether
the profit or premium is certain and
defined, or casual, indefinite, and
depending on the accidents of
trade. In the former case it is a
loan (whether usurious or not is
not material to the present question), in the latt.er a partnership.
The hazard of ~oss and profit is not
equal and reciprocal, if the lender
can receive only a limited sum for
the profits of his loan, and · yet is
made liable to all the losses, all the
debts contracted in the trade, t.o
any amount." Nares, J., of same
opinion.
·
'3

58.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

cause, as will be seen, whether there are profits or not, the

i

58.]

LAW OF P .A.RTNEBSHIP.

creditors may resort to all of the assets of the firm for pay

ment, as well as to the individual responsibility of the part-

rers. Neither was it observed that the very statement of

the rule involved an inconsistency. Profits are what is left

after the creditors are paid and not before; and therefore to

take account of profits as such while the creditors yet remain

unpaid was an inconsistency. Neither was it observed that

the rule often resulted in compelling one creditor, though

for a small amount, to stand liable as a partner to the other

creditors, even in an indefinite amount. Whatever were

the inconsistencies, however, as they have often since been

pointed out, this was declared to be the rule, and it remained

the rule in England for many years, and was adopted from

thence into the United States, and has been reiterated and

affirmed in many American cases. 1

Under this rule it mattered little what was the name or

nature of the arrangement under which the parties were re-
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lated, or however strongly they asserted their intention not

to be partners, or to what devices they had recourse to avoid

such a conclusion ; if they shared profits as profits, as the

expression was, they were declared to be partners as to third

.persons and liable as such.

58. Of the case of Cox T. Hickman. In 1860 a case

arose in the English courts which required a re-examination

of the ground of liability by sharing profits. This was the

case of Cox v. Hickman, 2 decided in the English House of

Lords. The parties sought to be charged as partners were

not partners inter sese and never intended to be, but they

i See Dob v. Halsey (1819), 16 Medara (1855), 2 Stockt Ch. (N. J.)

Johns. (N. Y.) 34, 8 Am. Dec. 293; 469, 64 Am. Dec. 464; Pratt v.

Bromley v. Elliot (1859), 38 N. H. Langdon (1867), 97 Mass. 97, 93 Am.

287, 75 Am. Deo. 182; Miller v. Dec. 61.

Hughes (1818), 1 A. K Marsh. (Ky.) Cox v. Hickman (I860), 8 House

181,10 Am. Dec. 719; Simpson v. of Lords Cases, 268, Ames' Cases on

Feltz (1826), 1 McCord Ch. (S. C.) Partn. 47.

cause, as will be seen, whether there are profits or not, the
creditors may resort to all of the assets of the firm for payment, as well as to the individual responsibility of the part-r.ers. Neither was it observed that the very statement of
the rule involved an inconsistency. Profits are what is left
after the creditors are paid and not before; and therefore to
take account of profits as such while the creditors yet remain
unpaid was an inconsistency. Neither was it observed that
the rule often resulted in compeliing one creditor, though ..
for a small amount, to stand liable as a partner to the other
creditors, even in an indefinite amount. Whatever were
the inconsistencies, however, as they have often since been
pointed out, this wa-s declared to be the rule, and it remained
the rule in Engla~d for many years, and was adopted from
thence into the United States, and has been reiterated and
affirmed in many American cases.1
Under this rule it mattered little what was the name or
nature of the arrangement under which the parties were related, or however strongly they asserted their intention not
to be partners, or to what devices they had recourse to avoid
·such a conclusion; if they shared profits as profits, as the
-0xpression was, they were declared to be partners as to third
ersons and liable as such~

213, 16 Am. Dec. 602; Sheridan v.

44

§ 58. Of the case of Cox v. Hickman.-In·1860 a case
arose in the English courts which required a re-examination
of the ground of liability by sharing profits. This was the
-case of Cox v. Hickman,2 decided in the English House of
Lords. The parties sought to be charged as partners were
not partners inter sese and never intended to be, but they
I See Dob v. Halsey (1819), 16
Johns. (N. Y.) 34, 8 Am. Dec. 293;
Bromley v. Elliot (1859), 38 N. H.
287, 75 Am. Dec. 182; Miller v.
Hughes (1818), 1 A. K Marsh. (Ky.)
181, 10 Am. Dec. 719; Simpson v.
Feltz (1826), 1 McCord Ch. (S. C.)
213, 16 Am. Dec. 602; Sheridan v.

Medara. (1855), 2 Stockt. Ch. (N. J.)
469, 64 Am. Dec. 464; Pratt v.
Langdon (1867), 97 Mass. 97, 93 Am.
Dec. 61.
2 Cox v. Hickman (1860), 8 House
of Lords Cases, 268, Ames' Cases on
Partn. 47.
44

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

WHAT ACTS DEBATE A PARTNERSHIP. [ 59.

were entitled to share in the net income of a business as

WHAT AOTB OBEATE A PARTNERSHIP.

[§

59~

creditors until their claims were paid.

The facts were that the firm of Smith & Son, becoming

financially embarrassed, turned their property over to trust-

ees appointed by their creditors. The trustees were to carry

on the business under the name of " The Stanton Iron Com-

pany." and divide the net income, 'which was always to be

considered the property of Smith <& Son, among the creditors

until their claims were paid, and then the property was to

be restored to Smith & Son. Hickman sold goods to the

trustees in the name adopted by them for the business, and

drew bills on them which were accepted in that name by

one of the managing trustees. These bills not being paid,

the action was brought to charge the creditors as partners.

It was urged that as they were to share the profits they

thereby became liable as partners, and many of the judges

were of this opinion; but the Lords united in repudiating the

old and arbitrary rule, and placed the liability upon the
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ground which has since been maintained in England that

of mutual agency.

59. Same subject. In the leading opinion of Lord

Cran worth it was said: "It was argued that as they would

be interested in the profits, therefore they would be part

ners. But this is a fallacy. It is often said that the test, 01

one of the tests, whether a person not ostensibly a partnei

is nevertheless in contemplation of law a partner, is whether

he is entitled to participate in the profits. This no doubt is

in general a sufficiently accurate test ; for a right to partici-

pate in profits affords cogent, often conclusive, evidence that

the trade in which the profits have been made was carried

on in part for or on behalf of the person setting up such a

claim. But the real ground of the liability is that the trade

were entitled to share in the net income of a business as.
creditors until their claims were paid.
The facts were that the firm of Smith & Son, becoming
financially embarrassed, turned their property over to trustees appointed by their creditors. The trustees were to carry
on the business under the name of "The Stanton Iron Company/' and divide the net income, which was always to be·
considered the property of Smith & Son, among the creditors.
until their claims were paid, and then the property was to
be restored to Smith & Son. Hickman sold goods to the·
trustees in the name adopted by them for the business, and
drew bills on them which were accepted in that name by
one of the managing trustees." These bills not being paid,,
the action was brought to charge the creditors as partners.
It was urged that as they were to share the profits they
thereby became liable as partners, and many of the judges:
were of this opinion; but the Lords united in repudiating th~,
old and ·arbitrary rule, and placed the liability upon tha·
ground which has since been maintained in England-that
of mutual agency.

had been carried on by persons acting on his behalf. When

that is the case, he is liable to the trade obligations, and en-

titled to its profits, or to a share of them. It is not strictly

correct to say that his right to share in the profits makes

45

§ 59. Same subject.- In the leading opm10n of Lord·
Cranworth it was said: "It was argued that as they would·
be i~terested in the profits, therefore they would be part
ners. But this is a fallacy. It is often said that the test, 01·
one of the tests, whether a person not ostensibly a partne1
is nevertheless in contemplation of law a partner, is whether
he is entitled to participate in the profits. This no doubt is.
in general a sufficiently accurate test; for a right to participate in profits a:ffords cogent, often conclusive, evidence that
the trade in which the profits have been made was carried·
on in part for or on behalf of the person setting up such a
. claim. But the real ground of the liability is that the trade·
had been carried on by persons acting on his behalf. Whenthat is the case, he is liable. to the trade obligations, and en·
titled to its profits, or to a share of them. It is not .strictly
correct to say that his right to share in the profits makes45

60, 61.] LAW OF PABTNEKSHIP.

him liable to the debts of the trade. The correct mode o\

§§ 60, 61.]

LAW OF P ARTNE.RSHIP.

stating the proposition is to say that the same thing which

entitles him to the one makes him liable to the other, namely,

the fact that the trade has been carried on on his behalf, i. e.,

that he stood in the relation of principal towards the persons

acting ostensibly as the traders, by whom the liabilities have

been incurred, and under whose management the profits

have been made."

60. Same subject. " Taking this to be the ground of

liability as a partner," continued Lord Cranworth, " it seems

to me to follow that the mere concurrence of creditors in an

arrangement under which they permit their debtor, or trust-

ees for their debtor, to continue his trade, applying the

profits in discharge of their demands, does not make them

partners with their debtor or the trustees. The debtor is

still the person solely interested in the profits, save only that

he has mortgaged them to his creditors. He receives the

benefit of the profits as they accrue, though he has precluded
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himself from applying them to any other purpose than the

discharge of his debts. The trade is not carried on by or

on account of the creditors, though their consent is neces-

sary in such a case, for without it all the property might be

seized by them in execution. But the trade still remains

the trade of the debtor or his trustees ; the debtor or the

trustees are the persons by or on behalf of whom it is car-

ried on." The defendants were therefore held not liable.

61. Effect of Cox v. Hickman on English law. In a

case arising not long afterwards it became essential to de-

termine, in the language of Blackburn, J., " what really was

the effect of the decision of the House of Lords in Cox v.

Hickman," and he said : " Prior to that decision, the dictum

of De Grey, C. J., in Grace v. Smith, * that every man who

has a share of the profits of a trade ought also to bear a

share of the loss,' had been adopted as the ground of judg-

ment in Waugh v. Carver, where it was laid down * that he

who takes a moiety of all profits indefinitely shall, by op-

46

him liable to the debts of the trade. The correct mode dJ.
stating the proposition is to say that the same thing which
entitles him to the one makes him liable to the other, namely,
the fact that the trade has been carried on on his behalf, i. e.,
that he stood in the relation of principal towards the persons
acting ostensibly as the traders, by whom the liabilities have
been incurred, and under whose management the profits
have been made."
§ 60. Same subject.-"Taking this to be the ground of
liability as a partner," continued Lord Cranworth, "it seems
to me to follow that the mere concurrence of creditors in an
arrangement under which they permit their debtor, or trustees for their debtor, to continue his trade, applying · the
profits in discharge of their demands, does not make them
partners with their debtor or the trustees. The debtor is
still the person solely interested in the profits, save only that
he has mortgaged them to his creditors. He receives the
benefit of the profits as they accrue, though he has precluded
himself from applying them to· any other purpose than the
discharge of his debts. The trade is not carried on by or
on account of the creditors, though their consent is necessary in such a case, for without it all the property might be
seized by them in execution. But the trade still remains
the trade of the debtor or his trustees; the debtor or the
trustees are the persons by or on behalf of whom it is carried on." The defendants were therefore held not liable.
§ 61. Effect of Cox v. Hickman on English law.- In a
case arising not long afterwards it became essential to determine, in the language of Blackburn, J., "what really was
the effect of the decision of the House of Lords in Cox v.
Hickman," and he said: " Prior to that decision, the dictum
of De Grey, C. J., in Gr~ce v. Smith, 'that every man who
has a share of the profits of a trade ought also to bear a
share of the loss,' had been adopted as the ground of judgment in Waugh v. Carver, where it was laid down 'that he
who takes a moiety of all profits indefinitely shall, by op46
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WHAT ACTS OKEATE A PABTNEBSHIP. [ 6L

eration of law, be made liable to losses if losses arise, upon

WHAT A.OTB ORE.AT."E .A PARTNERSHIP.

[§ 6L

the principle that, by taking a part of the profits, he takes

from the creditors a part of that fund which is the proper

security to them for the payment of their debts.' This de-

cision has never been overruled. The reasoning on which it

proceeds seems to have been generally acquiesced in at the

time; and when, more recently, it was disputed, it was a

common opinion (in which I for one participated) that the

doctrine had become so inveterately part of the law of Eng-

land that it would require legislation to reverse it. In Cox

v. Hickman the creditors of a trade had agreed that their

debtor's trade should be carried on for the purpose of pay-

ing them their debts out of the profits, and the composition

deed to which they were parties secured to them a property

in the profits. The rule laid down in Waugh v. Carver, if

logically followed out, led to the conclusion that all the

creditors who assented to this deed, and by so doing agreed

to take the profits, were individually liable as partners; but
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when it was sought to apply the rule to such an extreme

case, it was questioned whether the rule itself was really

established. There was a very great difference of opinion

amongst the judges who decided the case in its various stages

below, and also amongst those consulted in the House of

Lords. In the result, the House of Lords consisting of Lord

Campbell, C., and Lords Brougham, Cranworth, Wensleydale

and Chelmsford unanimously decided that the creditors

were not partners. The judgments of Lord Cranworth and

of Lord 'Wensleydale bear internal evidence of having been

written. Lord Campbell, C., and Lords Brougham and

Chelmsford said a few words expressing their concurrence.

It is therefore in the written judgments, and more especially

in the elaborate judgment of Lord Cranworth, that we must

look for the ratio decidendi. . . .

" I think that the ratio decidendi is, that the proposition

laid down in Waugh v. Carver viz., that a participation

in the profits of a business does of itself, by operation of

law, constitute a partnership is not a correct statement

47

eration of law, be made liable. to losses if losses arise, upon
the principle that, by taking a part of the profits, he takes ·
from the creditors a part of that fund which is the proper
security to them for the payment of their debts.' This decision has never been overruled. The reasoning on which it
proceeds seems to have been generally acquiesced in at the
time; and when, more recently, it was disputed, it was a
common opinion (in which I for one participated) that the
doctrine had become so inveterately part of the law of England that it would require legislation to reverse it. In Cox
v. Hickman the creditors of a trade had agreed that their
debtor's trade should be carried on for the purpose of paying them their debts out of the profits, and the composition
deed to which they were parties secured to them a property
in the profits. The rule laid down in Waugh v. Carver, if
logically followed out, led to the conclusion that all the
creditors.who assented to this deed, and by so doin'g agreed
to take the profits, were individually liable as partners; but
when it was sought to apply the rule to such an extreme
case, it was questioned whether the rule itself was really
established. There was a very great dift'erence of opinion
amongst the judges who decided the case in its various stages
below, and also amongst those consulted in the House of
Lords. In the result, the House of Lords - consisting of Lord
Campbell, C., and Lords Brougham, Cran worth, Wensleydale
and Chelmsford - unanimously decided that the creditors
were not partners. The judgrp.ents of Lord Cranworth and
of Lord ·wensleydale bear internal evidence of having been
written~ Lord Campbell, C., and Lords Brougham and
Chelmsford said a few words expressing their concurrence.
It is therefore in the written judgments, and more especially
in the elaborate judgment of Lord Cranworth, that we must
look for the ratio deaidendi. . • .
"I think that the ratio decidendi is, that the proposition
laid down in Waugh v..Carver - viz., that a participation
in the profits of a business does of itself, by operation of
law, constitute a partnership- is not a correct statement
47

62, 63.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

of the law of England ; but that the true question is, as stated

§§ 62, 63.]

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

by Lord Cranworth, whether the trade is carried on on be-

half of the person sought to be charged as a partner, the

participation in the profits being a most important element

in determining that question, but not being in itself decisive ;

the test being, in the language of Lord "Wensleydale, whether

it is such a participation of profits as to constitute the rela-

tion of principal and agent between the person taking the

profits and those actually carrying on the business." l

62. Effect of Cox T. Hickman in the United States.- -

In the United States the case of Cox v. Hickman has been

quite generally followed. In many of the states earlier de-

cisions following the old English cases have been overruled,

though in others, and notably in New York* and Pennsyl-

vania,* the courts have held the former rule to be too deeply

of the law of England; but that the true question is, as stated
by Lord Cranworth, whether the trade is carried on on behalf of the person sought to be charged as a partner, the
participation in the profits being a most important element
in determining that question, but not being in itself decisive;
the test being, in the language of Lord Wensleydale, whether
it is such a participation of profits as to constitute the relation of principal and agent between the person taking the
profits _a nd those actually carrying on the business." 1

rooted in their jurisprudence to be overthrown, except by

legislative action.

63. Same subject Beecher T. Ens!;. In a case in
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Michigan 4 in which the question arose, the court, speaking

through Mr. Justice Cooley, after reviewing many of the de-

iBullen v. Sharp (1865), L. R. 1 Beecher v. Bush (1881), 45 Mich.

Com. PL 86, Ames' Gas. on Partn. 188, 40 Am. Rep. 465, Paige's Partn.

67. See, also, Mollwo v. Courts of Cas. 46. In this case it appeared

Wards (1872), L. R. 4 Pr. Coun. App. that Beecher owned a hotel One

419, Ames' Cases on Partn. 79; Williams proposed to "hire the

Pooley v. Driver (1876), 5 Ch. Div. use " of it and pay Beecher there-

458, Ames' Cases on Partn. 87. See, for, from day to day, a sum " equal

also, now the Partnership Act, 2, to one-third of the gross receipts

§ 62. E:fl'ect of Cox v. Hickman in the United States.- In the United States the case of Cox v. Hickman has been
quite generally followed. In many of the states earlier d&cisions following the old English cases have been overruled,
though in others, and notably in New York 2 and Pennsylvania,S the courts have held the former rule to be too deeply
rooted in their jurisprudence to be overthrown, except by
legislative action.

Appendix, post. and gross earnings." Beecher ao

2 See Leggett v. Hyde (1874), 58 cepted and the arrangement went

N. Y. 272, 17 Am. Rep. 244; Hack- into effect Williams bought goods

ett v. Stanley (1889), 115 N. Y. 625. of Bush which he did not pay for,

* See Wessels v. Weiss (1895), 166 and this action was to hold Beecher

Pa. St. 490, 31 AtL Rep. 247. In liable for them as a partner with

§ 63. Same subject-Beecher v. Bnsh.-In a case in
Michigan' in which the question arose, the court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Cooley, after reviewing many of the de-

North Carolina, see Southern Fer- Williams by force of the arrange-

tilizer Co. v. Reams (1890), 105 N. ment Held, not liable,

C. 283; Cossack v. Burgwyn (1893),

112 N. C. 304, 16 a E. Rep. 900.

48

1 Bullen v. Sharp (1865), L. · R. 1
Com. Pl 86, Ames' Cas. on Partn.
67. See, also, Mollwo v. Courts of
Wards (1872), L. R. 4 Pr. Coun. App.
419, Ames' Cases on Partn. 79;
Pooley v. Driver (1876), 5 Ch. Div.
458, Ames' Cases on Partn. 87. See,
also, now the Partnership Act, § 2,
Appendix, post.
2 See Leggett v. Hyde (1874), 58
N. Y. 272, 17 Am. Rep. 244; Hackett v. Stanley (1889), 115 N. Y. 625.
•See Wessels v. Weiss (1895), 166
Pa. St. 490, 31 Atl Rep. 247. In
North Carolina, see Southem Fertilizer Co. v. Reams (1890}, 105 N.
C. 283; Cossack v. Burgwyn (1893),
112 N. C. 304. 16 S. E. Rep. 900.

•Beecher v. Bush (1881), 45 Mich.
188, 40 Am. Rep. 465, Paige's Partn.
Cas. 46. In this case it appeared
that Beecher owned a hotel One
Williams proposed to "hire the
use" of it and pay Beecher the~
for, from day to day, a sum "equal
to one-third of the gross receipts
and gross earnings." Beecher a<>
cepted and the arrangement weni
into effect. Williams bought goods
of Blish which he did not pay for,
and this action was to hold Beecher
liable for them as a partner with
Williams by force of the arrangement. Held, not liable.
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VTHAT ACTS CREATE A PARTNERSHIP

'WB.AT ACTS ORE.A.TE A PARTNERSHIP

[64.

cisions both prior and subsequent to Cox v. Hickman, says:

" It is needless to cite other cases. They cannot all be rec-

[§ 64.

.
cisions both prior and subsequent to Cox v. Hickman, says:

onciled, but enough are cited to show that, in so far as the

notion ever took hold of the judicial mind that the question

of partnership or no partnership was to be settled by arbi-

trary tests, it was erroneous and mischievous, and the proper

corrective has been applied. Except when one allows the

public or individual dealers to be deceived by the appear-

ances of partnership where none exists, he is never to be

charged as a partner, unless by contract and with intent he

has formed a relation in which the elements of partnership

are to be found. And what are these? At the very least

the following: Community of interest in some lawful com-

merce or business, for the conduct of which the parties are

mutually principals of and agents for each other, with gen-

eral powers within the scope of the business, which powers,

however, by agreement between the parties themselves, may
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be restricted at option, to the extent even of making one

the sole agent of the others and of the business."

64. Same subject Harvey v. Childs. In another

case l upon the subject which arose in Ohio it is said : " "What

shall be regarded, as to third persons, as a test of partnership

between parties who did not consider themselves to be part-

i Harvey v. Childs (1876), 28 Ohio

St. 819, 22 Am. Rep. 387. In this

case one Potter was buying hogs

for shipment. He had not money

enough, and tried to get Childs to

supply it and take an interest in

" It is needless to cite other cases. They cannot all be reconciled, but enough are cited to show· that, in so far as the
notion ever took hold of the judicial mind that the question
of partnership or no pa~tnership was to be settled by arbitrary tests, it was· erroneous and mischievous, and the proper
corrective has been applied. Except when one allows the
· public or individual dealers to be de.ceived by the appearances of partnership where none exists, he is never to be
charged as a partner, unless by contract and with intent he
has formed a relation in which the elements of partnership ·
are to be found. And what are these? At the very least
the following: Community of interest in some lawful commerce or business, for the conduct of which the parties are
mutually principals of and agents for each other, with general powers within th'e scope of the business, which powers,
however, by agreement between the parties themselves, may
be restricted at option, to the extent even of making one
the sole agent of the others and of the business."

the venture, but Childs refused. It

was then agreed that Childs should

let Potter have money to complete

his purchases, and Childs was to

take possession of the hogs as se-

curity, sell them, reimburse him-

§ 64:. Same subject - Harvey v. Childs. - In another
case 1 upon the subject which arose in Ohio it is said: "What
shall be regarded, as to third persons, as a test of partnership
between parties wlro did not consider themselves to be part-

self and have half of the net

profits; but that in any event Pot-

ter should pay back all of Childs'

advances. Without the knowledge

44

of Childs, Potter bought on his own

credit a lot of hogs of Harvey, the

plaintiff, but did not pay for them.

These hogs formed part of the lot

which Childs sold in pursuance

of his arrangement with Potter.

There were no profits, but a loss,

and Potter made it good to Childs.

Potter did not pay Harvey, and

Harvey sued Childs to hold him

liable as a partner with Potter in

the purchase. Held, that he was

not liable. See, also, Clifton v.

Howard (1886), 89 Ma 192, 58 Am.

Rep. 97.

I Harvey v. Childs (1876), 28 Ohio
St. 319, 22 Am. Rep. 387. In this
case one Potter was buying hogs
for shipment. He had not money
enough, and tried to get Childs to
supply it and take an interest in
the venture, but Childs refused. It
was then agreed that Childs should
let Potter have money tq complete
his purchases, and Childs was to
take possession of the hogs as security, sell them, reimburse him·
self and have half of the net
profits; but that in any event Potter should pay back all of Childs'
advances. Without the knowledge

'

of Childs, Potter bought on his own
credit a lot of hogs of Harvey, the
plaintiff, but did not pay for them.
These hogs formed part of the lot
which Childs sold in pursuance
of his arrangement with Potter.
Th&e were no profits, but a loss,
and Potter made it good to Childs.
Potter did not ·pay Harvey, and
Harvey sued Childs to hold him
liable as a partner with Potter in
.the purchase. Held, that he was
not liable. See, also, Clifton v.
Howard (1886), sg Mo. 192, 58 Am.
Rep. 97.
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65.] JLAW OF PABTNEBSHIP.

ners and who have done nothing to estop them from deny-

§ 65.]

LAW OJ' P A.RTNEBSHIP.

ing that they are such, has been much discussed by courts

and elementary writers, and the problem seems to be one

of difficult solution. It is needless to review here the nu-

merous cases on the subject; a statement of results is suffi-

cient.

" No little difficulty has been experienced in determining

the meaning and limits of phrases that have been recognized

as tests of a partnership in such cases, and in their applica-

tion to the varying cases that arise. The effort has been to

draw a distinct line between cases where one has a com-

munity of interest in the profits of a business, as distin-

guished from those where one is entitled to receive a sum

of money out of the profits as a creditor, or a sum propor-

tioned to a quantum of profits, or a share of the profits as

a compensation for services or labor.

" Although a partnership may be said to rest upon the

idea of a communion of profits, nevertheless the foundation
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of the liability of one partner for the acts of another is the

relation they sustain to each other, as being each principal

and agent. That relation, it would seem, then, constitutes

the true test of a partnership liability, and rests upon the

just foundation that the joint liability was incurred on the

express or implied authority of the party sought to be

charged."

65. Same subject. "But if the relation of principal

and agent be regarded as the test of a partnership and con-

sequent joint liability," continued the court, " the question

still remains: What shall be deemed sufficient evidence of

that relation, or to raise the implication of authority to

incur the liability in question ? To this end numerous tests

have been supposed to exist; but the best considered and

least objectionable is that of a community of interest in the

profits of a business or transaction as a principal or pro-

prietor. But this test is valuable as a rulo chiefly because

it evinces a relation between the parties, where each may

50

ners and who have done nothing to estop them from deny·
ing that they are such, has been much discussed by courts
and elementary writers, and the problem seems to be one
of difficult solution. It is needless to review· here the numerous cases on the subject; a statement of results is sufficient.
"No little difficulty has been experienced in determining
the meaning and limits of phrases that have been recognized
as tests of a partnership in. such cases, and in their application to the varying cases that arise. The effort has been to
draw a distinct line between cases where one has a community of interest in the profits of a business, as distinguished from those where one is entitled to receive a. sum
of money out of the profits as a creditor, or a. sum proportioned to a quantum of profits, or a share of the pro.fits as
a compensation for services or labor.
"Although a partnership may be said to rest upon the
idea of a communion of profits, nevertheless the foundation
of the liability of one partner for the acts of another is the
relation they sustain to each other, as being each principal
and agent. That relation, it would seem, then, constitutes
the true test of a partnership liability, and rests upon the
just foundation that the joint liability was incurred on the
express or implied authority of the party sought to be
charged."
§ 65. Same subject. - "But if the relation of pri!lcipal

and agent be regarded as the test of a partnership and con·
sequent joint liability,'' continued the cour~ "the question
still remains: What shall be deemed sufficient evidence of
that relation, or to raise the implication of authority to
incur the liability in question~ To this end numerous tests
have been supposed to ex~st; but the best considered and
least objectionable is that of a community of interest in the
profits of a business or transaction as a principal or proprietor. But this test is valuable as a rulo chiefly because
it evinces a relation between the parties, where each may
50
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WHAT ACTS CREATE A PARTNERSHIP. [ Ob.

reasonably be presumed to act for himself and as agent for

WHAT .A.OTB OREA.TE A P.ARTNRRSHIP.

[§ 66.

the others, and to that extent establishes the fact that the

liability was incurred on the authority of all so participating

in the profits. Participation, in the profits of a business,

however, cannot be regarded as a rule so universal and un-

relenting as to be unjustly applied to a case where a debt is

incurred by one who cannot be said to be acting, in the par-

ticular transaction, as the agent or on behalf of the party

sought to be charged. Therefore, on principle, the true test

of a partnership, at last, is left to be that of the relation of

the parties as principal and agent, to be proved by any com-

petent evidence; for where they sustained that relation, a

joint liability may be said to have been incurred by the au-

thority or on behalf of each of the parties so related. The

tendency of the more modern authorities, both English and

American, is to this conclusion."

66. Same subject Meehan T. Yalentine. The test

of mutual agency has not, however, proven entirely satis-
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factory to all of the courts. It is said, and not without rea-

son, that this is to invert the logical order of events and

turn the result into the cause that mutual agency is the

result of partnership rather than that partnership is the re-

sult of mutual agency. Thus it is said in a recent case ! in

the supreme court of the United States: "As has been

pointed out in later English cases, the reference to agency

1 Meehan v. Valentine (1891), 145 determine the eract profit, it was

reasonably be presumed to act for himself and. as agent for
the others, and to that extent establishes the fact that the
liability was incurred on the authority of all so participating
in the profits. Participation in the profits of a business,
however, cannot be regarded as a rule so universal and unrelenting as to be unjustly applied to a case where a debt is
incurred by one who cannot be said to be acting, in the particular transaction, as the agent or on behalf of the party
sought to be charged. Therefore, on principle, the true test
of a partnership, at last, is left to be that of the relation of
the parties as principal and agent, to be proved by any competent evidence; for where they sustained that relation, a
joint liability may be said to have been incurred by the authority or .on behalf of each of the parties so related. The
tendency of the more modern authorities, both English ;ind
American, is to this conclusion."

U. S. 611. This was an action agreed that he should have $1,000

brought to charge the estate of one each year on account, leaving the

P., deceased, of which V. was ex- exact amount to be determined on

ecutor, on the ground that P. was the final settlement of the whole

a partner in the firm of C. & Co. business. This arrangement was

P. loaned C. & Co. $10,000 on the continued for four years, when C.

agreement that he was to have, in & Co. failed, owing large amounts

addition to the interest, one-tenth to the plaintiff and others. The

of the net profits over a given sum. court held that this was a loan;

P. received, under this agreement, that P. was a creditor and not a

about $1,500 the first year; but partner, and consequently that the

afterwards, as it was difficult to action could not be maintained.

51

§ 66. Same subject - Meehan v. Valentine.- The test
of mutual agency has not, however, proven entirely satisfactory to all of the courts. It is said, and not without reason, that this is to invert the logical order of events and
turn the result into the cause-that mutual agency is the
result of partnership ·rather than that partnership is the result of mutual agepcy. Thus it is said in a recent case 1 in
the supreme court of the United States: "As has been
pointed out in later English cases, the reference to agency
determine the e~act profit, it was
agreed that he should have $1,000
each year on account, leaving the
exact amount to be determined on
the final settlement of the whole
business. This arrangement was
continu~d for four years, when C.
& Co. failed, owing large amounts
to the plaintiff and others. The
court held that this was a loan;
that P. was a creditor and not a
partner, and consequently that the
action could not be maintained.

I Meehan v. Valentine (1891), 145
U. S. 611. This was an action
brought to charge the estate of one
P., deceased, of which V. was executor, on the ground that P. was
a partner in the firm of C. & Co.
P. loaned C. & Co. $10,000 on the
agreement that he was to have, in
addition to the interest, one-tenth
Qf the net profits over a given sum.
£>.received, under this agreement,
about $1,500 the first year; but
afterwards, as it was d1flicult to

51

67, 68.] LAW OF PARTNEBSHIP.

as a test of partnership was unfortunate and inconclusive,

§§ 67, 68.]

LAW 07 P .A.RTNERSHIP.

inasmuch as agency results from partnership rather than

partnership from agency. Such a test seems to give a

synonym rather than a definition; another name for the

conclusion rather than a statement of the premises from

which the conclusion is to be drawn. To say that a person

is liable as a partner, who stands in the relation of principal

to those by whom the business is actually carried on, adds

nothing by way of precision, for the very idea of partner-

ship includes the relation of principal and agent."

67. Same subject. In this case the court further say :

" In the present state of the law upon this subject, it may

perhaps be doubted whether any more precise general rule

can be laid down than that those persons are partners who

contribute either property or money to carry on a joint

business for their common benefit, and who own and share

the profits thereof in certain proportions. If they do this,

as a. test of partnership was unfortunate and inconclusive,
inasmuch as agency results from partnership rather than
partnership from agency. Such a. test seems to give a
synonym rather than a definition; another name for the
conclusion rather than a statement of the premises from
which the conclusion is to be drawn. To say that a person
is liable as a partner, who stands in the relation of principal
to those by whom the business is actually carried on, adds
nothing by way of precision, for the very idea of° partnership includes the relation of principal and agent."

the incidents or consequences follow, that the acts of one in

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

conducting the partnership business are the acts of all ; that

each is agent for the firm and for the other partners ; that

each receives part of the profits as profits, and takes part ol

the fund to which the creditors of the partnership have a

right to look for the payment of their debts ; that all are

liable as partners upon contracts made by any of them

within the scope of the partnership business; and that even

an express stipulation between them that one shall not be

so liable, though good between themselves, is ineffectual as

against third persons. And participating in profits is pre-

sumptive, but not conclusive, evidence of partnership."

68. Same subject. Notwithstanding these differences

of opinion as to the test of mutual agency, it is entirely clear

that the old rule that sharing profits as profits made one a

partner is overthrown. It seems also to be true that the real

test is that suggested by the definition given in the first sec-

tion, namely, that there must be a community of interest

a joining as principals, in carrying on a business for theii.

52

§ 67. Same subject. - In this case the court further say:
"In the present state of the law upon this subject, it may
perhaps be doubted whether any more precise general rule
can be laid down than that those persons are partners who
contribute either property or money to carry on a joint
business for their common benefit, and who own and share
the profits thereof in certain proportions. If they do this,
the incidents or consequences follow, that the acts of one in
conducting the partnership business are the acts of all; that
each is agent for the firm and for the other partners; that
each receives part of the profi.ts as profits, and takes part oi
the fund to which the creditors of the partnership have a
right to look for the payment of their debts; that all are
liable as partners upon contracts made by any of them
within the scope of the partnership business; and that even
an express stipulation between them that one shall not be
so liable, though good between themselves, is ·ineffectual as
against third persons. And participating in profits is presumptive, but not conclusive, evidence of partnership."
§ 68. Same subject.- Notwithstanding these differences
of opinion as to the test of mutual agency, it is entirely clear
that the old rule that sharing profits as profits made one a
partner is overthrown. It seems also to be true that the real
test is that suggested by 'the definition given in the first section, namely, that there must be a community of interesta. joining as principals, in carrying on a business for theiiv
52
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WHAT ACTS CREATE A PARTNERSHIP. [ 69.

joint profit. This community of interest as principals in the

WHAT ACTS OREA.TE A P A.BTNERSHIP.

[§ 69.

transaction necessarily excludes mere servants or agents

who are to share profits by way of contingent compensa-

tion ; lenders who are to share in the profits by way of con-

tingent interest; landlords who are to take a share of the

profits by way of rent; and any other class of creditors

whose interest is not in the business itself, who have no com-

mon ownership of the business, its capital or its stock in

trade, who do not own the profits, if there are any, who

have no voice or part in controlling the management of the

business, but who are simply entitled to be paid out of the

profits, if there are any, some claim or demand which they

have against the real principals in the business. 1

It is apparent that the subdivision now under consider-

ation is not property to be deemed a ground for the creation

of a ^w^m-partnership. It remains, therefore, to consider

the other, already mentioned, namely

2. Of Holding Out as a Partner.
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69. Person may become liable as a partner by bold-

ing himself out as one. A person who is not actually a

partner may render himself liable as though he were one by

so conducting himself as to reasonably induce third persons

to believe that he is a partner and to act upon that belief.

This rule is based upon the same principle as that which has

been discovered in the law of Agency, that a person may

become liable for the acts of another who was not really

his agent, if he has so conducted himself as to lead others

Joint profit. This community of interest as principals in the
transaction necessarily excludes mere servants or agents
who are to share profits by way of contingent compensar
tion; lenders who are to share in the profits by way of contingent int~rest; landlords who are to take a share of the
profits by way of rent; and any other class of creditors
whose interest is not in the business itself; who have no common ownership of the business, its capital or its stock in
trade, who do not own the profits, if there are any, who
have no voice or part in controlling the management of the
business, but who are simply entitled to be paid out of the
profits, if there are any, some claim or demand whlch they
have against the real principals in the business.1
It is apparent that the .subdivision now under consideration is not properly to be deemed a ground for the creation
of a. quasi-partnership. It remains, therefore, to consider
the other, already mentioned, namely-

to believe that such person was his agent. It is a case in

which the principle of estoppel applies. Estoppel is that

which stops, bars, or prevents. More specifically, for our

2. Of Holding Out ,as a Parl!Mr.

1 See, also, Parchen r. Anderson goner v. First Nat. Bank (1894), 43

(1885), 5 Mont 438, 51 Am. Rep. 65; Neb. 84, 61 N. W. Rep. 112; Boston

Vinson v. Beveridge. 3 MacArth. Smelting Co. v. Smith (1880), 13

(D. C.) 597, 36 Am. Rep. 113; So- R L 27, 43 Am. Rep. 8; Culley v.

diker v. Applegate (1884), 24 W. Edwards (1884), 44 Ark. 423, 5J

Va. 411, 49 Am. Rep. 252; Wag- Am. Rep. 614

53

§ 69. Person may become liable as a pa~tner by holding himself out as one.-A person who is not actually a
partner may render himself liable as though he were one by
so conducting himself as to reasonably induce third persons
to believe that he is a partner and to act upon that belief.
This rule is based upon the same principle as that which has
been discovered in the law of Agency,- that a person may
become liable for the acts of another who was not really
his agent, if he has so conducted himself as to ~ead others
to believe that such person was his agent. It is a case in
which the principle of estoppel applie·s. Estoppel is that
which stops, bars, or prevents. More specifically, for our
1 See, also, Parchen T. Anderson
(1885), 5 Mont. 438, 51 Am. Rep. 65;
Vinson v. Beveridge, 3 MacArth.
(D. C.) 597, 36 Am. Rep. 113; Sodiker v. Applegate (1884), 24 W.
Va. •11, ~9 Am. Rep. 252; Wag-

goner v. First Nat. Bank (1894), 43
Neb. 84, 61 N. W. Rep. 112; Boston
Smelting Co. v. Smith (1880), 13
R. L 27, 43 Am. Rep. 8; Culley v.
Edwards (1884), 44 Ark. 423, 51
Am. Rep. 61'.

t53

70.] LAW OF PAKTNEKSHIP.

purposes, it is that principle of the law which operates to

§ 70.J

LAW OJ" P ABTNERSBIP.

prevent a man, who has knowingly led another reasonably

and in good faith to rely upon the existence of a certain

condition of things, from afterwards denying, to the preju-

dice of such other, that such a condition of things did exist.

In the law of partnership it is commonly spoken of as a

liability incurred by holding oneself out as a partner.

70. Same subject What facts must exist? In order

fto the existence of this liability, two main facts must exist :

1. The condition or thing relied upon as evidence of the

holding out must have been caused either by the party to

be charged as partner, in perspn, or by another with his

knowledge and consent; and

purposes, it is that principle of the law which operates to
prevent a man, who has knowingly led another reasonably
and in good faith to rely upon th~ existence of a certain
condition of things, from afterwards denying, to the prejudice of .such other, that such a condition of things did exist.
In the faw of partnership it is commonly spoken of as a
liability incurred by holding oneself out as a partner.

2. The party seeking to hold him liable as a partner must,

in the exercise of reasonable prudence and good faith, have

relied upon such condition or thing and been misled by it. 1

The condition or thing relied upon may be an act or a

representation or a mere failure to act. No particular form
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or ceremony is necessary. The appearance or condition re-

lied upon need not have been caused by the party in person,

but may have been caused by others with his knowledge

1 In Lindley on Partnership (vol. cannot be imputed to the person

1, p. 43) it is said: " It follows . . sought to be made liable ; and in the

that a person cannot be liable on a absence of the second, the person

contract, on the ground that he seeking to make him liable has not

held himself out as a partner, un- in any way been misled." See. also,

less he did so before the contract Hahlo v. Mayer (1890), 102 Mo. 93,

was entered into. It also follows 22 Am. St. Rep. 753; Fletcher v.

that no person can be fixed with Pullen (1889), 70 Md. 205, 14 Am.

liability on the ground that he has St Rep. 355; Morgan v.Farrel (1890),

been held out as a partner, unless 58 Conn. 413, 18 Am. St. Rep. 282:

two things concur, viz. : first, the al- Van Kleeck v. Hammell (1891), 87

leged act of holding out must have Mich. 599, 24 Am. St Rep. 182;

been done either by him or by his Thompson v. First National Bank

§ 70. Same subject-·What facts must exist1- In. order
to the existence of this liability, two main facts must exist:

1. The condition or thing relied upon as evidence of the
Iholding
out must have been caused either by the party to
be ~harged as partner, in perspn, or by another with his
knowledge and consent; and
.
2. The party seeking to hold him liable as a partner must,
in the exercise of reasonable prudence and good faith, have
relied upon such condition or thing and been misled by it.1
The condition or thing relied upon may be an act or a
representation or a mere failure to act. No particular form
or ceremony is necessary. The appearance or condition relied upon need not have been caused by the party in person,
but may have been caused by others with his knowledge

consent, and secondly, it must have (1883), 111 U. S. 529 ; Lincoln v. Craig

been known to the person seeking (1889), 16 R. L 564, 18 AtL Rep, 175;

to avail himself of it. In the ab- Cornhauser v. Roberts (1890), 75

sence of the first of these requi- Wis. 554, 44 N. W. Rep. 744,

sites, whatever may have been done

54

1 In Lindley on Partnership (vol.
1, p. 43) it is said: "It follows • •
· that a person cannot be liable on a
contract, on the ground that he
held himself out as a partner, unless he .did so before the contract
was entered into. It also follows
· that no person can be fixed with
liability on the ground that he has
been held out as a partner, unless
two things concur, viz.: first, the alleged act of holding out must have
been done either by him or by his
consent, and secondly, it must have
been known to the person seeking
to avail himself' of it. In the absence of the first of these requisites, whatever may have be.e n done

cannot be imputed to the person
sought to be made liable; and in the
absence of the second, the person
seeking to make him liable has not
in any way been misled." See~ also,
Hahlo v. Mayer (1890), 102 Mo. 98,
22 Am. St. Rep. 753; Fletcher v.'
Pullen (1889), 70 Md. 205, 14 Am.
St. Rep. 855; Morganv.Farrel(1890),
58 Conn. 413,.18 Am. St. Rep. 282;
Van Kleeck v. Hammell (1891), 87
Mich. 599, 24 Am. St. Rep. 182;
Thompson v. First National Bank
(1883), 111 U.S. 529; Lincoln v. Craig ·
(1889), 16R.L564,18 AtL Rep. 175;
Comhauser v. Roberts (1890), 75
Wis. 554, 44 N. W. Rep. 744..

54
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WHAT ACTS CREATE A PARTNERSHIP.

and consent. It may consist in a mere omission to do what

WHAT ACTl'S ORJUTB A PA.RTNJmSHll'.

[§ 71.

a reasonable man should do, under the circumstances, to

prevent third persons from being misled by a false appear-

ance of things of which he had notice. 1

71. Same subject Who may enforce liability. It is

not necessary that the condition or appearance shall have

been known to persons generally ; it is enough, but also es-

sential, that it vras known to the party deceived by it. 2 But

and consent. It may consist in a mere omission to do what
a reasonable man should do, under the circumstances, to
prevent third persons from being misled by a false appearance of things of which he had notice.1

the party seeking to enforce the liability must have exer-

cised reasonable prudence, must have acted in good faith,

and must have been actually deceived by the condition or

appearance. If he knew, or might have known, the true

state of facts, or if he did not rely upon the appearance or

condition, he has no cause of complaint. 1

1 Thus in Fletcher v. Pull en, supra,

there was evidence that the defend-

ant, to his knowledge, had been ad-

vertised in the newspapers as a
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partner with another person. Said

the court: " Having knowledge of

these advertisements, it was his

duty to deny the partnership if he

wished to escape liability. But

what was he to do and how much?

We do not say that he was under a

§ 71. Same subject-Who may enforce liability•.- I t is
not necessary that the condition or appearance shall have
been known to persons generally; it is enough, but also essential, that it was known to the party deceived by it.2 But
the party seeking to enforce the liability must have exercised reasonable prudence, must have acted in good faith,
and must _have been actually deceived by the condition o:r
appearance. If he knew, or might have known, the true
state of facts, or if he did not rely upon the appearance o:r
condition, he has no cause of complaint.1

legal obligation to publish a repu-

diation of the partnership in the

same newspapers, or in any other,

though this would seem to be a

very obvious and the most efficient

mode of proclaiming such denial,

and the fact that he failed to do so

was a circumstance to go to the

jury. But we take it that the rule

upon this subject stated by a very

eminent jurist is reasonable and

just: ' If one is held out as a part-

ner, and he knows it, he is charge-

able as one, unless he does all that a

reasonable and honest man should

do, under similar circumstances, to

assert and manifest his refusal,

and thereby prevent innocent par-

ties from being misled.' Parsons

on Partnership, 134."

2 Clearly the party cannot be

held liable as a partner by estoppel

except to those who knew of the

holding out and relied upon it

Webster v. Clark (1894), 34 Fla. 637,

16 So. Rep. 601, 43 Am. St. Rep. 217,

27 L. R, A. 126; Dubos v. Jones

(1894), 34 Fla. 539, 16 So. Rep. 392;

Knard v. Hill (1893), 102 Ala. 570,

15 So. Rep. 345.

1 In Morgan v. Farrel, supra, the

court held that the party seeking

to enforce the liability must show

that he exercised good faith and

due diligence to know the truth;

and that if such circumstances are

brought to his notice as would be

certain to excite inquiry in the

mind of any prudent man, and the

means of ascertaining the truth

were readily accessible but not

used, the party could not recover.
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1 Thus in Fletcher v. Pullen, supra, assert and manifest his refusal,
there was evidence that the defend- and thereby prevent innocent paran t, to his knowledge, had been ad- ties from being misled.' Parsons
vertised in the newspapers as a on Partnership, 134."
partner with another person. Said
2 Clearly the party cannot be
the court: "Having knowledge of held liable as a partner by estoppel
these advertisements, it was his except to those who knew of the
duty to deny the partnership if he holding out and relied upon it.
wished to escape liability. But Webster v. Clark (1894), 34 Fla. 637,
what was he to do and how much? 16 So. Rep. 601, 43 Am. St. Rep. 217,
We do not say that he was under a 27 L. R. A. 126; Dubos v. Jones
legal obligation to publish a repu- (1894), 34 Fla. 539, 16 So. Rep. 392;
diation of the partnership in the Knard v. Hill (1893), 102 Ala. 570,
same newspapers, or in any other, 15 So. Rep. 345.
though this would seem to be a
aIn Morgan v. Farrel, supra, the
very obvious and the most efficient court held that the party seeking
mode of proclaiming such denial, to enforce the liability must show
and the fact that he failed to do so that he exercised good faith and
was a circumstance to go to the due diligence to know the truth;
jury. But we take it that the rule and that if such circumstances are
up~n this subject stated by a very brought to his notice as would be
eminent jurist is reasonable and certain to excite inquiry in the
just: 'If one is held out as a part- mind of any prudent man, and the
ner, and he knows it, he is charge- means of ascertaining the truth
able as one, unless he does all that a were readily accessible but not
reasonable and honest man should used, the party could not recover.
do, under similar circumstances, to
55

72, 73.] LAW OF PARTNEBSHIP.

In a recent case 1 it is said: " The law on this subject, well

§§ 72, 73.]

LAW OF P.ARTNEBSHIP.

established by authority, may be stated thus: The ground

of liability of a person as partner who is not so in fact is

that he has held himself out to the world as such, or has

permitted others to do so, and by reason thereof is estopped

from denying that he is one as against those who have in

good faith dealt with the firm or with him as a member of

it. But it must appear that the person dealing with the

firm believed, and had a reasonable right to believe, that the

party he seeks to hold as a partner was a member of the

firm, and that the credit was, to some extent, induced by

this belief. It must also appear that the holding out was

by the party sought to be charged, or by his authority, or

with his knowledge or assent. This, where it is not the di-

rect act of the party, may be inferred from circumstances,

such as advertisements, shop bills, signs or cards, and from

various other acts from which it is reasonable to infer that

the holding out was with his authority, knowledge or as-
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sent."

72. Same subject Evidence admissible. The bur-

den of proving the liability as a partner is upon him who

asserts it. This proof may be made by any kind of evi-

dence having a legitimate tendency to that end. Thus it

may be established not only by direct evidence, but by the

admissions, acts or declarations of the party sought to be

charged. It cannot, however, be established by showing a

general reputation that the party was a partner.

Whether the party charged has held himself out as a part-

ner, or has permitted it to be done, is a question of fact for

the jury. 2

73. Same subject The effect. A person may thus

become liable as though he were a partner by " holding out,"

In a recent case 1 it is said: "The law on this subject, well
established by authority, may be stated thus: The ground
of liability of a person as partner who is not so in fact is
that he has held himself out to the world as such, or has
permitted others to do so, and by reason thereof is estopped
from denying that he is one as against those who have in
good faith dealt with the firm or with him as a member of
it. But it must appear that the person dealing with the
firm believed, and had a reasonable right to believe, that the
party he seeks to hold as a partner was a member of the
firm, and that the credit was, to some extent, induced by
this belief. It must also appear that the holding out was
by the party sought to be charged, or by his authority, or
with his knowledge or assent. This, where it is not the direct act of the party, may be inferred from circumstances,
such as advertisements, shop bills, signs or cards, and from
various other acts from which it is reasonable to infer that
the holding out was with his authority, knowledge or assent."

either in contract or. in tort; but he is not thereby made a

1 Fletcher v. Pullen, supra. 855; Seabury v. Crowell (1890), 51

'Fletcher v. Pullen (1889), 70 Md. N. J. L. 103, 52 id 413. 16 AtL Rep.

S05, 16 AtL Rep. 887, 14 Am. St. Rep. 84, 11 L. R. A. 136.

56

§ 72. Same subject- Evidence admissible.- The burden -of proving the liability as a partner is upon him who
asserts it. This proof may be made by any kind of evidence having a legitimate tendency to that end. Thus it
may be established not only by direct evidence, but by the
admissions·, acts or declarations of the party sought to be
charged. It cannot, however, be established by showing a
general reputation that the party was a partnel".
Whether the party charged has held himself out as a partner, or has permitted it to be done, is a question of fact for
·
the jury.2
§ 73. Same subject-The e1fect.-A person may thus
become ·liable·as though he were a partner by" holding out,"
either in contract or.in tort; but he is not thereby made a
v. Pullen, supra.
855; Seabury v. Crowell (1890), 51
v. Pullen (1889), 70 Md. N. J. L. 103, 52 id. 413. 16 Atl Rep.
~o, 16 AtL Rep. 887, 14 Am. St. Rep. 84, 11 L. R. A. 136.
56
1 Fletcher
2 Fletcher
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WHAT ACTS OKEATB A. PABTNBKSHIP. [ 73.

partner as to other persons than those relying upon the con-

WHAT A<J1'8 OREA.TB A P A.RTNlmSHIP.

[§ 73.

dition or appearance for which he is thus held responsible,

nor does he acquire the rights or obligations of a partner as

between himself and his alleged copartners.

Whether he is to be held liable alone or in connection

with his reputed partner must depend upon the acts of both.

If the person with whom he was held out as a partner was

ignorant of it and did not concur in it, he could not be held

liable. If, on the other hand, he concurred or co-operated

in the holding out of the other, both may be held liable.

It must also be borne in mind that though a partnership

actually exists with certain bounds or limits, one or more

partners may become liable to third persons beyond those

bounds or limits, if they hold themselves out as partners in

a more enlarged capacity than that fixed as between the

partners themselves.
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partner as to other persons than those relying upon the condition or appearance for which he is thus held responsible,
nor does he acquire the rights or obligations of a partner as
between himself and his alleged copartners.
Whether he is to be held liable alone or in connection
with his reputed partner must depend upon the acts of both.
If the person with whom he was held out as a partner was
ignorant of it and did not concur in it, he could not be held
liable. If, on the other hand, he concurred or co-operated
in the holding out of the other, both may be held liable.
It must also be borne in mind that though a partnership
actually exists with certain bounds or limits, one or more
partners may become liable to third persons beyond those
bounds or limits, if they hold themselves out as partners in
a more enlarged capacity than that fixed as between the
partners themselves. '

CHAPTER VL

OF SOME INCIDENTS OF PARTNERSHIP.

74 In general.

L OF ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP.

75. Of the necessity of articles.

76. Of the scope of the articles.

77. Of the construction of arti-

cles.

78. Of waiving or enlarging by

CHAPTER VI.

conduct.

79. Of continuing under former

OF SOME INCIDENTS OF PARTNERSHIP.

articles,

80. Of the usual clauses in arti-

V. Ol.I' THE PROPERTY OJ' TH& FlBJL

§ 74. In general

cles.

81. Of enforcing the provisions.

IL OP THB FIRM NAME.

82. Of the necessity of a firm

name.

83. What name may be adopted.
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name upon dissolution.
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upon dissolution.
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97. Nature of each partner's interest.
98. Extent of each partner's interest.
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his creditor.
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90. What constitutes capital
91. Fixing amounts and interests in.
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BOMB INCIDENTS Of PARTNERSHIP. [ 74r-T6.

SOME INCIDENTS OF P .A.RTiaRBHIP.

74. In general. A partnership having been formed, a

[§§ 74:-76.

number of subjects incident to its existence become impor-

tant, and though they may not all be similar in their char-

acter they may appropriately be grouped together in one

chapter for consideration.

L OP ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP.

75. Of the necessity of articles. As has been stated,

it is desirable, but not usually indispensable, to have writ-

ten evidence of the agreement between the parties as to the

creation, continuance, terms and conditions of their partner-

§ 74:. In general.-A partnership having been formed, a.
number of subjects incident te its existence become important, and though they may not all be similar in their character they may appropriately be grouped together .i n one
chapter for consideration.

ship. The formal written instruments prepared in such cases

are spoken of as the partnership articles. As between them-

selves, it is, in general, possible for the parties to fix their

rights, duties and liabilities, as well as the circumstances of

L OF ARTICLES

011'

::rABTNERSHIP.

the commencement, continuance and termination of the part-

nership, by their agreement; and though, in the absence of

such an agreement, the law will usually determine these mat-

ters for them, it is not by any means certain that the legal
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conclusions will be the same that the parties contemplated,

and it is in any event desirable that the opportunity for con-

troversy be removed by express stipulation.

76. Of the scope of articles. It is not, however, usu-

ally feasible, by even the most carefully-drawn articles, to

provide beforehand for every possible contingency, or to de-

fine all the rights, duties or liabilities of the partners. Much

must of necessity be understood ; custom or usage may be

tacitly recognized; and conduct or practice may add to or

modify that which is expressed. It may thus happen that,

in a given case, the body of law or rules which are to govern

the relations of the partners as between themselves is to be

gathered from a variety of sources. As was said in one case : l

" The duties and obligations arising from the relation be-

tween the parties are regulated by the express contract

l Smith v. Jeyes, 4 Beavan (Eng. Ch.), 505.

59

§ 75. Of the necessity of articles.- As has been stated,
it is desirable, but not usually indispensable, to have written evidence of the agreement between the parties as to the
creation, continuance, terms and conditions of their partnership. The formal written instruments prepared in such cases
are spoken of as the part!liership articles. As between themselves, it is, in general, possible for the parties to fix their
rights, duties and liabilities, as well as the circumstances of
the conµnencement, continuance and termination of the partnership, by their agreement; and though, in the absence of
such an agreement, the law will usually determine these matters for them, it is not by any means certain that the legal
conclusions will be the same that the parties contemplated,
and it is in any event desirable that the opportunity for controversy be removed by express stipulation.
§ 76. Of the scope of articles.- It is not, however, usually feasible, by even the most carefully-drawn articles, to
provide beforehand for every possible contingency, or to define all the rights, duties or liabilities of the partners. Much
must of necessity be understood; custom or usage may be
tacitly recognized; and conduct or practice may add to or
modify that w:hich is expressed. It may thus happen that,
in a given case, the body of law or rules which are to govern
the relations of the partner.s as between themselves is to be
gathered from a variety of sources. .A.s was said in one case:_1
"The duties and obligations arising from the relation between the parties are regulated by the express contract
l

Smith v. Jeyes, 4 Beavan (Eng. Ch.), 505.
59
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SOME rNCTDEJSTS OF PABTNEESHIP. [ 7&.

while the other would retard or defeat that general purpose

BOMB INCIDENTS OM' PARTNERSHIP.

[§

7S~

or object, the former construction is to be preferred; so if

powers claimed would, by their exercise, advance the general

object, their existence will be more readily inferred than if

they are obstructive to it. In the same line are the other

rules of construction, that powers conferred are to be

deemed to have been so conferred with a view to the benefit

of all concerned, and hence that an exercise of it for the

benefit of one to the detriment of the others was not really

intended, though the words used might, upon their face,

bear such a construction ; and that any provision, however

worded, is, if possible, to be so construed as to prevent one

partner from defrauding another in reliance upon its letter,

but in violation of its spirit. 1

78. Of waiving or enlarging express provisions by

conduct. Any written stipulation, however express, is

capable of being modified, superseded or abandoned by the

consent of all of the partners; and this consent may be

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

shown not only by express words, but by conduct or the

established practice of the parties. But the unanimous con-

sent of all is necessary, for a portion cannot alter, modify or

enlarge the contract of all.

In an English case J it was said by Lord Eldon : " In ordi-

1 See Blissett v. Daniel (1853), 10 only be evidenced by writing, but

while the other would retard or defeat that general purposeor object, the former construction is to be preferred; so ff
powers claimed would, by their exercise, advance the general
object, their existence will be more readily inferred than ff
they are obstructive to it. In the same line are the other·
rules of construction, that powers conferred · are to be·
deemed to have been so conferred with a view to the Qenefit
of all concerned, and hence that an exercise of it for the·
benefit of one to the detriment of the others was not really
.intended, though the words used might, upon their face,_
bear such a construction; and that any provision, however·
worded, is, if possible, to be so construed as to prevent onepartner from defrauding another in reliance upon its letter,
but in violation of its spirit.1

Hare (Eng. Ch.), 493; Pettyt v. also by the conduct of the parties

Janeson (1819), 6 Maddock (Eng. in relation to the agreement and

Ch.), 146. to their mode of conducting their

2 Const v. Harris (1834), 1 Tur. & business: when, therefore, there is

Rus. 496. So in England v. Curling a variation and alteration of the

(1844), 8 Beavan, 129, it was said terms of a partnership, it does not

by Lord Langdale: " With respect follow that there was not a binding

to a partnership agreement, it is to agreement at first. Partners, if

be observed that, all parties being they please, may, in the course of

competent to act as they please, the partnership, daily come to a

they may put an end to or vary new arrangement for the purpose

it at any moment; a partnership of having some addition or altera-

agreement is therefore open to tion in the terms on which they

variation from day to day, and the carry on business, provided those

terms of such variations may not additions or alterations be made

61

§ 78. Of waiving or enlarging expre~s provisions by
conduct.- Any written stipulation, however express, is.
capable of being modified, superseded or abandoned by the·
consent of all of the partners; and this consent may be
shown not only by express words, but by conduct or the
established practice of the parties. But the unaniJilOU~ consent of all is necessary, for a portion cannot alter, modify orenlarge the contract of all.
In ~n English case% it was said by Lord Eldon: . ,,, In ordi1 See Blissett v. Daniel (1853), 10 only be evidenced by writing, but
Hare (Eng. (.,"'h.), 493; Pettyt v. also by the conduct of the parties
Janeson (1819), 6 Maddock (Eng. in relation to the agreement and
Ch.), 146.
to t heir mode of conducting their
l Const v. Harris (1824), 1 Tur. & business: when, therefore, there is .
Rus. 496. So in England v. Curling a variation and alteration of the
(1844), 8 Beavan, 129, it was said . terms of a partnership, it does not
by Lord Langdale: "With respect follow that there was not a binding
t6 a partnership agreement, it is to agreement at first. ~artners, if
be observed that, all parties being they please, may, in the course of ·
oompetent to act as they please, the partnership, daily come to a
they may put an end to or vary new arrangement for the purpose
it at any moment;. a partnership of having some addition or alteraagreement is therefore open to tion in the terms on which they
variation from day to day, and the carry on business, provided thoseterms of such variations may not additions or alterations be ma~
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79, 80.] LAW OF PABTNKESHIP.

§§ 79, 80.]

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

nary partnerships nothing is more clear than this: that, &\

though partners enter into a written agreement, stating the

terms upon which the joint concern is to be carried on, yet

if there be a long course of dealing, or a course of dealing

not long, but still so long as to demonstrate that they have

all agreed to change the terms of the original written agree-

ment, they may be held to have changed those terms by

conduct. For instance, if in a common partnership the par-

ties agree that no one of them shall draw or accept bills of

exchange in his own name without the concurrence of the

others, yet, if they afterwards slide into a habit of permit-

ting one of them to draw or accept bills without the con-

currence of the others, this court will hold that they have

varied the terms of the original agreement in that respect."

79. Of continuing partnership under former articles.

When a partnership has existed under articles providing for

a definite term, and upon the expiration of that term the

partnership is continued without any new agreement, the
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original articles will continue to regulate the rights and ob-

ligations of the partners, though the continuing partnership

will usually be deemed to be at will merely and not renewed

for a similar term. The original articles may also survive

changes in the persons comprising the firm, and be continued

by their adoption by the new firm. 1

80. Of the usual clauses in partnership articles.

The subjects most commonly covered by the partnership ar-

ticles are : (1) the nature, name and place of the business ;

(2) the commencement and duration of the partnership;

(3) the capital and property of the firm ; (4) the share of

with the unanimous concurrence l See Metcalfe v. Bradshaw (1893),

of all the partners." See, also, Scud- 145 III 124, 33 N. E. Rep. 1116, 36

der v.Ames (1886), 89 Ma 496; Gam- Am. St. Rep. 478; United States

inon v. Huse (1881), 100 111. 234; Bank v. Binney (1828), 5 Mason (U.

Gage v. Parrnlee (1877), 87 III 829; S. C. C.), 176; Boardman v. Close

Thrall v. Seward (1865), 87 Vt. 573; (1876), 44 Iowa, 438; Sangston v.

Gregg v. Hord (1889), 129 III 613, Hack (1879), 52 Md. 173.

23 N. E. Rep. 528.
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nary partnerships nothing is more clear than this: that, ~
though partners enter into a written agreement, stating the
terms upon which the joint concern is to be carried on, yet
if there be a long course of dealing, or a course of dealing
not long, but still so long as to demonstrate that they have
all agreed to change the terms of the original written agreemen t, they may be held to have changed those terms by
conduct. For instance, if in a common partnership the parties agree that no one of them shall draw or accept bills of
exchange in his own name without the concurrence of the
others, yet, if they afterwards slide into a habit of permitting one of them to draw or accept bills without the concurrence of the others, this court will hold that they have
varied the terms of the original agreement in that respect."
§ 79. Of continuing partnership under former articles.
When a partnership has existed under articles providing for
a definite term, and upon the expiration of that term the
partnership is continued without any new agreement, the
original articles will continue to regulate the rights and obligations of the partners, though the continuing partnership
will usually be deemed to be at will mer~ly and not renewed
for a similar term. The original articles may also survive
changes in the persons comprising the firm, and be continued
by their adoption by the new firm.1
§ 80. Of the usual clauses in partnership articles.The subjects most commonly covered by the partnership articles are: (1) the nature, name and place of the business;
(2) the commencement and duration of the partnership;
(3) the capital and property of the firm; (4) the share of
with the unanimous concurrence
of all the partners." See, also, Scudder v. Ames(1886), 89Mo.496; Garnmon v. Huse (1881), 100 UL 234;
Gage v. Parmlee (1877), 87 IlL 329;
Thrall v. Seward (1865), 37 Vt. 573;
Gregg v. Hord (1889), 129 IlL 613,
22 N. E. Rep. 528.

I See Metcalfe v. Bradshaw (1893),
145 Ill. 124, 33 N. E. Rep. 1116, 36
Am. St. Rep. 478; United States
Bank v. Binney (1828), 5 Mason (U.
s; C. C.), 176; Boardman v. Close
· (1876), 44 Iowa, 428; Sangston v.
Hack (1879), 52 Md. 173.
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SOlCB INOIDBNTB OF P ABTNBRSHIP.

SOME INCIDENTS OF PAJBTNEJB8HIP. [ 81, 82.

[§§ 81, 82.

each in the profits and losses; (5) the conduct and powers

of the partners ; and (6) the dissolution and winding up of

the firm. Many other subjects are introduced in special

cases. A form of articles which may prove to be suggestive

is printed in an appendix.

81. Of the enforcement of the provisions. It is cus-

tomary to include provisions for arbitration in case of dis-

putes, and for fixing the value of shares by that method in

case of the retirement of a partner. Provisions are also fre-

ea.ch in the profits and losses; (5) the conduct ·and powers
of the partners; and (6) the dissolution and winding up of
the firm. Many other subjects are introduced in special
case&. A form of articles which may prove to be suggestive
is printed in an appendix.

quently inserted for making offers to buy or sell in case of

dissolution ; for giving indemnity against debts to the retir-

ing partner; for taking in new partners; for permitting the

representatives of a deceased partner to be admitted ; for

expelling a partner; and the like. Many of these provisions

can have only a negative effect, for it is well settled that

agreements to become partners, agreements to continue a

partnership for a definite time, agreements to submit dis-

puted matters to arbitration, and agreements to admit new
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partners, will not be specifically enforced by the courts, but

the parties will be left to such remedy as they may find, if

any, in an action for the breach of the agreement. The exe-

cution of formal instruments clearly provided for may be

specifically enforced, including even the execution of park

nership articles, where that is necessary to confer upon one

party a right to which he is entitled, even though the part-

nership thereby created may be immediately dissolved. 1

II. OF THE FIBM NAME.

82. Of the need of a firm name. A firm name is a

customary but not a necessary incident of a partnership. As

has been seen, the partnership is not, in legal contempla

See England v. Curling (1844), 118 Mass. 279, 19 Am. Rep. 459;

8 Beavan (Eng. Ch.), 129; Buck v. Tobey v. Bristol County, 3 Story

Smith (1874), 29 Mich. 166, 18 Am. (U. S. C. Ct), 819.

Rep. 84; Somerby v. Buntin (1875),
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§ 81. Of the enforcement of the provisions.- It is customary to include provisions for arbitration in case of disputes, and for fixing the Yalue of shares by that method . in
case of the retirement of a partner. Provisions are also frequently inserted for making offers to buy or sell in case of
dissolution; for giving indemnity against debts to the retiring partner; for taking in new partners; for permitting the
representatives of a deceased partner to be admitted; for
expelling a partner; and the like. Many of these provisions
can have only a negative effect, for it is well settled that
agreements to become partners, agreements to continue a
partnership for a definite time, agreements to submit disputed . matters to arbitration, and agreements to admit new
partners, will not be specifically enforced by the courts, but
the parties will be left to such remedy as they may find, if
any, in an action for the breach of the agreement. The execution of formal instruments clearly provided for may be
· specifically enforced, including even the execution of partnership articles, where that is necessary to confer upon one
party a right to which he is entitled, even though the partnership thereby created may be immediately dissolved.1

II. OF

THE FIRM

NAME.

§ 82. Of the need of a firm name.- A firm name is a
customary but not a necessary incident of a partnership. As
has been seen, the partnership is not, in legal contempla·
England v. Curling (1844), 118 Mass. 279, 19 Am. Rep. 459 ;
8 Beavan (Eng. Ch.), 129; Buck v. Tobey v. Bristol County, S Story
Smith (1874), 29 Mich. 166, 18 Am. (U.S. C. Ct.), 819.
Rep. 84:; Somerby v. Buntin (1875),
1 See
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83.] LAW OF PABTNEBSHIP.

§ 83.]

LAW 07 P .A.RT.NERSHIP.

tion, a distinct and separate entity, but merely a collection

of individuals with whom, for most purposes, the law deals

as such. A firm name, therefore, is not indispensable, 1 but

it is a matter of convenience in identifying and ascertaining

the individuals interested ; and when a firm name has been

adopted, it ought always to be used in the partnership trans-

actions.

83. What name may be adopted. In some states, as

n New York, statutes have been enacted forbidding the use

of the name of a person not actually interested in the firm,

or the use of the term " & Co." unless it represents an actual

partner. 2 But where no statute prevents, the firm may

tion, a distinct a.n:d separate .entity, but merely a.· collection
of individuals with whom, for most purposes, the law deals
as such. A firm name, therefore, is not indispensable,1 but
it is a matter of convenience in identifying_ and ascertaining
the individuals interested; and when a firm name has been
adopted, it ought always to be used in th~ partnership transactions.

adopt any name it chooses, so long as it does not interfere

with the rights of others. It may thus use the name of a

stranger, of a single partner or of a portion of the partners,

or it may adopt a wholly fictitious name. It may also ac-

quire a name by usage, even though it has another fixed by

the agreement of the partners. And though it may have a
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regular firm name, it may be bound by the use, in a single

transaction, of some other name. 1 It may change or add to

1 See Meriden Nat Bank v. Gal- or a corporation, see Birmingham

laudet (1890), 120 N. Y. 298, 24 N. E. Loan Co. v. First Nat. Bank (1893),

Rep. 994 100 Ala. 249, 46 Am. St. Rep. 45;

2 As to the use of the term "& Clark v. Jones, 87 Ala. 474; Sey-

Co.," when forbidden by statute, mour v. Harrow Co., 81 Ala. 250.

see Gay v. Seibold (1884), 97 N. Y. s An obligation under seal exe-

472, 49 Am. Rep. 533; Sparrow v. cuted by all the members of a firm,

Kohn (1885), 109 Pa. St. 359, 58 Am. in and for its business and for its

Rep. 726; Wood v. Railroad Co. benefit, binds the firm although

(1878), 72 N. Y. 196, 28 Am. Rep. the firm name is not mentioned,

125; Zimmerman v. Erhard (1880), and although it appears upon its

83 N. Y. 74, 38 Am. Rep. 396. Where face to be simply the obligation of

no such statute exists, the use of the partners contracted in their in-

" & Co." raises no necessary pre- dividual names. Berkshire Woolen

§ 83. What name may be adopted.-In some states, as
n New York, statutes have been enacted forbidding the use
of the name of a person not actually interested in the firm,
or the use of the term " & Co." unless it represents an actual
partner.2 But where no statute prevents, the firm may
adopt any name it chooses, so long ~s it ·does not interfere
with the rights of others. It may thus use the name of a
stranger, of a single partner or of a portion of the partners,
or it may adopt a wholly fictitious name. .. It may also acquire a name by usage, even though it has another fixed by
the agreement of the partners. And though it may have a
regular firm name, it may be bound by the use, in a. single
transaction, of some other name.1 It may change or add to

sumption that it represents a part- Co. v. Juillard (1879), 75 N. Y. 535,

ner. Robinson v, Magarity, 28 I1L 31 Am. Rep. 489. A firm is bound

423; Brennan v. Pardridge, 67 Mich, by an acceptance in an agent's

449. As to whether the firm name name which it has adopted as a

is such as to import a partnership firm name by an agreement of the

84

1 See Meriden Nat. Bank v. Gallaudet (1890), 120 N. Y. 298, 24 N. E.
Rep. 994.
2 As to the use of the term " &
Co.," when forbidden by statute,.
see Gay v. Seibold (1884), 97 N. Y.
472, 49 Am. Rep. 533; Spa~ow v.
Kohn (1885), 109 Pa. St. 359, 58 Am.
Rep. 726; Wood v. Railroad Co.
(1878), 72 N. Y. 196, 28 Am. Rep.
125; Zimmerman v. Erhard (1880),
83 N. Y. 74, 38 Am. Rep. 396. Where
no such statute exists, the use of
" & Co." raises no necessary presumption that it represents a partner. Robinson v, Magarity, 28 IIL
'23; Brennan v. Pardridge, 67 Mich.
'49. As to whether the firm name
1s such aa to .import a partnership

or a corporation, see Birmingham
Loan Co. v. First Nat. Bank (1893),
100 Ala. 249, 46 Am. St. Rep. 45;
Clark v. Jones, 87 Ala. 474; Seymour v. Harrow Co., 81 Ala. 250.
s An obligation under seal ex~
cuted by all the members of a firm,
in and for its business and for its
benefit, binds the ·firm although
the firm name is not mentioned,
and although it appears upon its
face to be simply the obligation of
the partners contracted in their individual names. Berkshire Woolen
Co. v. Juillard (1879), 75 N. Y. 535,
31 Am. Rep. 48~. A firm is bound·
by an acceptance in an agent's
name which it has adopted as a
firm name by an agreement ·of the
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BOMB XNOroBNTS OF PABTNEBSHTP. [ 84.

its name at any time. It may acquire rights in its firm

!Olm INOIDENTS OY F ARTNERBBIP.

[§ 84.

name and transfer them in the individual names of the part-

ners, and vice versa. Whatever the name used, it may be

shown by parol evidence who the persons were who were

represented by it.

84> What may be done in the firm name. As a gen-

eral rule, all simple contracts, written or unwritten, nego-

tiable or non-negotiable, whether creating rights or imposing

obligations, may be made in the firm name, 1 and, as will be

seen, 2 one partner has usually implied authority to bind the

its name at any time. It may acquire rights in its firm
name and transfer them in the individual names of the partners, and vice versa. Whatever the name used, it may be
shown by parol evidence who the persons were who .were
represented by it.

firm by contracts made in its name for partnership purposes.

But one partner has no implied authority to bind the firm

by an instrument under seal, and, in general, conveyances of

real estate cannot be made either by or to the firm in the

firm name. Such conveyances will, however, usually oper-

ate to convey an equitable interest which may be enforced

in a court of chancery; and where a conveyance of real es-

tate is made to a firm in the name of the firm which con-
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tains the full name of one or more of the partners, a legal

title will generally be held to vest in those partners whose

names appear, and equity will charge them as trustees for

all. 1

partners to do business under the taken in the firm name. Hendren

name of such agent, where it does v. Wing (1895), 60 Ark. 561, 31 S. W.

not appear that the agent was Rep. 149. As to real estate mort-

doing business also on his own ao gage, see Woodward v. McAdam

count; but if that fact appears, it (1894), 101 CaL 438.

must be shown that he accepted * See post, 164

the bill on account of the partner- * A deed to John Smith & Co. op-

ship in order to bind it. Bank of erates to vest the entire legal title

Rochester v. Monteath (1845), 1 in John Smith alone. Winter v.

Denio (N. Y.) 403, 43 Am. Dec. 681. ,Stock, 29 CaL 407, 89 Am. Dec. 57;

See, also, Le Roy v. Johnson, 2 Horeau v. Saffarans, 8 Sneed

Peters (U. S.), 186; Ripley v. Colby (Term.), 595, 67 Am. Dec. 582. A

(1851), 23 N. H. 438; Getchell v. mortgage of real estate given to

Foster, 106 Mass. 43; Uhler v. "Farnham & Love joy, of the

Browning, 28 N. J. L. 79; Barcroft county of Hennepin, state of Min-

v. Haworth, 29 Iowa, 462. nesota," is legally sufficient as a

§ 84. What may be done in the firm name.- As a general rule, all simple contracts, written or un'written, negotiable or non-negotiable, whether creating rights or imposing
obligations, may be made in the firm name,1 and, as will be
seen,2 one partner ·has usually implied authority to bind the
firm by contracts made in its name for partnership purposes.
But one partner has no implied authority to bind the firm ·
by an instrument under seal, and, in general, conveyances of
real estate cannot be made either by or to the firm in the
firm name. Such conveyances will, however, usually operate to convey an equitable interest which may be enforced
jn a court of chancery; and where a conveyance of real estate' is m~de to a firm in the name of the firm which contains the full name of one or more of- the partners, a legal
title will generally be held to vest in those partners whose
names appear, and equity will charge them as trustees for
all.•

1 A chattel mortgage may be mortgage to S. W. Farnham and
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partners to do business under the taken in the finn name. Hendren
name of such agent, where it does v. Wing (1895), 60 Ark. 561, 31 S. W.
not appear that the agent was Rep. 149. As to real estate mortdoing business also on his own ao- gage, see Woodward v. McAdam
couht; bu.t jf that fact appears, it (1894); 101 Cal 438.
must be shown that he accepted
2 See post, § 164.
the bill on account of the partner1 A deed to John Smith & Co. opship in order to bind it. Bank of erates to vest the entire le 1 title
Rochester v. Monteath (1845), 1 in John Smith alone. Wmter v.
Denio (N. Y.) 402, 43 Am. Dec. 681.
ock, 29 Cal 407, 89 Am. Dec. 57;
See, also, Le Roy v. J ohna,on, 2
v. SaffaranS, 8 Sneea
:Peters (U.S.), 186; Ripley v. Colby (Tenn.), 595, 67 Am. Dec. 582. A
(1851), 23 N. H. 438; Getchell v. mortgage of real estate given to
Foster, 106 Mass. 42; Uhler v. "Farnham ~ Lovejoy, of the
Browning, 28 N. J. L. 79; Barcroft county of Hennepin, state of Minv. Haworth, 29 Iowa, 4~2.
nesota," is legally sufficient as a
1 A chattel mortgage may be mortgage to S. W. Farnham and
6
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85.] LAW OF PAKTNKKSHIP.

§ 85.]

LAW OF P AB.'fNllliSHIP.

Unless authorized by statute, actions cannot be maintained

either by or against the partnership in the firm name, but

must be brought in the individual names of the partners. 1

85. Of the firm name as property. " The name by

which a firm is known," says Mr. Justice Lindley,* " is not

of itself the property of the firm, and there is nothing at

Unless authorized by statute, actions cannot be maintained
either by or against the partnership in the firm name, but
must be brought in the imlivid uafnam es of the partners.1~

common law to prevent persons from carrying on business

in partnership under any name they please." Notwithstand-

§ 85. Of the firm naine as property.-" The name by

ing this, however, it is clear that the firm name is a thing of

value, which may be made the subject of sale or assignment.

It is also a thing which the law will protect. Thus Mr.

Lindley continues : " One firm is not at liberty to mislead

the public by so using the name of another firm as to pass

off themselves or their goods for that other or for the goods

of that other. Moreover, an established firm can prevent a

company (corporation) from registering under the name of

the firm."

But the rule that one firm cannot adopt the same name as

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

another firm is subject to the qualification that a person or

a number of persons, who have not limited their right by

contract, cannot be prevented from using his or their own

name, even though it be that of a former firm in the same

business, 5 provided it is done in good faith and with no at-

tempt to mislead the public as to the identity. 4

J. A. Lovejoy, sho^.-n to have been 72 Ind. 281; Ladiga Saw Mill Co.

the members of a firm engaged in v. Smith, 78 Ala. 108.

business in that county under that * Lindley on Partnership (EwelTs

name. Menage v. Burke (1890), 43 2d Am, ed.), p. 114.

Minn. 211, 19 Am. St. Rep. 235. See, * See Williams v. Farrand (1891),

also, Townshend v. Goodfellow 88 Mich. 473, 50 N. W. Rep. 446, 14

(1889), 40 Minn. 812, 12 Am. St. L. R. A. 161; Russia Cement Co. v.

Rep. 736; Kelley v. Bourne, 15 Le Page (1888), 147 Mass. 206, 17 N.

Ore, 476. To same effect in case E. Rep. 304, 9 Am. St. Rep. 685;

of deed: Sherry v. Gilmore, 58 Wis. Meneely v. Meneely (1875), 62 N. Y.

324; Cole v. Mette, 65 Ark. 504, 427, 20 Am. , Rep. 489; Rogers v.

Thus, see Whitman v. Keith, 18 Rogers (1885), 53 Conn. 121, 55 Am.

Ohio St. 134; Fitzgerald v. Grim- Rep. 78.

mell, 64 Iowa, 261; Love v. Blair, Where such an attempt appear*

66

which a firm is known," says Mr. Justice Lindley,2 "is not
of itself the property of the firm, and there is nothing at
common law to prevent persons from carrying on business
in partnership under any name they please." N otwithstanding this, however, it is clear that the firm name is a thing of
value, which may be made the subject of sale or assignment.
It is also a thing which the law will protect. ·Thus Mr.
Iindley continues: " One firm is not at liberty to mislead
the public by so using the name of another firm as to pass
off themselves or their goods for that other.or for the goods
of that other. Moreover, an established· firm can prevent a
company (corporation) from registering under the name of
the firm."
·
But the rule that one firm cannot adopt the same name as
another firm is subject to the qualification that a person or
a number of persons, who have not limited their right by
contract, cannot be prevented from using his or their own
name, even though it be that of a former firm in the same
business,3 provided it is done in good faith and with no attempt to mislead the public as to the identity.'
J. A. Love joy, sho vn to have been
the membei-s of a firm engaged in
business in that county under that
name. Menage v. Burke (1890), 48
Minn. 211, 19 Am. St. Rep. 235. See,
also, Townshend v. Goodfellow
(1889), 40 Minn. 812, 12 Am. St.
Rep. 736; Kelley v. Bourne, 15
Ore. 476. To same effect in case
of deed: Sherry v. Gilmore, 58 Wis.
324; Cole v. Mette, 6~ Ark. 504.
l Thus, see Whitman v. Keith, 18
Ohio St. 134; Fitzgerald v. Grimmell, 64 Iowa, 261; Love v. Blair,

72 Ind. 281; Ladiga Saw Mill Co.
v. Smith, 78 Ala. 108.
.
2 Lindley on Partnership (Ewell's
2d Am. ed.), p. 114.
'See Williams v. Farrand (1891),
88 Mich. 473, 50 N. W. Rep. 446, 14
L. R. A. 161; Russia. Cement Co. v.
Le Page (1888), 147 Ma:ss. 206, 17 N.
E. Rep. 804, 9 Am. St. Rep. 685;
Meneely v. Meneely (1875), 62 N. Y.
427, 20 Am •. Rep. 489; Rogers v.
Rogers (1885), 58 Conn. 121, M Ant.
Rep. 78.
'Where such an attempt appeaN
66
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SOME INCIDENTS OF PARTNERSHIP. [ 86.

86. Of the right to the firm name upon dissolution.

!OME INOIDENTS OJ!' PARTNERSHIP.

[§ 86.

The firm name, as has been seen, may be one of two kinds,

it may be a fictitious name, like " The Ann Arbor Hardware

Co.," or it may be a purely personal one, made up of the in-

dividual names of the partners, like " Smith & Jones; " and

some difference in legal consequences follows the distinction:

1. Upon the dissolution of the partnership by mere lapse

of time or otherwise, neither partner buying out the other,

either would have the right to go into business for himself

and adopt the old firm name if it was a fictitious one and

could be used without leading the public to believe that the

old firm still continued ; but neither would have the right

to use the old firm name including the individual names of

any partner who did not continue with him, nor to announce

himself "successor to" the old firm, though either might

designate himself as "formerly of" the old firm; but he

must do nothing to deceive the public, as by putting his own

name and the " formerly of " in very small letters, and the
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old firm name in very large letters. 1

2. Upon the dissolution of a partnership by death, it has

been held that the survivor has the right to continue the use of

the old name, whether fictitious or personal ; J but the true

rule seems to be that the name, if of value, is a partnership

asset, and must be dealt with as such. 1

3. If one partner buys out the other for the purpose of

continuing the business, but nothing is expressly agreed upon

in reference to the name, the sale by one of all his interest

in the business, and a fortiori if the good-will be expressly

included, gives to the continuing partner the exclusive right

to continue the use of the old firm name if it be a fictitious

the use may be enjoined. Bininger 4 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 394; Holbrook v.

v. Clark (1870), 60 Barb. (N. Y.) 113. Nesbitt (1895), 163 Masa 120, 39 N.

^ee Hookham v. Pottage (1872), E. Rep. 794.

L. R. 8 Ch. App. 91 ; Smith v. 2 See Lewis v. Langdon, 7 Simons

Cooper (1877), 5 Abb. New Cas. (Eng. Ch.), 421.

(N. Y.) 274; Morgan v. Schuyler * See Fenn v. Bolles, 7 Abb. Pr.

(1880), 79 N. Y. 490. 35 Am. Rep. (N. Y.) 421.

543; Peterson v. Humphrey (1857),
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§ 86. Of the right to the firm name upon dissolution.The firm name, as has been seen, may be one of two kinds,it may be a fictitious name, like "The Ann Arbor Hard war~
Co.," or it may be a purely personal one, made up of the individual na:rp.es of the p~rtners, like " Smith & Jones; " and
some difference in legal consequences follows the distinction:
1. Upon the dissolution of the partnership by mere lapse
of time or otherwise, neither partner buying out the other,
either would have the right to go into business for himself
and adopt the oltl firm name if it was a fictitious one and
could be used without leading the public to believe that the
old firm still continued; but neither would have the right
to use the old firm name including the individual names of
any partner who did not continue with him, nor to announce
himself "suocess01' to" the old firm, though either might
designate himself as "/0 rmerly ()f" the old firm; but he
must do nothing to deceive the public, as by putting his own
name and the "formerly of" in very small letters, and the
old fi~m name in very large letters. 1 ·
2. Upon t.J:i.e dissolution of a partnership by death, it has
been held that the survivor has the right to cont~nue the use of
the old name, whether fictitious or personal; 2 but the true
rule seems to be that the name, if of value, is a partnership
3.8set, and must be dealt with as such.1_
3. If one partner buys out the other for the purpose of
continuing the business, but nothing is expressly agreed upon
in reference to the name, the sale by one of all his interest
in the business, and a fortiori if the good-will be expressly
included, gives to the continuing partner the exclusive right
to continue the use of the old firm name if it be a fictitious
1

the use may be enjoined. Bininger
v. Clark (1870), 60 Barb. (N. Y.) 113.
I_See Hookham v. Pottage (1872),
L. R. 8 Ch. App. 91; Smith v.
Cooper (1877), 5 Abb. New Cas.
(N. Y.) 274; Morgan v. Schuyler
(1880), 79 N. Y. 490. 35 Ain. Rep.
543; Peterson v. Humphrey (1857),

4 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 394; Holbrook v.
Nesbitt (1895), 163 Mass. 120, 39 N.
E. Rep. 794.
2 See Lewis v. Langdon, 7 Simons
(Eng. Ch.), 421.
1 See Fenn v. Bolles, 7 Abh Pr.
(N. Y.) 421.
67
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§ 87.]
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LAW OF PAKTNEBSHIP.

one, but not if it be a purely personal one containing the

name of the retiring partner, except where the personal

name has been made a trade-mark of the business. The re-

tiring partner may go into business in his own name, but

he must not use even his own name in such a manner as to

mislead the public into believing that he is the old firm. 1

4. The retiring partner may, however, by express agree-

ment invest the continuing partner with the right to con-

tinue the former firm name, though it is a purely pe'rsonal

one; and the retiring partner may, in the same manner,

limit his own right to resume business or to use or permit

to be used his own name in connection with a new business

to compete with the old. 1

III. OF THE GOOD-WILL.

87. What is meant by the good-will. What is known

as the " good-will " of the business may properly be consid-

ered in connection with the name. The good-will is regarded
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as a valuable incident of the business, and may be sold or

transferred as such. Precisely what it is the courts have

found it difficult to define. "The term good-will," says

one, but not if it be a purely personal one containing the
name of the retiring partner, except where the personal
name has been made a trade-mark of the business. The r&tiring partner may go into business in his own name, but
he must not use even his own name in such a manner as to
mislead the public into believing that he is the old firm. 1
4:. The retiring partner may, however, by express agre&ment invest the continuing partner with the right to continue the former firm name, though it is a purely personal
one; and the retiring partner may, in the same manner,
limit his own right to resume business or to use or permit
to be used his own name in connection with a new business
to compete with the old.2

i See Williams v. Farrand (1891),

88 Mich. 473, 50 N. W. Rep. 446, 14

L. R. A. 161 ; Vonderbank v. Schmidt

(1892), 44 La. Ann. 264, 10 So. Rep.

III. OF

THE

Goon-WILL.

616, 32 Am. St. Rep. 836, 15 L. R. A.

462 and note; Brass and Iron Works

Co. v. Payne (1893), 50 Ohio St. 115,

19 L. R A. 82; Myers v. Kalamazoo

Buggy Co. (1884), 54 Mich. 215, 19

N. W. Rep. 961, 20 id. 545, 52 Am.

Rep. 811; Snyder Manufacturing

Co. v. Snyder (1896), Ohio St.

, 43 N. E. Rep. 325. As to the

use of individual names as trade-

marks, see Fish Bros. Wagon Co. v.

§ 87. What is meant by the good-will.-What is known
as t.he "good-will" of the business may properly be considered in connection with the name. The good-will is regarded
as a valuable incident of the business, and may be sold or
transferred as such. Precisely what it is the courts have
found it difficult to define. "The term good-will," says

Fish (1892), 82 Wis. 546, 52 N. W. Rep.

545, 33 Am. St. Rep. 72, 16 L. R. A.

453; Marshall v. Pinkham (1881), 52

Wis. 585, 9 N. W. Rep. 615, 38 Am.

Rep. 756; Russia Cement Co. v. Le

Page (1888), 147 Mass. 206, 17 N. E.

Rep. 304, 9 Am. St. Rep. 685; Shaver

v. Shaver (1880), 54 Iowa, 208, 37

Am. Rep. 194, 6 N. W. Rep. 188.

2 See Grow v. Seligman (1882), 47

Mich. 607, 41 Am. Rep. 737; Frazer

v. Frazer Lubricator Co. (1887), 121

IlL 147, 13 N. E. Rep. 639, 2 Am. St.

Rep. 73; Symonds v. Jones (1890),

82 Me. 302, 19 AtL Rep. 820, 17 Am.

St. Rep. 485, 8 L, R. A. 570; Le Page

Co. v. Russia Cement Co. (1892), 51

Fed. Rep. 941, 17 L. R. A. 354, 5 U. &

App. 112.
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1 See Williams v. Farrand (1891),
88 Mich. 473, 50 N. W. Rep. 446, 14
L.R..A.161;Vonderbankv.Schmidt
(1892), 44 La. Ann. 264, 10 S~ Rep.
616, 32 Am. St. Rep. 336, 15 L. R. A.
462 and note; Brass and Iron Works
Co. v. Payne (1893), 50 Ohio St. 115,
19 L. R. A. 82; Myers v. Kalamazoo
Buggy Co. (1884), 54 ?4ich. 215, 19
N. W. Rep. 961, 20 id. 545, 52 Am.
Rep. 811; Snyder Manufacturing
Co. v. Snyder (1896), - Ohio St.
- , 43 N. E. Rep. 325. As to the
use of individual names as trademarks, see Fish Bros. Wagon Co. v.
Fish (1892),82 Wis. 546, 52 N.W. Rep.
64.5, 33 Am. St. Rep. 72, 16 L. R. A.

453; Marshall v. Pinkham (1881), 52'
Wis. 585, 9 N. W. Rep. 615, 38 Am.
Rep. 756; Russia Cement Co. v. L&
Page (1888), 147 Mass. 206, 17 N. E.
Rep. 304, 9 Am. St. Rep. 685; Shaver
v. Shaver (1880), 54 Iowa., 208, 87
Am. Rep. 194, 6 N. W. Rep. 188.
2 See Grow v. Seligman (1882), 47
Mich. 607, 41 Am. Rep. 737; Frazer
v. Frazer Lubricator Co. (1887), 121
Ill 147, 18 N. E. Rep. 639, 2 Am. St.
Rep. 73; Symonds v. Jones (1890),
82 Me. 302, 19 Atl Rep. 820, 17 Am.
St. Rep. 485, 8 L. R. A. 570; Le Page
Co. v. Russia Cement Co. (1892), CU
Fed. Rep. 941, 17 L. R. A. 854, GU. S.
App. 112.
68
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80MB INCIDENTS OF PABTNEESHIP. [ 87.

SOME INOIDENTS OF PARTNERSHIP.

Mr. Justice Lindley, 1 " can hardly be said to have any pre-

[§

87~

cise signification. It is generally used to denote the benefit

arising from connection and reputation ; and its value is what

can be got for the chance of being able to keep that connec-

tion and improve it." Mr. Justice Story 2 describes it as the

benefit or advantage " which is acquired by an establishment

beyond the mere value of the capital, stock, funds or property

employed therein, in consequence of the general public pat-

ronage and encouragement which it receives from constant

or habitual customers on account of its local position, or

common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or

punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances or neces-

sities, or even from ancient partialities or prejudices." Lord

Eldon * declared that " the good-will of a trade is nothing

more than the probability that the old customers will resort

to the old place;" and this is approved by Mr. Parsons, 4

who says : " It is a hope or expectation, which may be rea-

sonable and strong, and may rest upon a state of things that
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has grown up through a long period and been promoted by

large expenditures of money. And it may be worth all the

money it has cost, and a great deal more; but it is, after all,

nothing more than a hope, grounded upon a probability."

The term " good-will," however, as is pointed out in a late

case* in Nebraska, is often used in three different senses:

1. That above indicated; 2. Where it is connected with or

includes a trade-mark or trade-name ; 6 and 3. Where it is

coupled with an express agreement not to compete with the

business with which it is connected. The first is the true

use, and it is in that sense that the term is here used.

1 1 Lindley on Partnership (Ew- 4 Parsons on Partnership (4th ed.),

ell's 2d Am. ed.), 439. 181.

1 Story on Partnership, 99. Lobeck v. Hardware Co. (1893),

In Cruttwell v. Lye, 17 Ves. 335, 87 Neb. 158, 55 N. W. Rep. 650, 23

346. Many later cases, however, L. R. A. 795.

regard this definition as too nar- 6 As an illustration of this form,

row. See Trego v. Hunt (1896), the court cited Smith v. Walker

Ap. Cas. 7. (1885), 57 Mich. 456, 22 N. W. Rep.
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Mr. Justice Lindley,1 "can hardly be said to have any precise signification. It is generally used to denote the benefit
arising from connection and reputation; and its value is what
can be got for the chance of being able to keep that connec-·
tion and improve it." Mr. Justice Story 2 descriqes it as the
benefit or advantage "which is acquired by an establishment
beyond the mere value of the capital, stock, funds or property
employed therein, in consequence of the general publfo patronage and encouragement which it receives from constant
or habitual customers on account of its local position, or
common celebrity, or rep~tation for skill or affluence, or
punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances or necessities, or even from ancient partialities or prejudices." Lord
Eldon 1 declared that "the good-will of a trade is nothing
more than the probability that the old customers will resort
to the old place;" and this is approved by Mr. Parsons,4
who says: "It is a hope or expectation, which may be reasonable and strong, and may rest upon a state of things that
has grown up through a long period and been promoted by
large expenditures of money. And it may be worth all the
money it has cost, and a great deal more; but it is, after al~
nothing more than a hope, grounded upon a probability."
The term "good-will," however, as is pointed out in a late
case_• in Nebraska, is often used in three different senses:
1. That above indicated; 2. Where it is connected with or
includes a trade-mark or trade-name; 6 and 3. Where it is
coupled with an express agreement not to compete with the
business with which it is connected. The first is the true
use, and it is in that sense that the term is here used.
11 Lindley on Partnership (Ewell's 2d Am. ed.), 439.
2 Story

on Partnership, § g9.

· a In Cruttwell v.

Ly~

17 Ves. 835,

346. Many later cases, however,
regard this definition as too narrow. See Trego v. Hunt (1896),
Ap. Oas. 7.

'Parsons on Partnership (4th ed.),
§ 181. .
,
I Lobeck v. Hardware Co. (1893),
87 Neb. 158, 55 N. W. Rep. 650, 28
L. R. A. 795.
6 As an illustration of this, form,
the court cited Smith v. Walker
(1885), 57 Mich. 456, 22 N. W. Rep.
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§§ 88, 89.J

LAW OF PARTNEBSHIP.
I

88, 89.] LAW OF PAKTNBESHIP.

88. Good-will as an asset. The good-will is a partner-

ship asset. As a rule, it inheres in the business and not in

the locality, though in the case of hotels, theaters and simi-

lar places the rule is otherwise. 1 It does not attach to the

stock in trade, and does not necessarily pass with a sale of

the stock. It does pass, however, with a sale of the busi-

ness, or of all interest in or assets of the business. 1

89. Disposition of good-will on dissolution. Upon a

voluntary dissolution of the business, the good-will is an

asset and will be sold for the benefit of the partners, if

either partner desires such sale. 8 Upon a dissolution by

§ 88. Good-will as an asset.-The good-will is a partnership asset. As a rule, it inheres in the business and not in
the locality, though in the case of hotels, theaters and similar places the rule is otherwise.1 It does not attach to the
stock in trade, and does not necessarily pass with a sale of
the stock. It does pass, however, with a sale of the business, or of all interest in or assets of the business.2

death, the good-will does not go to the survivor alone, but is

still a firm asset for whose value he must account if he ob-

tains the benefit of it. 4

The sale by one partner of the good-will does not, ofitsdj,

carry the right to the firm name, if it be a personal one in-

cluding the name of the retiring partner, unless it has been

made a trade-mark ; neither does it, of itself and in the ab-
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sence of an agreement not to do so, operate to prevent the

retiring partner from starting a new business in competition

with the old, or even, it has been held, prevent him from

267, 24 id. 830, 26 id. 78& See, also, (1869), 62 Pa. St. 81, 1 Am. Rep. 382,

as to the effect of the sale of busi- Booth v. Jarrett (1876), 52 How. Pr.

ness and good- will where the firm (N. Y.) 169; Woodward v. Lazar

name has been made a trade-mark, (1863), 21 CaL 448, 82 Am. Dec. 75;

Horton Mfg. Co. v. Horton Mfg. Armstrong v. Kleinhaus (1884), 80

Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 816; Snyder Mfg. Ky. 303, 56 Am. Rep. 894

Co. v. Snyder (1896), Ohio St. 2 Hoxie v. Chaney (1887), 143 Mass.

, 43 N. E. Rep. 325. In the for- 592, 58 Am. Rep. 149; Merry v.

mer case the court said: "If one Hoopes (1888), 111 N. Y. 415; Will-

has made of his own name a trade- iams v. Farrand (1891), 88 Mich. 473,

mark, and then transfers to an- 50 N. W. Rep. 446, 14 L. R. A. 161.

other his business, in which his 3 Sheppard v. Boggs (1879), 9 Neb.

name has been so used, the right 257; Snyder Mfg. Co. v. Snyder

§ 89. Disposition of good-will on dissolution.-Upon a.
voluntary dissolution of the business, the good-will is an
asset and will be sold for the benefit of the partners, if
either partner desires such sale.1 Upon a dissolution by
death, the good-will does not go to the survivor alone, but is
still a firm asset for whose value he must account if he obtains the benefit of it.'
The sale by one partner of the good-will does not, of itself,
carry the right to the firm name, if it be a personal one including the name of the retiring partner, unless it has been
made a trade-mark; neither does it, of itself and in the absence of an agr.eemen t not to do so, operate to prevent the
retiring partner from starting a new business in competition
with the old, or even, it has been held, prevent him from

to continue such use of the name (1893), Ohio St. , 43 N. E. Rep.

will doubtless follow the business 325.

as often as it may be transferred." * Smith v. Everett (1859), 27 Beav.

iChittenden v. Witbeck (1883), (Eng. Ch.) 446; Rammelsberg v,

50 Mick 401; Musselman's Appeal Mitchell (1876), 29 Ohio St. 22.
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267, 24 id. 830, 26 id. 783. See, also, (1869), 62 Pa. St. 81, 1 Am. Rep. 882;
as to the effect of the sale of busi- Booth v. Jarrett (1876), 52 How. Pr.
ness and good-will where the firm (N. Y.) 169; Woodward v. Lazar
name has been made a trade-mark, (1863), 21 Cal 448, .82 Am. Dec. 75;
Horton Mfg. Co. v. Horton Mfg. Armstrong v. Kleinhaus (1884), 82
Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 816; Snyder Mfg. Ky. 303, 56 Am. Rep. 894.
2 Hoxie v. Chaney (188~, 143 Mas&
Co. v. Snyder (1896), - Ohio St.
- , 43 N. E. Rep. 325. In the for- 592, 58 Am. Rep. 149; Merry v.
mer case the court said: "If one Hoopes (1888), 111 N. Y. 415; Will·
has made of his own name a trade- iams v. Farrand (1891), 88 Mich. 473,
mark, and then transfers to an- 50 N. W. Rep. 446, 14 L. R. A. 161.
other his business, in which his
3 Sheppard v. Boggs (1879), 9 Neb.
name has been so used, the right 257; Snyder Mfg. Co. v. Snyder
to continue such use of the name (1896),-0hio St.-, 48 N. E. Rep.
will doubtless follow the business 325.
as often as it may be transferred.''
4 Smith v. Everett (1859), 27 Beav.
1 Chittenden v. Witbeck (1883), (Eng. Ch.) 446; Rammelsberg v.
50 Mich. 401; Musselman'~ Appeal Mitchell (1876), 29 Ohio St. 22.
70
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SOME INCIDENTS OF PARTNERSHIP. [

SOMR INCIDENTS OF P .ARTNERSHIP.

[§§ 90-92.

soliciting the trade of the old customers; though it will pre-

vent him from carrying on the new business in such a way

as to make it appear to be the old one. 1

IY. OF THE CAPITAL OF THE FIRM.

90. What constitutes capital. The capital of the firm

is the aggregate of the sums which the partners have agreed

soliciting the trade of the old customers; though it will prevent him from carrying on the new business in such a way
as to make it appear to be the old one.1

to contribute for the transaction of the partnership business.

It differs from the property of the firm, inasmuch as the

capital is a fixed sum, while the amount of property pos-

IV. 011'

THE CAPITAL Oii' THE

Furn.

sessed by the firm may vary from time to time, and be more

or less than the capital. It differs also from advances made

by the partners to the firm, for the latter are in the nature of

loans to the firm, and not contributions to its fixed capital. 1

91. Fixing amount and interests. In the final distri-

bution of assets upon the winding up of the partnership

business, capital is usually to be distributed among the part-

ners in proportion to the capital contributed, and it is there-

fore desirable to have the amount of the capital and the
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shares of each partner definitely fixed, though, where noth-

ing appears to the contrary, it will be presumed that their

shares are equal.

The amount of the capital as originally determined can-

not subsequently be increased or diminished without the

consent of all of the partners.

§ 90. What constitutes capital.-The capital of the firm
is the aggregate of the sums which the partners have agreed
to contribute for the transaction of the partnership business.
It differs from the property of the firm, inasmuch as the
capital is a fixed sum, while the amount of property possessed by the firm may vary from time to time, and be more
or less than the capital. It differs also from advances made
by the partners to the firm, for the latter are in the nature of
loans to the firm, and not contributions to its fixed capital.1

92. What may be received as contributions to capital.

The contributions to the capital need not be in money, but

1 See Knoedler v. Glaenzer (1893), good-will to his partner cannot, be-

55 Fed. Rep. 895, 14 U. S. App. fore the dissolution has taken

336, 20 L. R. A. 733; Vonderbank place, proceed to copy from the

v. Schmidt (1892), 44 La. Ann. 264, firm books the names of the firm

82 Am. St. Rep. 836, 15 L. R. A. customers for the purpose of so-

462; Williams v. Farrand (1891), 88 liciting their custom when the dis-

Mich. 473, 50 N. W. Rep. 446, 14 L. solution is complete. Trego v.

R. A. 161: Vernon v. Hallam (1886), Hunt (1896), Ap. Cas. 7.

84 Ch. Div. 748. A partner, how- 2 1 Lindley on Partnership (Ew-

who has agreed to sell the ell's 2d ed.), 820.

71

§ 91. Fixing amount and interests.- In the final distribution of assets upon the winding up of the partnership
business, ·capital is usually to be distributed among the partners in proportion to the capital contributed, and it is therefore desirable to have the · amount of the capital and the
shares of each partner definitely fixed, though, where nothing appears to the contrary;it will be presumed that their
'
shares are equal.
The amount of the capital as originally determined cannot subsequently ,be increased or diminished without the
consent of all of the partners.
§ 92. What may be received as contributions to capital.
The contributions to the capital need not be in money, but
I See Knoedler v. Glaenzer (1893), good-will to his partner cannot, be55 Fed. Rep. 895, 14 U. S. App. fore the dissolution has taken
336, 20 L. R. A. 733; Vonderbank place, proceed to copy from the
v. Schmidt (1892), 44 La. Ann. 264, firm books the names of the firm
82 Am. St. Rep. 836, 15 L. R. A. customers for the purpose of so.462; Williams v. Farrand (1891), 88 liciting their custom when· the disMich. 478, 50 N. W. Rep. 446, 14 L. solution is complete. Trego T.
R. A. 161: Vernon v. Hallam (1886), Hunt (1896), Ap. Cas. 7.
84 Cb. Div. 748. A partner, how21 Lindley on Partnership (Ew~ver, who has agreed to sell the ell's 2d ed.), 820.
71

,

§§ 93, 94.]

LAW 01l' P A.RTNERSHIP.

93, 94.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

may be made in real or personal property, labor, skill, 01

whatever the parties may agree to receive as such. Neither

is it necessary that each partner shall contribute the same

kind of thing, for one may contribute money and another

property and another skill, and the like. The use only of

property may also be contributed, the partner retaining to

himself as an individual the title to it. It is not necessary

that the several contributions shall be equal in amount or

value ; for one may contribute much while another contrib-

utes little.

It does not follow, however, where one contributes money,

and the other skill, experience or labor, that they will ulti-

mately own this money together (though capital is firm

property, and though property bought with it for partner-

ship purposes would be partnership property), or that upon

a termination of the partnership they will share it in com-

mon ; for, as will be seen, upon such a termination each part-

ner is to be repaid his contributions to capital before the
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profits are divided. 1

V. OP THE PROPERTY OF THE FIRM.

1. Of firm Property in General.

93. What may be partnership property. The prop-

erty of the firm may be that originally contributed by the

partners to form the partnership capital, or it may be that

subsequently acquired in partnership dealings. It may be

either real or personal. Unless provided otherwise by the

articles or by statute, there is no limit to the kind or amount

of the property which the firm may possess.

Somewhat different rules apply when the property is real

estate, and these will be made the subject of separate men-

tion.

94. What constitutes partnership property. What

property is partnership property, or when it becomes such,

!See Shea v. Donahue (1885), 15 Whitcomb v. Converse (1875), 119

Lea (Tenn.), 160, 54 Am. Rep. 407; Masa 38, 20 Am. Rep. 31L
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may be made in real or personal property, labor, skill, 01
whatever the parties may ag ree to receive as such. Neither
is it necessary that each partner shall contribute the same
kind of thing, for one may contribute money and another
property and another skill, and the like. The 'U8e only of
property may also be contributed, the partner retaining to
himself as an individual the title to it. It is not necessary
that the several contributions shall be equal in amount or
value; for one may contribute much while another contributes little.
It does not follow, however, where one contributes money,
and the other skill, experience or labor, that they will ultimately own· this money together (though capital is firm
property, and though property bought with it for partnership purposes would be partnership property), or that upon
a termination of the partnership they will share it in common; for, as will be seen, upon such a termination each partner is to be repaid his contributions to capital before the
profits are divided. 1

v.

OF THE PROPERTY OF THE FIRM.

1. Of Firm Property in General.
§ 93. What may be partnership property.-The property of the firm may be that originally contributed by the
partners to form the partnership capital, or it may be that
subsequently acquired in partnership dealings. It may be
either real or personal. Unless provided otherwise by the
articles or by statute, there is no limit to the kind or amount
of the property which the firm may possess.
Somewhat different rules apply when the property is real
estate, and these will be made the subject of separate mention.

§ 94:. What con:stitutes partnership property.- What
property is partnership property, or when it becomes such,
1 See Shea v. Donahue (1885), 15 Whitcomb v. Converse (1875), 119
Lea (Tenn.), 160, 54 Am. Rep. 407; Mass. 38, 20 Am. Rep. 31L
72
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SOME INCmRNTS OF PABTNEBSHIP. [ 95, 96.

SOME INCIDENTS 01" PARTNERSHIP.

[§§ 95, 96.

is not always easy to determine. " Not only all the goods

and merchandise properly so called," says Mr. Parsons, 1

" but all chattels bought by the partnership, or otherwise

coming to them, as their furniture, books, etc., are partner-

ship property ; and so also all bills of exchange and notes,

or other evidence of debts, and all debts or accounts or bal-

ances, or other claims ; and all shares in companies, or scrip

bought with partnership funds, or otherwise assigned to the

partnership and not transferred to the individual partners

and charged in their accounts, would be regarded as part-

nership property."

95. Same subject Property bought by partner in

his own name. Whether property bought by one partner

in his own name is partnership property depends upon the

circumstances and the intention. One partner may, of course,

buy property for himself; but where he takes title in his own

name to property bought with partnership funds, there is a

strong presumption that it is partnership property, though
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he may show that, by arrangement with his partners, it was

is not always easy to determine.

"Not only all the goods
and merchandise properly so called," says Mr. Parsons,1
"but all cha.t~els bought by the partnership, or otherwise
coming to them, as their furniture, books, etc., are partnership property; and so also all bills of exchange and notes,
or other evidence of debts, and all debts or accounts or balances, or other claiµis; and all shares in companies, or scrip
bought with partnership funds, or otherwise assigned to the .
partnership and not transferred to the individual partners
and charged in their a~_connts, would be regarded as partnership property."

really to be his own ; as, for example, that- the funds were

loaned to him with which to buy the property on his own

account. If, however, he takes title in himself when it was

his duty to take it for the firm, the firm may require him to

transfer to it; and, though he buys in his own name, if he

was really buying for the firm, the firm is liable to the seller.

It is simply the application of the rules of agency, the firm

being the principal, and the partner the agent. 8

96. Same subject Property used by the firm. Not

all property used by the firm is firm property ; for, as has

been seen, the partners' contribution to the firm capital may

be simply the use of property and not its title ; and, during

the continuance of the relation, the firm may acquire, by

Larsons on Partnership, 177. Miss. 615 ;Kruschkev. Stefan (1892),

*See Traphagen v. Burt (1876), 67 83 Wis. 373, 53 N. W. Rep. 679.

N. Y. 30; Davis v. Davis (1882X 60
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§ 95. Same subject-Property bonght by partner in
his own name.-Whether property bought by one partner
in his own name is partnership property depends upon the
circumstances and the intention. One partner may, of course,
buy property for himself; but where he takes title in his own
name to property bought with partnership funds, there is a
strong presumption' that it is partnership property, though
he may show that, by arrangement with his partners, it was
really to be his own; as, for example, that- the funds were
loaned to him with which to buy the property on his own
account. If, however, he takes title in himself when it was
his duty to take it for the firm, the firm may require him to
transfer to it; and, though he buys in his own nam e, if he
was really buying for the firm, the firm is liable to the seller.
It is simply the application of the rules of agency, the firm
being the principal, and the partner the agent.2
1

§ 96. Same subject - Property used by the firm.,- Not
all property used by the firm is firm property; for, as.has
been seen, the ·partners' contribution to the firm capital may
be simply the use of property and not its title; and, during
· th~ continuance of the relation, the firm may acquire, by
on Partnership, § 177. Miss. 615; Kruschke v. Stefan (1892),
See Traphagen v. Burt (1876), 67 83 Wis. 373, 53 N. W. Rep. 679.
N. Y. 30; Davis v. Davis (1882), 60
1 Parsons

I
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§§ 97, 98.)

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

97, 98.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

lease or otherwise, the right to use or employ the individual

property of a partner as well as of a stranger.

07. Nature of each partner's interest in the firm

lease or otherwise, the right to use or employ the individual
property of a partner as well as of a stranger.

property. In the absence of any special agreement pre-

scribing a different rule, all the members of the firm are in

terested in the whole of the partnership property. Thej

are, however, neither joint tenants nor tenants in common,

but the possessors of a peculiar interest. That interest i:>

simply each partner's share in whatever surplus may remain

after the debts and obligations of the firm are paid. 1 It is a

right, not to partition or distribution of the property in kind,

but to have the assets sold and the proceeds divided after

the payment of partnership debts and obligations. The

partners may, indeed, by agreement, divide the surplus of

the property after the payment of the debts, in kind, if they

see fit to do so, but neither can claim such a division as a

matter of right; and if the estate is settled m court the

property will be sold and the surplus divided in money. 2
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The rule is the same whether the property is real or personal.

98. Extent of each partner's interest. This share or

interest of each partner is obviously made ap of two kinds

of items : 1. That, if anything, which is due to be returned

to him on account of his original contributions to capital.'

2. That, if anything, which is due to Lim on account of

profits. 4 The distribution of profits, of sourse, cannot take

place until the contributions to capital have been restored.

The ratio of distribution of the two funds capital and

profits may be the same, but it is dot necessarily so. It

will be the same where the parties have agreed that profits

or losses are to be divided in the same proportions as the

1 Sindelare v. Walker (1891), 137 v. Bristow (1878), 73 N. Y. 264,

§ 97. Nature of each partner's interest in the firm
property.-In the absence of any special agreement pr&
scribing .a different rule, all the members of the firm are in
terested in the whole of the partnership property. The:y
are, however, neither joint tenants nor tenant~ in common,
but the possessors of a peculiar interest. That interest i~
simply each partner's share in whatever surplus may rem&fo
after the debts and obligations of the firm are paid. 1 It is a.
right, not to partition or di.s tribution of the property in kind,
but to have the assets sold and the proceeds divided after
the payment of partnership debts and obligations. The
partners may, indeed, by agreement, divide the surplus of
the property after the payment of the debts, in kind, if they
see fit to do so, but neither can claim such a division as a
matter of right; and if the estate is settled ia court the
property will be sold and the surplus divided in money. 2
The rule is the same whether the property is real or personal.

Hi. 43, 27 N. K Rep. 59, 81 Am. St. Paige's Partn. Cas. 106.

Rep. 353; Menagh v. Whitwell Wild v. Milne (1859), 26 Bearan,

(1873), 52 N. Y. 146, 11 Am. Rep. 683, 504, Ames' Partn. Caa 17&

Ames' Caa on Partn. 229; Staats See post, 304.

See post, 304,805.
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§ 98. Extent of each partner's interest.~· This share or
interest of each partner is obviously made ap of two kinds
of items: 1. That, if anything, which is due to be returned
to him on account of his original ·co?-tril,utions to capital.•
2. That, if anything, which is due
him on account of
profits.' The distribution of profits, of ~ourse, cannot take
place until the contributions to capital have been restored.
The ratio of distribution of the two tunds - capital and
profits - may be the same, but it is dot necessarily so. It
will be the same where the parties hu.ve agreed that profits
or losses are to be divided in the st..me proportions as the

to

v. Walker (1891), 137 v. Bristow (1878), 73 N. Y. 264,
Rep. 69, 31 Am. St. Paige':, Partn. Cas. 106.
IWii<t v. Milne (1859), 26 Beann,
Rep. 353; Menagh v. Whitwell
(1873), 62 N. Y. 146, 11 Am. Rep. 683, 604, Ames' Partn. Ca& 173.
a See post, § 804.
Ames' Oas. on Partn. 229; Staats
' See post, §§ 804, 805.
1 Sindelare

m 43, 27 N. E.

74
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SOMB INCIDENTS OF PARTNERSHIP. [ 99.

contributions to capital; but, where nothing is shewn re-

SOME INCIDENTS OJ" P ABTNERSHIP.

[§ 99.

specting such an agreement, it will be presumed that the

profits or losses are to be shared equally. This will be the

presumption even though it appears that the contributions

to capital were unequal. 1 Speaking of shares in this sense,

that is, of shares in the profits and losses as distinct from

contributions to capital, Mr. Justice Lindley says : " Whether

partners have contributed money equally or unequally,

whether they are or are not on a par as regards skill, con-

nection or character, whether they have or have not labored

equally for the benefit of the firm, their shares will be con-

sidered as equal unless some agreement to the contrary can

be shown to have been entered into." a

99. The transfer of shares. Such being the nature of

a partner's share or interest, it is clear that he has no title

to any specific article or portion of the partnership property,

and hence can neither assign, sell nor mortgage any partic-

ular portion of it as his own. The utmost that he can do is
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to transfer his share or interest in the whole assets, and the

value of such share or interest can only be conclusively de-

termined upon a winding up of the partnership affairs. 3 Of

this nature only, therefore, is the right which is transferred

contributions to capital; but, where nothing is shewn respecting such an agreement, it will be presumed that the
profits or losses are to be shared equally. This will be the
presumption even though it appears that the cont ributions
to capital were unequal. 1 Speaking of shares in this sense,
that is, of shares in the pro.fits and losses as distinct from
contributions to capital, Mr.Justice Lindley says: "Whether
partners have contributed money equally or unequally,
whet~er they are or are not on a par as regards skill, connection or character, whether they have or have not labored
equally for the benefit of the firm, their shares will be considered as equal unless some agreement to the contrary can
be shown to have been entered into." 2

by a partner's sale or assignment of his interest, or which

passes to his representative upon his death, or which can be

claimed by the legatee under his will, or which devolves upon

his assignee in bankruptcy or insolvency.

A partner may, indeed, transfer such interest as he has, and

this limited interest will often be held to pass under a convey-

ance by which he has attempted to transfer a greater right. 4

1 1 Lindley on Partnership (Ew- Appeal (1869), 63 Pa. St 194, Paige's

ell's 2d Am. ed.), 348, 349; Robinson Partn.Cas. 163; Sindelare v. Walker

v. Anderson, 20 Beavan, 98; Pea- (1891), 137 HL 43, 27 N. E. Rep. 59, 31

cock v. Peacock, 16 Ves. 49. Am. St Rep. 353; Menagh v. Whit-

2 1 Lindley on Partnership (Ew- well (1873), 52 N. Y. 146, 11 Am. Rep.

ell's 2d Am. ed.), 349. 68&

'Collins' Appeal (1883), 107 Pa. *See Carrie v. Cloverdale Ckx, 90

St. 590, 53 Am. Kep. 479 ; Whigham'* CaL 84.
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§ 99. The transfer of shares.- Such being the nature of
a partner's share or interest, it is clear that he has no title
to any specific article or portion of the partnership property,
and hence can neither assign, sell nor mortgage any particular portion of it as his own. The utmost that he can do is
to ttansfer his share or interest in the whole assets, and the
value of such share or interest can only be conclusively determined upon a winding up of the partnership affairs. 3 Of
this nature only, therefore, is the right which is transferred
by a partner's sale or assignment of his interest, or which
passes to his representative upon his death, or which can be
claimed by the legatee under his will, or which devolves upon
his assignee in bankruptcy or insolvency.
A partner may, indeed, transfer such interest as he has, and
this limited interest will often be held to pi!iSS under a conYeyance by which he has attempted to transfer a greater right.'
11 Lindley on Partnership (Ew- Appeal (1869), 63 Pa. St. 194, Paige's
ell's 2d Am. ed.), 348, 349; Robinson Partn.Cas.163; Sindelare v. Walker
v. Anderson, 2-0 Beavan, 98; Pea- (1891), 137 Ill 43, 27 N. E. Rep. 59, at
cock v. Peacock, 16 Ves. 49.
Am. St. Rep. 353; MAnagh v. Whit21 Lindley on Partnership (Ew- well (1873)~ 52 N. Y. i46, 1). Am. Rep.
ell's 2d Am. ed.), 349.
683.
a Collins' Appeal (1883), 107 Pa.
•See Carrie v. Cloverdale Co., 90
St. 590, 52 Am. .kep. 479; Whigham'q C~L 84.
75

'§§ 100, 101.]

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

100, 101.] LAW OF PAKTNER8HIP.

The transfer of his interest, however, does not operate to

introduce the grantee into the firm, but it dissolves the part-

nership, leaving to the grantee the right to the value of the

share acquired as determined upon the final accounting.

An exception to this rule of dissolution exists in joint-

stock companies, mining partnerships, and others in which,

by statute or agreement, the shares of the members are

transferable.

100. Seizure of partner's share by his individual

creditor. In most states the share or interest of one part-

ner in the property of the partnership may be levied upon

and sold on execution at the suit of his individual creditors;

but no specific chattels can be so seized or sold, and the only

The transfer of his interest, however, does not operate to
.introduce the grantee into the firm, but it dissolves the partnership, leaving to the grantee the right to the value of the
-share acquired as determined upon the final accounting.
An exception to this rule of dissolution exists in jointstock companies, mining partnerships, and others in which,
by statute or agreement, the shares of the members are
transferable.

right acquired by the purchaser is the right to an accounting

and to secure the partner's interest after the settlement of

the partnership affairs and the payment of the partnership

debts. 1

The method of procedure in seizing and selling the part-
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ner's interest is not uniform, though the right is generally

recognized.

2. Of the Title to Personal Property.

101. May be held in firm name. As has been already

stated, the title to personal property may be acquired, held

and disposed of by the firm in the firm name, and this is the

proper and appropriate manner in which the title to such prop-

erty should be taken, held and disposed of. Bills of sale and

chattel mortgages may therefore be made to or by the firm

in the firm name, subject to the disabilities, hereafter to be

noticed, attaching to the . execution of instruments under

seal. Choses in action, as well as choses in possession, may

be acquired or transferred in the name of the firm.

Gerard v. Bates (1888), 124 III St. Rep. 403; Nixon v. Nash (1861),

150, 16 N. E. Rep. 258, 7 Am. St 12 Ohio St. 647, 80 Am. Dec. 390;

§ 100. Seizure of partner's share by his individual
creditor.- In most states the share or interest of one partner in the property of the partnership may be levied upon
and sold on execution at the suit of his individual creditors;·
but no specific chattels can be so seized or sold, and the only
right acquired by the purchaser is the right to an accounting
and to secure the partner's interest after the settlement of
the partnership affairs and the payment of the partnership
debts.1
The method of procedure in seizing and selling the partner's interest is not uniform, though the right is generally
recognized.

Rep. 350; Williams v. Lewis (1888), Morrison v. Blodgett (1836), 8 N. H.

2. Of th:6 Title

115 Ind. 45, 17 N. E. Rep. 262, 7 Am. 238, 29 Am. Dec. 653; Hutchinson

76

f,o

Personal P'roperty.

§ IQI. May be held in firm name.- AB ha.s been already
stated, the title to personal property may be acquired, held
and disposed of by the firm in the firm name, and this is the
proper and appropriate manner in which the titl~ to such property should be taken~ held and disposed of. Bills of sale and
chattel mortgages may therefore be made to or by the firm
in the firm name, subject to the disabilities, hereafter to be
noticed, attaching to the,. execution of instruments under
seal. Choses in action, as well as choses in possession, may
be acquired or transferred in the name of the firm.
1 Gerard

v. Bates (1888), 124 TIL
150, 16 N. E. Rep. 258, 7 Am. St.
Rep. 350; Williams v. Lewis (1888),
115 Ind. 45, 17 N. E. Rep. 262, 7 Am.

St. Rep. 403; Nixon -v. Nash (1861),
12 Ohio St. 647, 80 Am. Dec. 390;
Morrison v. Blodgett (1836), 8 N. H.
238, 29 Am. Dec. 653; Hutchinson
76
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BOMB INCIDENTS OF PAKTNERSHIP. [ 102-104.

102. May be held in the name of one partner for the

SOME INCIDENTS 01" PARTNERSHIP.

[§§ 102-104..

firm. But personal property may be firm property al-

though the title is taken or held in the name of one partner

only. It may have been so taken and held with the consent

of all of the partners, in which case their rights to it, as be-

tween themselves, are clear; but it may also have been so

taken or held by one partner in violation of his duty to the

firm, but in this case also, as has been seen, equity regards

it as firm property and will protect the rights of the other

partners in it.

103. Title is in firm collectively. Whether, how-

ever, the title be in the firm name or in that of one partner

for the firm, the ownership of the property is not in the

partners as individuals, but in the firm as such. The part-

ners are therefore, as has been seen, neither joint tenants

nor tenants in common, but the possessors of that peculiar

interest already described, known as the partner's share.

One partner, therefore, as has been already noted, can neither

§ 102. May be held · in the name of one partner for the·
firm.· But personal property may be firm property although the title is taken or held in the name of one partner·
only. It may ha:ve been so taken and held with the consent.
of all of the partners, in which case their rights to it, as between themselves, are clear; but it may also have been so ·
taken or held by one partner in violation of his duty to the,
firm, but in this case also, as has been seen, equity regards
it as firm property and will protect ~he rights of the other
partners in- i~.
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sell, assign nor mortgage any specific chattel, but simply his

interest in the whole assets. 1

3. Of the Title to Real Estate.

104. Legal title to real property cannot be taken in

firm name. Partnership real estate stands upon peculiar

footing. A partnership may own or deal in lands, but it is

incapable, as a partnership, of taking or holding the legal

title to lands in the firm name, inasmuch as it is incapable

of acting to such an extent as a separate legal entity. A

conveyance to the firm by name operates, therefore, either

to pass no title at all, as where the name is a wholly fictitious

one, 2 or to vest the legal title in those partners whose indi-

vidual names appear in the firm name. 3

"Where, therefore, it is desired to convey real estate to a

v. Dubois (1881), 45 Mich. 143; 2 Compare Tidd v. Bines (1879), 26

Whigham's Appeal (1869), 63 Pa. Minn. 201, with Byam v. Biokford

§ 103. Title is in firm collectively. -Whether, however, the title be in the firm name or in that of one partner·
for the firm, the ownership of the property is not in the:
partners as individuals, but in the firm as such. The partners are .therefore, as has been seen, neither joint tenants.
nor tenants in common, but the possessors of that peculiar
interest- already described, known as the partner's share.
One partner, therefore, as has been already noted, can neithersell, assign nor mortgage any specific chattel, but simply his
interest in the whole assets.1

St. 194, Paige's Partn. Gas. 16a (1885), 140 Mass. 31.

1 See ante, 99. * See ante, 84, and note.

77

3. Of the Title to Real Estate.

§ 10!. Legal title to real property cannot be taken in.
firm name. - Partnership real estate stands upon peculiar
footing. A partnership may own or deal in lands, but it is.
incapable, as a partnership, of taking or holding the legal
title to Jands in the firm name, inasmuch as it is incapable ·
of 'acting: to ·such an extent as a separate legal entity. A
conveyance to the firm by name operates, therefore, either·
to pass no title at all, as where the name is a wholly fictitious .
one,2 or to vest the legal title in those partners whose indi- ·
vidual names appear in the firm name. 3
Where, therefore, it is desired to convey real estate to a
v. Dubois (1881), 45 Mich. 143;
2 Compare Tidd v. Rines (1879), 26 .
Whigham's Appeal (1869), 63 Pa. Minn. 201, with Byam v. Bickford,
(1885), 140 Mass. 31.
St. 194, Paige's Parta Oas. 163.
I See ante, § 99.
3 See ante, § 84, and note.

77

§§ 105, 106.]

t.A.W OF P A.RTNERSHIP.

105, 106.] 1<AW OF PARTNERSHIP.

firm, the utmost that can be done is to vest the title in the

partners as individuals f or the firm; and for this purpose

the most unequivocal meAiod is to make the deed run to

all of the partners in their individual names, as partners

doing business under the firm name which may have been

adopted, and expressly declaring that they are to hold it as

such partners and for partnership purposes,

105. But the equitable title is in the firm. But

though the firm as such cannot, in the firm name, hold the

legal title to real estate, the equitable title to firm realty is

in the firm, and equity will regard and protect the land as

partnership property. For this purpose, the person or per-

firm, the utmost that can be done is to vest the title ir.. the
partners a~ individuals -For the firm; and for this purpose
the most unequivocal medb.od is to make the deed run to
all of the partners in their individual names, as partners
doing business under the firm name which may have been
adopted, and expressly declaring that they are to hold it as
such partners and for partnership purposes.

sons holding the legal title, whether one partner or all, will

be regarded as holding in trust for the firm. 1

106. When land is partnership property. The ques-

tion whether land held in the name of one partner or of all

is partnership property or not, where there is no unequivo-

cal evidence of the intention, is one of much importance and
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frequently of great difficulty. The question may be raised

either by the partners themselves, or by the heirs or widow

of a deceased partner, or by the separate creditors of the

partner in whose name the legal title may be vested, claim-

ing priority over the firm creditors.

The chief criterion by which the question is to be deter-

§ ·105. But the equitable title is in the firm. - But
though the firm as such cannot,.. in the firm name, hold the
legal title to real estate, the equitaole title to firm realty is
in the firm, and equity will regard and protect the land as
partnership property. For this purpose, the person or persons holding the legal title, ·whether one partner or all, will
be regarded as holding in trust for the firm. 1

mined, as is declared in a recent case, is the intention of the

partners. "That intention," said the court, 2 "may be ex-

pressed in the deed conveying the land, or in the articles of

partnership; but when it is not so expressed, the circum-

stances usually relied upon to determine the question are

the ownership of the funds paid for the land, the uses to

i See Kiddle v. Whitehill (1889), 1117; Hatchett v. Blanton (1882),

135 U. S. 621, 10 Sup. Ct Rep. 924, 72 Ala. 423; Shanks v. Klein (1881),

34 L. ed. 282; Paige v. Paige (1887), 104 U. S. 18, Paige's Partn. Cas. 136.

71 Iowa, 318, 32 N. W. Rep. 360, * Robinson Bank v. Miller (1894),

60 Am, Rep. 799; Harris v. Harris 153 III 244, 38 N. E. Rep. 1078, 46

(1891), 153 Masa. 439, 26 N. E. Rep. Am. St. Rep. 883, 27 L. R. A. 449.
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§ 106. When land is partnership property.-The question whether land held in the name of one partner or of all
is partnership property or not, where there is no unequivo. cal evidence of the intention, is ono of much importance and
· frequently of great difficulty. The question may be raised
either by the partners themselves, or by the heirs or widow
of a deceased partner, or by the separate creditors of the
partner in whose name the legal title may be vested, claiming priority over the firm creditors.
The chief criterion by which the question is to be determined, as is declared in a recent case, is the intention o.f the
partners. "That intention," s~id the court,2 "may be expressed. in the deed conveying the land, or in the articles of
partnership; but when it is not so expressed, the circumstances usually relied upon to determine the question are
the ownership of the funds paid for the land, the uses to
1 See Riddle v. Whitehill (1889), 1117; Hatchett v. Blanton (1882),
135 U. S. 621, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 924, 72 Ala. 423; Shanks v. Klein (1861),
34 L. ed. 282; Paige v. Paige (1887), 104 U. S. 18, Paige's Partn. Cas.136.
71 Iowa, 318, 32 N. W. Rep. 360,
2 Robinson Bank v. Miller (1894),
60 Am. Rep. 799; Harris v. Harris 153 IlL 244., 38 N. E. Rep. 1078, 46
(1891), 153 Mass. 439, 26 N. E. Rep. Am. St. Rep. 883, 27 I. R. A. 449.
78
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which it is put, and the manner in which it is entered upon

the books of the firm. 1 Where real estate is bought with

partnership funds for partnership purposes, and is applied

to partnership uses, or entered and carried in the accounts

of the firm as a partnership asset, it is deemed to be firm

property ; and, in such case, it makes no difference, in a court

of equity, whether the title is vested in all the partners as

tenants in common, or in one of them, or in a stranger. 2 If

the real estate is purchased with partnership funds, the

party holding the legal title will be regarded as holding it

subject to a resulting trust in favor of the firm furnishing

the money. In such case no agreement is necessary, and

the statute of frauds has no application." *

107. Same subject. Where the land was purchased in

their individual capacity by persons who thereafter became

partners, the question whether it has been converted into

1 Citing here, 1 Bates on Part- that it was so regarded, it is con
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nership, 280: 2 Lindley on Part-

nership, marg. p. 649; 17 Am. &

Eng. Ency. of Law, 945. In Lind-

say v. Race (1894), 103 Mich. 28, it

is said: "Whether lands held in

which it is put, and the manner in which it is entered upon
the books of the firm. 1 Where real estate . is bought with
partnership funds for partnership purposes, and is applied
to partnership .uses, or entered and carried in the accounts
of the firm as a partnership asset, it is deemed to be firm
property; and, in such case; it makes no difference, in a court
of equity, whether the title is vested in all the partners as
tenants in common, or in one of them, or in a stranger.2 If
the real estate is purchased with partnership funds, the
party holding the legal title will be regarded as holding it
subject to a resulting trust in favor of the firm furnishing
the money. In such case no agreement is necessary, and
the statute of frauds has no application." 1

the name of one partner or of both

are to be deemed copartnership

property is generally a question of

intent, to be gathered from the

manner in which the members of

§ 107. Same subject.- Where the land was purchased in
their individual capacity by persons who thereafter became
partners, the question whether it has been convert ed into

the firm have dealt with them.

While the fact that the funds of

the copartnership have been used

in paying for the lands, wlien origi-

nally purchased or subsequently,

is not conclusive of this intent, yet

it is persuasive evidence, and when,

as in this case, it is accompanied

by the entry of the transaction on

the firm books as a copartnership

transaction, under circumstances

which import a daily declaration

79

vmcmg.

2 Citing here, Parsons on Part-

nership (4th ed.), 265; 1 Bates on

Partn., 281; Johnson v. Clark, 18

Kan. 157. To same effect: Page v.

Thomas (1885). 43 Ohio St 38, 54

Am. Rep. 788; Collner v. Greig

(1890), 137 Pa. St. 606, 21 Am. St. Rep.

899 ; Pepper v. Thomas (1887), 85 Ky.

539; Ross v. Henderson (1877), 77

N. C. 170; Roberts v. Eldred (1887),

73 CaL 391

J Citing here, Parker v. Bowles, 57

N. H. 491 ; Bates on Partn., supra.

To same effect: Riddle v. Whitehill

(1889), 135 U. S. 621, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep.

924, 34 L. ed. 282; Way v. Stebbins

(1882), 47 Mich, 296, 11 N. W. Rep.

166; Paige v. Paige (1887), 71 Iowa,

318, 32 N. W. Rep. 360, 60 Am. Rep

799; Galbraith v. Tracy (1894), 153

111. 54, 38 N. E. Rep. 937, 28 L. R A.

129, 46 Am. St. Rep. 807.

I Citing here, 1 Bates on Partnership, § 280; 2 Lindley on Partnership, marg. p. 649; 17 Am. &
Eng. Ency. of Law, 945. In Lindsay v. Race (1894), 103 Mich. 28, it
is said: " Whether lands held in
the name of one partner or of both
are to be deemed copiutnership
property is generally a question of
intent, to be gathered from the
manner in which the m embers of
the firm have dealt with them.
While the fact that the funds of
the copartnership have been used
in paying for the lands, wh en originally purchased or subgequently,
is not conclusive of this intent, yet
it is persuasive evidence, antl when,
as in this case, it is accompanied
by the entry of the transaction on
the firm books as a copartnershi p
transaction, under chcumstances
wh ich import a daily declaration

that it was so regarded, it is convincing."
2 Citing here, Parsons on Partnership (4th ed.), § 265; 1 Bates on
Partn., § 281; Johnson v. Clark, 18
Kan. 157. To same effect: Page v.
Thomas (1885), 43 Ohio St. 38, 54
Am. Rep. 788; Collner v. Greig
(1890), 137 Pa. St. 606, 21 Am. St. Rep.
899; P epper v. Th om as (1887), 85 Ky.
539; Ross v. H enderson (1877), 77
N. C. 170; Roberts v. Eldred (1887),
73 Cal 394.
s Cit ing here, Park~r v. Bowles, 57
N. H. 491; Bates on Partn., supra.
To same effect: Riddle v. Whitehill
(1889), 135 U. S. 621, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep.
924, 34 L. ed. 282; Way v. Stebbins
(1882), 47 Mich. 296, 11 N. W. Rep.
166; Paige v. Paige (1887), 71 Iowa,
318, 32 N. W. Rep. 360, 60 Am. Rep.
799; Galbraith v. Tracy (1894), 153
ill 54, 38 N. E. Rep. 937, 28 L. R. A.
129, 46 .Am. St. Rep. 867.
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partnership land is one of greater difficulty, and the authori-

ties cannot be reconciled. In the case 1 quoted from in the

preceding section it is said: "The theory of some of the

cases is that real estate bought with separate, and not part-

nership, funds cannot be converted into firm property by a

verbal agreement between the partners, because no trust can

be created in lands unless by writing, in view of the statute

of frauds, except such as results by implication of law. 2

There are cases which hold that, even though the land was

originally bought by the several partners with their individ-

ual funds, and deeded to them as tenants in common, yet it

will be regarded in equity as firm property where it is im-

proved out of partnership funds for firm purposes, and act-

ually used for such purposes, or where the firm puts valuable

and permanent improvements upon it for firm purposes,

and which are essential to the firm. In some instances the

land is held to be the property of the partners, and the im-

provements to be the property of the firm. 1
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" The use of the property is not conclusive of its character

as real estate or personalty, but is only evidence of the in-

tention of the parties. When the intention of the partners

to convert the land into firm property is inferred from cir-

cumstances, the circumstances must be such as do not admit

of any other equally reasonable and satisfactory explana-

tion. 4 And where it is sought to show a conversion of the

land into personalty by agreement of the partners, such

agreement must be clear and explicit."'

1 Robinson Bank v. Miller (1894), Bank v. National Mechanics' Bank

153 111. 244, 38 N. E. Rep. 1078, 46 (1895), 80 Md. 371, 30 AtL Rep. 913,

Am. St Rep. 883, 27 L. R. A. 449. 27 I* R A. 449, 45 Am. St Rep. 350,

2 Citing here, Parker v. Bowles it is said that where the land was

(1876), 57 N. H. 491. originally owned by the partners

3 Citing 1 Bates on Partnership, as individuals, and so stands upon

281, 282, 285. the public records, something more

4 Citing Parsons on Partnership, than the mere intent of the part-

267. ners or the entries upon their own

8 Citing 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. books is necessary to convert the

of Law, 954 In National Union property into firm property as

80

partnership land is one of greater difficulty, and the authorities cannot be reconciled. In the case 1 quoted from in the
preceding section it is said: "The theory of some of the
cases is that real estate bought with separate, and not partnership,"funds cannot be converted into firm property by a
verbal agreement between the partners, because no trust can
be created in lands unless by writing, in view of the statute
of frauds, except such as results by implication of law. 2
There are cases which hold that, even though the land was
originally bought by the several partners with their individual funds, and deeded to them as tenants in common, yet it
will be regarded in equity as firm property where it is improved out of partnership funds for firm purposes, and act..
ually used for such purposes, or where the firm puts valuable
and permanent improvements upon it for firm purposes,
and which are essential to the firm. In some instances the
land is held to be the property of the partners, and the improvements to be the property of the firm. 1
" The use of the property is not conclusive of its character
as real estate or personalty, but is only evidence of the intention of the parties. When the intention of the partners
to convert the land into firm property is inferred from circumstances, the circumstances must be such as do not admit
of any other equally reasonable and satisfactory explanation.' And where it is sought to show a conversion of the
land into personalty by agreement of the partners, such
agreement must be clear and explicit." 1
I Robinson Bank v. Miller (1894), Bank v. National Mechanics' Bank
153 Ill 244, 38 N. E. Rep. 1078, 46 (1895), 80 Md. 371, 30 Atl Rep. 913,
Am. St. Rep. 883, 27 L. R. A. 449.
27 L. R. A. 449, 45 Am. St.. Rep. 350,
2 Citing here, Parker v. Bowles it is said that where the1land was
(1876), 57 N. H. 491.
.
originally owned by tl].e partners
a Citing 1 Bat~s on Partnership, as individuals, and so stands upon
§§ 281, 282, 285.
the public records, something more
4 Citing Parsons on Partnership, than the mere intent of the pa.rt.
§ 267.
ners or the entries upon their own
5Citing 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. books is necessary to convert the
of Law, 954. In National Union property into firm property as
80
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108. Nature of partner's interest in partnership

(§§ 108, 109

realty. The interest of each partner in the partnership real

estate, like his interest in the partnership personal property,

is not a title to any specific parcel or to any specific portion,

but simply an interest in the residue after the partnership

debts have been paid and its affairs are wound up. 1 Until

that purpose is accomplished, therefore, he can sell, assign

or mortgage no greater interest, nor can more be taken upon

process against him at the suit of his individual creditors.

109. Partnership realty, when deemed personal es-

tate. The English rule regards partnership realty as part- I *

nership capital and as having in all respects the character

of personal property; I but the American rule is otherwise.

In this country the partnership realty retains its character

as such for most purposes, though the firm may deal with it

as personal estate, 2 and equity will regard it as personalty |

against individual creditors. Com- stopped, and the partners unable

pare Goldthwaite v. Janney (1894),
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102 Ala. 431, 15 So. Rep. 560, 28 L.

R A. 16; Alkire v. Kahle (1888),

123 111. 496, 17 N. E. Rep. 693, 5 Am.

St. Rep. 540.

1 See Du Bree v. Albert (1882), 100

Pa. St. 483; Henry v. Anderson

(1881), 77 Ind. 361; Kruschke v.

Stefan (1892), 83 Wis. 373.

2 Thus, in Woodward-Holmes Co.

§ 108. Natnre, of partner's interest in partnership
realty.-The interest of each partner in the partnership real
estate, like his interest in the pal'tnership personal property,
is not a title to any specific parcel or to any specific portion,
but simply an interest in the residue after the partnership
d_ebts have been paid and its affairs are wound up.1 Until
that purpose is accomplished, therefore, he can sell, assign
or mortgage no greater interest, nor can more be taken upon
process against him at the suit of his individual creditors.
§ 109. Partnership realty, when deemed personal es·
tate.-The English rule regards partnership realty as partnership capital and as having in all respects the character
of personal property;) but the American rule is otherwise.
In this country the partnership realty retains_its character as such for most purposes, though the firm may deal with it
as personal estate,2 and equity will regard' it as personalty I

\~

v. Nudd (1894), 58 Minn. 236, 59 N.

W. Rep. 1010. 27 L, R. A. 340, it is

said: " During the continuance of

the partnership the partners can

convey or mortgage it, in the

course of their business, whenever

they see fit, without their wives

joining in the conveyance or mort-

gage, and the wives would have no

dower or other interest in it. This

is one of the very objects of treat-

ing partnership real estate as per-

sonal property; for otherwise the

business of the firm might be

to realize on the assets of the firm,

by reason of the wife of one of

them refusing to join in the con-

veyance or mortgage. They have

the same power of disposition over

it for the purposes of a dissolution

of the partnership, the payment of

its debts, and the distribution or

division of the capital among them-

selves; for until that is done the

property has not fulfilled its func-

tions as personalty, or ceased to be

partnership property." So in Ro-

velsky v. Brown (1891), 92 Ala. 522,

9 So. Rep. 182, 25 Am. St Rep. 83,

it is held that one member of a

firm,' engaged in the business of

buying and selling real estate, can

bind the firm by a contract in the

firm name for the sale of partner

ship land, and that such contract

will be specifically enforced against

all the partners.

81

against i~dividual creditors. Com- stopped, and the partners unable
pare Goldthwaite v. Janney (1894), to realize on the assets of the firm,
102 Ala. 431, 15 -So. Rep. 560, 28 L. by reason of the wife of one of
R. A. 16; Alkire v. Kahle (1888), them refusing to join in the con123 Ill. 496, 17 N. E. Rep. 693, 5 Am. veyance or mortgage. They have
the same power of <lisposition over
St. Rep. 540.
1 See Du Bree v. Albert (1882), 100 it for the purposes of a dissolution
Pa. St~ 483; Henry v. Anderson of the partnership, the payment of
(1881), 77 Ind. 361; Kruschke v. its debts, and the dist ribution or
Stefan (1892), 83 Wis. 373.
division of the capital among them2 Thus, in Woodward-Holmes Co. selves; for untii that is done th&
v. Nudd (1894), 58 Minn. 236, 59 N. property has not fulfilled its funoW. Rep. 1010, 27 L. R. A. 340, it is tions as personalty, or ceased to be
said: "During the continuance of partnership property." So in Rothe partnership the partners can velsky v. Brown (1891), 92 Ala. 522,
convey or mortgage it, in the 9 So. Rep. 182, 25 Am. St. Rep. 831
course of their business, whenever it is held that one member of a
they see fit, without their wives _firm,' engaged in the business of
joining in the conveyance or mort- buying and selling real estate, can
gage, and the wives would have no bind the firm by a contract in the
· dower or other interest in it. This - firm name for the sale of partner
is one of the very objects of treat- ship land, and that such contract
ing partnership real estate as per- will be specifically enforced against
sonal property; for otherwise the all the partners.
business of the firm might be

•
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for the purpose of paying the debts and settling the partner*

ship affairs to the exclusion of heirs, widow or the creditors

of the individual partners. 1 As soon as that purpose is ac-

complished, however, the realty resumes its character as

such. It therefore descends to the heir of a deceased part-

ner, though charged with the trust in favor of the partner-

ship ; 2 and the widow of a deceased partner may have dower

in it * after the firm debts are paid.

110. Bona fide purchaser from partner haying legal

title. Partnership lands, therefore, when found to be such,

are liable to the partnership creditors, and the latter take

precedence over the creditors of an individual partner in

whose name the legal title stands, and over a transfer by

for the purpose of paying the debts and settling the partnel'
ship affairs to the exclusion of heirs, widow or the creditors
of the individual partners.1 As soon as that purpose is accomplished, however, the realty resumes its character as
such. It therefore descends to the heir of a deceased partner, though charged with the tru~t in favor of the partnership; 2 and the widow of a deceased partner may have dower
in it 1 after the firm debts are paid.

such partner of the legal title to any one not a bonafide pur-

chaser. But a lonafide purchaser or mortgagee of partner-

ship lands, in ignorance that they were such, from the part-

ner having the legal title of record, will be protected as

against both the other partners and creditors. 4
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111. Interest of surviving partner in firm realty.

Upon the dissolution of the partnership by death, the entire

legal title to all the partnership personalty vests, as will be

*See Robinson Bank v. Miller 210; Strong v. Lord (1883), 107 m.

(1894), 153 III 244, 88 N. E. Rep. 1078, 25.

48 Am. St. Rep. 883, 27 L. R. A. 449; * Norwalk Nat Bank v. Sawyer

Paige v. Paige (1887), 71 Iowa, 818, (1882), 38 Ohio St 338; McNeil v.

32 N.W. Rep. 360,60 Am. Rep. 799; Congregational Society (1884), 66

Mallory v. Russell (1887), 71 Iowa, CaL 105; Seeley v. Miohell (1887),

63, 60 Am. Rep. 776; Willet v. 85 Ky. 508, 4 & W. Rep. 190; Tar-

Brown (1877), 65 Mo. 188, 54 Am. bell v. West (1881), 86 N. Y. 287;

Rep. 265; Fairchild v. Fairohild Kepler v. Savings & Loan Co.

§ 110. Bona fide purchaser from partner having legal
title.- Partnership lands, therefore, when found to be such,
are liable to the partnership creditors, and the latter take
precedence over the creditors of an individual partner in
whose name the legal title stands, a_n d over a. transfer by
such partner of the legal title to any one not a bona faU purchaser. But a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee of partnership lands, in ignorance that they were such, from the partner having the legal title of record, will be protected as
against both the other partn_ers and creditors.'

(1876), 64 N. Y. 471. (1882), 101 Pa. St. 602. See, also,

2 Martin v. Morris (1885), 62 Wis. National Union Bank v. National

4t8, 22 N. W. Rep. 525; Galbraith Mechanics' Bank (1895), 80 Md. 371,

v. Tracy (1894), 153 I1L 54, 38 N. E. 80 AtL Rep. 913, 27 L, R. A. 449, 45

Rep. 937, 46 Am. St. Rep. 867, 28 L. Am. St. Rep. 350; Qoldthwaite Y.

R. A, 129. Janney (1894), 102 Ala. 431. 15 So.

§ 111. Interest of surviving partner in firm realty.Upon the dissolution of the partnership by death, the entire
legal title to all the partnership personalty vests, as will be

Brewer v. Browne (1880), 68 Ala. Rep. 560, 28 L. R A. 16.

82

1 See

Robinson Bank v. Miller
(1894), 153 Ill. 244, 88 N. E. Rep. 1078,
46 Am. St. Rep. 883, 27 L. R. A. 449;
Paige v. Paige (1887), 71 Iowa, 818,
32 N. W. Rep. 360, 60 Am. Rep. 799;
Mallory v. Russell (1887), 71 Iowa,
63, 60 Am. Rep. 776; Willet v.
Brown (1877), 65 Mo. 188, 54 Am.
Rep. 265; Fairchild v. Fairchild
(1876), 64 N. Y. 471.
2 Martin v. Morris (1885), 62 Wis.
418, 22 N. W. Rep. 525; Galbraith
v. Tracy (1894), 153 Ill 54, 38 N. E.
Rep. 937, 46 Am. St. Rep. 867, 28 L.
R. A. 129.
I Brewer v. Browne (1880), 68 Ala.

210; Strong v. Lord (1888), 107 Ill
25.
'Norwalk Nat. Bank v. Sawyer
(1882), 88 Ohio St. 338; McNeil v.
Congregational Society (1884), 66
Cal. 105; Seeley v. Michell (1887),
85 Ky. 508, 4 S. W. Rep. 190; Tarbell v. West (1881), 86 N. Y. 287;
Kepler v. Savings & Loan Co.
(1882), 101 Pa. St. 602. See, also,
National Union Bank v. National
Mec.h anics' Bank (1895), 80 Md. 87~,
SO Atl Rep. 913, r/ L. R. A. 449, 45
Am. St. Rep. 350; Goldthwaite T.
Janney (1894), 102 Ala. 431, 15 So..
Rep. 560, 28 L. R. A. 16.
8~
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[ 111.

. SOME INCIDENTS OF PARTNERSHIP.

seen hereafter, 1 in the survivor. With respect of the part-

[§ 111.

nership realty, however, a somewhat different rule prevails.

The real estate, though treated as personalty in the United

States for many purposes, retains its character as realty so

far as the exigencies of the partnership affairs will permit.

The legal title to it unless it had been vested for the firm

in the name of one partner only who chances to be the sur-

vivor descends, as has been seen, 1 to the heirs subject to

the partnership needs, but the equitable title vests in the sur-

viving partner for the purpose of paying the firm debts and

settling up the partnership affairs in substantially the same

manner that the legal title to the personal assets vests in

him. As such survivor he may, therefore, convey, when nec-

essary, the equitable title to part or all of the partnership

realty, and the court will then require the heirs or other

holders of the legal title to convey that legal title to the

person who has purchased the equitable title from the SIK-
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viving partner. 1

i See post, 238.

* See ante, 109.

See Shanks v. Klein (1881), 104

U. & 18, 26 L. ed. 635, Paige's Partn.

Gas, 136; Walling v. Burgess (1889),

122 Ind. 299, 7 L. R A. 481; Tilling-

hast v. Champlin (1856), 4 R L ,.73,

67 Am. Dec. 510; Buffum r. Bu Turn

(1861), 49 Me. 108, 77 too ^e\ 248.

88

seen hereafter,1 in the survivor. With respect of the partnership realty, however, a somewhat different rule prevails.
The real estate, though treated as personalty in the United
States for many purposes, retains its character as realty so
far as the exigencies of the partnership affairs will permit.
The legal title to it - unless it had been vested for the firm .
in the name of one partner only who chances to be the survivor - descends, as has be~n seen,2 to the heirs subject to
the partnership needs, but the equitable title vests in the surviving partner for the purp<;>se of paying the firm debts and
settling up the partnership affairs in substantially the same
manner that the legal title to the personal assets vests in
him. As such survivor he may, therefore, convey, when necessary, the equitable title to part or all of the partnership
realty, and the court will then require the heirs or othe1·
holders of the legal title to convey that legal title to the
person who has purchased the equitable title from the SU'
viving partner.•
1 See post,

§ 268.

122 Ind. 299, 7 L. R. A. 481; TilliWl.g·
hast v. Champlin (1856), 4 R. L ..73,
•see Shanks v. Klein (1881), 104 67 Am. Dec. 510; Buffum .,. Bu·' Ium
U.S. 18, 26 L. ed. 635, Paige's Partn. (1861), 49 Me. 108, 77 1.ro iolf>1. 249.
Ca& 136; Walling v. Burgess (1889),
88
2 See

ante, § 109.

CHAPTER VIL

OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARTNERS TOWARDS EACH

OTHER.

112. Duty of partners to exercise

good faith.

11& Duty not to carry on com-

peting business.

114. Duty to exercise care and

skill

115. Duty to conform to partner-

ship agreement.

116. Duty to keep accounts.

117. Duty to consult with each

other.

118. Right of each to participate

in business.

119, 120. Right of partner to ex-

tra compensation.

121. Right of partner to interest
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on advances.

122. Right to have partnership

property applied to pay-

ment of partnership debts.

123. One partner cannot ap-

ply partnership property

to his own uses.

124. Claims of partnership

creditors based on this

right of partners.

125-127. Right to contribution

and indemnity.

112. Duty to exercise good faith. The relation of

partners to each other is one of great confidence and trust,

and the law demands from them the exercise of the highest

integrity and good faith toward each other. Each one is

bound to use the partnership property and exercise his part-

nership powers for the benefit of the firm and not for him-

self alone. Profits made in the course of the partnership

belong to the firm, and one partner will not be permitted

to make gain for himself at the expense of the firm. Secret

commissions made by one partner upon partnership dealings

must be accounted for to the firm, and if one partner takes

advantage of his position to acquire for himself that which

ought to be acquired for the firm, he will be required to

transfer it to the firm. So one partner will not be permitted,

either directly or indirectly, to buy of or for himself or to

sell to or for himself on the partnership account, without

84
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RIGHTS AiTD DUTIES OF PAETNEBS.

[ 113.

RIGHTS A.ND DUTIES OJ' PARTNEBS.

[§ 113.

the knowledge and consent of the other partners; and in

their dealings with each other, in relation to partnership

matters, each is required to make a full disclosure of all

facts within his knowledge affecting the transaction. This

duty of good faith is intensified when one partner is conduct-

ing the business alone as managing partner. 1

113. Duty not to carry on other business to prejudice

of firm. Partners may agree in their articles or otherwise

that one or more partners may carry on other business, or

be relieved in whole or in part from giving their time and

efforts to the firm business; but in the absence of such an

the knowledge and consent of the other partners; and in
their dealings with each other, in relation to partnership
matters, each is required to make a full disclosure of all
fac~ within his knowledge affecting the transaction. This
duty of good faith is intensified when one partner is conducting the bus~ness alone as managing partner.1

agreement, a partner has no right to give his time, skill or

capital to another business or firm to the prejudice of his

partners. If he clandestinely carries on the same business

1 See Brooks v. Martin (1863), 2 must give the firm the benefit:

Wall (U. S.) 70, and Kimberley v.

Arms (1888), 129 U. S. 512, as to the
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duties of a managing partner. See,

also, Trego v. Hunt (1896), Ap. Caa 7.

See Hodge v. Twitchell (1885), 33

Minn. 389, 23 N. W. Rep. 547, and

Newell v. Cochran (1889), 41 Minn.

374, 43 N. W. Rep. 84, as to secret

commissions made by one partner;

§ 113. Duty not to carry on other business to prejudice
of firm.- Partners may agree in their articles or otherwise
that one or more partners may carry on other business, or
be relieved in whole or in part from giving their time and
efforts to the firm business; but in the absence of such an
agreement, a partner has no right to give his time, skill or
-0apital to another business or firm to the prejudice of his
partners. If he clandestinely carries on the same business

Caldwell y. Davis (1887), 10 Colo.

481, 3 Am. St. Rep. 599, as to the

duty to make full disclosure in

dealings with each other; John-

son's Appeal (1886), 115 Pa. St. 129,

2 Am. St. Rep. 539, and Mitchell v.

Reed (1874), 61 N. Y. 123, 19 Am.

Rep. 252, that if one partner takes

a renewal in his own name of an

existing lease to the firm, it inures

to the benefit of the firm. This

seems to be true even after a disso-

lution of the firm, because the

chance of renewal is a firm asset.

See, also, to the effect that one

partner who buys up a claim

against the firm at a discount

Easton v. Strother (1881), 57 Iowa,

506; that one who buys in property

belonging to the firm, as upon a

sale on execution, must hold for

the firm: Railsback v. Love joy

(1886), 116 111. 442; Roby v. Cole-

hour (1890), 135 111. 300; that insur-

ance of firm property, taken in the

name of one partner, inures to the

firm: Tebbetts v. Dearborn, 74 Me.

892; that one partner cannot apply

firm property to his own uses:

Morrison v. Blodgett (1836), 8 N.

H. 238, 29 Am. Dec. 653; that one

partner cannot through a third

person secretly purchase firm assets

sold on dissolution: Jones v. Dex-

ter (1881), 130 Mass. 380, 39 Am.

1 See Brooks v. Martin (1863), 2
Wall (U.S.) 70, and Kimberley v.
Arms (1888), 129 U.S. 512, as to the
-dutiesofamanagingpartner. See,
also, Tregov. Hunt(1896), Ap. Cas. 7.
See Hodge v. Twitchell (1885), 33
Minn. 389, 23 N. W. Rep. 547, and
Newell v. Cochran (1889), 41 Minn.
374, 43 N. W. Rep. 84.. as to secret
commissions made by one partner;
Caldwell .v. Davis (1887), 10 Colo.
481, 3 Am. St. Rep. 599, as to the
duty to make full disclosure in
dealings with each other; Johnson's Appeal (1886), 115 Pa. St. 129,
2 Am. St. Rep. 539, and Mitchell v.
Reed (1874), 61 N. Y. 123, 19 Am.
Rep. 252, that if one · partner takes
a renewal in his own name of an
ex:IBting lease to the firm, it inures
to the benefit of the firm. This
seems to be true even after a dissolution of the firm, because the
chance of renewal is a firm asset.
See, also, to the effect that one
partner who buys up a claim
against the firm at a discount

must give the firm the benefit:
Easton ·v. Strother (1881), 57 Iowa,
506; that one who buys in property
belonging to the firm, as upon a
sale on execution, must hold for
the firm: Railsback v. Lovejoy
(1886), 116 ill 442; Roby v. Colehour (1890), 135 ill 300; that insurance of firm property, taken in the
name of one partner, inures to the
firm: Tebbetts v. Dearborn, 74 Me.
392; that one partner cannot apply
firm property to his own uses:
Morrison v. Blodgett (1836), 8 N.
H. 238, 29 Am. Dec. 653; that one
partner cannot through a third
personsecretlypurchasefirmassets
sold on dissolution: Jones v. Dexter (1881), 130 Mass. 380, 39 Am.
Rep. 459, and note; that ·one partner cannot avail himself of information acquired as a. partner to
aid him in carrying on another
business in competition with the
firm: Aas v. Benham (1891), 2 Ch.
244; Latta v. Kilbourn (1893), 150
U.S. 524, 37 L. ed. 1169.

Rep. 459, and note; that one part-

ner cannot avail himself of infor-

mation acquired as a partner to

aid him in carrying on another

business in competition with the

firm: Aas v. Benham (1891), 2 Ch.

244; Latta v. Kilbourn (1893), 150

U. S. 524, 37 L. ed. 1169.
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114, 115.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

\ §§ 114, 115.]

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

as that of the firm and in competition with it, he may be

compelled to account to the firm for the profits which he

makes, 1 but he will not be compelled to account if the busi-

ness is a different and non-competing one. 2

" If a member enter into a transaction in his own behalf,

which is within the scope of the partnership business," said the

court in one case, " his copartner may insist that it is a fraud

upon him and claim the benefit resulting from it ; yet this is a

right which the partner can alone assert, and it is not avail-

able to third persons for the purpose of fixing a liability

upon the partnership when such claim has not been as-

serted." *

114. Duty to exercise care and skill. It is the duty

of each partner, and he impliedly if not expressly agrees, to

transact the business of the firm with reasonable care, skill,

diligence and economy; and if the firm sustains injury by

reason of his failure to do so, he must bear the loss, 4 though

he will not be liable for a loss caused by honest mistake or
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error of judgment not amounting to gross negligence or ig-

norance.*

as that of the firm and in competition with it, he may be
compelled to account to the firm for the profits which he
makes, 1 but he. will not be compelled to account if the business is a different and non-competing one.2
"If a member enter into a transaction in his own beha1f,
which is within the scope of the partnership business," said the
court in one case, "his copartner may insist that it is a fraud
upon him and claim the benefit resulting from it; yet this is a
right which the partner can alone assert, and it is not available to third persons for the purpose of fixing a liability
upon the partnership when such claim has not been ~
serted." 1

115. Duty to conform to partnership agreements.

It is also the duty of each partner to conform to all of the

agreements, regulations and restrictions imposed by the part-

nership articles, and to confine his acts within the scope and

limits fixed for the partnership business. If, by reason of

his breach of duty in these respects, a loss happens to his

partners, he must indemnify them.

* See Goldsmith v. Eichold (1891), Yetzer v. Applegate (1891), 83

94 Ala. 116, 33 Am. St. Rep. 97; Iowa, 726, 50 N. W. Rep. 66.

Todd v. Rafferty (1878), 80 N. J. Eq. Charlton v. Sloan (1888), 76 Iowa,

254. 288, 41 N. W. Rep. 30a One part-

J Aaa v.Benham(1891),2Ch.244; ner cannot hold the other liable

Latta v. Kilbourn (1893), 150 U. S. when both have been equally neg-

§ 114:. Duty to exercise care and skill.- It is the duty
of each partner, and he impliedly if not expressly agrees, to
transact the business of the firm with reasonable care, skill,
diligence and economy; and if ~he firm sustains injury by
reason of his failure to do so, he must bear the loss,' though
he will not be liable for a loss caused by honest mistake or
error of judgment not amounting ~o gross negligence or ignorance.6

524,37L.ed. 1169; Metcalf e v. Brad- ligent. Insley v. Shire (1895), 64

shaw (1893), 145 111. 124, 33 N. E. Kan. 793, 39 Pac. Rep. 713, 46 Am.

Rep. 1116, 36 Am. St. Rep. 478. St. Rep. 80a

* Lockwood v. Beckwith (1858), 6

Mioh. 168.

§ 115. Duty to conform to partnership agreements.It is also the duty of each partner. to conform to all of the
agreements, regulations and restrictions imposed by the partnership articles, and to confine his acts within the scope and
limits fixed for the partnership business. If, by reason of
his breach of duty in these respects, a loss happens to his
partners, he must indemnify them.
1 See Goldsmith v. Eichold (1891),
'Yetzer v. Applegate (1891), 83
I
94 Ala. 116, 83 Am. St. Rep. 97; Iowa, 726, 50 N. W. Rep. 66.
Todd v. Rafferty (1878), 30 N. J. Eq.
I Charlton v. Sloan (1888), 76 Iowa,
254.
288, 41 N. W. Rep. 303. One part2 Aas v. Benham (1891), 2 Ch. 244; ner cannot hold the other liable
Latta v. Kilbourn (1893)~ ·150 U. S. when both have been equally neg524, 37 L. ed.1169; Metcalfe v. Brad- ligent. Insley v. Shire (1895), M
shaw (1893), 145 Ill. 124, 33 N. E. Kan. 793, 39 Pao. Rep. 718, 45 Am.
Rep. 1116, 36 Am. St. Rep. 478.
St. Rep. 808.
s Lockwood v. Beckwith (1858), 6
Mich. 168.
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filGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARTNERS. [ 116, 117

Thus, where the partners expressly agreed that no one oi

.RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARTNERS.

them should sign, accept or indorse negotiable paper except

(§§ 116, 11 '2

for their own legitimate purposes, and one of them used the

firm name for the accommodation of a third person in such

a way that the firm was held liable, the offending partner

was compelled to make good the loss to his partners. 1 And

where one partner who had stipulated to render certain serv-

ices for the firm refused without reasonable cause to do so,

it was held that he was answerable to his partners for the

value of the services. 2

116. Duty of partners to keep accounts. It is the

right of every partner to have true and proper accounts kept

of the partnership transactions, and to have these accounts,

at all reasonable times, open to his inspection at the place

of business. The general duty of keeping the accounts may,

by the articles, be devolved upon one partner, or upon a

clerk; but even in such a case, as well as when there is no

agreement, it is the duty of each partner to make and keep,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

or enable such partner or clerk to keep, correct accounts of

Thus, where the partners expressly agreed that no one oi
them should sign, accept or indorse negotiable paper except
for their own legitimate purposes, and one of them used ·the
firm name for the· accommodation of a third person in such
a way that the firm was held liable, the offending partner
was compelled to make good the loss to his partners. 1 And
where one partner who had stipulated to render pertain services for the firm refused without reasonable cause to do so,
it was held that he was answerable to his partners for the
value of the services.2

his transactions. Where a partner fails in his duty in this

regard, every reasonable presumption will be made against

him upon the final accounting. 8

117. Duty to consult with each other. In every im-

portant exigency in the partnership affairs, where one part-

ner is about to 1 act, he should consult with his partners un-

less the circumstances are such as to prevent or excuse him

from so doing. Thus, where one partner, without consulting

his copartner whose knowledge of the subject would have

rendered the purchase unnecessary bought in for a large

i Murphy v. Crafts (1858), 13 La. Clagett (1877), 48 McL 223; Pierce

Ann. 519, 71 Am. Dec. 5ia v. Scott (1861), 37 Ark 308; Pom0-

* Marsh's Appeal (1871), 69 Pa. St roy v. Benton (1882), 77 Mo. 64;

80, 8 Am. Rep. 206. Diamond v. Henderson (1879), 47

See Kelly v. Qreenleaf (1843), 3 Wis. 172; Knapp v. Edwards (1883),

Story (U. & a C.), 105; Webb v. 57 Wis. 19L

Fordyce (1880), 55 Iowa, 11; Hall v.
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§ 116. Duty of partners to keep accounts.- It is the
right of every partner to have true and proper accounts kept
of the partnership transactions, and to have these accounts,
at all reasonable times, open to his inspection at the place
of business. The general duty of keeping the accounts may,
by the articles, be devolved upon one partner, or upon a
clerk; but even in such a case, as well as when there is ·no
agreement, it is the duty of each partner to make and keep, or enable such partner or clerk to keep, correct accounts of
his transactions. Where a partner fails in his duty in this
regard, every reasonable presumption will be made against
him upon the final accounting.3

§ 117. Duty to consult with each other.- In every important exigency in the partnership affairs, where one partner is about to·act, he should consult with his partners unless the circumstances are such as to prevent or excuse him
from so doing. Thus, where one partner, without consulting
his copartner-whose knowledge of the subject would have
rendered the purchase unnecessary- bought in for a, large
1 Murphy

v. Crafts (1858), 18 La. Clagett (1877), 48 Md. 223; Pierce
Ann. 519, 71 Am. Dec. 519.
v. Scott (1861), 37 Ark. 308; Pom,e1 Marsh's Appeal (1871), 69 Pa. St. roy v. Benton (1882), 77 Mo. 64;
80, 8 Am. Rep. 206.
Diamond v. Henderson (1879), 47
· •See Kelly v. Greenleaf (1843), 3 ·wis.172; Knapp v. Edwards (1883),
Story (U. S. C. C.), 105; Webb v. 57 Wis. 191.
Fordyce (1880), 55 Iowa, 11; Hall v.
87

118, 119.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

§§ 118, 119.]

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

sum an apparent but really unfounded claim against the firm

real estate, it was held that his act was gross negligence and

that he could not require his copartner to contribute to the

expense of the purchase. 1

118. Right of each partner to share in management

of the business. Unless they have agreed otherwise, it is

the right of each partner to take an equal part in the trans-

sum an apparent but really unfounded claim against the firm
real estat e, it w~ held that his act was gross negligence and
that he could not require his copartner to contribute to the
expense of the purc~ase. 1

action of the firm's business. Each has an equal right to

information about its business and projects, to have free ac-

cess to its books and accounts, and to participate generally

in the conduct of its affairs. " Although one may have an

interest only in the profits and not in the capital," said the

court in one case, 2 his right to participation is the same be-

cause " his rights are involved in the proper conduct of the

affairs of the firm, so that profits may be made."

119. Right of partner to extra compensation. In

the absence of special agreement, a partner is not entitled

to compensation for his services for the partnership, but
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must be content with his share of the profits, if any. 1 It

makes no difference that his services are more valuable than

those of any other partner, or that he performs a greater

portion of the duties than any other. 4 Nor does the fact

that one partner is disabled by sickness from rendering any

service give another partner, who performs it all, a claim

for compensation, for such sickness is one of the risks inci-

§ 118. Right of each partner to share in management
of the business.- Unless they have agreed otherwise, it is
the right of each partner to take an equal part in the transaction of the firm's business. Each has an equal right to
information about its business and projects, to have free ao.
cess to its books and accounts, and to participate generally
in the conduct of its affairs. ''Although one may have an
interest only in the profits and not in the capital," said the
court in one case,2 his right to participation is the same b&
cause "his rights are involved in the proper conduct of the
affairs of the firm, so that profi~s may be made."

dent to the relation. 8 Even where one partner winds up

the business of the firm, he is not ordinarily entitled to extra

compensation ; 8 though he has been held to be entitled to it

1 Yorks v. Tozer (1894), 59 Minn. Peacock (1884), 109 I1L94; Redfield

78, 60 N. W. Rep. 846, 28 L. R A. 86. v. Gleason (1888), 61 Vt 220, 15 Am.

Katz v. Brewington (1889), 71 SL Rep. 889.

Md. 79, 20 AtL Rep. 139. Burgess v. Badger (1888), 124 111.

Major v. Todd (1890), 84 Mich. 85, 288.

47 N. W. Rep. 841 ; Godfrey v. White 8 Heath v. Waters (1879), 40 Mich.

(1880), 43 Mich. 171, 5 N. W. Rep. 457.

243; Hyre v. Lambert (1892), 37 W. Barry v. Jones (1872), 11 Heiak.

Va. 26, 16 S. E. Rep. 446; Ligare v. (Term.) 206, 27 Am. Rep. 74&
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§.119. Right of partner to extra compensation.- In
the absence of special agreement, a partner is not entitled
to compensation for his services for the partnership, but
must be content with his share of the profits, if any.1 It
makes no difference that his services are more valuable than
those of any other partner, or that he performs a greater
portion of the duties than any other.' Nor does the fact
that one partner is disabled by sickness from rendering any
service give another partner, who performs it all, a claim
for compensation, for such sickness is one of the risks incident to the relation.6 Even where one partner winds up
the business of the firm, he is not ordinarily entitled to extra
compensation; 6 though he has been held to be entitled to it
1 Y orks

v. Tozer (1894), 59 Minn.
78, 60 N. W . Rep. 846,, 28 L. R. A. 86.
! Katz v. Brewington (1889), 71
Md. 79, 20 Atl Rep. 139.
aMajor v. Todd (1890), 84 Mich. 85,
(7 N. W. Rep. 841; Godfreyv. White
(1880), 43 Mich. 171, 6 N. W. Rep.
243; Hyre v. Lambert (1892), 37 W.
Va. 26, 16 S. E. Rep. 446; Ligare v.

Peacock (1884), 109 Ill 94; Redfield
v. Gleason (1888), 61Vt.220, 15 Am.
St. Rep. 889. .
•Burgess v. Badger (1888), 124 Ill
288.
6 Heath v. Waters (1879), 40 Mich.
457~
.
6 Barry v. Jones (1872), 11 Heiak.
(Te~) 206, 27 Am. Rep. 742.
88
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EIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARTNEBS. [ 120.

where, after dissolution by death, he carries on the business

.RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARTNERS.

[§ 120.

successfully with the consent of those interested, until it

could be wound up. 1

If one partner is thus ordinarily not entitled to extra com-

pensation for his services, it is all the more clear that he

will not be so entitled where he has wrongfully excluded his

partner from participation in the business. 2

120. Same subject May be agreement to pay it.

But there may be an agreement to pay a partner for his

services as such, and this agreement may be express or im-

plied. "Where it can be fairly and justly implied," said

the court in one case,* " from the course of dealing between

the partners, or from circumstances of equivalent force, that

where, after dissolution by death, he carries on the business
successfully with· the consent of those interested, until it
could be wound up. 1
If one partner is thu'3 ordinarily not entitled to extra compensation for his services, it is all the more clear that he
will not be so entitled where he has wrongfully excluded his
partner from participation in the business.2

one partner is to be compensated for his services, his claim

will be sustained." It has been so implied, for example,

where one partner gave his whole time to strangers for a

salary which he retained, leaving the claimant partner to

manage the firm business alone. 4 It has been implied also
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from the acquiescence and course of dealing of the part-

ners.*

Where one partner is expressly to be paid in considera-

tion of extra services, he will not be entitled to pay if such

services are not rendered, even though he was disabled by

illness.'

1 Robinson v. Simmons (1888), 146 T. McClintook (1887), 50 Ark. 193;

Mass. 167, 15 N. E, Rep. 558, 4 Am. Lassiter v. Jackman (1882), 88 Ind.

St. Rep. 299; Zell's Appeal (1889), 11&

126 Pa. St. 742. Winchester v. Glazier (1890), 152

2 Hannaman v. Karrick (1893), Mass. 316, 25 N. E. Rep. 728, 9 L. R.

9 Utah, 236, 33 Pac. Rep. 1039. A. 424. As to validity of subse-

* Emerson v. Durand (1885), 64 quent promise to pay in considera-

Wis. Ill, 54 Am. Rep. 593. tion of past extra services, see

Emerson v. Durand (1885), 64 Gray v. Hamil (1889), 82 Ga. 375,

Wis. Ill, 54 Am. Rep. 593; Morris 6 L. R A. 72.

v. Griffin (1891), 83 Iowa, 827, 49 N. Kinney v. Maher (1892), 156

W. Rep. 846. See, also, Askew v. Mass. 252, 30 N. E. Rep. 818.

Springer (1884), 111 111. 662; Weeks

89

§ 120. Same subject - May be agreement to pay it.But there may be an agreement to pay a partner for his
services as such, and this agreement may be express or implied. "Where it can be fairly and justly implied," said
the court in one case,1 "from the course of dealing between
the partners, or from circumstances of equivalent force, that
one partner is to be compensated for his services, his claim
will be sustained." It has been so implied, for example,
where ~ne partner gave his whole time to strangers for a
salary which he retained, leaving the claimant partner to
manage the firm business alone.' It has been implied also
from the acquiescence and course of dealing of the partners. •
Where one partner is expressly to ~e paid in consideration of extra services, he will not be entitled to pay if such
services are not rendered, even though he was disabled by
illness.•
1 Robinson v. Simmons (1888), 146
Mass. 167, 15 N. E. Rep. 558, 4 Am.
St. Rep. 299; Zell's Appeal (1889),
126 Pa. St. 742.
2 Hanna man v. Karrick (1893),
9 Utah, 236, 33 Pac. Rep. 1039.
8Emerson v. Durand (1885), 64
Wis. 111, 54 Am. Rep. 593.
'Emerson v. Durand (1885), 64
Wis. 111, 54 Am. Rep. 593; Morris
v. Griffin (1891), 83 Iowa, 827, 49 N.
W. Rep. 846. See, also, Askew v.
Springer (1884), 111 Ill 662; Weeks

v. McClintock (1887), 50 Ark. 193;
Lassiter v. Jackman (1882), 88 Ind. ·
118.
II Winchester v. Glazier (1890), 152
Mass. 316, 25 N. E. Rep. 728, 9 L. R.
A. 424. As to validity of subsequent promise to pay in consideration of past extra services, see
Gray v. Hamil (1889), 82 Ga. 375,
6 L. R. A. 72.
6 Kinney v. Maher (1892), 156
Mass. 252, 30 N. E. Rep. 818.
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§§ 121-123.) .

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

121-123.] . LA.W OF PARTNEB8HIP.

121. Bight of partner to interest on money advanced.

A partner who advances money for partnership purposes is

usually held to be not entitled to interest upon it, unless

there has been an agreement express or implied to pay in-

terest, though by some authorities it is allowed. 1 Mercan-

tile usage, however, and the course of dealing between the

partners may be sufficient to sustain an implication of a

promise to pay interest. " Slight circumstances," said the

court in one case, 2 " may be sufficient to show such an un-

dertaking."

122. Eight of partners to have partnership property

applied to partnership debts. It is the right of each part-

ner to have the partnership property applied to the payment

of the partnership debts, and for the enforcement and pro-

tection of this right he is often said to have a lien upon or

equity in the property.

§ 121. Right of partner to interest on money advanced.
A partner who advances money for partnership purposes is
usually held to be not entitled to interest upon it, unless
there has been an agreement express or implied to pay interest, though by some authorities it is allowed.1 Mercantile usage, however, and the course of dealing between the
partners may be sufficient to sustain an implication of a
promise to . pay interest. "Slight circumstances," said the
court in one case,2 "may be sufficient to show such an undertaking."

Whether the right or equity of the partners is strictly to

be deemed a lien, as it is so often called, is perhaps open to
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question, though the name cannot be regarded as of great

importance while the right itself, by whatever name it may

be called, is clearly settled both in reason and authority.* .

Out of this right grow two rules of much importance:

123. Partner cannot apply partnership property

to his own uses. First. One partner cannot, without the

consent of the other, apply the partnership property to his

own uses or to his own debts, and of this the parties who

deal with him must take notice at their peril.

One partner, therefore, without the express or implied

consent of his copartners, cannot pledge, mortgage or assign

partnership property in security or payment of his own

debts; he cannot apply partnership funds in satisfaction of

his own obligations; he cannot use the firm's name or credit

i See Prentice v. Elliott (1883), 73 Winchester v. Glazier (1890), 152

Ga. 154; Baker v. Mayo (1880), 129 Mass. 316, 85 N. K Rep, 728, 9 I* R

Mass. 517; Whitcomb v. Converse A. 424.

(1875), 119 Mass. 38, 20 Am. Rep. 311. See post, ch. XVHL
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§ 122. Right of partners to have partnership property
applied to partnership debts.- It is the right of each partner to have the partnership property applied to the payment
of the partnership debts, and for the enforcement and protection of this right he is often said to have a lien upon or
~quity in the property.
Whether the right or equity of the partners is strictly to
be deemed a lien, as it is so often called, is perhaps open to
question, though the name cannot be regarded as of great
importance while the right itself, by whatever name it may
be called, is clearly settled both in reason and authority.' .
Out of this right grow two rules of much importance:
§ 123. - - Partner cannot apply partnership property
to his own nses.-First. One partner cannot, ·without the
consent of the other, apply the p~rtnership property to his
own uses or to his own debts, and of this the parties who
deal with him must take notice at their peril.
. One partner, therefore, without the express or implied
consent of his copartners, cannot pledge, mortgage or assign
partnership property in security or payment of his own
debts; he cannot .apply partnership funds :In satisfaction of
his own obligations; he cannot use the fh;m's name or credit
1 See Prentice v. EUiott (1883), 72
t Winchester v. Glazier (1890), 152
Ga. 154; Baker v. Mayo (1880), 129 Mass. 316, 25 N. E. Rep. 728, 9 L. R.
Mass. 517; Whitcomb v. Converse A. 424..
(1875), 119 Mass. 38, 20 Am. Rep. 311.
I See post, ch. XVllL
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EIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PABTNERS. [ 124.

RIGHTS A.ND DUTIES OJ' PARTNERS.

on his private account ; he cannot set off a private account

[§ 124.

against a debt due the firm : in all these and similar cases

the firm is not bound, and the firm's property, funds or cred-

its may be recovered unless the other party is in a situation

to claim the protection afforded to a bona fide holder for

value and without notice. 1

The right of one partner to make such an application of

the partnership assets with the previous consent or subse-

quent ratification of the other partners is clear enough,

where the claims of the partnership creditors are not

thereby impaired. "Whether it can be done with such con-

sent at the expense of the partnership creditors depends

upon other considerations, similar to those involved in the

following section, and hereafter more fully to be examined.

124. Claims of partnership creditors based on

rights of partners. Secondly. Upon dissolution of the

partnership and a division of its assets by the court, this

right will be enforced, based upon the presumption that such
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is the wish of each partner, and the partnership creditors

will be given a preference in the partnership assets over the

individual creditors of the partners. The rule is sometimes

stated, as will be more fully seen hereafter, 2 that the part-

nership creditors have a lien upon, and an absolute right to

priority of payment out of, the partnership property; but

on his private account; he cannot set off a private account
against a debt due the firm: in all these and similar cases
the firm is not bound, and the firm's property, funds or credits may be recovered unless the other party is in a situation
to claim the protection afforded to a bona fide holder for
· value and without notice. 1
The right of one partner to make such an application of
the partnership assets with the previous. consent or subse- ·
quent ratification of the other partners is clear enough,
where the claims of the partnership creditors are not
thereby impaired. Whether it can be done with such· consent at the expense of the partnership creditors depends
upon other considerations, similar to those involved in the
following section, and hereafter more fully to be examined.

the weight of modern authority is to the effect that their

rights are based upon this right of each partner to have the

firm property applied to the partnership debts.' As is said

1 See Davies v. Atkinson (1888), N. E. Rep. 776; Rogers v. Betterton

124 I1L 474, 16 N. E. Rep. 899, 7 Am. (1894), 93 Tenn. 630, 27 S. W. Rep.

St. Rep. 373 and note; Cannon v. 1017; Co wen v. Hardware Co.

Lindsay (1887), 85 Ala. 198, 3 So. (1892), 95 Ala. 324, 11 So. Rep. 195.

Rep. 676, 7 Am. St. Rep. 38; Jan- 2 See post, ch. XVIIL

ney v. Springer (1889), 78 Iowa, 617, 'See Winslow v. Wallace (1888),

43 N. W. Rep. 461, 16 Am. St Rep. 116 Ind. 324, 17 N. E. Rep. 923;

460; Farwell v. St Paul Trust Co. Purple v. Farrington (1889), 119

(1891), 45 Minn. 495, 48 N. W. Rep. Ind. 164, 4 L, R. A. 535, 21 N. E.

326, 22 Am. St Rep. 742; Bruckett Rep. 543; Ellison v. Lucas (1891),

v. Downs (1895), 163 Mass. 70, 39 87 Ga. 234, 27 Am. St Rep. 243, 13
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§ 124:. - - Claims of partnership creditors based on
rights of partners.- &cond"/;y. Upon dissolution of the
partner~hip and a. division of its assets by the court, this
right will be enforced, based .upon the presumption that such
is the wish of each partner, and the partnership creditors
will be given a preference in the partnership assets over the
individual creditors of the pa.rtners. The rule is sometimes
stated, as will be more fully seen hereafter,2 that the partnership cred~tors have a lien upon, and an absolute right to
priority of payment out of, the partnership pr<?pe.rty; but
the · weight of modern authority is to the effect that tJ:~eir
rights are based upon this right of each 'partner to have the
firm propel'.ty applied to the partnership debts.1 As is said
See Davies v. Atkinson (1888), N. E. Rep. 776; Rogers v. Betterton
124 ill 474, 16 N. E. Rep. 899, 7 Am. (1894), 93 Tenn. .630, 27 S. W. Rep.
St. Rep. 373 and note; Cannon v. 1017; Cowen v. Hardware Co.
Lindsay (1887), 85 Ala. ·198, 3 So. (1892), 95 4-la. 324, 11 So. Rep. 195.
Rep. 676, 7 Am. St. Rep. 38; Jan2 See post, ch. XVIIL
ney v. Springer (1889), 78 Iowa, 617,
•See Winslow v. Wallace (1888),
· 43 N. W. Rep. 461, 16 Am. St. Rep. 116 Ind. 324, 17 N. E. Rep. 923;
460; Farwell v. St. Paul Trust Co. Purpl~ v. Farrington (1889), 119
(1891), 45 Minn. 495, 48 N. W. Rep. Ind. 164, 4 L. R. A. 535, 21 N. E.
326,. 22 Am. St. Rep. 742; ~ruckett Rep. 543; Ellison v. Lucas (1891),
v. Downs (1895), 163 Mass. 70, 39 87 Ga. 224, 27 Am. St. Rep. 242, 18
91
I

·§ 125.]

LAW OF P .A.RTNE.RSHIP•

125.] LAW OF PABTNEBSHIP.

in one case: "The rule that obtains in the distribution oi

the estates of partners, and under which partnership cred-

itors are entitled to priority of payment out of the part-

nership assets, is an equitable doctrine, for the benefit and

protection of the partners respectively. Partnership cred-

itors have no lien upon partnership property. Their right

to priority of payment out of the partnership assets over

the individual creditors is always worked out through the

lien of the partners."

125. Partner's right to contribution and indemnitj

from copartners. As will be seen hereafter, 1 the obliga-

tion of those debts and liabilities which are binding upon

the firm is the joint obligation of all the partners and not

the several obligation of any of them ; they should therefore

.. in one case: "The rule that obtains in the distribution ot
the estates of partners, and under which partnership creditors are entitled to priority of payment out of the par~
nershlp assets, is an equitable doctrine, for the benefit and
protection of the partners respectively. Partnership creditors have no lien upon partnership property. Their right
to priority of payment out of the partnership assets over
the individual creditors is always worked out through the
lien of the partners."

be borne by all the partners and not by one alone. It re-

sults, then, that if one partner pays or is compelled to bear

more than his just share of such debts and liabilities, he is

entitled to demand that his copartners shall, for his relief,
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contribute their due proportion thereof. 2

So if, in the conduct of the partnership affairs, one part-

ner is called upon to advance money for partnership pur-

poses, or fairly and in good faith incurs an obligation on the

firm account, he is entitled to reimbursement from the firm

for his outlay, and to be indemnified by the firm against

such obligation. 1

The partner's right to reimbursement or indemnity, how-

ever, will not arise if the demand, with respect of which he

claims it, was one which by agreement he was to bear alone,

8. E. Rep. 445; Reyburn v. Mitch- Rep. 812; Carver Machine Co. v.

ell (1891), 106 Mo. 365, 27 Am. St. Bannon (1887), 85 Tenn. 712, 4 Am.

Rep. 350, 16 S. W. Rep. 592; Gold- St. Rep. 803, 4 S. W. Rep. 33L

smith v. Eichold Bros. (1891), 94 1 See post, 209.

Ala. 116, 33 Am. St. Rep. 97, 10 So. See Forbes v. Webster (1829), 2

Rep. 80; Arnold v.Hagerinan (1888), Vt 58; Lyons v. Murray (1888), 95

45 N. J. Eq. 186, 14 Am. St. Rep. Mo. 23, 8 S. W. Rep. 170, 6 Am. St.

712, 17 AtL Rep. 93; Hundley v. Rep. 17.

Farris (1890), 103 Ma 78, 23 Am. St. See Wheeler v. Arnold (1874),

Rep. 863, 12 U R. A. 254, 15 S. W. 30 Mich. 304
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§ 125. Partner's right to contribution and indemnit1
·from copartners.-As will be seen hereafter,1 the obligation of those debts and liabilities which are binding upon
the firm is the joint obligation of all the partners and not
the several obligation of any of them; they should therefore
be borne by all the partners and not by one alone. It results, then, that if one partner pays or is compelled to bear
more than his just share of such debts and liabilities, he is
entitled to demand that his copartners shall, for his relief,
contribute their due proportion thereof.2
So if, in the conduct of the partn~rship affairs, one partner is called upon to advance money for partnership purposes, or fairly and in good faith incurs an obligation on the
firm a'ccount, he is entitled to reimbursement from the firm
for his outlay, and to be indemnified by the firm against
such obligation.•
The partner's right to reimbursement or indemnity, however, will not arise if the demand, with respect of which he
claims it, was one which by agreement he was to bear alone,
S. E. R ep. 445; Reyburn v. Mitchell (1891), 106 Mo. 365, 27 Am. St.
Rep. 350, 16 S. W. R ep. 592; Goldsmith v. Eichold Bros. (1891), 94
Ala. 116J 33 Am. St. Rep. 97, 10 So.
Rep. 80; Arnold v.Hagerman (1888),
45 N. J. Eq. 186, 14 Am. St. Rep.
712, 17 AtL Rep. 93; Hundley v.
Farris (1890), 103 Mo. 78, 23 Arp. St.
Rep. 863, 12 L. R. A. 254, 15 S. W.

Rep. 812; Carver Machine Co. v.
Bannon (1887), 85 Tenn. 712, 4 Am.
St. Rep. 803, 4 S. W. Rep. 331.
1 See post, § 209.
·
zSee Forbes v. Webster (1829), 2
Vt. 58; Lyons v. Murray (1888), 95
Mo. 23, 8 S. W. Rep. 170, 6 Am. St.
Rep. 17.
3 See Wheeler v. Arnold (1874),
30 Mich. 804.
92
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EIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARTNERS. [ 126, 127.

or if it was not fairly and in good faith incurred, or if the

RIGHTS AND DUTilllS OF PARTNERS.

(§§ 126, 121.,

necessity for it arose only through his own negligence, bad

faith or breach of duty. 1

126. On illegal transactions. "There is a say-

ing," remarks Mr. Justice Lindley, 2 " that there is no contri-

bution amongst wrong-doers; but this doctrine is certainly

inapplicable to partners in the general form in which it is

or if it was not fairly and in good faith incurred, or if the-.
necessity for it arose only through his own negligence, bad~
faith or breach of duty.1

enunciated. It is true that, if a partnership is itself illegal,

no member of it can, in respect of any transaction tainted

with the illegality which infects the firm, obtain relief

against any other member; but there is no authority for

saying that if one of the members of a firm sustains a loss

owing to some illegal act not attributable to him, but yet

imputable to the firm, such loss must be borne entirely by

him, and that he is not entitled to contribution in respect

thereof from the other partners. The claim of a partner to

contribution from his copartners in respect of a partnership

transaction cannot be defeated on the ground of illegality
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unless the partnership is itself an illegal partnership; or

unless the act relied on as the basis of tho claim is not only

illegal, but has been committed by the partner seeking con-

tribution when he knew or ought to have known of its ille-

gality. In any of these cases he can obtain no assistance

against his copartners, and must abide the consequences of

his own wilful breach of the law. 8 . . . But if the part-

nership is not itself illegal, and if the partner claiming con-

tribution has not himself been personally guilty of a breach

of the law, his claim will prevail, although the loss in re-

spect of which it is made may have arisen from an unlawful

act."

127. HOTT enforced. "Whether one partner has

really paid more than his just proportion on the partnership

1 See McFadden v. Leeka (1891), * Quoted with approval in Smith

48 Ohio St. 513, 28 N. E. Rep. 874. v. Ayrault (1888), 71 Mich. 475, 39

1 Lindley on Partnership (Ew- N. W. Rep. 724, 1 L. R. A. 311.

ell's 3d ed.), 37a

§ 126. - · On illegal transactions.-" There is a say-ing," remarks Mr. Justice Lindley,2 "that there is no contri-bution amongst wrong-doers; · but this doctrine is certainly inapplicable to partners in the general form in which it is,
enunciated. It is true that, if a partnership is itself illegal, .
no member of it can, in respect of any transaction tainted
with the illegality which infects the firm, obtain relief·
against any other member; but there is no authority for ·
saying that if one of the members of a firm sustains a loss. ,
owing to some illegal act not attributable to him, but yet-.
imputable to the firm, such loss must be borne entirely by
him, and that he is not entitled to contribution in respect·
thereof from the other partners. The claim of a partner to contribution from his copartners in respect of a partnership ·,
transaction cannot be defeated on. the ground of illegality
unless the partnership is itself an illegal partnership; orunless the act relied on as the basis of the claim is not only
illegal, but has been committed .by the partner seeking con- tribution when he knew or ought to have known of its illegality. In any of these cases he can obtain no assistance •
against his copartners, and must abide the consequences .of·
his own wilful breach of the law. 3 • • .• But if the partnership is not itself illegal, and if the partner claiming contribution has not hims.elf "been personally guilty of a breach.,
of the law, his claim will prevail, although the loss in r&spect of which it is made may have arisen from an unlawful .
act."
§ 127. - - How enforced.- Whether one partner has
-really paid more than his just proportion on the partnership··
1 See McFadden v. Leeka (1891), ·
I Quoted with approval in Smith
48 Ohio St. 513, 28 N. E. Rep. 874.
v. Ayrault (1888), 71 Mich. 475, 39 ·.
11 Lindley on Partnership (Ew- N. W. Rep. 724, 1 L. R. A. 31L
ell's 2d ed.), 378.

§ 127.]

LA.W OF PABTNEBSHIP.

127.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

account is often, if not usually, a question requiring some in-

vestigation of the whole partnership accounts to determine.

If he has done so upon one occasion, it may be that his co-

partner upon some other occasion has paid as much or more

under similar circumstances for which he also has a claim

against the firm; and how the final balance will stand may be

a matter of some uncertainty, which it will require a general

accounting to make clear. As will be seen in the succeeding

chapter, courts of law are not usually an appropriate forum

for taking such an account, and the parties are required to

go into a court of equity. The result, therefore, is, that a

partner's claim for contribution or reimbursement is usually

one to be enforced only in a court of equity. 1 It is not, how-

ever, always so. The claim may arise in respect of some

isolated transaction ; it may be that the other partner has

recognized its validity and expressly promised to pay his

share ; 2 it may be that the demand did not arise until after

an accounting or a dissolution and accounting: 1 in these
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and like cases, as will be seen in the succeeding chapter, the

objection to legal proceeding may be removed, and a court

of law rather than of equity may take jurisdiction.

1 See Lawrence v. Clark (1840), 9 * See Logan v. Trayser (1890), 77

Dana (Ky.), 257, 35 Am. Dec. 133; Wis. 579, 46 N. W. Rep. 877; Sears

Kennedy v. McFaddon (1811). 3 H. v. Starbird (1889), 78 CaL 225, 20

& J. (Md.) 194, 5 Am. Dec, 434. Pac. Rep. 547.

*Seepost, 139, 140.
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account is often, if not usually, a question requiring some in·
vestigation of the whole partnership accounts to determine.
If he has done so upon one occasion, it may be that his copartner upon som.e other occasion has paid as much or more
under similar circumstances for which he also has a claim
against the firm; and how the final balance will stand may be
a matter of some uncertainty, which it will require a general
accounting to make clear. As will be seen in the succeeding
chapter, courts of law are not usually an appropriate forum
for taking such an account, and the parties are required to
go into a court of equity. The result, therefore, is, that a
partner's claim for contribution or reimbursement is usually
one to be enforced only in a court of equity.1 It is not, however, always so. The claim ~ay arise in respect of some
isolated transaction; it may be that the other partner has
recognized its validity and expressly promised to pay his
share; 2 it may be that the demand did not arise until after
an accounting or a dissolution and accounting: 1 in these
and like cases, as will be seen in the succeeding chapter, the
objection to legal proceeding may be removed, and a court
of law rather than of equity may take jurisdiction.
1 See Lawrence v. Clark (1840), 9
a See Logan v. Trayser (1890), 77
Dana (Ky.), 257, 35 Am. Dec. 133; Wis. 579, 46 N. W. Rep. 877; Sears
Kennedy v. McFaddon (1811), 3 H. v. Starbird (1889), 78 Cal 225, 20
& J. (Md.} 194, o Am. Dec. 434.
Pac. Rep. 547.
ISee post, §§ 139, 140.
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CHAPTER YIIL

OF ACTIONS BETWEEN PARTNERS.

J38. Of actions bet ween partners

in general.

L ACTIONS AT LAW.

•

129. What cases arise.

1. Partner against Firm.

130. One partner cannot sue the

firm at law.

2. Firm against Partner.

CHAPTER VIIL

131. Firm cannot sue partner at

law.

. OF ACTIONS BETWEEN PARTNERS.

3. Partner against Partner.

132-134. One partner cannot sue

another at law on claim

arising out of partnership

I

a

transactions.

135. One partner may sue if

claim does not involve
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partnership transactions.

136-142. Illustrations of the rule.

1.29.

143. One partner may sue an-

other for breach of part-

nership agreements.

t.
130.

144. For wrongful practices

resulting in loss.

145. For fraud in inducing

2.

partnership.

146. On matters distinct

from partnership.

4. Firm against Firm having Com-

mon Partner.

131.

Of actions between partners § 145. - - For fraud in inducing
in general.
partnership.
146. - - On matters distinct
L ACTIONS AT LAW.
from partnership.
What cases arise.
4. Firm against Firm hamng 0()111,.
mon Partner.
Partner against Firm.
147. One firm cannot sue another
One partner cannot sue the
at law if they have a comfirm at law.
mon partner.
Firm against Partner.
U ACTIONS IN EQUITY.
Firm cannot sue partner at
148. Equity the proper tribunal
~w.
in partnership ma,t ters.

3. Partner against Partner.

147. One firm cannot sue another

at law if they have a com-

mon partner.

n. ACTIONS IN EQUITY.

148. Equity the proper tribunal

in partnership matters.

L Specific Performance*

149-151. In what cases granted.

2. Injunctions.

152. In what cases granted.

8. Accounting and Dissolution.

153. In what cases granted.

154 Who may have accounting.

4. Receiver.

155. When receiver appointed.

156. Powers and duties of re-

ceiver.

132-134. One partner cannot sue
another at law on claim
arising out of partnership
transactions.
135. One partner may sue if
claim does not involve
partnership transactions.
136-142. Illustrations of the rule.
143. One partner may sue another for breach of partnership agreements.
144. - - For wrongful practices
resulting in loss.

1. Specific Performance.
149-151. In what cases granted.
2. Injunction&

152. In what cases granted.
8. Accounting and Dissolution.

153. In what cases granted.
154. Who may have accounting.
~Receiver.

155. When receiver appointed.
156. Powers and duties of receiver.

128. Of actions between partners in general. The

question of the remedies which partners may have between

themselves involves several considerations of interest and

importance. Certain of the rules applicable result from the

peculiar relations between the parties, and others from the

peculiar nature of the interests involved. As has been al-

ready seen, while the law for some purposes regards the

95

§ 128. Of actions between partners in general.- The
question of the remedies which partners :m.ay have between
themselves involves several considerations of interest and
iinportance. Certain of the rules applicable result from the
peculiar relations between the parties, and others from the
peculiar nature of the interests involved. As has been already seen, while the law for some purposes regards the
95

§§ 129, 130.]
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129, 130.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

firm as a distinct entity, for most purposes the partners

must be regarded as individuals. This is usually the rule as

respects actions at law. If, therefore, one partner would

maintain an action against the firm, he must sue himself as

a partner with the others. If he should recover judgment

against the firm, he might be called upon as a member of

the firm to pay or satisfy his own judgment. If he bases

an action upon his interest in the partnership, it will usually

require an accounting and settlement to determine what his

interest is. The same difficulties would usually exist if the

firm were to sue one partner. These, and other like con-

siderations, have led to the establishment of certain rules

respecting the remedies of partners as between themselves

which require examination.

L ACTIONS AT LAW.

129. In what cases the question arises. The question

of the right to maintain an action at law respecting partner-

ship transactions may arise in four classes of cases : 1. Where
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the claim is by one partner against the firm; 2. "Where the

claim is by the firm against a partner; 3. Where the claim

is by one partner against one or more of his fellow-partners ;

and 4. Where the claim is between firms which have one or

firm as a distinct entity, for most purposes the partners
must be regarded as individuals. This is usually the rule as
respects actions at law. If, therefore, one partner would
maintain an action against the firm, he must sue himself as
. a partner with the others. If he should recover judgment
against the firm, he might be called upon as a member of
the firm to pay or satisfy his own judgment. If he bases
an action upon his interest in the partnership, it will usually
require an accounting and settlement to determine what his
interest is. The same difficulties would usually exist if the
firm were to sue one partner. These, and other like considerations, have led to the establishment of certain rules
respecting the remedies of partners as between themselves
which require examination.

more partners in common.

1. Partner against Firm.

130. One partner cannot sue the firm at law. 1. One

partner cannot maintain an action at law against the firm

L

AOTioNs AT

LA.w."

of which he is a member to recover upon any claim which

he may have against the firm as such. The reasons are evi-

dent. He is himself a member of the firm against which

he makes the claim, and if he should sue the firm he must

sue himself as one member of it. To be thus both plaintiff

and defendant involves an inconsistency which the law does

not permit. It is, moreover, ordinarily impossible for him

to show, without a final settlement of its accounts, whether

the firm really owes him or not. There may be counter-
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§ 129. In what cases the question arises.-The question
of the right to maintain an action at law respecting partnership transactions may arise in four classes of cases': 1. Where
the claim is by one partner against the firm; 2. Where the
claim is by the firm against a partner; 3. Where the claim
is by one pa.rtner against one or more of his fellow-partners ;
and 4. Where the claim is between firms which have one or
more partners in common.
1. P Mtner against Firm.

§ 130. One partner cannot sue the firm at law.-1. One
partner cannot maintain an action at law against the firm
of which he is a member to recover upon any claim which
he may have against the firm as such. The reasons are evident. He is himself a member of the firm against which
he makes the claim, and if he should sue the firm he must
sue himself as one member of it. To be thus both plaintiff
and defendant involves an inconsistency which the law does
not permit. It is, moreover, ordinarily impossible for hjm
to show, without a final settlement of its accounts, whether
the firm really owes him or not. There may be counter96
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ACTIONS BETWEEN PARTNERS. [ 131.

claims of such extent that a final balance would prove him

ACTIONS BETWEEN PARTNERS.

[§ 131.

to be the debtor; and to reach this final balance the reme-

dies of the common law are usually not adequate.

Onq_partner, therefor^ p.nnr|nt. sne the firm at law to re-

cover for his services where there is an agreement to pay ;

or to recover for advances or loans which he has made to

the firm, or for money which he has paid out on its account,

or for goods which he has sold to the firm, or for the rent

of premises which he has leased to the firm. 1 In all these

and like cases, the remedy of the partner, as will be seen, is

to go into a court of equity, praying for an accounting and,

usually, for a dissolution.

2. Firm against Partner.

131. Firm cannot sue one partner at law. 2. For

similar reasons, the firm as such cannot sue one partner at

law to recover upon a claim made against him by the firm.

The same difficulty of parties, and the same uncertain char-

acter of the claim, exist as where the situation is reversed,
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as seen in the preceding section.

Thus, the firm as such cannot maintain an action at law

against one partner to recover for goods sold to him by the

elaims of such extent that a final balance would prove him
to be the debtor; and to reach this final balance the remedies of the common law are usually not adequate.
()ne partner, therej,Qre, cannot sue the firm at law to recover for his servrnes where there is an agreement to pay;
or to recover for advances or loans which he has made to
the firm, or for money which he has paid out on its account,
or for goods which he bas sold to the firm, or for the rent
of premises which he has leased to the firm. 1 In all these
and like cases, the remedy of the partner, as will be seen, is
to go into a court of equity, praying for an accounting and,
usually, for a dissolution.

firm, or for the recovery of money due from him to the firm

upon his note or otherwise, though a bonafide indorsee of

2. Firm against (?ar&ner.

the note might sue. 1

1 See Newby v. Harrell (1888), 99 (1889), 74 Mich. 664, 42 N. W. Rep.

§ 131. :Firm cannot sue one partner at law .-2. For

N. C. 149, 6 Am. St. Rep. 503, 5 S. E. 276, 16 Am. St Rep. 666, 4 L. R. A.

Rep. 284; Duff v. Maguire (1868), 99 241; Walker v. Wait (1878), 50 Vt

Mass. 300; O'Brien v. Smith (1889), 668); though this would not be the

42 Kan. 49, 21 Pac. Rep. 784; Rem- result if the transfer were merely

ington v. Allen (1871), 109 Mass. 47; to enable the transferee to sue

Mickle v. Peet (1875), 43 Conn. 65; (Wintermute v. Tarrant (1890), 83

Pico v. Cuyas (1873), 47 CaL 174. Mich. 555, 47 N. W. Rep. 358); or if

Where a partner loans money to the note were so transferred that

the firm and takes the firm's note, the action must be brought in the

the note is valid, though the part- name of the assignor. Davis v.

ner himself cannot sue upon it, Merrill (1883), 51 Mich. 480, 16 N. W.

and if he indorses to a holder for Rep. 864.

value, the latter may recover of 2 See Parker v. Macomber (1836^

the firm (Carpenter v. Greenup 18 Pick. (Mass.) 505; Bank v. Del-
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similar reasons, the firm as such cannot sue one partner at
law to recover upon a claim made against him by the firm.
The same difficulty of parties, and the same uncertain character of the claim, exist as where the situation is reversed,
as seen in the preceding section.
Thus, the firm as .such cannot maintain an action at law
against one partner to recover for goods sold to him by the
firm, or for the recovery of money due from him to the firm
upon his note or otherwise, though a bona fide indorsee of
the note might sue. 2
1 See Newby v. Harrell (1888 ), 99 (1889), 74 Mich. 664, 42 N. W. Rep.
N. C. 149, 6 .Am. St. Rep. 503, 5 S. E. 276, 16 Am. St. Rep. 666, 4 L. R. A.
Rep. 284; Duff v. Maguire (1868), 99 241; Walker v. Wait (1878), 50 Vt.
Mass. 300; O'Brien v. Smith (1889), 668); though this would not be the
42 Kan. 49, 21 Pac. Rep. 784; Rem- result if the transfer were merely
ington v. Allen (1871), 109 Mass. 47; to enable the transferee to sue
Mickle v. Peet (1875), 43 Conn. 65; (Wintermute v. Tan-ant (1890), 83
Pico v. Cuyas (1873), 47 Cal 174.
Mich. 555, 47 N. W. Rep. 358); or if
Where a partner loans money to the note were so transferred t hat
·the firm and takes the firm's note, the action must be brought in the
the note is valid, though the part- name of the assignor. Davis v.
ner himself cannot sue upon it, l\Ierrill (1883), 51 Mich. 480, 16 N. W.
and ·if he indorses tO a holder for Rep. 864.
value, the latter may recover of
2 See Parker v. Macomber (1836),
the firm (Carpenter v. Greenup 18 Pick. (Mass.) 505; Bank v. Del7
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§§ 132, 133.)

LAW OF F ARTNERSHil:

132, 133.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

3. Partner against Partner.

3. PM&nm against PMtner.

132. One partner cannot sue another at law on claim

arising out of partnership transactions. 3. The ques-

tion of the right of one partner to sue another may arise :

(a) Out of partnership transactions; (I) Out of matters re-

lating to the partnership, but not involving partnership trans-

actions; and (c) Upon matters having no connection with

the partnership.

a. In the first of these cases it is the general rule that one

partner cannot sue another partner at law upon a claim

against that partner arising out of partnership transactions

unless the partnership accounts, at least so far as that claim

is concerned, have been fully settled, and a final balance has

been arrived at in his favor ; or, as it is frequently expressed,

unless there has been an account stated between them. If

such a balance has been reached in his favor, then, if there

is no express promise, the law will usually imply a promise

by the other partner to pay it, and the claim becomes, by the
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accounting and promise, so far transformed from a partner-

ship liability into a personal and private one, that the part-

ner entitled may sue the partner obligated in an action at

law. 1

133. Reason for the rnle. The reason for the

general rule denying the right to sue at law is that it is

ordinarily impossible to determine whether the defendant

partner is really indebted to the plaintiff partner or not until

the partnership accounts are settled and the true standing

of the parties ascertained; and the process and remedies

afforded by a court of law are not usually adequate or ap-

propriate to the investigation of claims requiring such an

accounting. Where, however, the parties themselves have

made an investigation and have stated the result showing a

afield (1891), 126 N. Y. 410, 27 N. E. Douthit v. Douthit (1892), 133

Rep. 797; Burley v. Harris (1836), Ind. 26, 32 N. E. Rep. 715. See, also,

8 N. H. 233, 29 Am. Dec. 650; Ivy Beede v. Fraser (1894), 66 Vt 114, 28

v. Walker (1880), 58 Miss. 253. AtL Rep. 880, 44 Am. St Rep. 824.
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132. One partner cannot sue another at law on claim
arising out of partnership transactions.- 3. The ques'§

tion of the right of one partner to sue another may arise:
(a) Out of partnership transactions; (b) Out of matters relating to the partnership, but not involving partnership transactions; and (o) Upon matters having no connection with ·
the partnership.
a. Iri the first of these cases it is the general rule that one
partner cannot sue another partn~r at law upon a claim
against that partner arising out· of partnership transactions
unless the partnership accounts, at least so far as that claim
is concerned, have been fully settled, and a final balance has
been arrived at in his favor; or, as it is frequently expressed,
unless there has been an account stated between them. If
such a balance has been reached in his favor, then, if there
is no express promise, the law will usually imply a promise
by the other partner to pay it, and the claim becomes, by the
accounting and promise, so far transformed from a partnership liability into a personal and private one, that the partner entitled may sue the partner obligated in an action at
law. 1

§ 133. ·--Reason for the rule.- The reason for the
general rule denying the right to sue at law is that it is
ordinarily impossible to determine whether the defendant
partner is really indebted to the plaintiff partner or not until
the partnership accounts are settled and the true standing
of the parties ascertained; and the process and remedies
afforded by a court of law are not usually adequate or appropriate to the -inv~stigation of claims requiring such an
accounting. Where, however, the parties themselves have
made an investigation and have stated the. result showing a
afield (1891), 126 N•.Y. 410, 27 N. E.
1 Douthit v. Douthit (1892), 133
Rep. 797; Burley v. Harris (1836), Ind 26, 32 N. E. Rep. 715. See, also,
& N. H. 233, 29 Am. Dec. 650; Ivy Beede v. Fraser (1894), 66 Yt. 114, 28
v. Walker (1880), 58 Miss. 253.
AtL Rep. 880, 44 Am. St. Rep. 824.
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ACTIONS BETWEEN PARTNERS. [ 134-138.

ACTIONS

balance due to one of the partners, the chief objection to a

BJ~TWEEN

PARTNERS.

[§§ 134-138.

suit at law is obviated and it may therefore be maintained.

134. When rule does not apply. The general

rule, moreover, has been held not to apply where the part-

nership was a special one, for a single and finished transac-

tion only, or where all of the partnership affairs have been

balance due to one of the partners, the chief objection to a
suit at law is obviated and it may therefore be maintained.

settled except a single transaction, or where the accounts

are so simple and easily adjusted as to leave no necessity for

an accounting in equity. 1

135. One partner may sue another at law upon claim

connected with but not involving partnership transac-

tions. 5. But there is a large class of cases involving mat-

ters which, though they are connected with the partnership,

do not constitute partnership transactions, but are individual

transactions between particular partners, and as to these an

action at law may be maintained. Thus

136. As for not forming partnership as agreed.

§ 134. - - When rule does not apply.- The general •
·rule, moreover, has been ·held not to apply where the partner:;hip was a special one, ·for a single and finished transaction only, or where all of the partnership affairs have been
settled except a single transaction, or where the accounts
are so simple and easily adjusted as to leave no necessity for
an accounting in equity. 1

A breach of an agreement to enter into partnership, or to
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permit a person to become partner, may furnish the basis

of an action at law, because here, though a partnership was

contemplated, it was never created, and there can conse-

quently be no partnership transactions involved, and no

necessity for an accounting. 2

137. Or for dissolving contrary to agreement.

For like reasons, an action at law may be maintained by one

partner against another who has dissolved the partnership

in violation of his agreement that it should continue for a

definite term. 8

138. Or for not furnishing capital as agreed.

§ 135. One partner may sue another at law upon claim
connected with but not involving partnership transactions.-b. But there is a large class of cases involving matters which, though they are connected with the partnership,
do not constit'ute partnership transacti<;ms, but are individual
transactions between particular partners, and as to these an
action at law may be maintained. Thus-

An action at law may be maintained by one partner against

See Fry v. Potter (1880), 12 R. L 2 Hill v. Palmer (1882), 56 Wis.

542; Kutz v. Dreibelbis (1880), 126 123, 43 Am. Rep. 703.

Pa. St. 335, 17 AtL Rep. 609; Bagley v. Smith (1853), 10 N. Y.

Wheeler v. Arnold (1874), 30 Mich. 489, 61 Am. Dec. 756.

304; Clarke v. Mills (1887), 36 Kan.

393.
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§ Hl6. - - As for not forming partnership as agreed.A breach of an agreement to en'.ter into partnership, or to
permit a person to become partner, may furnish the basis
of an action at law, because here, though a partnership was
contemplated, it was never created, and there can consequently be no partnership tr?insactions involved, and no
necessity for an ~ccounting.
2

§ 137. - - Or for dissolving contrary to agreement.For like reasons, an action at law may be maintained by one
partner against another who has dissolved the partners.hip
in violation of his agreement that it should continue for a
definite term. 3
§ 138. - - Or for not furnishing capital as agreed.An action at law may be maintained by one partner against
2 Hill v. Palmer (1882), 56 Wis.
See Fry v. Potter (1880), 12 R. L
123,
43 Am. Rep. 703.
542; Kutz v. Dreibelbis (1880), 126
a Bagley v. Smith (1853), 10 N. Y.
Pa. St. 335, 17 AtL Rep. 609;
Wheeler v. Arnold (1874), 30 Mich. 489, 61 Am. Dec. 756.
304; Clarke v. Mills (1887), 36 Kan.
393.
99
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139-141.] LAW OF PABTNEESHIP.

§§ 139-141.]

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

another to recover damages for the tatter's breach of his

agreement to contribute capital or furnish goods, or do any

other act to start or launch the partnership. 1 "An agreement

to pay money or to furnish stock," said the court in a recent

case, 8 " for the purpose of launching the partnership, is an

individual engagement of each partner to the other, and the

defaulting partner may be sued in an action at law upon his

agreement. It is entirely separate and distinct from the

partnership accounts, and this forms the true test in deter-

mining whether an action at law will lie by one partner

against his copartner."

139. Or for not reimbursing for capital advanced.

If one partner advances money, or pays for goods, or fur-

nishes any other thing at the request of the other to enable

the latter to supply his portion of the agreed capital, an ac-

tion at law will lie for reimbursement. 1

140. Or for not indemnifying as agreed. If one

partner agrees with another to pay a firm debt out of his

another to recover damages for the latter's breach of his
agreement to contribute capital or furnish goods, or do any
other act to start or launch the partnership.1 "An agreement
to pay money or to furnish stock," said the court in a recent
case,' "for the purpose of launching the partnership, is an
individual engagement of each partner to the other, ·a nd the
defaulting partner may be sued in an action at law upon his
agreement. It is entirely separate and distinct from the
partnership accounts, and this forms the true test in determining whether an action at law will lie by one partner
against his copartner."
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private funds or to hold the other harmless from liability by

reason of any partnership transaction, an action at law may

be maintained for a breach of the agreement. 4

141. Or for not paying debts assumed. If one

partner upon dissolution agrees to pay the debts of the firm,

or to collect the debts and pay over a share of the collec-

tion, an action at law may be maintained if the agreement

is broken. 5

i See Scott v. Campbell, 80 Ala. 132, 28 N. W. Rep. 753; Bull v. Coe

§ 139. - - Or for not reimbursing for capital advanced ..
If one partner advances money, or pays for goods, or furnishes any other thing at the request of the other to enable
the latter to supply his portion of the agreed capital, an action at law will lie for reimbursement.•

728; Sprout v. Crowley, 30 Wis. (1888), 77 CaL 54, 18 Pac. Rep. 808.

187. 11 Am. St. Rep. 235; Smith v. Kemp

Cook v. Canny (1893), 96 Mich. (1892), 92 Mich. 357, 52 N. W. Rep.

398, 55 N. W. Rep. 987. To like ef- 639.

feet: Brown v. Tapscott (1840), 6 4 See Miller v. Bailey (1890), 19

Mees. & Wels. 119, Ames' Cases on Oreg. 539, 25 Pac. Rep. 27; Edwards

Partn. 468; Scott v. Campbell v. Remington (1881), 51 Wis. 836;

(1857), 30 Ala. 728; Sprout v. Crow- Kellogg v. Moore (1881), 97 I1L 282.

§ 14:0. - - Or for not indemnifying as agreed •.- I f one
partner agrees with another to pay a firm debt out of his
private funds or to hold the other harmless from liability by
reason of any partnership transaction, an action at law may
be maintained for a breach of the agreement.'

ley (1872), 30 Wis. 187. 8 See Thropp v. Richardson (1890).

'Bates v. Lane (1886), 62 Mich. 132 Pa. St. 899, 19 AtL Rep. 218;
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§ 14:1. - - Or for not paying debts assumed.- If onepartner upon dissolution agrees to pay the debts of the firm,
or to collect the debts and pay over a share of the collection, an action at law may be maintained if the agreement
is broken.6
1 See Scott v. Campbell, SO Ala.
728; Sprout v. Crowley, 30 Wis.
187.
2 Cook v. Canny (1893), 96 Mich.
398, 55 N. W. Rep. 987. To like effeet: Brown v. Tapscott (1840), 6
Mees. & Weis. 119, Ames' Cases on
Partn. 468; Scott v. Campbell
(1857), 30 Ala. 728; Sprout v. Crowley (1872), 30 Wis. 187.
a Bates v. Lane (1886), 62 Mich.

132, 28 N. W. Rep. 758; Bull v. Coe
(1888), 77 Cat 54, 18 Pao. Rep. 808,
11 Am. St. Rep. 285; Smith v. Kemp
(1892), 92 Mich. 357, 52 N. W. Rep.
639.
'See Miller v. Bailey (1890), 19
Oreg. 539, 25 Pac. Rep. 27; Edwards
v. Remington (1881), 51 Wis. 886;
Kellogg v. Moore (1881). 97 ill 282.
I See Thropp v. Richardson (1890).
132 Pa. St. 899, 19 Atl Rep. 218 ;-

100
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ACTIONS BETWEEN PARTNEBS. [ 142-146.

142. Or, generally, where partnership transac-

AOTIONS BETWEEN P .A.RTNERS.

[§§ 142-146.

tion by agreement is transformed into individual one.

And, generally, the partners may, by express agreement,

transform a partnership transaction into the individual one

of one of the partners, and upon matters thus separated

from the partnership affairs an action at law may be main-

tained. 1

143. One partner may sue another for breach of part-

nership agreements. Actions at law may also be main-

tained by one partner against another for a breach of such

stipulations or agreements in the partnership articles as

were designed for the protection of the partner complain-

ing, as upon a breach of an agreement not to sign the firm

§ 14:2. - - Or, generally, where partnership transacfion by agreement is transformed into individual one.And, generally, the partners may, .by express agreement,
transform a partnership transaction into the individual one
of one of the partners, and upon matters thus separated
from the partnership affairs an action at law may be maintained.1

name as an accommodation indorser. 2

144. One partner may sue another for wrongful prac-

tices resulting in loss. And the same rule would apply

where one partner, by fraudulent practices, or by any wrong-

ful act, in violation of his duty as a partner, should impose
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loss upon his partner, as by giving the firm note without au-

thority for his private debt. 3

145. One partner may sue another for fraud in in-

ducing partnership. So an action at law will lie for mis-

representations or deceit by one partner in inducing another

to become a partner. 4

146. On matters distinct from partnership one partner

§ 14:3. One partner may sue another for breach of partnership agreements.-Actions at law may also be main.
tained by one partner against another for a breach of such
stipulations or agreements in the partnership articles as
were designed for the protection of the partner complaining, as upon a breach of an agreement not to sign the firm
name as an accommodation indorser.3

may sue another. c. As to matters entirely distinct from

Ferguson v. Baker (1889), 116 N. Y. See Fuller v. Percival (1879), 126

257, 22 N. E. Rep. 400. Mass. 381; Calkins v. Smith (1872),

*See Ryder v. Wilcox (1869), 103 48 N. Y. 614; Boughner v. Black's

Mass. 24; Purvines v. Champion Adm'r (1886), 83 Ky. 521, 4 Ani. St.

(1873), 67 111. 459; Neil v. Greenleaf Rep. 174

(1875), 26 Ohio St. 567; Emery v. See Rice v. Culver (1880), 82 N.

Wilson (1879), 79 N. Y. 18. J. Eq. 601 ; Morse v. Hutchins (1869),

2 See Stone v. Wendover (1876), 2 102 Mass. 439; Hale v. Wilson (1878),

Mo. App. 247; Vance v. Blair (1849), 112 Mass. 444,

§ 14:4:. One partner may sue another for wrongful practices resulting in loss.- And the same rule would apply
where one partner, by fraudulent practices, or by any wrongful act, in violation of his duty as a partner, should .impose
loss upon his partner, as by giving the firm note without authority for his private debt. 3

18 Ohio, 532, 51 Am. Dec. 467.
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§ 14:5. One partner may sue another for fraud in in·
ducing partnership.- So an action at law will lie for misrepresentations or deceit by one partner in inducing another
to become a partner.'
§ 14:6. On matters distinct from partnership one partner
may sue another.- a. As to matters entirely distinct from
Ferguson v. Baker (1889), 116 N. Y.
1 See Fuller v. Percival (1879), 126
257, 22 N. E. Rep. 400.
Mass. 381; Calkins v. Smith (1872),
1 See Ryder v. Wilcox (1869), 103 . 48 N. Y. 614; Boughner v. Black's
. Mass. 24; Purvines v~ Champion Adm'r (1886), 83 Ky. 021, 4 Am. St.
(1873), 67 Ill. 459; Neil v. Greenleaf Rep. 174.
.
•See Rice v. Culver (1880), 82 N.
(1875), 26 Ohio St. 567; Emery v.
Wilson (1879), 79 N. Y. 78.
J. Eq. 601; Morse v. Hutchins (1869),
2 See Stone v. Wendover (1876), 2 102 Mass. 439; Hale v. Wilson (1873),
Mo. App. 247; Vance v. Blair (1849), 112 Mass. 444.
18 Ohio, 532, 51 Am. Dec. 467.
101

147.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

§ 147.J

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

the partnership affairs, one partner may, of course, sue another

as freely as though in respect to other matters they did not

sustain the relation of partner. 1

4. Firm against Firm having Common Partners.

147. One firm cannot sue another at law if there is a

common partner. 4. In the absence of a statute authoriz-

ing it, one firm cannot maintain an action at law against an-

other firm if there are partners common to both firms. The

death of the common partner will not remove the impedi-

ment as to matters arising before the death, nor will the dis-

solution of the firm. The nature of the claim is immaterial,

if it is an obligation in favor of one firm and against the

other as such. The forum for actions in such cases is the

court of equity.*

It is not permitted, it is said in one case,* " that one of

the parties should thus appear both as a plaintiff and de-

fendant, in effect prosecuting an action against himself, in

which, if a recovery were to be allowed, it would be in his
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favor and at the same time against himself. Nor, at law,

would the contract or agreement between the two firms hav-

ing a common member be recognized as creating a legal ob-

ligation or cause of action. The transaction would be treated

as an attempt by a party to enter into a contract with him-

self. 4 The remedial system of the common law was too in-

flexible and restricted to enable it to adjust the complex

rights and obligations of the parties under such circum-

stances. But in equity the agreements of the members of

firms so related to each other were treated as obligatory,

and the fact that one of the parties to the joint contract

1 See Elder v. Hood (1865), 38 111. Crosby v. Timolat, supra.

538; Newsom v. Pitman (1892), 98 * Citing Bosanquet v. Wray, 6

Ala. 526, 12. So. Rep. 412. Taunt 597; De Tastet v. Shaw, 1

2 See Hall v. Kimball (1895), 77 III Barn. & Aid. 664, 669; Leake, Cont

181; Crosby v. Timolat (1892), 50 439, 440; McFadden v. Hunt, 5

Minn. 171, 52 N. W. Rep. 526; Bea- Watts & S. 468; Price v. Spencer,

cannon v. Liebe (1884), 11 Oreg. 443, 7 Phila. 178.

5 Pac. Rep. 273.

102

the partnership affairs, one partner may, of course, sue another
as freely as though ·in respect to other matters they did not
sustain the relation of partner.1

~

/J+..'

4. Firm against ·Firm having Common Partnera.

§ 14:7. One firm cannot sue another at law if there is a
common partner.- 4. In the absence of a statute authoriz-

ing it, one firm cannot maintain an action at law against another firm if there are partners common to both firms. The
deata of the common partner will not remove the impediment as to matters arising before the death, nor will the dissolution of the firm. The nature of the claim is immaterial,
if it is an obligation in favor of one firm and against the
other as such. The forum. for actions in such cases is the
court of equity.1
It is not permitted, it is said in one case,1 "that. one of
the parties should thus appear both as a plaintiff and defendant, in effect prosecuting an action against himself, in
which, if a recovery were to be allowed, it would be in his
favor and at the same time against himself. Nor, at law,
would the contract or agreement between the two firms having a common member be recognized as creating a legal obligation or cause of action. The transaction would be treated
as an attempt by a party to enter into a contract with himself.' The remedial system of the common law was too inflexible and restricted to enable it to adjust the complex
rights and obligations of the parties under such circums~nces. But in equity the agreements of the members of
firms so related to each other were treated as obligatory,
and the fact that one of the parties to the joint contract
I See Elder v. Hood (1865), 38 I1L
I Crosby v. Timolat, supra.
538; Newsom v. Pitman (1892), 98
'Citing Bosanquet v. Wray, 8
Ala. 526, 12, So. Rep. 412.
Taunt. 597; De Tastet v. Shaw, 1
2 See Hall v. Kimball (1895), 77 Ill. Barn. & Ald. 664, 669; Leake, Cont.
161; C.rosby v. Timolat (1892), 50 439, 440; McFadden v. Hunt, 5
Minn. 171, 52 N. W. Rep. 526; Bea- Watts & S. 468; Price v. Spencer.
cannon v. Liebe (1884), 11Oreg.443, 7 Phila. 178.

5 Pac. Rep. 273.
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ACTIONS BETWEEN PARTNERS. [ 148, 149.

ACTIONS BETWEEN P ARTNERB.

stood in the position of both an obligor and obligee did not

[§§ 148, 149.

stand in the way of affording such relief or remedy as might

be found to be appropriate and necessary to the ends of

justice." l

II. OF ACTIONS IN EQUITY.

148. Equity the proper tribunal in partnership mat-

ters. The court of equity is the chief and appropriate tri-

bunal for the settlement of all controversies growing out of

partnership transactions as such. Its principal function is

in winding up the partnership affairs and arriving at the re-

spective interests therein of the partners and creditors, but

its aid may often be sought in other matters. Thus

1. /Specific Performance.

149. In what cases granted. Something of the power

of the courts of equity to enforce specific performance of

partnership agreements has been already considered in a

previous section, 2 and, as there noticed, the jurisdiction is

limited by the nature of the case. But such stipulations as
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are capable of specific performance will be enforced, either

directly or negatively by an injunction against their breach.*

1 Citing 1 Story, Eq. Jur., 679, books and the furnishing of copies

thereof (Lingen v. Simpson, 1

stood in the position of both an obligor and obligee did not
stand in the way of .affording such relief or remedy as might
be found to be appropriate and necessary to the ends of
justice." 1
II. OF AoTioNs IN EQUITY.
§ 148. Equity the proper tribunal in partnership mat·
ters.- The court of equity is the chief and appropriate tri~
burial for the settlement of all controversies growing out of
partnership transactions as such. Its principal function is
in winding up the partnership affairs and arriving at the re- ·
spective interests therein of the partners and creditors, but
its aid may often be sought in other matters. Thus·-

Simons & Stuart, 600); agreements

that a third party,, and he only,

1. Specific Performance.

shall get in debts (Davis v. Amer,

3 Drew. 64; Turner v. Major, 3

Giff. 442); agreements that the

value of the share of an outgoing

or a deceased partner shall be as-

certained in a specified way and

taken accordingly (Morris v. Kears-

ley, 2 Y. & C. Ex. 139; Essex v.

Essex, 20 Beav. 442; King v. Chuck,

17 Beav. 325); agreements that an

outgoing partner shall offer his

share to his copartners before sell-

§ 14:9. In what eases granted.- Something of the power
of the courts of equity to enforce specific performance of
partnership agreements has been already considered in a
previous section,2 and, as there noticed, the jurisdiction is.
limited' by the nature of the case. But such stipulations as
are capable of specific performance will be enforced, either ,
directly or negatively by an injunction against their breach.I

ing it to other persons (Homfray

v. Fothergill, 1 Eq. 567); agree

680; Haven v. Wakefield, 39 I1L

509; Chapman v. Evans, 44 Miss.

113; Calvit's Ex'rs v. Markham, 3

How. (Miss.) 343; Hayes v. Bement,

3 Sandf. 394.

2 Ante, 81.

* In 1 Lindley on Partnership,

478, it is said: "The court has en-

forced the following agreements

entered into upon or with a view

to a dissolution, namely: Agree-

ments not to carry on business

within a certain distance or for a

certain space of time (Whittaker

v. Howe, 8 Beavan, 383; Turner v.

Major, 3 Giffard, 442); agreements

as to the custody of partnership

103

Citing 1 Story, Eq. Jur., §§ 679, books and the furnishing of copies
680; Haven v. Wakefield, 39 Ill. thereof (Lingen v. Simpson, 1
. 509; Chapman v. Eva!ls, 44 Miss. Simons & Stuart, 600); agreements
'113; Calvit's Ex'rs v. Markham, 3 that a third party, and he only,
How. (Miss.) 343; Hayes v. Bement, shall get in debts cDavis v. Amer,
3 Sandf. 394.
3 Drew. 64; Turnel" v. Major, 3
2 Ante,~ 81.
Giff. 442); agreements that the
a In 1 Lindley on Partnership, value of the share of an outgoing
478, it is said: "The court has en~ or a deceased partner shall be aeF
forced the following agreements certained in a specified way and
entered into upon or with a view taken accordingly (Morris v. Kearsto a dissolution, namely: Agree- ley, 2 Y. & C. Ex. 139; .E ssex v.
ments not to carry on business Essex, 20 Beav. 442; King v. Chuck,
within a certain distance or for a 17 Beav. 325); agreements that an
certain space of time (Whittaker outgoing: partner shall offe;r his
v. Howe, 3 Beavan, 383; Turner v. share to his copar~ners before sellMajor, 3 Giffard, 442); agreements ing it to other persons (Homfray
as to the custody of partnership v. Fothergill, 1 Eq. 567); agree103
I

150.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

§ 150.]

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

The chief objections which arise to the exercise of the

power to grant specific performance in partnership cases are

those which inhere in the peculiar nature of the subject.

Thus, where the purpose is to compel parties to enter into

partnership as agreed, if no time was stipulated for its con-

vinuance, of what avail is it to enforce the creation of a

partnership which the parties may immediately dissolve?

if a term of continuance was agreed upon, can the court as-

sume the task of constantly watching the parties to observe

whether they are performing their duties as partners?

150. Same subject. Tn one case l in which the ques-

tion arose, the court, in denying the application, said: " It is

extremely plain that the court cannot assume to enforce the

performance of daily prospective duties, or supervise or di-

rect in advance the course or conduct of one who is to con-

trol and manage in the interest of a firm in which he is to

stand as a member, and where, too, the stipulated arrange-

The chief objections which arise to the exercise of the
power to grant specific performance in partnership cases are
those which inhere in the peculiar nature of the subject.
Thus, where the purpose is to compel parties to enter into
'"'>artnership as agreed, if no time was stipulated for its con..muance, of what avail is it to enforce the creation of a
partnership which the parties may immediately dissolve 1if a term of continuance was agreed upon, can the court assume the task of constantly watching the parties to observe
whether they are performing their duties as partners~

ment as plainly set forth contemplates that his personal skill
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and judgment shall be applied and govern according to the

shifting needs of property and business. No court is com-

petent to execute such an arrangement."

In another case, 1 involving the same question, the court

said : " It is a rule in equity that the court will not decree

a specific performance where it has no power to enforce the

decree. Hence partnership articles will not be enforced,

especially where no time is fixed for its continuance, as

either party may dissolve it at pleasure. And even where

a time is fixed it is difficult to see how the decree can be

enforced. Take this case as an illustration : Is the court to

keep its hand on the parties for seventeen years and compel

them to carry on this business?"

ments to grant an annuity to a trade secret (Morison r. Moat, 9

retiring partner and his widow Hare, 241)."

(Aubin v. Holt, 2 K. & J. 66; Page l Buck v. Smith (1874), 29 Mich.

v. Cox, 10 Hare, 163); agreements 166, 18 Am. Rep. 84

not to divulge or make use of a 'Morris v. Peckham (1883), 51

Conn. 128, Paige's Partn. Gas. 114.

104

§ 150. Same subject.- In one case 1 in which the question arose, the court, in denying the application,_ said: "It is
extremely plain that the court cannot assume to enforce the
performance of daily prospective duties, or supervise or direct in advance the course or conduct of one who is to control and manage in the interest of a firm in which he is to
stand as a member, and where, too, the stipulated arrangement as plainly set forth contemplates that his personal skill
and judgment shall be applied and govern according to the
shifting needs of property and business. No court is competent to execute such an arrangement."
In another case,2 involving the same question, the court
said: "It is a rule in equity that the court will not decree
a specific performance where it has no power to enforce the
decree. Hence partnership articles will not be enforced,
especially where no time is fixed for its continuance, as
either party may dissolve it at pleasure. And even where
a time is fixed it is difficult to see how the decree can be
enforced. Take this case as an illustration: Is the court to
keep its hand on the parties for seventeen years and compel
them to carry on this business W"
ments to grant an annuity to a. trade secret (Morison T. Moat, 9
retiring partner and . his widow Hare, 241)."
(Aubin v. Holt, 2 K. & J. 66; Page
1 Buck v. Smith (1874), 29 Mich.
v. Cox, 10 Hare, 168); agreements 166, 18 Am. Rep. 84.
11\forris v. Peckham (1888), 51
not to divulge or make use of a
Conn. 128, Paige's Partn. Ca& 114.

104
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ACTIONS BETWEEN PABTNEKS. [ 151, 152

151. Same subject. There may, nowever, be cases in

.A.OTIONS BETWREN P ABTNERS.

[§§ 151, 152

which the court will enforce specific performance of an agree-

ment to form a partnership, notwithstanding that it may

be immediately dissolved. This will be done, for example,

where it will secure to a partner the interests in property to

which by the partnership agreement he is entitled. 1

2. Of Injunctions.

152. In what cases granted. Injunctions are fre-

quently granted upon the application of one partner against

his copartner, either before or pending or after a dissolu-

tion.

1. Before dissolution, and for the very purpose often of

§ 151. Same subject.-There may, nowever, be cases in
which the court will enforce specific performance of an agreement to form a partnership, notwithstanding that it may
be immediately dissolved. This will be done, for example,
where it will secure to a partner the interests in property to
which by the partnership agreement he is entitled. 1

obviating the necessity for a dissolution, injunctions may be

granted to prevent the commission by partners of acts in-

consistent with the terms of their agreement or violating the

2. Of Injimctiona.

rights of their copartners. Thus, one partner may be en-

joined from obstructing or impeding the business ; excluding

another partner from his rightful share in the management
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of the business ; interfering with the servants of the firm ;

removing the books or papers of the firm ; using partnership

property for individual purposes; engaging in a rival busi-

ness; extending the partnership transactions beyond the

limits agreed upon ; publishing a notice of dissolution before

the stipulated term has expired, and the like. 2

2. Pending an application for a dissolution or for an ac-

counting, injunction may be issued to restrain one partner

from interfering with the property, creating new liabilities,

and the like. 8

3. After dissolution, one partner may be enjoined from

wasting, injuring, disposing of or wrongfully dealing with

^omerby v. Buntin (1875), 118 44 Miss. 202; Van Keuren v. Tren-

Mass. 279, 19 Am. Rep. 459. ton Mfg. Co. (1861), 13 N. J. Eq.

* See Marble Co. v. Ripley (1870), 802; Levine v. Michael (1883), 35 La.

10 Wall. (U. S.) 339; Pirtle v. Perm Ann. 1121.

(1835), 3 Dana CKy.), 247, 28 Am. See Wilson y. Fitchter (1885), 11

Dec. 70; New v. Wright (1870), N. J. Eq. 71.

105

§ 152. In what cases granted.- Injunctions are frequently granted upon the application of one partner against
his copartner, either before or pending or after a dissolution.
1. Before dis8olution, and for the very purpose often of
obviating the necessity for a dissolution, injunctions may be
granted to prevent the commission by partners of acts in. consistent with the terms of their agreement or violating the
rights of their copartners. Thus, one partner may be enjoined from obstructing or impeding the business; excluding
another partner from his rightful share in the management
of the business; interfering with the servants of the firm;
removing the books or papers of the firm; using partnership
property for individual purposes; engaging in a rival business; extending the partnership transactions beyond the
limits agreed upon; publishing a notice of dissolution before
the stipulated term has expired, and the like. 1
2. Pending an application for a dissolution or for an ae>a
counting, injunction may be issued to restrain one partner
from interfering with the property, creating new liabilities,
and the like.1
3. ..After disso.lution, one partner may be enjoined from
wasting, injuring, disposing of or wrongfully dealing with
1 Somerby v. Buntin (1875), 118
Mass. 279, 19 Am. Rep. 459.
2 See Marble Co. v. Ripley (1870),
lO Wall (U.S.) 339; Pirtle v. Penn
(1835), S Dana (Ky.), 247, 28 Am.
Oec. 70; New v. Wright (1870),

44 Miss. 202; Van Keuren v. Trenton Mfg. Co. (1861), 13 N. J. Eq.
802; Levine v. Michael (1883), 35 IA
Ann. 1121.
a See Wilson v. Fitohter (1885). 11
N. J. Eq. 71.
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153.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

§ 153.]

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

the assets ; from holding out the complainant as being still

a partner ; from continuing business in violation of his agree-

ment ; from using the old firm name in such a way as to

render former partners liable, and the like. 1

3. Of Accounting and Dissolution.

153. In what cases granted. The most common ground

for appealing to a court of equity is to secure an accounting

to determine the interests of partners and creditors, to ad-

the assets; from holding out the complainant as being still
a partner; from continuing business in violation of his agreement; from using the old firm name in su~h a way as to
render former partners liable, and the like.1

just mutual claims and demands, and to obtain a decree for

payment and distribution. The jurisdiction of a court of

3. Of .Accowntimg and .Dissolution.

equity for these purposes is ample and its power to enforce

its decrees complete. 2 Its aid, however, must be sought be-

fore the claim has become stale, and the complainant's laches

may bar relief.'

An accounting is usually coupled with a demand for disso-

lution, and it was formerly the rule that accounting would

not be granted where it would not be complete and final or

unless it was coupled with a dissolution ; but the modern au-
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thorities have relaxed this rule, and there are now cases in

which an accounting alone may be granted. The most im-

portant of these, according to Mr. Justice Lindley, 4 are three :

1. Where one partner has sought to withhold from his co-

partner the profit arising from some secret transaction.

2. Where the partnership is for a term of years still unex-

pired, and one partner has sought to exclude or expel his

copartner or to drive him to a dissolution. 3. Where the

partnership has proved a failure, and the partners are too

numerous to be made parties to the action, and a limited ac-

1 See McGowan Co. v. McGowan Clark v. Gridley (1871), 41 Cal. 119;

(1872), 22 Ohio St 370; Wilkenson Denver v. Roane (1878), 99 U. S.

v. Tilden (1881), 9 Fed. Rep. 683; 355.

Roberts v. McKee (1859), 29 Ga. See Bell v. Hudson (1887), 73

181; Shannon v. Wright (1883), 60 CaL 285, 2 Am. St Rep. 791, and

Md. 520; Fletcher v. Vandusen note,

(1879), 52 Iowa, 448. 2 Lindley on Partnership (Ew-

2 See Bracken v. Kennedy (1842), ell's ed.), 495.

4 I1L 558, Paige's Partn. Caa 170;
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§ 153. In what cases granted.-Themostcommongronnd
for appealing to a court of equity is to secure an accounting
to determine the interests of partners and creditors, to adjust mutual claims and demands, and to obtain a decree for
payment and distribution. The jurisdiction of a court of
equity for these· purposes is ample and Its power to enforce
its decrees complete.2 Its aid, however, must be sought 00.
fore the claim has become stale, and the complainant's !aches
•
may bar relief.1
An accounting is usually coupled with a demand for dissolution, and it was formerly the rule that accounting would
not be granted where it would not be complete and final or
unless it was coupled with a dissolution; but the modern authorities have relaxed this rule, and there are now cases in
which an accounting alone may be granted. The most important of these, according to Mr. J u.stice Lindley,' are three:
1. Where one partner has sought to withhold from his copartner the profit arising from some secret transaction.
2. Where the partnership is for a term of years still unexpired, and one partner has sought to exclude or expel his
copartner or to drive him to a dissolution. 3. Where the
partnership has proved a failure, and the partners are too
numerous to be made parties to the action, and a limited ac1 See

McGowan Co. v. McGowan
(1872), 22 Ohio St. 370; Wilkenson
v. Tilden (1881), 9 Fed. Rep. 683;
Roberts v. McKee (1859), 29 Ga.
161; Shannon v. Wright (1883), 60
Md. 520; Fletcher v. Vandusen
(1879), 52 Iowa, 448.
2 See Bracken v. Kennedy (1842),
., ill 558, Paige's PartD. Cas. 170;

Clark v. Gridley (1871), 41 Cal 119;
Denver v. Roane (1878), 99 U. S.
355.
aSee Bell v. Hudson (1887), 78
Cal 285, 2 Am. St. Rep. 791, and
note.
'2 Lindley on Partnership (Ewell's ed.), 495.
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ACTIONS BETWEEN PABTNEES. [ 154, 155.

count will result in justice to them all. To these may be

ACTIONS BETWEEN P ARTNERB.

[§§ 154, 155.

added the case where the partnership agreements provide for

periodical accountings or accountings as to distinct trans-

actions. 1

In these cases, however, an accounting will not, except in

pursuance of partnership agreements, be granted of an iso-

lated portion of what has been dealt with as a complete and

general whole. 2

The effect of the illegality of the transaction in an action

for accounting has already been referred to. 1

154. Same subject Who may demand accounting.

The application for the accounting may be made by a

partner ; by an employee who takes a share of profits by

way of compensation for his services ; by the personal rep-

resentative of a deceased partner; by the assignee or pur-

chaser of the interest of a partner; by the purchaser of a

share upon a sale on execution; but not usually by a gen-

eral creditor. 4

eount will result in justice to them all. To these may be
added the ca1:le where the partnership agreements provide for
periodical accountings or accountings as to distinct transactions.1
In these cases, however, an accounting will not, except in
pursuance of partnership agreements, be granted of an isolated portion of what has been dealt with as a. complete and
general whole.2
The effect of the illegality of the transaction iil an action
for accounting has already been referred to.1
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4. Of Receiver a.

155. When will be appointed. Eeceivers are frequently

appointed in the settlement of partnership affairs, though

the appointment is not a matter of course and will not be

made unless good grounds exist for it. A receiver will not

usually be appointed except upon dissolution; but the ap-

pointment may be made before, if a dissolution is inevitable,

or if the partnership is insolvent and the assets are being

wasted or improperly applied; but mere disputes or ill-feel-

i See Patterson v. Ware (1846), 10 47 N. J. Eq. 569, 21 AtL Rep. 297, 24

Ala. 444; Wadley v. Jones (1875), Am. St. Rep. 419.

55 Ga. 329. 4 See Bentley v. Harris (1873), 10

'See Davis v. Davis (1882), 60 R. L 434, 14 Am. Rep. 695; Freeman

Miss. 615. v. Freeman (1884), 136 Mass. 260;

*See ante, 20. See, also, Pfeuffer Gerard v. Bates (1888), 124 EL 150,

v. Maltby (1881), 54 Tex. 454, 38 Am. 7 Am. St. Rep. 350, 16 N. E. Rep.

§ 154-. Same subject-Who may demand accounting.The application for the accounting may be made by a
partner; by an employee who takes a share of profits by
way of compensation for his services; by the personal representative of a deceased partner; by the assignee or purchaser .o f the interest of a partner; by the purchaser of a
share upon a sale on execution; but not usually by a general creditor.'
4. Of Reedvers.

Rep. 631 ; Pennington v. Todd (1890), 258 ; Channon v. Stewart (1882), 103

HL 541, Paige's Partn. Gas. 179.
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§ 155. When will be appointed.-Receivers are frequently
appointed in the settlement of partnership affairs, though
the appointment is not a matter of course and will not be
made unless good grounds exist for it. A receiver will not
usually be appointed except upon dissolution; but the appointment may be made before, if a dissolution is inevitable,
'or if the partnership is insolvent and the assets are being
wasted or improperly applied; but mere disputes or ill-feel1 See Patterson v. Ware (1846), 10
Ala. 444; Wadley v. Jones (1875),
55 Ga. 329.
t See Davis v. Davis (1882), 60
Miss. 615.
•See ante,§ 20. See, also, Pfeuffer
v. Maltby (1881), 54 Tex. 454, 38 Am.
Rep.631; Pennington v. Todd(1890),

47 N. J. Eq. 569, 21 Atl Rep. 297, 24
Am. St. Rep. 419.
'See Bentley v. Harris (1873), 10
R. L 434, 14 Am. Rep. 695; Freeman
v. Freeman (1884), 136 Mass. 260;
Gerard v. Bates (18881 124 Ill 150,
7 Am. St. Rep. 350, 16 N. E. Rep.
258; Channon v. Stewart (1882), 103
m 541, Paige's Partn. Cas. 179.
10'7
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ing among the partners is not a sufficient ground. 1 It may

be made also where one partner is insolvent and is wasting

the assets or breaking up the business. 1 A receiver may be

appointed to supersede a surviving partner or a sole manag-

ing partner if he is acting wrongfully or misusing or misap-

plying the assets.' One of the partners may be appointed

receiver if he is otherwise a suitable person.

156. Powers and duties of receiver. The receiver is

an officer of the court and acts under its direction. He

may be authorized to continue the business long enough to

permit its being wound up without sacrifice. He has not

the title to the property, but the right of possession and dis-

ing among the partners is not a sufficient ground.1 It may
be made also where one partner is insolvent and is wasting
the assets or breaking up the business.' A receiver may be
.appointed to supersede a surviving partner or a sole managing partner if he is acting wrongfully or misusing or misapplying the assets.1 One of the partners may be· appointed
~eceiver if he is otherwise a suitable person.

position, and should be given control of all of the assets of

the firm. He may sue in his own name to collect the debts,

but he cannot usually be sued without the consent of the

court, nor can creditors of the firm levy upon the property

in his possession. 4

iSee New v. Wright (1870), 44 See Jackson v. Lahee (1886), 114

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Miss. 202, Paige's Partn. Gas. 181. HL 287, 2 N. K Rep. 172; Morey v.

See Shannon v. Wright (1883), Grant (1882), 48 Mich. 826, 12 N. W.

60 Md. 520; Phillips v. Trezevant Rep. 202; Henning v. Raymond

(1872), 67 N. C. 870. (1886), 35 Minn, 803, 29 N. W. Rep.

See Word v. Word (1889), 90 1821

Ala. 81.
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§ 156. Powers and duties of receiver.-The receiver is
an officer of the court and acts under its direction. He
may be authorized to continue the business long enough to
permit its being wound up without sacrifice. He ha~ not
the title to the property, but the right of possession and disposition, and should be given control of all of the assets of
the firm. He may sue in his own name to collect the debts,
but he cannot usua!ly be sued without the consent of the
-0ourt, nor can creditors of the firm levy upon the property
in his possession.'
1 See

New v. Wright (1870). 44

'See Jackson v. Lahee (1886), 114
fil 287, 2 N. E. Rep. 172; Morey v.
'See Shannon v. Wright (1883), Grant (1882), 48 Mich. 826., 12 N. W.
60 Md. 520; Phillips v. Trezevant Rep. 202; Henning v. Raymond
(1872), 67 N. C. 870.
(1886), 85 Minn. 803, 29 N. W. Rep.
I See Word v. Word (1889), 90 182.
Ala. 81.
Miss. 202, Paige's Partn. Cas. 181.
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CHAPTER IX.

OF THE POWERS OF PARTNERS.

157. In general.

L POWERS AS BETWEEN PARTNERS

THEMSELVES.

158. As between themselves,

partners may agree upon

powers.

159. If no agreement, usual pow-

ers implied.

CHAPTER IX.

160. Of what matters third per-

sons must take notica

161. Nature and extent of busi-

ness to be observed.

OF THE POWERS OF PARTNERS.

163. Distinction between trading

and non-trading firm.

163. Power of one partner to dis-

§ 157. In general

sent from proposed acts.

164. Of the partner as the agent
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of the firm.

l POWERS AS BETWEEN PARTNEBS
THEMSELVES.

165. Partner no implied power

outside the scope of busi-

ness.

166. What is meant by scope.

167. Extending scope by

conduct

168. Consideration of particular

158. As between themselves,
partners may agree upon
.powers.
159. If no agreement, usual powers implied.

powers.

169. Admissions.

170. Agents.

171. Arbitration.

l l POWERS AS BETWEEN FmH AND
TBmD PERSONS.

172. Assignments for crak

itors.

173. Attorneys.

174 Bills and notes.

160. Of what matters third per-

sons must take notice.
161. Nature and extent of busi-

175. Borrowing money.

176. Buying.

177. Collecting and receiv-

ing payment.

178. Compromises.

179. Confessing judgment.

180. Deeds and other sealed

instruments.

181. Hiring property.

182. Insurance.

183. Mortgages and pledges*

184. Notice.

185. Payment

186. Sales.

187. Suits at law.

188. Suretyship and guar-

anty.

ness to be observed.
162. Distinction between trading
and non-trading firm.
163. Power of one partner to dissent from proposed acts.
164. Of the partner as the agent
of the firm.
165. Partner no implied power
outside the scope of business.
166. --What is meant hy scope.
167. - - Extending scope by
conduct.

§ 168. Consideration of particula1·
powers.
169. - - Admissions.
170. --Agents.
17L - - Arbitration.
172. - - Assignments for cred•
itors.
173. Attorneys.
174. - - Bills and notes.
175. Borrowing money.
176. Buying.
177. - - Collecting and receiving payment.
178. - - Compromises.
179. --Confessing jud~ent.
180. - - Deeds and other sealed•
instruments.
181. - - Hiring property.
182. - - Insurance.
183. Mortgages and pledges...
184. - - Notice.
185. - - Payment.
186. - - Sales.
187. Suits at law.
188. Suretyship and guaranty. ·
189. The powers of the majority.
190. Ratification of unauthorized
acts.

189. The powers of the majority.

190. Ratification of unauthorized

acts.

157. In general. The relation of partnership, as has

been seen, creates the relation of principal and agent be-

tween the .partners, each partner being at once principal of

and agent for the others. Courts which have adopted the

100

§ 157. In general.-The relation of partnership, as has .
been seen, creates the relation of principal and agent between the .partners, each partner being at once principal of
and agent for the others. Courts which have adopted thetas»

158.] LAW or FABTNBBSHIP.

§ 158.]

U W OF P ABTNERSHIP.

idea of the distinct entity of the partnership regard each

partner as agent for the firm, as a collective body, rather

than as principal for himself and agent for the others. The

results, however, are not materially different, and it is suffi-

cient for our purpose to say that the power of each partner

to bind himself and his partners or, in other words, to

bind the firm rests substantially upon the general prin-

ciples of agency.

It will be evident that the power of the partner-agent to

bind his principal, i. <?., his partners or the firm, presents the

same two aspects that have been discovered in the law of

agency, namely:

(1) The power as between the partner and the firm, and

(2) The power as between the firm and third persons.

1. POWERS AS BETWEEN THE PABTNEBS THEMSELVES.

158. As between themselves, partners may fix powers

by agreement. It has been seen that, between the agent

and the principal, the powers of the agent may be fixed by
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their agreement, and that, as between these parties, the

agreement so made is usually conclusive, even though, as

between the principal and third persons, the principal may

be held liable for the agent's exercise of more extended

powers. The same rule applies here. The partners may by

idea of the distinct entity of the partnership regard each
partner as agent for the firm, as a collective body, rather
than as principal for himself and agent for the others. The
results, however, are not materially different, and it is sufficient for our purpose to say that the power of each partner
to bind himself and his partners - or, in other words, to
bind the firm- rests substantially upon the general principles of agency. ~
It will be evident that the power of the partner-agent to
bind his principal, i.e., his partners or the firm, presents the
same two aspects that have been discovered in the law of
agency, namely:
(1) The power as between the partner and the firm, and
(2) The power as between the firm and third persons.

their own agreement determine the powers which shall be

exercised by each partner, and between themselves this

agreement, unless expanded or waived, will be conclusive.

It will also be conclusive as respects third persons who have

1. PoWERB

AS BETWEEN THE PARTNERS THEMSELVES.

notice of the agreement; but secret limitations upon the

usual powers of a partner can be no more conclusive upon

third persons who have no notice of them than are secret

limitations upon the usual powers of an agent. The result

§ 158. As between themselves, partners may fix powers
by agr.eement.- It has been seen that, between the agent

may be, therefore, as in the case of agency, that a partner

may, by exceeding secret limitations but acting within the

usual powers, bind the firm to third persons, and, at the

110

and the principal, the powers of .t he agent may be fixed by
their agreement, and that, as between these parties, the
agreement so made is usually conclusive, even though, as
between the principal and third persons, the principal may
be held liable for the agent's exercise of more extended
powers. The same rule applies here. The partners may by
their own agreement determine the powers whlch shall be
exercised by each partner, and between themselves this
agreement, unless expanded or waived, will be conclusive.
It will also be conclusive as respects third persons who have
notice of the agreement; but secret limitations upon the
usual powers of a partner can be no more conclusive upon
third persons who have no notice of them than are secret
limitations upon the usual powers of an agent. The result
may be, therefore, as in the case of agency, that a partner
may, by exceeding seoret limitations but acting within the
usual powers, bind the firm to third µer~ons, and, at the
110
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POWERS OF PARTNERS. [ 159-161.

same time, make himself liable to his partners for the loss

they may sustain by reason of his act. 1

159. If no powers agreed upon, usual powers im-

plied. If, however, the partners have not expressly agreed

upon the powers that shall be exercised by each, then they

must be taken as having impliedly agreed that the usual and

ordinary powers of partners in similar cases may be exer-

cised. In this event, the question as between the partners

will be substantially the same as between the firm and third

persons, and the question then arises, What are the usual or

the implied powers of a partner 2 As this question is, there-

fore, to be answered in substantially the same way between

whatever parties it may arise, we will consider it, for both

purposes, under the head of the implied powers of partners

as respects third persons.

IL POWERS AS BETWEEN THE FIRM AND THIRD PERSONS.

160. Of what matters third persons must take no-

tice. It was found in the law of Agency that third per-
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sons would not be justified in proceeding blindly upon the

assumption that an agent really possessed every power which

he might undertake to exercise ; but that they must investi-

gate his authority and act in good faith and with reasonable

prudence. The same principle applies here. Persons deal-

ing with a partner as such are bound to determine the ex-

istence of the partnership and to take heed of all limitations

of which the nature and extent of the business may give

notice, as well as of those restrictions which are actually

brought to their knowledge.

161. Nature and extent of business to be observed.

The nature and scope of the business are therefore to be re-

garded. It may be limited to a single venture or transac-

tion, and in such a case limitations similar to those imposed

See Leavitt v. Peck (1819), 8 Vance v. Blair (1849), 18 Ohio, 632,

Conn. 125, 8 Am. Dec, 157; Stone 51 Am. Dec. 467.

v. Wendover (1876), 2 Ma App. 247;

111

162.J LAW OF PAIiTNERSHIP.

§ 162.]

LAW 011' PARTNERSHIP.

by a special agency must be observed. It may be confined

to a single line of business, and in such a case the implied

authority must be limited by the usages of that business,

unless the partners have, by their words or conduct, given

it a wider scope. It may be a business of a particular kind,

as in the case of a professional partnership, in respect of

which the law recognizes but limited powers. Of all such,

facts third persons must take notice, and must be bound by

the legal conclusions to be drawn from them. 1

162. Same subject Distinction between trading and

non-trading firms. Perhaps the most important distinc-

tion to be observed as to the nature of the partnership busi-

ness is that drawn between trading and non-trading firms.

" The test of the character of the partnership," it is said in

a recent case, " is buying and selling. If it buys and sells,

by a special agency must be observed. It may be confined
to a single line of business, and in such a case the implied
authority must be limited by the usages of that business,
unless the partners have, by their words or conduct, given
it a wider scope. It may be a business of a particular kind,
as in the case of a professional partnership, in respect of
which the law recognizes but limited powers. Of all such.
facts third persons must take notice, and must be bound by
the legal conclusions to be drawn from them.1

it is commercial or trading. If it does not buy or sell, it is

one of employment or occupation." By this is meant, of

course, buying and selling as a business, and not as a mere
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incident to some other business or occupation. The distinc-

tion is an important one ; for, as can readily be seen, and as

will be more fully observed hereafter, much greater powers

may properly be regarded as incident to a commercial or

trading business than to one for the exercise of a profession

1 Where a partnership is limited ners themselves if such persons, at

to a particular trade or business, the time of the dealing, knew the

one partner cannot bind his co- nature of such agreement, or had

partner by any contract not relat- knowledge of such facts and cir-

ing to such trade or business, and cumstances relating thereto as

third persons will be presumed to would lead a man of common pru-

have knowledge of the limited dence to make inquiry about them,

nature of the partnership from cir- Bromley v. Elliott (1859), 88 N. H.

cumstances connected with the 287, 75 Am. Dec. 182. To same ef-

business of the firm. Livingston feet: Baxter v. Rollins (1894), 90

v. Roosevelt (1809), 4 Johns. (N. Y.) Iowa, 217, 57 N. W. Rep. 83a See,

251, 4 Am. Dec. 273, 1 Am. Lead, also, Wilson v. Richards (1881), 28

Cas., p. 507 and note. Persons deal- Minn. 337; Cargill v. Corby (1852),

ing with partners are bound by 15 Mo. 425.

the agreement between the part-
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§ 162. Same subject - Distinction between trading and
non-trading firms.- Perhaps the most important distinction to be observed as to the nature of the partnership business is that drawri between trading and non-trading firms.
" The test of the character of the partnership," it is said in
a recent case, "is buying and selling. If it buys and sells,
it is commercial or trading. If it does not buy or sell, it is
one of employment or occupation." By this is meant, of
course, buying and selling as a business, and not as a mere
incident to some other business or occupation. The distinction is an important one; for, as can readily be seen, and as
will be more fully observed hereafter, much greater powers
may properly be regarded as incident to a. commercial or
trading business than to one for the exercise of a. profession
l Where a partnership is limited
to a particular trade or business,
one partner cannot bind his copartner by any contract not relating to such trade or business, and
third persons will be presumed to
have knowledge of the limited
nature of the partnership from circumstances connected with the
business of the firm Livingston
v. Roosevelt (1809), 4 Johns. (N. Y.)
251, 4 Am. Dec. 273, 1 Am. Lead.
Cas., p. 507 and note. Persons dealing with partners are bound by
the agreement between the part-

ners themselves if such persons, at
the time of the dealing, knew the
nature of such agreement, or had
knowledge of such facts and circumstances relating thereto as
would lead a man of common prudence to make inquiry about them.
Bromley v. Elliott (1859), 88 N. H.
287, 75 Am. Dec. 182. To same effeet: Baxter v. Rollins (1894), 90
Iowa, 217, 57 N. W. Rep. 838. See,
also, Wilson v. Richards (1881), 28
Minn. 337; Cargill v. Corby (1852),
15 Mo. 420.

112
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POWERS OF PABTJTEBS. [ 163.

or occupation merely. Of this distinction and its legal con-

POWERS OF P A.RTNERS.

[§ 163.

sequences third persons are bound to take notice. 1

In dealing with this question in a recent case, 2 the court,

speaking of a farming partnership, said: "The partnership

in this case is not a trading or commercial one, which is gen-

erally governed as to its scope of authority by the rules of

the law-merchant, of which the courts take judicial cogni-

zance. The principle governing a non-trading partnership

is well settled. There are three classes of cases where each

partner connected with such associations may lawfully bind

the firm; the burden, in each case, being on the plaintiff to

prove the facts by which such authority is established, or

from which it may be implied: (1) Where he has express

authority to do so; (2) where the contract matle, or thing

done, is necessary in order to carry on the business of the

partnership; and (3) where it is usually or customarily inci-

dent to other partnerships of like nature."

1 63. Same subject The power of a partner to im-
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pose restrictions by dissent. The limitations upon the

implied powers of one partner may also be increased in cer-

tain cases by his copartner's dissenting to be bound by his

contemplated acts. One partner cannot by secret dissent

impose limitations upon his partner's power to bind the firm

to third persons ; neither can one partner by an open and

communicated dissent, without a dissolution, deprive hie

partner of those powers which the partnership articles con-

fer upon him ; nor can he by such dissent impose upon third

persons additional burdens or responsibilities, as, for example,

to take away a debtor's right to pay to either partner ; but

or occupation merely. Of this distinction and its legal oonsequences third persons are bound to take notice.1
In dealing with this question in a recent case,2 the court,
speaking of a farming partnership, said: "The partnership
in this case is not a trading or commercial one, which is generally governed as to its scope of authority by the rules ,o~
the law-merchant, of which the courts take judicial cognizance. The principle governing a non-trading partnership
is well settled. There are three classes of cases where each
·partner comiected with such associations ma.y lawfully bind
the firm; the burden, in each case, being on the plaintiff to
prove the facts by which such authority is established, or
from which it may be implied: (1) Where he has express
authority to do so; (2) where the contract madt.', or thing
done, is necessary in .o rder to carry on the busin0ss of the
partnership; and (3) where it is usually or customa1:i~)- incident to o~her partnerships of like nature."

as to the future exercise of implied powers, one of two part-

ners may, by giving notice to third persons, prevent his being

1 See Lee v. First National Bank Conn. 33, 55 Am. Rep. 53; Smith v.

(1890), 45 Kan. 8, 25 Pac. Rep. 196, Sloan (1875), 37 Wis. 285, 19 Am.

11 L. R. A. 238; Winship v. Bank Rep. 757.

of United States (1831), 5 Peters * Woodruff T. Scaife (1887), 83

OT. &), 529; Pease v. Cole (1885), 53 Ala. 152.
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§ 1 63. Same subject -The power of a partner to impose restrictions by dissent.-The limitations upon the
implied powers of one partner may also be increased in certain cases by his copartner's dissenting to be bound by his
contemplated acts. One partner cannot by secret dissent
impose limitations upon his partner's power to bind the firm
to third persons; neither can one partner by an open and
communicated dissent, without a dissolution, deprive hk
partner of those powers which the partnership articles confer upon him; nor can he by such dissent impose upon third
persons additional burdens or responsibilities, as, for exampl6i
to take away a debtor's right to pay to either partner; bu1
as to the future exercise of implied powers, one of two part.
ners may, by giving notice to third persons, prevent his being
1 See-Lee v. First National Bank Conn. 32, 55 Am. Rep. 53; Smith v.
(1890), 45 Kan. 8, 25 Pac. Rep. 196, Sloan (1875), 37 Wi& 285, 19 Am.
11 L. R. A. 238; Winship v. Bank Rep. 757.
of United States (1831), 5 Peters
2Woodru1f T. Scaife (1887), 83
(U. 8.), 529; Pease v. Cole (1885), 53 Ala. 152.
8
113

164, 165.] LA.W OF PAKTNEBSHIP.

§§ 164:, 165.]

LAW OF P .ARTNE.RSHIP.

bound by the contemplated act of his partner. 1 "WhetL er the

same rule applies where there are more than two partners

will be hereafter considered. 1

164. Of the partner as the agent of the firm. Ap-

plying these considerations, the general rule may be said to

be that each partner is the agent of the firm with implied

bound by the contemplated act of his partner.1 Whetl er the
same rule applies where there are more than two partners
will be hereafter considered.1

powers to bind the partnership in all matters falling within

the general and usual scope of the business as actually con-

ducted ; and that third persons dealing with one partner as

such agent will be protected if they act in good faith, with

reasonable prudence, and with no notice of any other limita-

tions than those which the nature of the business as ostensibly

carried on may afford.

Greater power may, of course, be conferred by the express

or implied consent of the partners previously given, or by

their subsequent ratification ; but the rule stated refers to the

authority to be implied from the nature of the business and

the method of transacting it

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

165. Partner has no implied power ontside ot scope

of business. The first and most obvious limitation imposed

by this rule is, that one partner has no implied power to

bind the firm in any matter outside of the scope of the busi-

ness as ostensibly carried on. Thus, as a few of many simi-

lar illustrations, it is not within the scope of the business of

a firm of lumber manufacturers to subscribe for stock in a

plank-road company ; nor of a firm of millers, or planters and

farmers, to carry on a grocery store ; nor of an iron furnace

partnership to buy a distillery ; nor of a printing firm to

undertake to sell pianos; nor of a firm of millers and grain

dealers to speculate in futures; nor of a trading partnership

See Leavitt v. Peck (1819), 8 v. Bernheim (1877), 78 N. C. 139;

§ 164. Of the partner as the agent of the firm·.- Applying these considerations, the general rule may be said to
be that each partner is the agent of the firm with implied
powers to bind the partnership in all matters falling within
the general and usual scope of the business as actually conducted; and that third persons dealing with one partner as
such agent will be protected if they act in good fai~h, with
reasonable prudence, and with no notice of any other limitations than those which the nature of the business as ostensibly
carried on may afford.
Greater power may, of course, be conferred by the express
or. implied consent of the partners previously given, or by
their subsequent ratification; but the rule stated refers to the
authority to be implied from the nature of the business and
the method of transacting it.

Conn. 125,8 Am. Dec. 157; Monroe Johnston v. Dutton (1855), 27 Ala.

v. Conner (1838), 15 Me. 178. 32 Am. 245; Wipperman v. Stacy (1891), 80

Dec. 148; Noyes v. New Haven R Wia. 845. 5fl N W. Rep. 330.

R Co. (1861), 80 Conn, 1; Johnson *3eepost, 18k
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§ 165. Partner has no implied power outside ot scope
of business.- The first and most obvious limitation imposed
by this rule is, that one partner has no implied power to
bind the firm in any matter outside of the scope of the business as ostensibly carried on. Thus, as a. few of many similar illustrations, it is not within the scope of the business of
a. firm of lumber -manufacturers to subscribe for stock in a.
plank-road company; nor of a firm of millers, or planters and
farmers, to carry on a. grocery store; nor of an iron furnace
partnership to buy a distillery; nor of a. printing firm to
undertake to sell pianos; nor of a firm of millers and grain
dealers to speculate·in futures; nor of a trading partnership
1 See Leavitt v. Peck (1819), 8
Conn. 125, 8 Am. Dec. 157; Monroe
v. Conner (1838), 15 Me. 178, 82 Am.
De~ 148; Noyes v. New Haven R.
R. Co. (1861), 80 Conn. 1; Johnson

v. Bernheim (1877), 78 N. a 189;
Johnston v. Dutton (1855), 27 Ala.
245; Wipperman v. Stacy (1891), 80
Wis. ~ 5'\ N- W. Rep. 886.
tSee pod,§ IS..

tt•
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POWERS OF PABTNBBS. [ 166, 167.

to collect accounts for others, or buy land for speculation. 1

POWERS OF PARTNERS.

[§§ 166, 167.

Other illustrations will be given under special heads.

166. What meant by scope. What is meant by the

scope of the business is not capable of exact definition, but,

to collect accounts for others, or buy land for speculation.1

in general, it means the limits commonly and usually fixed

to a similar business at that time and place, and reasonably

Other illustrations will be given under special heads. .

necessary to enable that business to be carried on. The

usages of those engaged in the same business at the same

time and place are therefore material to be observed as indi-

cating not only what the partners themselves but third per-

sons must have contemplated as falling properly within its

purpose. The previous practice and conduct of the particular

firm may also be of weight as indicating what the partners

§ 166. What lneant by .scope.-What is meant by the
scop6 of the business is not capable of exact definition, but,
in general, it means the limits commonly and usually fixed
to a similar business at that time and place, and reasonably
necessary to enable that business to be carried on. The
usages of those engaged in the same business at ~he same
.time and place are therefore material to be observed as indicating not only what the partners themselves but third persons must have contemplated as falling properly within its
purpose. The previous practice and conduct of the particular
firm may also be of weight as indicating what the partners
have determined to be authorized. Necessity alone is not
enough, nor is the fact that benefit may have resulted from
the. act; it must fall within the usages of such a business, or
at least within the usages of the particular business.
Scope is usually, perhaps, a question of fact to be determined by evidence of the circumstances,2 but there are many
cases in which the courts may determine, as matter of law,
that a given act is not within the scope of a particular business.•
I

have determined to be authorized. Necessity alone is not

enough, nor is the fact that benefit may have resulted from

the act ; it must fall within the usages of such a business, or

at least within the usages of the particular business.

Scope is usually, perhaps, a question of fact to be deter-
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mined by evidence of the circumstances, 2 but there are many

cases in which the courts may determine, as matter of law,

that a given act is not within the scope of a particular busi-

ness.*

167. Extending original scope by subsequent eon-

duct. The scope originally fixed by the partners for the

conduct of their business may be subsequently enlarged with

their consent. This consent may be given consciously and

expressly, or it may be given, perhaps unconsciously, by ac-

quiescence or implication. As the scope of the business is

iSee Barnard v. Plank-road Co. 59 Miss. 216; Brooks v. Hamilton

(1859), 6 Mich. 274; Banner Tobacco (1821), 10 Mart (La.) 283, 13 Am.

Co. v. Jenison (1882), 48 Mich. 459; Dec. 328.

Irwin v. Williar (1883), 110 U. S. 2 See Loudon Savings Society v

499; Boardman v. Adams (1857), 5 Savings Bank (1860), 36 Pa. St. 498

Iowa, 224, Paige's Partn. Cas. 120; 78 Am. Dec. 390.

Humes v. O'Bryan (1883), 74 Ala. * See Banner Tobacco Co. v. Jeni-

64; Waller v. Keyes (1834), 6 Vt. son (1882), 48 Mich. 459, 12 N. "W.

257; Pickels v. McPherson (1381), Rep. 655.
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§ 167. Extending original scope. by subsequent con·
·duct.-The scope originally fixed by the partners for the
conduct of their business may be subsequently enlarged with
their consent. This cons~nt may be given consciously and
expressly, or it may be given, perhaps unconsciously, by acquiescence ·or implication. As the scope of the business is
'
1 See

Barnard v. Plank-road. Co. 59 Miss. 216; Brooks v. Hamilton
(1821), 10 Mart. (La.) 283, 13 Am.
Dec. 328.
2 See Loudon Savings Society v
Savings Bank (1860), 36 P&. St. 49&
78 Am. Dec. 390.
a See Banner Tobacco Co. v. Jeni·
64; Waller v. Keyes (1834), 6 Vt. son (1882), 48 Mich. 459, 12 N. W .
257; Pickels v. McPherson (188 1), Rep. 655.

(1859), 6 Mich. 274; Banner Tobacco
Co. v. Jenison (1882), 48 Mich. 459; .
Irwin v. Williar (1883), 110 U. S.
499; Boardman v. Adams (1857), 5
Iowa, 224, Paige's Partn. Oas. 120;
Humes y, O'Bryan (1883), 74 Ala.

115
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168, 169.] LAW OF PABTNEBSHIT.

§§ 168, 169.]

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

extended, the range of the implied powers of the partners

extends accordingly. As was said in one case l in which a

firm of printers had gradually added piano selling to their

business, "Where a partnership firm, embarked in a partic-

ular business to which their engagements are confined, and

to which alone their partnership contracts extend, by mut-

ual agreement enlarge the sphere of their operations and in-

clude another branch of business, the power of each partner

to bind the firm by his contracts is co-extensive with the

whole business of the partnership; and the acts of each

member are as binding on the firm in the new branch of

business in which they are engaged as they are in the former

regular and ordinary business."

168. Consideration of particular powers. It is obvi

ously impossible to enumerate all of the powers which ma\

or may not fall within the scope of a particular partnership .

but the question of the existence of several has so frequently

arisen that they may be grouped together as further illus
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trations of the subject. Thus

169. Admissions. The statements, representa

tions and admissions of one partner are not admissible

against another, unless he has in some way assented to them,

extended, the range of the implied powers of the partners
extends accordingly. As was said in one case 1 in which a
firm of printers had gradually added piano selling to their
· business, "Where a partnership firm, embarked in a particular business to which their engagements are confined, and
to which alone their partnership contracts extend, by mutual agreement enlarge the sphere of their operations and include another branch of business, the power of each partner
to bind the firm by his contracts is co-extensive with the.
whole business of the partnership; and the acts of each
member are as binding on the firm in the new branch of
business in which they are engaged as they are in the former
regular and ordinary business."

either to prove the partnership or to prove that a given

transaction was a partnership transaction ; but if the exist

ence of the partnership has been established by other evi-

dence, then the admissions of one partner made during the

continuance of the partnership, while engaged in the tran&

action of the partnership business and in reference to part

nership affairs, are admissible against the firm. One partnei

cannot, however, by his admissions or declarations alone, de

prive his partners of their interests in the firm property. 8

l Boardman T. Adams (1857), 5 Am. Dec. 53; Griswold v. Haveo

Iowa, 224, Paige's Partn. Caa. 120. (1862), 25 N. Y. 595, 82 Am. Dec.

§ 168. Consideration of particular powers.- It is obvi·
ously impossible to enumerate all of the powers which maJ
or may not fall within the scope of a particular partnership :
but the question of the existence of several has so frequently
arisen that they may be grouped together as further illus
trations of the subject. Thus-

1 See Drumright v. Philpot (1854), 380; Williams v. Lewis (1888), IV>

16 Ga. 434, 60 Am. Dec. 738; Bur- Ind. 45, 17 N. E. Rep. 262, 7 Am. St.

gan v. Lyell (1851), 2 Mich. 102, 55 Rep. 403; Strong v. Smith (1892), 6?
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§ 169. - - Admissions.- The statements, representa
tions and admissions of one partner are not admissibk
against another, unless he has in some way assented to them,
either to prove the partnership or to prove that a given·
transaction was a partnership transaction; but if the exist
ence of the partnership has been established by other evi·
dance, then the admissions of one partner made during theoontinuance of the partnership, while engaged in the trans
action of the partnership business and in reference to part
nership affairs, are admissible against the firm. One partne1
cannot, however, by his admissions or declarations alone, ds
prive his partners of their interests in the firm property.'
1 Boardman v. Adams (1857), ts Am. Dec. 58; Griswold v. Haven
Iowa., 224, Paige's Partn. Cas. 120. (1862), 25 N. Y. 595, 82 Am. Dec.

2See Drumright v. Philpot (1854), 880; Williams v. Lewis (1888). 115
16 Ga. 434, 60 Am. Dec. 738; Bur- Ind. 4Q, 17 N. E. Rep. 262, 7 Am. St..
gan v. Lyell (1851), 2 Mich. 102, 55 Rep.'403; Strong v. Smith (1892), 62'
116

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

•

POWEBS OF PAETNBBS. [ 170-172.

"Where it is desired to prove by one partner either the ex-

POWERS OJ' P A.RTNEBS.

[§§ 170-172.

istence of the partnership or who were the partners com-

posing it, he should be called as a witness. While his extra-

judicial admissions are not admissible, his testimony on the

trial is competent. 1

170. Appointing agents. Each partner has im-

plied authority to employ such agents and servants as the

proper transaction of the partnership may require. 2 *^ ^

The firm may act as agent. Where the partners are ap- /!

pointed as individuals, all must ordinarily unite in executing

Where it is desired to prove by one partner either the existence of the partnership or who were the partners composing it, he should be called as a witness. While his extrajndicial admi'issiona are not admissible, his testimony on the
trial is com peten t. 1
·

the authority ; but where the firm is the agent, any partner

has implied power to execute the authority alone. 1

171. Arbitration. One partner has no implied

power to submit controverted partnership matters to arbitra-

tion. This is the prevailing rule whether the agreement to - \

submit is under seal or not, though in a few states an un-

sealed agreement by one partner has been held binding.

The power may, of course, be conferred by the consent of
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the other partners. 4

172. Assignments for creditors. By the weight

of authority it is settled, as a general rule, that one partner

has no implied power to make a general assignment of the . ,

§ 170. - - Appointing agents.- Each partner has implied authority to employ such agents and servants as the
proper transaction of the partnership may require. 2
The firm may act as agent. Where the partners are appointed as individuals, all must ordinarily unite in executing
the authority; but where the firm is the agent, any partner
has implied power to execute the authority alone.1

partnership property for the benefit of partnership credit-

ors, though it will be valid if the other partners previously

consent, either expressly or impliedly, or subsequently ratify

Conn. 39, 25 AtL Rep. 895; First 87 Minn. 101, 83 N. W. Rep. 818, 5

Nat. Bank v. Con way (1886), 67 Am. St. Rep. 827; Frost v. Erath

Wis. 210, 30 N. W. Rep. 215. Cattle Co. (1891), 81 Tex. 505, 17

!See First Nat Bank v. Conway, S. W. Rep. 52, 26 Am. St. Rep. 831.

supra. *See Fancher v. Furnace Co.

2 See Mead v. Shepard (1867), 54 (1886), 80 Ala. 481, 2 So. Rep. 268;

Barb. (N. Y.) 474; Sweeney v. Walker v. Bean (1886), 34 Minn.

Neely (1884), 53 Mich. 421; Harvey 427, 26 N. W. Rep. 232; Gay v.

T. McAdams (1875), 32 Mich. 472; Waltman (1879), 89 Pa. St 453;

§ 171. - -.Arbitration.- One partner has no implied
power to submit controverted partnership matters to arbitration. This is the prevailing rule whether the agreement to
submit i$ under seal or not, though in a few states an unsealed agreeqient by one partner has been held binding.
The .power may, of course, be conferred by the . consent of
the other partners.'

Carley v. Jenkins (1874), 46 Vt 721. Davis v. Berger (1884), 54 Mich.

> See Deakin v. Underwood (1887), 652, 20 N. W. Rep. 62&
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§ 172. .Assignments for creditors.-By the weight
of authority it is settled, as a general rule, that one partner
has no implied power to make a .general assignment of the
partnership property for the benefit of partnership creditors, though it will be valid if the other partners previously
consent, either expressly or impliedly, or subsequently ratify
Conn. 39, 25 Atl Rep. 895; First 87 Minn. 101, 83 N. W. Rep. 818, 5
Nat. Bank v. Conway (1886), 67 Am. St. Rep. 827; Frost v. Erath
Wis. 210. 30 N. W. Rep. 215.
Cattle Co. (1891), 81 Tex. 505, 17
I See First Nat. Bank v. Conway, S. W. Rep. 52, 26 Am. St. Rep. 831.
B1tpra.
•See Fancher v. Furnac& Co.
2See Mead v. Shepard (1867), 54 (1886), 80 Ala. 481, 2 So. Rep. 268;
Barb. (N. Y.) 474; Sweeney v. Walker v. Bean (1886), 34 :Minn.
Neely (1884), 53 Mich. 421; H a rvey 427, 26 N. W. Rep. 232; Gay v.
T. McAdams (1875), 32 Mich. 472; Waltman (1879), 89 Pa. St. 453;
Carley v. Jenkins (18J4), 46 Vt. 721. Davis v. Berger (1884), 54 .Mich.
I See Deakin v. Underwood (1887), 652, 20 N. W. Rep. 629.
117

173, 174.] LAW OF PABTNEBSHIP.

it. To this general rule one exception is made: that if the

§§ 173, 174.]

LAW OJ' P.ABTNERSHIP.

other partners have absconded or are absent so that they

cannot be consulted, or are otherwise incapable of assenting

or dissenting, then one partner may make such an assign-

ment without their consent. 1

173. Attorneys. One partner has implied author-

ity to employ attorneys to appear and represent the firm in

suits to which the firm is a party.*

174. Bills and notes. The implied power of one

partner to bind the firm upon negotiable paper depends

it. To this general rule one exception is made: that if the
other partners have absconded or are absent so that they
cannot be consulted, or are otherwise incapable of assenting
or dissenting, then one partner may make such an assignment without their ·consent.1

largely upon the trading or non-trading character of the

firm.

1. In ike case of a t/radi/ng firm, each partner has implied

authority to bind the firm by making, accepting or indors-

ing, in its name, and in the course of its business, a bill or

§ f73. - - Attorneys.- One partner has implied authority to employ attorneys to appear and represent the firm in
suits to which the firm is a party.2

note for partnership purposes; and negotiable paper exe-

cuted in the firm name by one partner in a trading firm will,

prima facie, be presumed to bind the firm. But if the bill
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or note was not for partnership purposes, but was really in

fraud of the firm as if it were given, without the othei

partners' consent, for the individual debt or purposes of one

partner, it would not bind the firm in the hands of the

original payee or of any other person who had notice of this

fact, or who did not pay value for it. In the hands of a

bonafide holder for value without notice, however, it would

be binding upon the firm, and the latter would have re-

coarse against the partner giving it. The original payee of

paper given for the individual debt of the partner, or any

other holder having notice of that fact, can only recover of

* See Loeb v. Pierpoint (1882), 58 iams v. Frost (1880), 27 Minn. 255 r

Iowa, 469, 43 Am. Rep. 122; Shat- Paige's Partn. Cas. 126; Hill v.

tuck v. Chandler (1889), 40 Kan. Postley (1893), 90 Va. 200, 17 S. E.

516, 10 Am. St. Rep. 227; Sullivan Rep. 946; Mayer v. Bernstein (1891),

T. Smith (1884), 15 Neb. 476, 48 69 Miss. 17.

Am. Rep. 354; Rumery v. McCul- 2 See Wheatley v. Tutt (1867), 4

loch (1882), 54 Wis. 565; Stein v. Kan. 240; Charles v. Eshleman

La Dow (1868), 13 Minn. 412; Will- (1879), 5 CoL 107.

118

§ 174. - - Bills and notes.- The implied power of one
partner to bind the firm upon negotiable paper depends
largely upon the trading or non-trading character of the
firm.
·
1. In the c<Ue of a trading ;form, each partner has implied
authority to bind the firm by making, accepting or indorsing,. in its name, and in the course of its business, a bill or
note for partnership purposes; and negotiable paper executed in the firm name by one partner in a trading firm will,
prima f aaU, be presumed to bind the firin. But if the bill
or note was not for partnership purpos~s, but was really in
fraud of the firm - as if it were given, without the othe1
partners' consent, for the individual debt or purposes of one
partner,- it would not bind the firm in the hands of the
original payee or of any other person who had notice of this
fact~ or who did not pay value for it. ·In the hands of a
bona fide holder for value without notice, however, it would
be binding U:pon the . firm, and the latter would have recourse against the partner giving it. The origin.a l payee of
paper given for the individual debt of the partner, or any
other holder having notice of that fact, can only recover of
I See Loeb v. Pierpoint (1882), 58
Iowa, 469, 43 Ai;n. Rep. 122; Shattuck v. Chandler (1889), 40 Kan.
516, 10 Am. St. Rep. 227; Sullivan
v. Smith - (1884), 15 Neb. 476, 48
Am. Rep. 354; Rumery v. McCulloch (1882), 54 Wis. 565; Stein v.
La Dow (1868), 13 Minn. 412; Will·

iams v. Frost (1880), 27 Minn. 255,
Paige's Partn. Cas. 126; Hill v.
Postley (1893), 90 Va. 200, 17 S. E.
Rep. 946; Mayer v. Bernstein (1891),
69 Miss. 17.
2See Wheatley v. Tutt (1867), 4
Kan. 240; Charles T. Eshleman
(1879), 5 Col 107•
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POWERS OF PABTNEBflL [ 174.

the firm by showing affirmatively that the other partners

POWERS 0¥' P ABTNEK&.

[§ 174.

previously authorized or subsequently ratified its execution. 1

2. In the case of a non-trading firm, however, one partner

has, by the weight of authority, no implied power to bind

the firm by making, accepting or indorsing negotiable paper,

even though it was done in the scope of the partnership busi-

ness and for its benefit. In such partnerships the power to

make negotiable paper can only exist by virtue of the con-

sent of the partners, the necessity of the case, or usage in

that or similar firms. Such paper is therefore unenforceable

not only in the hands of the original payee, but also of a

bonafide holder for value, because the nature of the business

is notice to every one of the limited powers of the partners.

A fortiori could neither the original payee nor a bonafide

holder recover if the paper were given for the individual

debt of a partner. To enable any person to recover, there-

fore, upon negotiable paper given by a partner in a non-

trading firm, the plaintiff must be prepared to show either
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such consent of the other partners, such necessity, or such

usage as will take the case out of the general rule. 1

1 See Redlon v. Churchill (1882), v. Duryee (1879), 17 Fla. Ill, 35 Am.

73 Me. 146, 40 Am. Rep. 345; Me- Rep. 89; Harris v. Baltimore (1890),

chanics' Ins. Co. v. Richardson 73 MdL 22, 25 Am. St. Rep. 565, 8 I*

(1881), 33 La. Ann. 1308, 39 Am. R. A. 677.

Rep. 290; Sherwood v. Snow (1877), This rule has been applied to

46 Iowa, 481, 26 Am. Rep. 155; partnerships carrying on the real

Howze v. Patterson (1875), 53 Ala. estate, loan and insurance business,

205, 25 Am. Rep. 607; Walsh v. Lee v. First National Bank, supra;

Lennon (1881), 98 III 27, 38 Am. Deardorf v. Thacher, 78 Mo. 128,

Rep. 75. 47 Am. Rep. 95; milling, Lanier v.

2 See Pease v. Cole (1885), 53 Conn. McCabe, 2 Fla. 82, 48 Am. Dec. 173 ;

53, 55 Am. Rep. 53; Smith v. Sloan water-works, Broughton v. Man-

(1875), 37 Wis. 285, 19 Am. Rep. 757; Chester Water- works, 3 Barn. &

Pooleyv.Whitmore(1873), lOHeisk. Aid. 1; gas works, Bramah v. Rob-

the firm by showing affirmatively that the other ·p artners
previously authorized or subsequently ratified its execution.1
2. In the case of a 'IUYll-trading form, however, one partner
has, by the weight_of authority, no implied power to bind
the firm by making, accepting or indorsing negotiable paper,
even though it was done in the scope of the partnership business and for its benefit. In such partnerships the power to
make negotiable paper can only exist by virtue of the consent of the partners, the necessity of the case, or usage in
that or similar firms. Such paper is therefore unenforceable
not only in the hands of the original payee, but also of a
bona .fUU holder for value, because the nature of the business
is notice to every one of the limited powers of the partners.
A fortiori could neither the original payee nor a bona fide
holder recover if the paper were given for the individual
debt of a partner. To enable any person to recover, therefore, upon negotiabl~ paper given . by a partner in a nontrading firm, the plaintiff must be prepared to show either
such consent of the other partners, such necessity, or such
usage as will take the case ou~ of the general rule.1

(Tenn.) 629, 27 Am. Rep. 733; Judge erts, 3 Bing. N. Cas. 963; printing

v. Braswell (1875), 13 Bush (Ky.), and publishing, Pooleyv.Whitmore,

67, 26 Am. Rep. 185; Lee v. First supra; Bays v. Conner, 105 Ind.

National Bank (1890), 45 Kan. 8, 11 415; planting, Prince v. Crawford,

L. R. A. 238; Levi v. Latham (1884), 50 Miss. 344; farming, Greenslade

15 Neb. 509, 48 Am. Rep. 361 ; Friend v. Dower, 7 Barn. <fc Cr. 635 ; Walker

119

1 See Redlon v. Churchill (1882), v. Duryee (1879), 17 Fla. 111, 35 Am.
73 Me. 146, 4-0 Am. Rep. 345; Me- Rep. 89; Ha:rris v. Baltimore (1890),
chanics' In& Co. v. Richardson 73 Md. 2~, 25 Am. St. Rep. 565, 8 L.
(1881), 83 La. Ann. 1308, 39 Am. R. A. 677.
Rep. 290; Sherwood v. Snow (1877),
This rule has been applied to
46 Iowa, 481, 26 Am. Rep. 155; partnerships carrying on the real
Howze v. Patterson (1875), 53 Ala. estate, loan and insurance business,
205, 25 Am. Rep. 607; Walsh v~ Lee v. First National Bank, supra;
Lennon (1881), 98 fil 27, 38 Am. Deardorf v. Thacher, 78 Mo. 128,
Rep. 75.
47 Am. Rep. 95; milling, Lanier v.
2 See Pease v. Cole (1885), 53 Conn. McCabe, 2 Fla. 82, 48 Am. Dec. 173;
53, 55 Am. Rep. 53; Smith v. Sloan water-works, Broµghton v. Man(1875), 87 Wis. 285, 19 Am. Rep. 757; chester Water-works, 3 Barn. &
Pooleyv. Whitmore (1873), 10 Heisk. Ald. 1; gas works, Bramah v. Rob.
(Tenn.) 629, 27 .Am. Rep. 733; Judge erts, 3 Bing. N. Cas. 963; printing
v. Braswell (1875), 13 Bush (Ky.), andpublishing,Pooleyv.Whitmore,
67, 26 Am. Rep. 185; Lee v. First supra; Bays ...-. Conner, 105 Ind.
National Bank (1890), 45 Kan. 8, 11 415; planting, Prince v. Crawford,
L. R. A. 238; Levi v. Latham (1884), 50 Miss. 344; farming, Greenslade
15 Neb. 009, 48 Am. Rep. 361; Friend v. Dower, 7 Barn. & Cr. 685; Walker
119

175, 176.]

LAW OF PABTNEBSHIP.

§§ 175, 176.]

LAW OJ' P ARTNERSBIP.

175. Borrowing money. The power to borrow

money rests upon substantially the same considerations as

the power to execute negotiable paper, and is usually exer-

cised with it. In a trading firm the power impliedly exists

for partnership purposes, 1 but not, it is said, in a non-trading

firm. 2 In the latter case it can be justified only by prior

authority, necessity or subsequent ratification. If the bor-

rowing was authorized, the firm is bound though the partner

misappropriates the money.

176.

Buying. The distinction between trading

and non-trading firms is material, but not conclusive as to

the implied power to buy. In the casfl of the trading firm,

whose business it is, in whole or in part, to buy goods for

use or sale, the power of each partner to buy such goods

§ 175. - - Bor rowiug money.-The power to borrow
money rests upon substantially t he same considerations a.s
the power to execute negotiable paper, and is usually exercised with it. In a trading firm the power impliedly exists
for partnership purposes,1 but not, it is srud, in a non-trading
firm. 2 In the latter case it can be justified only by pri01:
authority, necessity or subsequent ratification. If the borrowing was authorized, the firm is bound though the partner
misappropriates the money.

must clearly be implied. It must also be implied in the

case of a non-trading firm if the purchase is within the scope
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of the business as actually cond acted.*

(1881), 98 El. 27, 88 Am. Rep. 75;

Sherwood v. Snow (1877), 46 Iowa,

481,26 Am. Rep. 155: Harris v. Bal-

timore (1890), 73 Md. 22, 25 Am. St

Rep. 565, 8 L, R. A. 677; Gilchrist

v. Brande (1883), 58 Wis. 184; Col-

ler v. Porter (1891), 88 Mich. 549, 50

N. W. Rep. 65a

2 But see Hoskinson v. Eliot (1869),

62 Pa. St 393; Leffler v. Rice (1873),

§ 176. - - Buying.-The distinctiolll between trading
and non-trading firms is material, but not conclusive as to
the implied power to buy. In the caSA of the trading firm,
whose business it is, in whole or in part, to buy goods for
use or sale, the power of each partner to buy such goods
must clearly be implied. It must also be implied in the
case of a non-trading firm if the purchase is within the scope
of the business as actually cov.oucted.1

44 Ind. 103.

'See Bond v. Gibson (1808), 1

Camp. 185, Ames' Gas. on Partn.

537, and note; Lynch v. Thompson

(1883), 61 Miss. 354; Stillman v.

Harvey (1879), 47 Conn. 27; John-

ston v. Trask (1889), 116 N. Y. 136,

22 N. E. Rep. 377, 15 Am. St Rep.

894, 5 L. R. A. 630; Porter v. Curry

(1869), 50 111. 319, 99 Am. Dec. 520;

Davis v. Cook (1879), 14 Nov. 265;

Kenney T. Altvater (1874), 77 Pa.

St 34

v. Walker (1894), 66 Vt 285, 29 AtL

Rep. 146; keeping a tavern, Cockfl

v. Branch Bank, 8 Ala. 175; car*y-

ing on a theater, Pease v. Cole,

supra; operating a threshing ma-

chine, Horn v. City Bank, 32 Kan.

518; keeping livery-stable, Levi v.

Latham, supra; carrying on a laun-

dry, Neale v. Turton, 4 Bing. 149;

digging tunnels, Gray v. Ward, 18

111. 32; practicing law, Friend v.

Duryee, supra; or medicine, Cros-

thwait v. Ross, 1 Humph. (Tenn.)

23, 34 Am. Dec. 613; sawing lum-

ber, Dowling v. National Bank

(1891), 145 U. & 512, 36 L. ed. 795,

12 Sup. Ct Rep. 928; building,

Sniveley v. Matheson (1895), 12

v. Walker (1894), 66 Vt. 285, 29 Atl
Rep. 146; keeping a tavern, Coch
v. Branch Ban~ S Ala. 175; cavying on a theater, Pease v. f'40le,
sup ra; operating a threshiDR; machine, Horn v. City Bank. 82 Kan.
518; keeping livery-stable, Levi v.
Latham, supra; carrying on a laundry, Neale v. Turton, 4 Bing. 149;
djgging tunnels, Gray v. Ward, 18
Ill. 32; practicing law, Friend v.
Duryee, supra; or .medicine, Orosthwait v. Ross, i Humph. (Tenn.)
23, 34 Am. Dec. 613; sawing lumher, Dowling v. National Bank
(1891), 145 U. S. 512, 36 Led. 795,
12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 928; building,
Sniveley v. Matheson (1895), 12
Wash. 88, 40 Pac. Rep. 628.
·
1 See Rothwell v. Humphreys
(1795), 1 Esp. 406, Ames' Cas. on
Partn. 635, and note; Howze v.
Patterson (1875), 63 Ala. 205, 25
Am. Rep. 607; Walsh v. Lennon

(1881), 98 IlL 27, 88 Am. Rep. 75;
Sherwood v. Snow (1877), (6 Iowa,
481, 26 Am. Rep. 155; Harris v. Baltimore (1890), 73 Md. 22, 25 Am. St.
Rep. 065, 8 L. R.. A. 677; Gilchrist
v! Brande (1883), 58 Wis. 184; Coller v. Porter (1891), 88 Mich. 549, 50
N. W. Rep. 658.
2ButseeHoskinson v.Eliot(1869),
62 Pa. St. 393; Leftier v. Rice (1873),
44 Ind. 103.
a See Bond v. Gibson (1808), 1
Camp. 185, Ames' Cas. on Partn.
537, and note; Lynch v. Thompson
(1883), 61 :Miss. 354; Stillman v.
Harvey (1879), 47 Conn. 27; John·
ston v. Trask (1889), 116 N. Y. 186,
22 N. E. Rep. 377, 15 ~m. St. Rep.
894, 5 LR.. A. 630; Porter v. Curry
. (1869), 50 fil 319, 99 Am. Dec. 520;
Davis v. Cook (1879), 14 Nev. 265;
Kenney T. Altvater (1874), '1'1 P a.
St. 84.

Wash. 88, 40 Pac. Rep. 628.

1 See Rothwell v. Humphreys

(1795), 1 Esp. 406, Ames' Cas. on

Partn. 535, and note; Howze v.

Patterson (1875), 53 Ala. 205, 25

Am. Rep. 607; Walsh v. Lennon
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/
POWEES OF PABTNEBS. [ 177-179.

POWE.RS OF P .ABTNJmS.

The purchase may be on credit, and may be of either real

[§§ 177-179.

or personal property within the limits stated.

If the power exists, the firm is none the less bound because

the partner buying subsequently misapplied the goods.

An unauthorized purchase may, of course, be ratified by

the other partners.

177. Collecting and receiving payment. Every

partner in a firm, whether trading or non-trading, has im-

plied authority to receive payment of debts and other obli-

gations due to the firm, and to give receipts or discharges

therefor. 1 He may take a bill or note in payment, 2 though

he cannot ordinarily take goods unless that is customary, 1

The purchase may be on credit~ and may be of either real
or personal property within the limits stated.
If the power exists, the firm is none the less bound because
the partner buying subsequently misapplied the goods.
An unauthorized purchase may, of course, be ratified by
the other partners.

and, of course, he cannot accept his own outstanding note in

payment, or offset the firm debt against one of his own, or

accept goods for himself in payment of the debt due to the

firm. 4

178. Compromising debts. A partner's power to

bind the firm by the compromise of a debt due to it is fre-
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quently laid down in general terms, but it is certainly not

without limitation, and must, at least, be exercised without

fraud or collusion, in good faith and with reasonable pru-

dence.*

179. Confessing judgment. One partner has no

implied power to confess judgment or to give a T arrant of

1 Allen v. Farrington (1855), 2 (EL), 143, 12 Am. Dec. 151 : Warder

Sneed(Tenn.), 526; Major v.Hawkes v. Newdigate (1851), 11 B. Mon.

(1850), 12 IU. 298; Prentice v. Elliott (Ky.) 174, 52 Am. Dec. 566; Farwell

(1883), 72 Ga. 154; Salmon v. Davis v. St Paul Trust Co. (1891), 45 Minn.

(1812), 4 Binn. (Pa.) 375, 5 Am. Dec. 495, 48 N. W. Rep. 326, 22 Am. St

§ 177. ~ Collecting and receiving payment.· Every
partner in a firm, whether trading or non-trading, has implied authority to receive payment of debts and other obliga.tions due to the firm, and to give receipts or discharges
th.erefor.1 He may take a bill or note in payment,2 though
he cannot ordinarily take goods unless that is customary,1
and, of course, he cannot accept his own outstanding note in
payment, or offset the firm debt against one of his own, or
accept goods for himself in payment of the debt due to the
firm.'

410; Moist's Appeal (1873), 74 Pa. Rep. 742.

St 166. *See 1 Lindley on Partnership,

Heartt v. Walsh (1874), 75 HL 136; Pierson v. Hooker (1808), 8

200. Johns. (N. Y.) 68, 3 Am. Dec. 467;

*Lee v. Hamilton (1854), 12 Tex. Noyes v. Railroad Co. (1861), 80

413. Conn. 1; Hawn v. Land Co. (1887X

4 Gregg v. James (1825), Breese 74 CaL 418, 16 Pac. Rep. 196.
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§ 178. --Compromising debts.-A partner's power to
bind the ti.rm by the compromise of a debt due to it is fr&quently laid down in general terms, but it is certainly not
without limitation, and must, at least, be exercised without
fraud or collusion, in good faith and with reasonable pru- ·
dence.1
§ 179. - - Confessing judgment.- One partner has no
implied power to confess judgment or. to give all 11.rrant of
1 Allen

v. Farrington (1855), 2 (Ill), 143, 12 Am. Dec.151: Warder
Sneed(Tenn.),526;Majorv.Hawkes v. Newdigate (1851), 11 B. Mon.
(1850), 12 ill. 298; Prentice v. Elliott (Ky.) 174, 52 Am. Dec. 566; Farwell
(1883), 72 Ga. 154; Salmon v. Davis v. St. Paul Trust Co. (1891), 45 Minn.
<W12), 4 Bjnn. (Pa.) 375, 5 Am. Dec. 495, 48 N. W. Rep. 826, ,22 Am.: St.
410; Moist's Appeal (1878), 74 Pa. Rep. 742.
St. 166.
11 See 1 Lindley on Partnership,
2Heartt v. Walsh (1874), 75 fil 136; Pierson v. Hooker (1808), 3
200.
Johns. (N. Y.) 68, 3 Am. Dec. 467;
aLee v. Hamilton (1854), 12 Tex. Noyes v. Railroad Co. (1S61), SO
413.
. Conn. 1; Hawn v. Land Co. (1887),
'Gregg v. James (1825), Breese 74 Cal. 418, 16 Pac. Rep. 196.
121

180, 181.] LAW OF PAKTNKBSHIP.

§§ 180, 181.]

LAW 01" PARTNERSHIP.

attorney to confess judgment against the firm npon a debt

due by it, though the judgment may be valid against the

partner as an individual. 1

180. Deeds and instruments under seal. It is a

general rule that one partner has no implied authority to

bind the firm by deed, bond, mortgage or other instrument

attorney to confess jndgment against the firin upon a debt
due by it, though the judgment may be valid against the
partne.r as an individual.1

under seal; though the partner executing it may thereby

bind himself in many cases, either upon the instrument itself

or upon an implied warranty of authority. To sustain such

instruments against the firm, when executed by a single

partner, the previous authorization or subsequent ratifica-

tion by the firm must be shown. 7 Contrary to the rule

usually applicable in such cases, this authorization or ratifica-

tion may be effected by parol. 8

J A release of a fitm obligation is an exception to this rule

forbidding the execution of sealed instruments; and in any

case an act unnecessarily done under seal may, if otherwise

valid, be sustained by the rejection of the seal as surplusage. 4
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181. Hiring property. - One partner has implied

power to bind the firm by contracts for the hiring of such

property as the usual prosecution of the firm business re-

quires. Thus, for example, one partner may bind the firm

by a contract for the lease of premises on which to carry on

See Hier v. Kaufman (18), 134 26 Vt. 154, 60 Am. Deo. 303; Rus-

I1L 215, 25 N. E. Rep. 217; North v. sell v. Annable (1871), 109 Mass. 72,

Mudge (1862), 13 Iowa, 496, 81 Am. 12 Am. Rep. 665; Hull v. Young

Dec. 441; Morgan v. Richardson (1889), 80 S. C. 121,3 L. R. A. 521.

(1852), 16 Mo. 409, 57 Am. Dec. 235; Tischler v. Kurtz (1895), 35 Fla.

Soper v. Fry (1877), 37 Mich. 236. 323, 17 So. Rep. 661.

In Pennsylvania, see Boyd v. 4 Edwards v. Dillon (1893), 147 DL

§ 180. - - Deeds and instruments under seal.-It is a
general rule that one partner has no implied authority to
bind the firm by deed, bond, mortgage or other instrument
under seal; though the partner executing it may thereby
· bind himself in many cases, either upon the instrument itself
or upon an implied warranty of authority. To sustain such
instruments against the firm, when executed by a single
partner, the previous authorization or subsequent ratification by the firm must be shown.2 Contrary to the rule
usually applicable in such cases, this au\liorization or ratificar
tion may be effected by parol.1
·
) A release of a finn obligation is an exception to this rule
lorbidding the exe tion of sealed instruments; and in any
case an act unnecessarily done under seal may, if otherwise
valid, be sustained by the rejection of the seal as surplusag~.'
l

Thompson (1893), 153 Pa. St. 78, 25 14, 35 N. E. Rep. 135, 37 Am. St

AtL Rep. 769, 34 Am. St. Rep. 685. Rep. 199; Hocking v. Hamilton

In Virginia, see Alexander v. Alex- (1893), 158 Pa. St 107, 27 AtL Rep.

ander, 85 Va. 353; and in Louisiana, 836; Price v. Alexander (1850), 2

see Wilmot v. The Ouachita Belle, Greene (Iowa), 427, 52 Am. Dec. 526;

82 La. Ann. 607. Skinner v. Dayton (1822), 19 Johna

McDonald v. Eggleston (1853\ (N. Y.) 513, 10 Am. Dec. 286.

123

§ 181. - - Hiring property.-· One partner has implied
power to bind the firm by contracts for t.he hiring of such
property as the usual prosecution of the firm business requires. Thus, for example, one partner may bind the firm
by a contract for the lease of premises on which to carry on
1 See

Hier v. Kaufman (18-), 134
215, 25 N. E. Rep. 217; North v.
Mudge (1862), 13 Iowa, 496, 81 Am.
Dec. 441; Morgan v. Richardson
(1852), 16 Mo. 409, 57 Am. Pee. 235;
Soper v. Fry (1877), 37 Mich. 236.
In Pennsylvania, see Boyd v.
Thompson (1893), 153 Pa. St. 78, 25
AtL Rep. 769, 34 Am. St. Rep. 685.
In Virginia, see Alexander v. Alexantler, 85 Va. 353; and in Louisiana,
see Wilmot v. The Ouachita Belle,
82 La. Ann.-607.
•McDonald v. Eggleston (1853).

m

26 Vt. 15~ 60 Am. Dec. 303; Russell v. Annable. (1871), 109 Mass. 72,
12 Am. Rep. 665; Hull v. Young
(1889), SO S. C. 12~ 3 L. R. A. 521.
I Tischler v. Kurtz (1895), 35 Fla.
823, 17 So. Rep. 661.
•Edwards v. Dillon (1893), 147 DL
1~ 35 N. E. Rep. 135, 37 Am. St.
Rep. 199; Hocking v. Hamilton
(1893), 158 Pa. St. 107, 27 Atl Rep.
836; Price v. Alexander (1850), 2
'Greene (Iowa). 427, 52-Am. Dec. 526;
Skinner v. Dayton (1822), 19 Johns.
(N. Y.) 513, 10 .Am. Dec. 28&
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POWERS OF PAKTNEES. [ 182, 183.

the business of the firm, 1 or for the hiring of horses neces-

POWERS OF P .ARTNERS.

[§§ 182, 183.

sary for the conduct of the partnership affairs. 2

182. Insurance. One partner has implied power

to bind the firm by contracts for the insurance of the part-

nership property. 3 In case of loss, his power extends to the

settlement of the loss with the insurance company. 4 He

the business of the firm,1 or for the hiring of horses neces- ·
sary for the conduct of the p~rtnership affairs. 2

may also bind the firm by consenting to the cancellation or

surrender of a policy. 5

183. Mortgages and pledges. The power of one

partner to pledge or mortgage the personal property of the

firm to secure money borrowed seems to be co-extensive

with the power to bprrow. In respect of mortgages and

pledges to secure partnership indebtedness, the authorities

are not in harmony, but the prevailing rule is that one part-

ner has the implied power to mortgage, certainly part, and

usually all, of the property of the firm kept for sale, to se-

§ 182. - - Insurance.- One partner has implied power
to bind tl;le firm by contracts for the insurance of the partnership property. 3 In case of loss, his power extends to the
· settlement of the loss with the insurance company. 4 He
may also bind the fi.rm by consenting to the cancellation or
surrender of a policy.5

cure the payment of the firm debts. As to that not kept

for sale, the power to mortgage it all would seem to be sub-
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ject to the same limitations as the power to assign for the

beLefit of creditors. 6

But one partner has, of course, no implied power to pledge

or mortgage the partnership property to secure his own pri-

1 Seaman v. Ascherman (1883), 57 375; Donald v. Hewitt (1859), 33

Wis. 547, 15 N. W. Rep. 788; Still- Ala, 534, 73 Am. Dec. 431; Robards

man v. Harvey (1879), 47 Conn. 26; v. Waterman (1893), 96 Mich. 233,

Smith v. Cisson (1867), 1 Colo. 29. 55 N. W. Rep. 662; Hage v. Camp-

2 Sweet v. Wood (1893), 18 R. L bell (1891), 78 Wis. 572, 47 N. W.

386, 28 AtL Rep. 335. Rep. 179, 23 Am. St. Rep. 422; Git-

3 Hooper v. Lusby (1814), 4 Camp, izens' Nat. Bank v. Johnson (1890),

06; Peoria Ins. Co. v. Hall (1864), 79 Iowa, 290, 44 N. W. Rep. 551;

12 Mich. 202. McCarthy v. Seisler (1891), 130 Ind.

4 Brown v. Hartford Ins. Co. 63, 29 N. E. Rep. 407; Phillips v.

(1875), 117 Mass. 479. Furniture Co. (1890), 86 Ga. 699, 13

5 Hillock v. Traders' Ins. Co. S. E. Rep. 19; Horton v. Bloedorn

ass-i), 54 Mich. 531, 20 N. W. Rep. (1893), 37 Neb. 666, 56 N. W. Rep.

571. 321 ; Letts-Fletcher Co. v. McMaster

"See Tapley v. Butterfield (1840), (1891), 83 Iowa, 449, 49 N. W. Rep.

1 Mete. (Mass.) 515, 35 Am. Dec, 1035.
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§ 183. - - Mortgages and pledges.- The. power of one
partner to pledge or mortgage the personal property of the
firm to secure money borrowed seems to be co-extensive
with the power to bprrow. In respect of mortgages and
pledges to secure partnership indebtedness, the authorities
are not in harmony, but the prevailing rule is that one partner has the implied power to mortgage, certainly part, and
usually all, of the property of the firm kept for sale, to secure the payment of the firm debts. As to that not kept
for sale, the power to mortgage it all would seem to be subject to the same limitations as · the power to assign for the ·
beLefit of creditors.6
But one partner has, ~f course, no implied power to pledge
or mortgage the partnership property to secure his owil pril Seaman v. Ascherman (1883), 57
Wis. 547, 15 N. W. Rep. 788; Stillman v. Harvey (1879), 47 Conn. 26;
Smith v. Cisson (1867), 1 Colo. 29.
2 Sweet v. Wood (1893), 18 R. L
386, 28 Atl Rep. 335.
J Hooper v. ~usby (1814), 4Camp.
J6; Peoria Ins. Co. v. Hall (1864),
12 Mich. 202.
4 Brown v. Hartford Ins. Co.
(1875), 117 Mass. 479.
5 Hillock v. Traders' Ins. Co.
f1 884), 54 Mich. 531, 20 N. W. Rep.

375; Donald v. Hewitt (1859), 33
Ala. 534, 73 Am. Dec. 431; Robards
v. Waterman (1893), 96 Mich. 233,
55 N. W. Rep. 662; Hage v. Campbell (1891), 78 Wis. 572, 47 N. W.
Rep. 179, 23 Am. St. Rep. 422; Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Johnson (1890),
79 Iowa, 290, 44 N. W. Rep. 551;
McCarthy v. Seisler (1891), 130 Ind.
63, 29 N. E. Rep. 407; Phillips v.
Furniture Co. (1890), 86 Ga. 699, 13 .
S. E. Rep. 19; Horton v. Bloedorn
(1893), 37 Neb. 666, 56 N. W. Rep.
Gil.
321; Letts-Fletcher Co. v. McMaster
s See Tapley v. Butterfield (1840), (1891), 83 Iowa, 449, 49 N. W. Rep.
1 Mete. (Mass.) 515, 35 Am. · Dec. 1035.
·
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' 184-186.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP. '

·§§ 184-186.J

LA.W OF I) ARTNERSHIP.

1

vate debts, and of this the party taking it presumptively has

knowledge. 1

184. Notice. Notice to or knowledge of one part-

ner in relation to partnership matters is, in general, notice

to or knowledge of the firm.* Although not all of the ques-

vate debts, and of this the party taking it presumptively has
knowledge.1

tions have arisen in partnership cases, the rules applicable

in agency would doubtless apply, *. e., thatj__the_ju>ticejor

knowledge must; have been acquiredjn. relation to the part-

nership business and either during the partnership or so

soon before its creation that the partner receiving the notice

then remembered or must be presumed to have remembered

it.* The exceptions < /to_the general rule would also doubt-

less apply here if the jrartaer were really acting adversely

or were colluding with $lia-party claiming the benefit of the

notice, to defraud the firno.*

185. Payments. Each partner has implied power

to pay the firm debts out of the firm funds; and he may sell

or transfer the firm property in payment of firm debts under
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the same conditions that he might pledge or mortgage it for

the purpose of securing their payment. 6 He has no implied

authority, of course, to pay his private debt with partnership

funds, and cannot transfer partnership property in satisfac-

tion of such a debt.'

186. Sales. Each partner has implied authority

to sell, assign or dispose of, in the regular course of business,

1 See Oliphant v. Markham (1891), (1813), 1 Maule & SeL 255; Ex parte

§ 184-. Notice.- N ot1ce to or knowledge of one partner in relation to partnership matters is, in general, notice
to or knowledge of the firm.~ Although not all of the questions have arisen in partnership cases, the rules applicable
in agency would doubtless apply, i.e., tha~ the ll£)tic~or
;
knowledge mus\ have bften acquired ·
lation to the partnership business a~either during the partnership or so
soon before its creation that the partner receiving the notice
then remembered or must be presumed to have remembered
it.1 The exceptions~ the general rule would also doubtless apply here if the varfuer were really acting adversely
or were colluding with;-oo~arty claiming the benefit of the
) notice, to defraud the firll)...!

79 Tex. 543, 15 a W. Rep. 569, 23 Heatdn, Buck, 386.

Am. St. Rep. 36a 'See Ullman v. Myrick (1890), 33

2 See Tucker v. Cole (1882), 54 Ala. 532, 8 So. Rep. 410; Johnson v.

Wis. 539; Holton v. McPike (1881), Robinson (1887), 68 Tex. 399, 4 S. W.

27 Kan. 286; Herbert v.Odlin (1860), Rep. 625; Hanchett v. Gardner

40 N. H. 267; Howland v. Davis (1891), 138 III 571, 28 N. E. Rep. 788.

(1879), 40 Mich. 546. 8 See Cannon v. LinJsey (1887),

SeeMechem on Agency, 718- 85 Ala. 198, 3 So. Rep. 676, 7 Am.

723. St. Rep. 88; Janney v. Springer

See Bignold T. Waterhouse (1889), 78 Iowa, 617, 43 N. W. Rep.

461, 16 Am. St. Rep. 460.

124

§ 185. - - Payments.- Each partner has implied power
to pay the firm debts out of the firm funds; and he may sell
or transfer the firm property in payment of firm debts under
the same conditions that he might pledge or mortgage it for
the purpose of securing their payment.6 He has no implied
authority, of course, to pay his private debt with partnership
funds, and cannot transfer partnership property in satisfaction of such a debt.•

§ 186. - - Sales.- Each partner has implied authority
to sell, assign or dispose of, in the regular course of business,
I See Oliphant v. Markham (1891),
79 Tex. 543, 15 S. W. Rep. 669, 23
Am. St. Rep. 363. .
2 See Tucker v. Cole (1882). 54
Wis. 539; Holton v. McPike (1881),
27 Kan. 286; Herbert v. Odlin (1860),
40 N. H. 267; Howland v. Davis
(1879), 40 Mich. 546.
aSee Mechem on Agency, ~ 718723.
'See Bignold T. Waterhouse

(1813), 1 Maule & Sel 255; Ex parte
Heatdn, Buck, 386.
• See Ullman v. Myrick (1890), ;a
Ala. 532, 8 So. Rep. 410; Johnson v.
Robinson (1887), 68 Tex. .S99, 4 S. W.
Rep. 625; Hanchett v. Gardner
(1891), 138 IIL 671, 28 N. E. Rep. 788.
6 See Cannon v. Lindsey (1887),
85 Ala. 198, 3 So. Rep. 676, 7 Am.
St. Rep. 38; Janney v. Springer
(1889), 78 Iowa, 617, 43 N. W. Rep.
461, 16 Am. St. Rep. 460.
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POWERS OF PARTNERS [ 187.

so much of the partnership property as is designed for sale,

POWERS OF PARTNERS

•

even though it be the whole property of the firm, and may

pass the entire title to it. He may also sell or transfer, in

the course of the business, choses in action and other intan-

gible property of the firm, such as its accounts and bill?

receivable, patent-rights, and the like. And upon the sale

he may give such warranties of title or quality, or may make

such incidental contracts in relation thereto, as are usually

made in like cases. 1

The implied power^ofjcmg. partner to sell the entire prop-

erty of the firm is, by the weight of authority, limited to

that kept for sale, and does not include the power to sell that

kept for tne purposes of carrying on the business. 2

187. Suits at law. "A partner jnay sue in the |

name of himself and copartners without their consent," says ,

Mr. Justice Lindley, 8 " but if he sues against their consent I

he must indemnify them against the costs. So one partner I

may defend an action brought against the firm, indemnify- 1
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ing the firm against the consequences of so doing if he acts \

against the will of the other partners." If the firm is sued,

one partner may employ an attorney who may enter the

appearance of the firm as such, though probably not of the

other partners as individuals. 4

so much of the partnership property as is designed for sale,.
even though it be the whole property of the fi rm, and may
pass the entire title to it. He may also sell or transfer, ill>
the course of the business, choses in action and other intangible property of the firm, such as its accounts and bills
receivable, patent-rights, and the like. And upon the sale
he may give such warranties of title or quality, or may make
such incidental contracts in relation thereto, as are usually
made in like cases.1
The implied power of one partner to sell the entire property, of the firm is, by the wejght of authority, li:raited tothat kept for sale, and does not include the power to sell that
kept for tne. purposes of carrying on t he business. 2

b'or trespasses and other similar acts committed by one

partner in attempting to enforce partnership demands by

§ 187. - - Suit s at law.- "A partner..!!!.ay sue in the-

legal process, the firm will ordinarily be liable. 5 Even for

1 See Ellis v. Allen (1886), 80 Ala. ell's 2d Am. ed.), 271. See, also,

515, 2 So. Rep. 676; Crites v. Wilkin- Kuhn v. Weil (1880), 73 Mo. 213;

son (1884), 65 Cal. 559, 4 Pac. Rep. Ward v. Barber, 1 E. D. Smith (N.

567; First Nat. Bank v. Freeman Y.), 423.

(1882), 47 Mich. 408; Schneider v. 4 See Phelps v. Brewer (1852), 9

Sansom (1884), 62 Tex. 201. Cush. (Mass.) 390, 57 Am. Dec. 56;

2 See Lowman v. Sheets (1890), Haslet v. Street (1823), 2 McCord

124 Ind. 417, 24 N. E. Rep. 351, 7 L. (S. C.), 310, 13 Am. Dec. 724, and

R A. 784; Wilcox v. Jackson (1884), note; Hall v. Lanning (1875), 91

7 Colo. 521, 4 Pac. Rep. 966; Cay ton U. S. 160, 23 L. ed. 271; Bennett v.

v. Hardy (1858), 27 Mo. 536. Stickney (1845), 17 Vt 531.

8 1 Lindley on Partnership (Ew- 5 See Harvey v. Adams (1875), 32:
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name of himself and copartners without their consent," saysMr. Justice Lindley,3 "but if he sues ~inst their consent .
he must indemnify them against the costs. So one partnerinay defend an action brought agamst the firm, i~mnify
ing the firm against the consequences of so doing if he acts
against the will of the other partners." If the firm is sued,._
one partner may employ an attorney who may enter the
appearance of the firm as such, though probably not of theother partners as individuals.'
-~' or trespasses and other similar acts committed by onepartner in attempting to enforce partnership demands by
legal process, the firm will ordinarily be liable. 5 Even for

-

1 See Ellis v. Allen (1886), 80 Ala. ell's 2d Am. ed.), 271. See, also,
515, 2 So. Rep. 676; Crites v. Wilkin- Kuhn v. W eil (1880), 73 Mo. 213;
son (1884), 65 Cal. 559, 4 Pac. Rep. Ward v. Barber, 1 E. D. Smith (N._
567; First Nat. Bank v. Freeman Y.), 423.
(1882), 47 Mich. 408; Schneider v.
4 See Phelps v. Brewer (1852), 9
Sansom (1884), 62 Tex. 201.
Cush. (Mass.) 390, 57 Am. Dec. 56;
2 See Lowman v. Sheets (1890), H aslet v. St reet (1823), 2 McCord
124 Ind. 417, 24 N. E. Rep. 351, 7 L. (S. C.), 310, 13 Am. Dec. 724, and
R. A. 784; Wilcox v. Jackson (1884), note; H all v. La nning (1875), 91
7 Colo. 521, 4 Pac. Rep. 966; Cayton U. S. 160, 23 L. ed. 271; Bennett v.
v. Hardy (1858), 27 Mo. 536.
Stickney (1845), 17 Vt. 531.
11 Lindley on Partnership (Ew5 See Harvey v. Adams (1875), 32:,
125
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188, 189.] LA.W OF PAETNEBSHIP.

§§ 188, 189.]

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

the malicious acts of one partner, the others may be liable

if they co-operate in them or subsequently ratify them;

though one partner is not liable for a malicious prosecution

carried on by his partner if he did not know of it or con-

sent to it, and no benefit resulted to the firm. 1

188. Suretyship and guaranty. One partner

ay bind the firm upon a contract of suretyship or guar-

anty for the partnership purposes and within the scope of

ts business; 2 but he has no implied authority to bind the

the malicious acts of one partner, the others may be liable
if they co-operate in them or subsequently ratify them;
though one partner is not liable for a malicious prosecution
carried qn by his partner if he did not know of it or consent to it, and no benefit resulted to the firm. 1

firm by contracts of guaranty or suretyship either for him-

self individually or for strangers to the firm. 3

Where the indorsement of the firm name appears as such

upon what is clearly the individual note of the partner, it

is evidence of itself that the firm name is used for his ac-

commodation, and the firm cannot be held unless it author-

ized it; but where the instrument does not disclose that it is

the individual obligation of one partner, as where the note

of the partner is made to the firm and indorsed in its name
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by that partner for his own benefit, a bonafide holder igno-

rant of the fraud can recover. 4

189. Of the powers of a majority. The extent to

which a majority of the partners may control the partner-

ship affairs is not definitely settled by the authorities. It

is clear, however, that a majority cannot, against the dissent

of the minority, change the essential nature or extent of the

partnership business as originally agreed upon, as to alter

Mich. 472; Rolfe v. Dudley (1885), St. Rep. 636; Andrews v. Planters'

68 Mich. 208, 24 N. W. Rep. 657; Bank (1846), 7 Smedes & Mar. (Miss.)

Kuhn v. Weil, supra. 192, 45 Am. Dec. 300; New York,

1 Rosecrans v. Barker (1885), 115 etc. Ins. Co. v. Bennett (1825), 5

HI. 331, 56 Am. Rep. 169. Conn. 574, 13 Am. Dec. 109, and

2 See First National Bank v. Car- note.

penter (1875), 41 Iowa, 518; Jordan <See Redlon v. Churchill (1882),

v. Miller (1881), 75 Va. 442; Wilkins 73 Ma 146, 40 Am. Rep. 345; Sher-

§ 188. - - Suretyship and guaranty.- One partner
ay bind the firm upon a contract of suretyship or guaranty for the partnership purposes and within the scope of
~-- ·ts business; 2 but he has no implied authority to bind the
firm by contracts of guaranty or suretyship either for himself individually or for strangers to the :firm.3
Whe;e the indorsement of the firm name appears as such
upon what is clearly the individual note of the partner, it
is evidence of itself that the firm name is used for his accommodation, and the firm cannot be held unless it authorized it; but where the instrument does not disclose that it is
the ir~di vidual obligation of one partner, as where the note
of the partner is made to the firm and indorsed in its name
by that partner.for his own benefit, a bona fide holder ignorant of the fraud can recover.'

v. Pearce (1848), 5 Denio (N. Y.), 54L wood v. Snow (1877), 46 Iowa, 481,

'See Clarke v. Wallace (1891), 1 26 Am. Rep. 155; Atlas Nat Bank

N. D. 404, 48 N. W. Rep. 839, 26 Am. v. Savery (1879), 127 Masa 75.
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§ 189. Of the powers of a majority. -The extent to
which a majority of the partners may control the partnership affairs is not definitely settled by the authorities. It
is clear, however, that a majority cannot, against the dissent
of the minority, change the essential nature or extent of the
partnership business as originally agreed upon, as to alter
Mich. 472; Rolfe v. Dudley (1885),
58 Mich. 208, 24 N. W. Rep. 657;
Kuhn v. Weil, mpra.
1 Rosecrans v. Barker (1885), 115
IlL 331, 56 Am. Rep. 169.
2 See First National Bank v. Car·
penter (1875), 41 Iowa, 518; Jordan
v. Miller (1881), 75 Va.. 442; Wilkins
v. Pearce (1848), 5 Denio (N. Y.), 541.
'See Clarke v. Wallace (1891), ·1
N. D. 404., 48 N. W. Rep. 339, 26 Am.

St. Rep. 636; Andrews v. Planters'
Bank (1846), 7 Smedes & Mar. (Miss.)
192, 45 Am. Dec. 300; New York,
etc. Ins. Co. v. Bennett (1825), 5
Conn. 574, 13 Am. Dec. 109, and
note.
'See Redlon v. Churchill (1882),
73 Me. 146, 40 Am. Rep. 345; Sher·
wood v. Snow (1877), 46 Iowa, 481,
26 Am. Rep. 155; Atlas Nat. Bank
v. Savery (1879), 127 Mass. 75.
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POWERS OF PABTNEB8. [ 190.

POWERS OF P A.RTNEBS.

or amend the articles, reduce or increase the capital, embark

. [§ 190.

upon a new business, change its location, alter the share of

a partner, admit a new member, and the like. If they do,

the dissenting partners may withdraw from the firm. 1

But as to matters pertaining merely to the manner of con-

ducting the business, and all questions concerning the in-

ternal affairs of the partnership, it is equally clear that, if

the articles do not determine them, the partners themselves

must decide, and here the majority will prevail. While one

of two partners cannot, therefore, prevail against the ex-

pressed dissent of his partner, inasmuch as each has an equal

voice, it is held that a majority, where there are more than

two, can prevail as to these incidental matters, even against

the dissent of the minority. 1

190. Ratification of unauthorized acts. The acts of

one partner which may bind the firm may be not only those

which have been previously and expressly authorized, or

which are implied from the mere existence of the relation,
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but may also be those which, though unauthorized when

done, have subsequently been ratified by the other partners.

Liability may thus be imposed either in contract or in tort.

The occasions and conditions of ratification in these cases

are the same as in any other case of agency the firm or

the other partners being principal, and the partner acting

or amend the articles, reduce or increase the capital, embark
upon a new business, change its location, alter the share of
a partner, admit a new member, and the like. If they do,
the dissenting partners may withdraw from the :firm.1
But as to matters pertaining merely to the manner of conducting the business, and all questions concerning the internal affairs of the partnership, it is equally clear that, if
the articles do not determine them, the partners themselves
must decide, and here the majority will prevail. While one
of two partners cannot, therefore, prevail against the expresse'd dissent of his partner, inasmuch as each has an equal·
voice, it is held that a majority, where there are more than
two, can prevail as to these incidental matters, even against
the dissent of the minority.'

being agent, and as the reader is assumed to be familiar

with this subject from his previous study of agency, no dis-

cussion of it will be attempted here.*

i See Const v. Harris (1824), Turn. 27 Ala, 245; Staples v, Spra-rue

&R.517; Abbott v. Johnson (1855), (1883), 75 Me. 458; Clarke v. Kail-

83 N. H. 9; Zabriskie v. Railroad road Co. (1890), 136 Pa. St. 408, 20

Co. (1867), 18 N. J. Eq. 178, 90 Am. AtL Rep. 562; ante, 163.

Dec. 617. See Mechem on Agency, 10U-

>See Johnston v. Button (1855), 183.
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§ 190. Ratification of unanthorizec? acts. -The acts of
one partner which may bind the firm may be not only those.
which have · been previously and expressly authorized, or
whicli are implied from the mere existence of the relation,
hq.t may also be those which, though unauthorized when
done, have subsequently been ratified by the other partners.
Liability may thus be imposed either in contract or in tort.
The occasions and conditions of ratification in these cases
are the same as in any other case of agency- the firm or
the other partners being principal, and the partner acting
being agent,- and as the reader is assumed to be familiar
with this subject from his previous study of agency, no discussion of it will be attempted here.1
1 See

Const v. Harris (1824), Turn. 27 Ala. 245; Staples v. S p rag 111:.
(1883), 75 Me. 458; Clarke v. Rail82 N. H. 9; Zabriskie v. Railroad road Co. (1890), 136 Pa. St. 408, 20
Co. (1867), 18 N.-J. Eq. 178, 90 Am. AtL Rep. 562; ante,§ 163.
Dec. 617.
1 See Mechem on Agency,§§ 100'See Johnston T. Dutton (1855), 182.
& R. 517; Abbott v. Johnson (1855),
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CHAPTER X.

WHO ABE BOUND BY THE ACTS OF A PARTNER

191. In general

I. I CONTRACT.

192. All partners bound by au-

thorized contracts.

193. Dormant, secret and nom-

/
inal partners bound.

194, 195. Liability of firm upon

CHAPTERX.

contracts made by one

partner in his own name.

196. Note given by one part-

WHO ARE BOUND BY THE ACTS OF A PARTNER.

ner.

197. Unknown partnerships.

198. Contracts under seal.

199. Judgment against one

partner.-

200. Contracts made in individ-

ual names of all the part-
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ners.

201. Contracts where firm does

business in name of one

partner.

202. Contracts where there are

two firms of same name

with common partner.

203. Liability of partner who ex-

ceeds his authority.

tt IN TOBT.

204 Firm liable for torts of one

partner in scope of busi-

ness.

205. When liable for his mali-

cious or penal act.

206. When liable for partner's

breach of trust*

191. In general. The question, who are bound by the

acts of a partner, presents several different aspects. It is

§ 201. Contracts where firm does
business in name ol one
L IN CoNTRAC'l".
partner.
192. All partners bound by au202. Contracts where there are
thorized contracts.
two firms of same name
193. Dormant, secret . and nomwith common partner.
inal partners bound.
203. Liability of partner who ex194, 195. Liability of firm upon
ceeds his authority.
contracts made by one
U IN ToBT.
partner in his own name.
20!. Firm liable for tortB of one
196. Note given by one partpartner in scope of businer.
ness.
197. -Unknown partnerships.
205. When liable for his mali198. Contracts under seal
cious or penal act.
199. Judgment against one
206. When liable for partner's
partner..
breach of trust.
200. Contracts made in individual names of all the partners.

§ 191. In generaL

the question of the rights and remedies of third persons

based upon the act of one or more partners. It may arise

under varying circumstances, as, for example, where one

partner has assumed to bind the firm, but it is claimed that

his act was unauthorized; where he apparently acts for him-

self alone, but it is claimed that the firm was the real party;

where certain persons were ostensibly the only partners, but

it is claimed that others were also actually in the firm ; where

the act was the making of a contract ; where it was the com-

mission of a tort, and the like. The most appropriate classi-

128

§ 191. In general.-The question, who are bound by the
acts of a partner, presents several different aspects. It is
the question of the rights and remedies of third persons
based upon the act of one or more partners. It may arise
under varying circumstances, as, for example, where one
partner has assumed to bind the firm, but it is claimed that
his act was unauthorized; where he apparently acts for himself alone, but it is claimed that the firm was the real party;
where certain persons were ostensibly the only partners, but
it is claimed that others were also actually in the firm; where
the act was the making of a contract; where it was the commission of a tort, and the like. The most appropriate olassi128
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WHO BOUND BT ACTS OF PABTNEB. [ 192, 193.

WHO BOUND BY AOTB 011' PARTNER.

fication of the subject for our purpose is probably that used

(§§ 192, 193.

in Agency, namely, the liability 1. In contract. 2. In

tort

I. IN CONTRACT.

192. All partners bound by authorized contracts.

It has been seen in an earlier chapter that each partner is

the agent of the firm with powers conferred, either expressly

fication of the subject for our purpose is probably that used
in Agency, namely, the liability-1. In contract. 2. In

tort.

or impliedly, to bind the firm as its agent. It follows, there-

I. IN

fore, that whenever a partner makes a contract for the firm,

CoNTRAcrr.

and in its name, within the limit of his express or implied

authority as a partner, he binds the firm and all members of

it. It is immaterial, in this connection, whether the other

partners knew of the act or not; or, in the case of implied

powers, whether they had previously consented to it or not;

or whether it was, or was not, a violation of their agree-

ment between themselves. The only question, so far as the

liability of the firm to the third person is concerned, is

whether the contract was, in contemplation of law, within
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the power, of the partner; if it was, then every partner is

bound by it. 1

193. Dormant, secret and nominal partners bound

also, This liability involves every one who was, at the time

of the contract, either actually or nominally a partner in

the firm. The nominal partner is, of course, liable, having

been held out as a partner; and if one were then actually a

partner he is likewise liable though the other party did not

then know of it, or though such partner has since retired from

the firm. A secret or dormant partner is therefore liable,

when discovered, upon firm contracts, to the same extent as

though he had been an ostensible partner. The fact that

the other party dealt with the ostensible partner or partners,

and gave credit to them in ignorance of the existence of

the secret or dormant partner, is not an election to hold the

1 See Sweet v. Wood (1893), 18 Ins. Co. v Malone (1895), 45 Neb. 802,

R L 386, 28 AtL Rep. 335; Farmers' 63 N. W. Rep. 80S.

9 129

§ 192. All partners bound by authorized contracts.It has been seen in an earlier chapter that each partner is
the agent of the firm with powers conferred, either expressly
or impliedly, to bind the firm as its agent. It follows, therefore, that whenever a partner makes a contract for the firm,
and in its name, within the limit of his express or implied
authority as a partner, he binds the firm and all members of
it. It is immaterial, in this connection, whether the other
partners knew of the act or not; or, in the case of :implied
powers, whether they had previously consented.to it or not;
or whether it was, or was not, a violation of their agreement between themselves. The only question, so far as the
liability of the firm to the third person is concerned, is
whether the contract was, in contemplation of law, within
the power. of the partner; if it was, then every partner is
bound by it.1
§ 193. Dorma:nt, secret and nominal partners bound
also.-This liability involves every one who was, at the time
of the contract, either actually or nominally a partner in
the firm. The nominal partner is, of course, liable, having
been held out as a partner; and if one were then actually a
partner he is likewise liable though the other party did not
then know of it, or though such partner has since retired from
the firm. A secret or dormant partner is therefore liable,
when discovered, upon firm contracts, to the same extent as
though he had been an ostensible partner. The fact that
the other party dealt with the ostensible partner or partners,
and gave credit to them in ignorance of the existence of
the secret or dormant partner, is not an election to hold the
1 See

Sweet v. Wood (1893), 18 Ins.Co.v: Malone(l895),45Neb.802,

R. L 386, 28 Atl Rep. 335; _Farmers' 63 N. W. Rep. 802.

9

129

194.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

§ 194.]

LAW OF P ARTNERSITTP.

ostensible partners only, when the dormant or secret part

ners are afterwards discovered. And the dormant or secret

partners are bound not only by those acts which were actu-

ally authorized, but also, like other partners, by those acts

which were apparently authorized, or were within the scope

of the business as actually carried on. 1

Dormant and secret partners will also be bound by the

acts of the ostensible partners, even in those cases where :he

consent of all partners is necessary, if the other party was

ignorant of their existence and asted in good faith.'

194. Liability of the firm upon contracts made by

one partner in his own name. As has been seen, when a

firm name has been adopted, it ought always to be used in

partnership transactions; but, through inadvertence or error,

contracts may be made in the individual name of one part-

ner which were designed by one or both parties to be the con-

tracts of the firm. The question, therefore, arises, when may.

ostensible partners only, .when the dormant or -secret partr
ners are afterwards discovered. And the dormant or secret
partners are bound not only b.Y those acts which were actually authorized, but also, like other partners, by those acts
which were apparently authorized, or were within the scope
of the business as actually carried on.1
Dormant and secret partners will a~so be bound by the
· acts of the ostensible partners, even in those cases where ~he
consent of all ·partners is necessary, if the other party was
ignorant of their existence and a~ted in good faith. 2

a contract in the name of one partner be shown to be the
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contract of the firm? The solution of this question is af-r

fected both by the nature of the transaction and by the

intention of the parties. Thus :

1. The contract may be, (a) a simple contract not negoti-

able, () a negotiable instrument, or (c) a contract under

seal.

2. The existence of the partnership may, at the time of

making the contract, have been (a) known, or (b) unknown

by the other party.

3. The parties, or one of them, may have intended to

i See Winship v. United States Benfer (1892), 50 Kan. 108, 31 Pac.

Bank (1831), 5 Peters (U. S.), 529; Rep. 695, 34 Am. St. Rep, 110;

Brooke v. Washington (1852), 8 Bromley v. Elliott (1859), 88 N. H.

Gratt. (Va.) 248, 56 Am. Dec. 142, 287, 75 Am. Dec. 182.

and note; Richardson v. Farmer 2 See Locke v. Lewis (1878), 124

(1865), 36 Ma 35, 88 Am. Dec. 129; Mass. 1, 26 Am. Rep. 631; Reid v.

Gavin v. Walker (1885), 14 Lea Hollinshead (1825), 4 B. & Cress.

(Tenn.), 643; Callender v. Robin- 867, Ames' Cas. on Partn. 29.

son (1880), 96 Pa. St 454; Pitkin v.
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§ 194:. Liab~lity of the firm upon contracts ·made by
one partner in his own name.-As has been seen, when a
firm name has been adopted, it ought always to be used in
partne~ship transactions; but, through inadvertence or error,
contracts may be made· in the individual name of one part-·
ner which were designed by one .or both parties to be the contracts of the firm. The question, therefore, arises, when may.
a contract in.the name of one partner be sh<;>wn to be the
contract of the firm~ The solution of this question is af..
fected both by the nature of the transaction and by the
intention of the parties. Thus:
1. The contract may be, (a) a simple contract not negotiable, (h) a negotiable instrument, or (c) a contract under
seal.
2. The existence of the partnership may, at the time of
making the contract, have been (a) known, or (h) unknown
by the other party.
3. The parties, or one of them, may have intended to
1 See

Winship v. United States
Bank (1831), 5 Peters (U. S.), 529;
Brooke ·v. Washington (11:!52), 8
Gratt. (Va..) 248, 66 Am. Dec. 142,
and note; Richardson v. Farmer
(1865), 36 Mo. 35, 88 Am. Dec. 129;
Gavin v. Walker (1885), 14 Lea
(Tenn.), 643; Callender v. Robinson (1880), 96 Pa.. St. 404; Pitkin v.

Benfer (1892), tsff Kan. 108, 31 Pac.
Rep. 695, 84 Am. St. Rep. 110;
Bromley v. Elliott (1859), 88 N. H.
287, 75 Am. Dec. 182.
I See Locke v. Lewis (1878), 124
Maa& 1, 26 Am. Rep. 631; Reid v.
Hollinshead (1825), 4 B. & Cress.
867, Ames' Oas. on Partn. 29.
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WHO BOUND BY ACTS OF PAKTNEB. [ 195.

WHO BOUND BY .A.OTB OF P ARTNEB.

bind (a) the individual partner, or (5) the firm. The two

[§ 195.

latter groups are subsidiary, and may be considered under

birid (a) the individual part~er, or (b) the firm. The two
latter groups are subsidiary, aµd may be considered under
the first.

the first.

195. Same subject Known partnership Simple

contracts in name of one partner. Where a person acts

as partner for a known firm, the presumption is that he in-

tended to bind the firm and not himself, and where such

was the intention the firm and not the partner is bound.

This presumption, however, may be rebutted, and if it ap-

pears that the other party has knowingly dealt with the

partner as an individual, and that the latter has pledged his

individual credit, the partner alone will be bound and not

the firm. And if the transaction were really an individual

one, the firm does not become liable because it afterwards

received the benefit of the transaction. Thus, if money

were loaned or goods sold to one partner as an individual,

the firm does not become liable to the lender or the seller

simply because the money or the goods came to the use of
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the firm. The liability of the firm is to the partner upon

whose credit the money or goods were obtained, and that

partner must answer to those from whom they were ob-

tained. Whether the credit was extended to the firm as

such, or to the partner individually, is a question to be de-

termined in view of all of the facts and circumstances of the

case. 1

Where, however, the goods or money are applied to the

benefit of the firm, the firm may adopt the transaction, and

1 See Tyler v. "Waddingham (1890), firm is not liable upon a note given

58 Conn. 375, 8 L. R. A. 657; Peter- by one partner for his share of the

son v. Roach (1877), 32 Ohio St. 374, capital. First National Bank v.

30 Am. Rep. 607; Adams v. Hard- Cringan, supra. So where one part-

ware Co. (1887), 78 Ga. 485; Thorn- ner borrows money on his own note

ton v. Lambeth (1889), 103 N. C. 86; to reimburse another partner for

First National Bank v. Cringan money advanced to the firm, the

(1895), Va. , 21 S. E. Rep. 820; firm is not liable. Redenbaugh v.

Brown v. Fresno Raisin Co. (1894), Kelton (1895), Ma , 82 S. W.

101 CaL 222, 35 Pac. Rep. 639. The Rep. 67.
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§ 195. Same subject - Known partnership - Simple
contracts in name of one partner.- Where a person acts
as partner for a known firm, the presumption is that he intended to bind the firm and not himself, and where such
was the intention the firm and not the partner is bound.
This presumption, however, may be rebutted, and if it appears that the other party has knowingly dealt with the
partner as an individual, and that the latter has pledged his
individual credit, the partner alone will be bound and not
the firm. And if the transaction were reallv
., an individual
one, the firm does not become liable because it afterwards
received .the benefit of the transaction. Thus, if money
were lo~ned or goods sold to one partner as an individual,
the firm does not become liable to the lender or the seller
simply because the money or the goods came to the use of
the firm. The liability of the firm is to the partner upon
whose credit the money or goods were ~btained, and that
partner must answer to those from whom they w.ere obtained. Whether the credit was extended. to the firm as
such, or to the partner individually, is a question to be determined in view of all of the facts and circumstances of the
case.1
Where, however, the goods or money are applied to the
benefit of the firm, the firm may adopt the transaction, and
1 See Tyler v. Waddingham (1890), firm is not liable upon a note given
58 Conn. 375, 8 L R. A. 657; Peter- by one partner for his share of the
son v. Roach (1877), 32 Ohio St. 374, capitaL First National Bank v.
30 Am. Rep. 607; Adams v. Hard- Cringan, supra. . So where one partware Co. (1887), 78 Ga. 485; Thom- ner borrows money on his own note
ton v. Lambeth (1889), 103 N. C. 86; to reimburse another partner for
First NationiLI Bank v. Cringan money advanced to the firm, the
(1895), - Va.-, 21 S. E. Rep. 820; firm is not liable. Redenbaugh v.
Brown v. Fresno Raisin Co. (1894), Kelton (1895), - Mo. - , 82 S. W.
101 Cal 222, 35 Pac. Rep. 639. The Rep. 67.
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196.]

§ 196.]

LAW 01!' PARTNERSHIP.

LAW OF PAKTNEB8I1IP.

the benefit received will be a sufficient consideration to sup-

port a promise by the firm to pay the debt 1

196. Note of one partner. Similar questions arise

the benefit received will be a sufficient consideration to support a promise by the firm to pay the debt.1

where a creditor takes the obligation of one partner for a

partnership debt.

If, at the time the debt is contracted, the note or other

obligation of one partner is taken, and credit given exclu-

sively to him, the firm will not be bound ; but if credit were

given to the firm, the note or other obligation will be deemed

to have been taken as collateral security or otherwise, and

the firm will still be bound, not upon the note but upon the

original consideration. To whom the credit was given is

here, as in the preceding section, a question of fact to be

determined in view of all the circumstances. 2 And even

though the note were originally the obligation of one part-

ner only, still if it was really made upon the firm account,

the firm may adopt the debt and become liable to pay it. 1
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If the obligation of one partner, e. <?., his promissory note,

be taken for a previously created debt, the effect depends

upon the intention. Such a note may be taken as payment

iSee Seigel v. Chidsey (1857), 28

Pa. St. 279, 70 Am. Dec. 124.

See Hoeflinger v. "Wells (1879),

47 Wis. 628; North Penn. Coal Co.'s

Appeal (1863), 45 Pa. St. 181, 84

Am. Dec. 487; Maffet v. Leuckel

(1880), 93 Pa. St 468; Smith v.

Collins (1874), 115 Mass. 388. In

Hoeflinger v. Wells, supra, where

the question was whether plaintiff

could recover of the firm of Staf-

ford & Wells for money loaned

§ 196. - - Note of one·partner.- Similar questions arise
where a creditor takes the obligation of one partner for a.
partnership debt.
If, at the time the debt is contracted, the note or other
obligation of one partner is taken, and credit given exclusively to him, the firm will not be bound; but if credit were
given to the firm, the note or other obligation will be deemed
to have been taken as collateral security or otherwise, and
the firm will still be bound, not upon the note but upon the
original consideration. To whom the credit was given is
here, as in the preceding section, a question of fact to be
determined in view of all the circumstances.' And even
though the note were originally the obligation of one partner only, still if it was really made upon the firm account,
the firm may adopt the debt and become liable to pay it.'
.If the obligation of one partner, e. g., his promiss-ory note,
be taken for a previously created debt, the e:ffect depends
upon the intention. Such a note may be taken as payment

upon Stafford's note, the court says :

" If upon the trial the plaintiff can

show that the money was bor-

rowed for the firm, that he was at

the time advised that it was for

the firm, and that he loaned it to the

firm and upon its credit, then

the mere taking of the individual

note of the one partner for the

money so loaned will not defeat

the action. The taking of such

note may be evidence tending to

show that the money was not

loaned to the firm, and that the

sole credit was given to Stafford;

but it is not conclusive of that

fact; and if the jury or the court

should find as a fact that the

money was borrowed by and loaned

to the firm and upon its credit,

then the taking of the individual

note of one member of the firm

would not be a payment of such

firm debt, unless it was affirma-

tively shown that such note was

taken in payment of the same."

See Siegel v. Chidsey (1857), 28

Pa. St 279, 70 Am. Deo. 124
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1 See Seigel v. Chidsey (1857), 28
Pa. St. 279, 70 Am. Dec. 124.
I See Hoeflinger v. Wells (1879),
47 Wis. 628; North Penn. Coal Co.'s
Appeal (1863), 45 Pa. St. 181, 84
Am. Dec. 487; Ma:ffet v. Leuckel
(1880), 93 Pa. St. 468; Smith v.
Collins (1874), 115 Mass. 388. In
Hoeflinger v. Wells. supra, where
the question was whether plaintiff
could recover of the firm of Stafford & Wells for money loaned
upon Stafford's note, the court says:
"If upon the trial the plaintiff can
show that the money was borrowed for the firm, that he was at
the time advised that it was for
the firm, and that he loaned it to the
firm and upon its credit, then
the mere taking of the individual

note of the one partner for the
money so loaned will not defeat .
the action. The taking of such
note may be evidence tending to
show that the money was not
loaned to the firm, and that the
sole credit was given to Stafford;
but it is not conclusive of that
fact; and if the jury or the court
should find as a fact that the
money was borrowed by and loaned
to the firm and upon its credit,
then the taking of the individual
note of one member of the firm
would not be a payment of such
firm debt, unless it was affirmatively shown that such note waa
taken in payment of the same."
I See Siegel v. Chidsey (1807). 28
Pa. St. 279, 70 Am. Deo. 1~
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WHO BOUND BY ACTS OF PARTNER. [ 197.

of the firm debt, and if it is so taken the firm debt is gone;

WHO BOUND BY

A.errs OF P A.RTNER.

[§ 197.

but in order to discharge the firm the evidence must be clear

that it was so taken in satisfaction, for this will not be pre-

sumed from the mere fact of the taking, and in the absence

of such evidence the firm will still be bound upon the debt. 1

197. Same subject Unknown partnership. In those

cases in which it is held that the creditor has recourse against

one partner only, it is because it is determined that the cred-

itor has elected to give credit to such partner alone. But

an election involves the opportunity of choice of choosing

of the firm debt, and if it is so taken the firm debt is gone;
but in order to discharge the firm the evidence must be clear
that it was so taken in satisfaction, for this will not be presumed from the mere fact of the taking, and in the absence
of such evidence the firm will still be bound upon the debt.1

between the credit of the firm and that of the individual

partner, and this opportunity of choice can only exist

where the creditor knew that there was a partnership at the

time that he gave credit. If he did not then know of the

existence of the partnership, it is obvious that a different

question is presented, but it is, at the same time, a question

with which we have already had to deal. It is another phase

of the liability of an undisclosed principal the partner-
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ship for the acts and contracts of his agent the partner.

As to this, we have found that an undisclosed principal

when discovered is, in general, bound by the simple contracts

of his agent, although at the time the other party gave credit

to the agent alone, supposing him to be the principal. Two

exceptions to this rule were found to prevail: 1. That the

principal cannot_hejield where he had been previously led

by the creditor's conduct to settle-with the a^ent upon the

assumption that the agent-bad paid^such creditor; and

2. That the principal cannot be held where, after__his dis-

covery, the creditor has elected to give^ credit to the agent

alone. 2 This ruRTapplies in the case of partnerships, and

subjectTto the exceptions named, the undisclosed partners

are liable, when discovered, upon the simple contracts made

1 See Luddington v. Bell (1879), * See Mechem on Agency, g 695-

77 N. Y. 188, 33 Am. Rep. 601; 698.

Crocker v. Crooker (1863), 52 Me.

267, 83 Am. Dec. 509.
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§ 197. Saine subject-Unknown partnership.· In those
cases in which it is held that the creditor has recourse against
one partner only, it is because it is determined that the creditor has elected to give cred~t to such partner alone. But
an election involves the Qppo.r tunity of choice - of choosing ·
between the credit of the firm ·and that of the individual
partner,- and this opportunity of choice can only exist
where the creditor kn'ew that there was a partnership at the
time that he gave credit. If he did not then know of the
existence of the partnership, it is obvious that a different
q:uestion is presented, but.it is, at the same time, a question
with ·which we have already had to deal. Itis another phase
of the liability of an undisclosed principal - the partnership - for the acts and contracts of his agent- the partner.
As to this, we have found that an undisclosed principal
when discovered is, in general, bound by the simple contracts
of his agent, although at the time the other party gave credit
to the agent alone, supposing him to be the principal. Two
exceptions to this rule were found to prevail: 1. ThaUhe
principal canno
held where he had been _.Rreviously led
by the creditor's conduct to setJJe w:ith the agent upon the
assumption that the age.ut &ad paid~h creditor; and
2. That the principal canno~ held where, after his discovery, the creditor has· elected to giut_ credit to the agent
alone. 2 This r e applies in the case ·Of partnerships, and
subjeCt'to the exceptions named, the undisclosed partners
are liable, when discovered, upon the simple contracts made
I See Luddington v. Bell (1879),
t See Mechem on Agency,§§ 69577 N. Y. 138, 33 Am. Rep. 601; 698.
Crooker v. Crooker (1863), 52 Me.
267, 83 Am. Dec. 509.
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198-200.] LAW or PARTNERSHIP.

§§ 198-200.]

LA.W OJ!' P .A.R'I'NEBSHIP.

really in behalf of the firm though ostensibly by one part-

ner only. 1 This power of the creditor to hold the undis-

closed or dormant partners liable confers a right but does

not impose a duty ; that is, the creditor has usually his op-

tion to sue all or only the one with whom he dealt he may

sue all, but is not obliged to do so. 1

198. Same subject Contracts under seal. In the

case of instruments under seal, different rules apply for tech-

nical reasons. Upon such an instrument, where the common-

law incidents of a seal still exist, only those persons who

are named as parties to it can sue or be sued ; and hence if

one partner gives his own sealed obligation, or enters into a

contract under seal, the firm cannot be held, either upon the

instrument itself or upon the consideration, by showing the

contract was really made in behalf of the firm or that it re-

ceived the benefit of it.*

199. Same subject Judgment against one partner.

A judgment against one partner for a partnership debt dis-
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charges the other partners whether ostensible or secret. The

judgment is a higher security which merges the lower; and,

besides, the liability of the partners is a joint one, upon which

they cannot be separately sued. 4

200. Contracts made in individual names of all the

partners. Where a firm name has been adopted, it should

be used in partnership transactions, and, as a rule, the firm

cannot be bound as such by any other name. But this rule

is not inflexible, and between themselves partners may adopt

really in behalf of the firm though ostensibly by one partner only.1 This power of the creditor to hold the undisclosed or dormant partners liable confers a right but does
not impose a duty; that is, the creditor has usually his option to sue all or only the one with whom he dealt- he nUil!f
·
sue all, but is not obliged to do so.2
§ 198. Same subject-Contracts under seal.-In the
case of instruments under seal, different rules apply for technical reasons. upon such an instrument, where the commonla w incidents of a seal still exist, only those persons who
are named as parties to it can sue or be sued; and hence if
one partner gives his own sealed obligation, or enters into a
contract under seal, the firm can.not be held, either upon the
instrument itself or upon the _consideration, by showing t~e
contract was really made in behalf of the firm or that it r&c~ived the benefit of it.1

such names as they please. They may also do this as tc

1 See Beckham v. Drake, 9 Mees. ley, 3 Wash. (U. S. C. C.) 513; North

& Wels. 79; Reynolds v. Cleveland Penn. Coal Co.'s Appeal (1863X 4f

(1825), 4 Cowen (N. Y.), 282, 15 Am. Pa. St. 181, 84 Am. Dec. 487.

Dec. 369; Griffith v. Buff urn (1850), <See Smith v. Black (1822), P

22 Vt. 181, 54 Am. Dec. 64 Serg. & R (Pa.) 142, 11 Am. Dec

Cleveland v. Woodward (1843), 686; Wann v. McNulty (1845), 7 HI

15 Vt 302, 40 Am. Dec. 682. 355, 43 Am. Dec. 58; Suydam v.

'See Tom v. Goodrich, 2 Johna Barber (1858), 18 N. Y. 468, 75 Am.

(N. Y.) 214; United States v. Ast- Dec. 254. See, also, post, 210, 211.
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§ 199. Same subject-Judgment against one partner.
A judgment against one partner for a partnership debt discharges the other partners whether ostensible or secret. The
judginent is a higher security which merges the lower; and,
besides, the liability of the partners is a joint one, upon which
they cannot be separately sued.'

§ 200. Contracts made in individual names of all the
partners.-Where a firm name has been adopted, it should
be used in partnership . transactions, and, as a rule, the firm
cannot be bound as such by any other nam~. But this rule
is not inflexible, and between themselves partners may adopt
such names as they please. . They may also do this as tc
1 See

Beckham v. Drake, 9 Mees. ley, 3 Wash. (U.S. C. C.) 512; North

& Weis. 79; Reynolds v. Cleveland Penn. Coal Co.'s Appeal (1863),
. (1825), 4 Cowen (N. Y.), 282. 15 Am. Pa. St. 181, 84 Am. Dec. 487.

Dec. 369; Griffith v. Buffum (1850),
22 Vt. 181, 54 Am. Dec. 64.
tCleveland v. Woodward (1848),
15 Vt. 302, 40 Am. Dec. 682.
3 See Tom v. Goodrich, 2 Johns.
(N. Y.) 214; United States v. Astr

4.'~

'See Smith v. Black (1822), P
Serg. & R.. (Pa.) 142, 11 Am. Dec
686; Wann v. McNulty(1845), 7 ill
355, 48 Am. Dec. 58; Suydam v.
Barber .(1858), 18 N. Y. 468, 75 Am
Dec. 254. See., also, post,§§ 210. 211.
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WHO BOUND BY ACTS OF PAKTNEB, [ 201, 202.

creditors if the transaction is really a partnership transaction

[§§ 201, 202.

WHO BOUND BY AOTS OF P A.RTNER.

and for its benefit. Thus, though an obligation signed, not

in the firm name, but in the individual names of all of the

partners, \sprima facie an individual transaction and not a

partnership one, it may be shown to be a partnership trans-

action not only between the partners themselves, but also in

favor of the obligee and against other creditors of the firm. 1

201. Contracts where firm does business in name of

one partner. It is not uncommon, as has been seen, for a

firm to do business in the name of a single partner, and con-

tracts made in that name for the firm will bind 4 all members.*

If that partner carries on no individual business separate

from that of the firm, contracts made in such name will be

creditors if the transaction is really a partnership transaction
and for its benefit. Thus, though an obligation signed, not
in the firm name, but in the individual .names of all of the
partners, is prima f acie an individual transaction and not a
partnership one, it may" be shown to be a partnership transaction not only between the partners themselves, but also in
favor of the obligee and against other creditors of the firm. 1

presumed to bind the firm ; if he does carry on a separate

business, no such presumption arises, and the person who

would charge the firm upon a contract made in the name

of such partner must show that it was intended to bind the

firm.*

202. Contracts where there are two firms of same
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name with common partner. Cases occur, though they

are comparatively rare, where two firms are doing business

under the same name in the same locality, and having one

or more but not all of their members in common. It was

thought at one time that where a contract was made in such

firm name by the common partner, and the other party did

not know for which of the firms he assumed to act, either

firm could be held at the option of the other party, but that

both could not be held. The true rule seems to be, however,

iSee Berkshire Woolen Co. v. 2 See Rumsey v.Briggs (1893), 139

Juillard (1879), 75 N. Y. 535, 31 Am. N. Y. 323, 34 N. E. Rep. 929.

Rep. 488; Mix v. Shattuck (1878), 'See United States Bank v. Bin-

50 Vt 421, 28 Am. Rep. 511; Free- ney (1828), 5 Mason (U. & C. C.), 189;

§ 201. Contracts where firm does business in ·name of
one partner.- It is not uncommon, as has been seen, for a
firm to do business in the name of a single partner, and contracts made in that name for the firm will bind all members.'
If that partner carries on no individual business separate
from that of the firm, contracts made in such name will be
presumed to bind the firm; if he does carry on a separate
business, no ·such presumption arises, and the person who
would chai:ge the firm upon a contract made in the name
of such partner must show that it was intended to bind the
firm. 1
4

man v. Campbell (1880), 55 CaL 197; Yorkshire Banking Co. v. Beatson

Iddings v. Pierson (1884), 100 Ind. (1880), L. R 5 C. P. Div. 109: Bank

418; Warriner v. Mitchell (1889), of Rochester v. Monteath (1845), 1

128 Pa. St 153. Denio (N. Y.). 402, 43 Am, Dec, 681.
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§ 202. Contracts where there are two firms of same
name with common partner.- Cases occur, though they
are comparatively ra~e, where two firms are doing business
under the same name in the same locality, and having one
or more but not all of their members in common. It was
thought at one time that where a contract was made in such
firm name by the common partner, and the other party did
not know for which of the firms he assumed to act, either
firm could be held at the option of the ·other party, but that
both could not be held. The true rule seems to be, however,
l See Berkshire Woolen Co. v.
2 See Rumsey v. Briggs (1893), 139
Juillard (1879), 75 N. Y.- 535, 31 Am. N. Y. 323, 34 N. E. Rep. 929.
Rep. 488; Mix v. Shattuck (1878),
'See United States Bank v. Bin60 Vt. ~1. 28 Am. Rep. 511; Free- ney (1828), 5 Mason (tJ. S. C. C.), 189;
man v. Campbell (1880). 55Cal197; Yorkshire Banking Co. v. Beatson
Iddings v. Pierson (1884), 100 Ind. (1880), L. R. 5 C. P. Div. 109: Bank
4:18; Warriner v. Mitchell (1889), . of Rochester v. Monteath (1845), 1
128 Pa. St. 153.
Denio (N~ Y.), 402, 43 Am. Dec. 681.
135

..

203, 204:.] LAW OF PAKTNEESHIP.

§§ 203, 204.J

LAW OF P .A.RTNERSHIP.

that such cases stand upon no peculiar ground, but that that

firm only is to be held which by the facts and circumstances

is pointed out as the one for which the partner acted. 1

203. Liability where the partner exceeds his author-

ity. A partner, like other agents, may incur individual lia-

that such cases stand upon no peculiar ground, but that that
firm only is to be held which by the facts and circumstances
is pointed out as the one for which the partner acted. 1

bility by assuming to act without sufficient authority. In

such cases he may make express representations as to his

authority, and he may likewise make an implied representa-

tion by assuming to act as a partner. For a breach of either

of these representations he may be held liable to third per-

sons who are injured by reason of his undertaking to bind

the firm when he had no authority so to do. Whether he

can be held upon the very contract which he has made with-

out authority, depends upon whether the contract contains

apt words to charge him personally. His liability in these

cases depends ordinarily upon the familiar rules which make

an agent liable who has exceeded his authority or who has

assumed to act for a principal having no legal existence. 1

II. IN TOET.
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204. Firm liable for torts of one partner committed

in course of business. The liability of the firm for the

torts of one partner rests upon the same foundation as the

1 See Hastings National Bank v. bank account, but borrowed from

Hibbard (1882), 48 Mich. 452, 12 N. the first when necessary, and kept

W. Rep. 651; Swan v. Steele (1806), its account with it. One of the

7 East, 210. In Hastings National original partners made a note in

Bank v. Hibbard, supra, it appeared the firm name and discounted it at

that a firm of three partners, en- the plaintiff's bank. In an action

gaged in operating a particular by the bank the jury found that

flouring mill, temporarily arranged the bank relied exclusively upon

§ 203. Liability where the partner exceeds his author·
ity.-A partner, like other agents, may incur i~diYidual liability by assuming to act without sufficient authority. In
such cases he may make express representations as to his
authority, and he may likewise make an implied representation by assuming to act as a partner. For a breach of either
of these representations he may be held liable to third persons who are injured by reason of his undertaking to bind
the firm when he had no authority so to do. Whether he
can be held upon the very contract which he has made without authority, depends upon whether the contract contains
apt words to charge him personally. His liability in these
cases depends ordinarily upon the familiar rules which make
an agent liable who has exceeded his authority or who has
assumed to act for a principal having no legal existence.2

to take in another partner and run the credit of the original partners,

an additional mill as another firm. It was not claimed that the money

II. IN ToRT.

Both firms, however, had the same was borrowed or used for the bene-

name and used the same letter- fit of the later firm. It was there-

heads, upon which the names of all fore held that the additional part-

four partners were printed, but the ner could not be held liable,

business of the two mills was kept 2 See Mechem on Agency, 541,

distinct. The second mill kept no 557; Taft v. Church (1895), 162 Mass.

136

§ 204:. Firm liable for torts of one partner committed
in course of business.- The liability of the firm for the
torts of one partner rests upon the same foundation as the
I See Hastings National Bank v.
Hibbard (1882), 48 Mich. 452, 12 N.
W. Rep. 651; Swan v. Steele (1806),
7 East, 210. In Hastings National
Bank v. Hibbard, supra, it appeared
that a firm of three partners, ~ngaged in operating a particular
flouring mill, temporarily arranged
to take in another partner and run
an additional mill as another firm.
Both firms, however, had the same
name and used the same letterheads, upon which the names of all
four partners were printed, but the
business of the two mills was kept
distinct. The second mill kept no

bank account, but borrowed from
the first when necessary, and kept
its account with it.. One of the
original partners made a note in
the firm name and discounted it at
the plaintiff's bank. In an action
by the bank the jury found that
the bank relied exclusively upon
the credit of the original partners.
It was not claimed that the money
was borrowed or used for the benefit of the later firm. It was therefore held that the additional part·
ner could not be held liable.
2 See Mechem on Agency, §§ 541,
557; Taft v. Church (1895), 162 Mass.
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WHO BOUND BY ACTS OF PAETNEE, [ 205.

liability of a principal for the torts of his agent, which has

WHO BOUND BY A.OTB OF P A.BTNER.

[§ 205.

been already considered. Thus, the firm is liable in a civil

action for the negligence of one partner, committed in the

transaction of partnership business ; as, for example, where

one of a firm of lawyers or physicians causes loss to a client

or a patient by a want of professional skill or a failure to

use due care or diligence. 1

This liability of the firm is not, however, confined to actions

based upon a partner's negligence; it is liable also for his

trespass, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or malice, if com-

mitted in the scope of the partnership business and in fur-

therance of its interests; as, for example, where one partner

in the prosecution of the firm business wrongfully seizes the

property of a third person, or institutes malicious prosecu-

tions, or is guilty of a libel. 2 A greater liability still may

also be incurred by a previous authorization or a subsequent

ratification.

205. Liability of firm for partner's malicious or crim-

inal act. But the firm would not be liable, unless previously
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authorized or subsequently ratified, for similar acts commit-

ted by the partner outside of the partnership business and

527, 39 N. E. Rep. 283; North Star 211; Locke v. Stearns (1840), 1

Co. v. Stebbins (1893), 3 So. Dak. Meto. (Mass.) 560, 35 Am. Dec. 382;

540, 54 N. W. Rep. 59& Chester v. Dickerson (1873), 54 N. Y.

!See Hess v. Lowrey (1889), 122 1, 13 Am. Rep. 550; Jacobs v.

Ind. 225, 23 N. E. Rep. 156, 17 Am. Shorey (1868), 48 N. H. 100, 97 Am.

St. Rep. 355 ; Hyrae v. Erwin (1885), Dec. 586 ; Brundage v. Mellon (1895),

23 S. C. 226, 55 Am. Rep. 15; Col- N. Dak. , 63 N. W. Rep. 209;

Her v. McCall (1887), 84 Ala. 190, 4 Haney Mfg. Co. v. Perkins (1889),

liability of a principal for the torts of his agent, which has
been already considered. Thus, the firm is liable in a civil
action for the negligence of one partner, committed in the
transaction .of partnership business; as, for example, where
one of a firm of lawyers or physicians causes loss to a client
or a patient by a want of professional skill or a failure to ,
use due care or diligence. 1
This liability of the firm is not, however, confined to actions
based upon a partner's negligence; it is liable also for his
trespass, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or malice, if committed in the scope of the partnership business and in furtherance of its interests; as, for example, where one partner
in the prosecution of the firm business wrongfully seizes the
property of a third person, or institutes malicious prosecutions; or is guilty of a libel. 2 A greater liability still may
also be incurred by a previous authorization or a subsequent
ratification.

So. Rep. 367; Haley v. Case (1886), 78 Mich, 1, 43 N. W. Rep. 1073;

142 Mass. 316, 7 N. E. Rep. 877; Lathrop v. Adams (1882), 133 Mass.

Bucki v. Cone (1889), 25 Fla. 1, 6 So. 471, 43 Am. Rep. 528. The individ-

Rep. 160. ual property of an innocent part-

2 See Strang v. Bradner (1884), 114 ner is not liable to attachment for

U. S. 555, 29 L. ed. 248; Stanhope a firm debt fraudulently contracted

v. Swafford (1890), 80 Iowa, 45, 45 by a copartner. Jaffrey v. Jennings

N. W. Rep. 403; Morehouse v. North- (1894), 101 Mich, 615, 25 L. R. A. 645.

§ 205. Liability of firm for partner's malicious or crim·
inal act.-But the firm would not be liable, unless previously
authorized or subsequently ratified, for similar acts committed by the partner outside of the partnership business and

rop (1866), 33 Conn. 380, 89 Am. Dec.
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527, 89 N. E. Rep. 288; North Star
Co. v. Stebbins (1893), 8 So. Dak.
540, 54 N. W. Rep. 593.
1 See Hess v. Lo.wrey (1889), 122
Ind. 225, 28 N. E. Rep. 156, 17 Am.
St. Rep. 355; Hyrne v. Erwin (1885),
23 S. C. 226, 55 Am. Rep. 15; Collier v. McCall (1887), 84 Ala. 190, 4
So. Rep. 367; Haley v. Case (1886),
142 Mass. 316, 7 N. E. Rep. 877;
Bucki v. Cone (1889), 25 Fla. 1, 6 So.
Rep. 160.
2 See Strang v. Bradner (1884), 114
U. S. 555, 29 L. ed. 248; Stanhope
v. Swafford (1890), 80 Iowa, 45, 45
N. W. Rep. 403; Morehouse v. Northr op (1866), 83 Conn. 880, 89 Am. Dec.

211; Locke v. Stearns (1840), 1
Mete. (Mass.) 560, 35 Am. Dec. 882;
Chester v. Dickerson (1873), 54 N. Y.
1, 13 Am. Rep. 550; Jacobs v.
Shorey (1868), 48 N. H. 100, 97 Am.
Dec. 586; Brundage v. Mellon (1895),
- N. Dak. - , 63 :N. W. Rep. 209;
Haney Mfg. Co. v. Perkins (1889),
78 Mich. 1, 43 N. W. Rep. 1073;
Lathrop v. Adams (1882), 133 Mass.
471, 43 Am. Rep. 528. The individual property of an innocent partner is not liable to attachment for
a firm debt fraudulently contracted
by a copartner. Jaffray v. Jennings
(1894), 101 Mich. 615, 25 L. R. A. 640.
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206.]

§ 206.]

LAW 011' PARTNERSHIP.

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

for his own purposes, as where he acts from his own private

malice or ill-will. 1

Neither can one partner, not personally in fault, ordina-

rily be held liable in a criminal or penal action for the acts

of his partner.*

206. Liability of firm for partner's breach of trust.

Breaches of trust or misappropriation by one partner in

respect of funds or property which come into the possession

for his own purposes, as where he acts from his own private
malice or ill-will.1
Neither can one partner, not personally in fault, ordina.
rily be held liable in a criminal or penal action for the aots
of his partner.2

of the firm in the course of its business will make the firm

responsible; 1 but the firm will not be responsible, as for

breach of trust, because one partner wrongfully employs in

the partnership business funds of which he alone was trustee,

if his partners were ignorant of the source of the money or

of his want of title to it, though they would be liable if they

had such knowledge. 4

1 See Rosekrans v. Barker (1885),

115 IlL 331, 56 Am. Rep. 169.

2 See Watson v. Hinchman (1879),
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42 Mich. 27, 3 N. W. Rep. 336; Mo

Neely v. Haynes (1877), 76 N. a

133.

See Todd v. Jackson (1881X75

Ind.272.

See Englar v. Offutt (1889), 70

§ 206. Liability of:ftrm for partner's breach of trust.Breaches of trust or misappropriation by one partner in
respect of funds or property which come into the possession
of the firm in the course of its business will make the firm
. responsible; 1 but the firm will not be responsible, as for
breach of trust, because one partner wrongfully employs in
the partnership business funds of whi~h he alone was trustee,
if his· partners were ignorant of the source of the money or
of his want of ~itle to it, though they would be liable if they
had such knowledge.'

Md. 78, 14 Am. St. Rep. 333; Guillou

v. Peterson (1879), 89 Pa. St. 163:

Gilruth v. Decell (1894), 72 Misa

232, 16 So. Rep. 250.
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l See Rosekrans v. 'Barker (1885),
115 Ill 331, 56 Am. Rep. 169.
2 See Watson v. Hinchman (1879),
42 Mich. 27, 8 N. W. Rep. 236; MoNeely v. Haynes (1877), 76 N.
12?.

a

a See Todd v. Jackson (1881), 76
Ind. 272.
' See Englar v. Offutt (1889), 7C
Md. 78, 14 Am. St. Rep. 882; Guillou
v. Peterson (1879), 89 Pa. St. 163;
Gilruth v. Decell (1894), 79 Miss.
282, 16 So. Rep. 250.
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CHAPTEK XI

OF THE LIABILITY OF THE FIRM FOR THE ACTS OF ITS

AGENTS AND SERVANTS.

207. Firm liable like other principals for acts of its servant and agents.

207. Firm liable like other principals for the acts of

its servants and agents. It seems desirable to call atten-

tion not for the purpose of discussion but that it may not

be overlooked to the liability of the firm for the acts of

its ordinary servants and agents. The discussion of the

preceding chapter was devoted to the acts of the partner as

CHAPTER XI

agent of the firm, but the firm may, as has been seen, em-

ploy all the agents and servants, who are not partners, that

the business may demand. For the acts of these agents and

servants, whether in contract or in tort, the firm is liable in

the same cases and upon the same conditions as any other

OF THE LIABILITY OF THE FIRM FOR THE ACTS OF ITS
AGENTS AND SERVAN~

principal or master.

The discussion of this liability belongs, therefore, to treat-

§ 207. Firm liable like other principals for acts of its eervant and agents.

ises upon the law of agency and master and servant; with

the former of which, at least, it is assumed that the s

is already familiar.
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· § 207. Firm liable like other principals for the acts of
its .servants and agents.- It seems desirable to call attention - not for the purpose of discussion but that it may not
be overlooked- to the liability of the firm for the acts of
its ordinary servants and agents. The discussion of the
preceding chapter was devoted to the acts of the partner as.
agent of the firm, but the firm may, -as has been seen, employ ~11 the agents and servants, who are no~ partners, that
the business may demand. For the acts of these agents and
servants, whether in contract or in tort, the firm is liable in
the same cases and upon the same conditions as ·any other
principal or master.
The discussion of this liability belongs, therefore, to treatises upon the law of agency and master and servant; with
the former ·o.f which, at least, it is assumed that the s1;,,1~nt
..
IS al
. re ady f a.mil1ar.
1

•
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CHAPTER XIL

OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE* UABILITY OF

PARTNER&

20a In general

L OP THE NATURE OP PARTNER-

SHIP OBLIGATIONS.

209. Partnership obligations in

contract are joint.

CHAPTER XII.

210, 211. Judgment against

one releases all

212. Release of one releases

OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE LIABILITY OF

all

PARTNERS.

213. Partnership obligations in

tort are joint and several

L OP THE EXTENT OP PARTNER-

SHIP LIABILITY.

214. Each partner liable for

whole of partnership obli-

gations.

208. In general. The question of the liability of part^
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ners involves both the nature of that liability and its extent.

These subjects, therefore, will be separately considered.

215. Individual property of one

partner may be taken to

satisfy partnership debts.

216. Partner whose property is

so taken may have contri-

bution.

217. Exemptions from execution.

ILL OP THE BEGINNING AND END-

ING OP LIABILITY.

218. In general

219. Of an incoming partner.

220. Of an outgoing partner.

L OF THE NATURE OF PARTNERSHIP OBLIGATIONS.

209. Partnership obligations when arising on con-

§ 2oa In general

§ 215. Individual property of one
partner may be taken to
L OP THE NATURE OP PARTNERsatisfy partnership debts.
SHIP OBLIGATIONS.
216. P~rtner whose property is
209. Partnership obligations in
so taken may have contricontract are joint.
bution.
210, 211. -Judgment against
217. Exemptions from execution.
one releases all.
212. Release of one releases
Ill OF THE BEGINNING .A.ND ENI>all.
213. Partnership obligations in
. ING OF LIABILITY.
tort are joint and severaL
21a In general
L OF THE Ex:TEN'r OP PARTNER219. Of an incoming partner.
SHIP LIABILITY.
220. Of an outgoing partner.
214. Each partner liable for
whole of partnership obligations.

tract are joint. The obligation of those contracts which

are binding upon the firm is the joint obligation of all the

partners and not the several obligation of any of them.

One partner may, as has been seen, bind himself only; but

if he binds the firm, he binds all members of it jointly and

not severally.

§ 208. In general.-The question of the liability of part:ners involves both the nature of that liability and its extent.
These subjects, therefore, will be separately considered.

It is sometimes said that, while partnership contracts are

140

L

OF THE NATURE OF

p .A.RTNERSHIP

OBLIGATIONS.

§ 209. Partnership obligations when arising on con·
tract are joint.- The obligation of those contracts which
are binding upon the firm is the joint obligation of all the
partners and not the several obligation of any of them.
One partner may, as has been seen, bind himself only; but
if he binds the firm, he binds all members of it jointly and
not severally.
It is sometimes said that, while partnership contracts are
140
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NATURE AND EXTENT OF LIABILITY. [ 210.

thus joint at law, they are joint and several in equity; but

NATURB .A.ND · JCXTENT OF LUBILITY.

[§ 210_

this seems to be true as respects the remedy only. 1 ,

210. Same subject Judgment against one partner

releases others. The obligation of firm contracts being

joint, if the creditor proceeds to judgment against one of

ihus joint at law, they a~e joint and several in equity; but/
this seems to be true as respects the remedy only .1

them alone he releases the others. 2 In a leading case s in

the supreme court of the United States, where a creditor

who had taken judgment against one partner upon a firm

note in one state sought to recover against another partner

in another state, the court, through Mr. Justice Field, said :

" It is true that each copartner is bound for the entire

amount due on copartnership contracts; and that this obli-

gation is so far several that if he is sued alone, and does not

plead the non-joinder of his copartners, a recovery may be

had against him for the whole amount due upon the con-

tract, and a joint judgment against the copartners may be

enforced against the property of each. But this is a differ-

ent thing from the liability which arises from a joint and

several contract. There the contract contains distinct en-
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gagements that of each contractor individually, and that

of all jointly, and different remedies may be pursued upon

each. The contractors may be sued separately on their

several engagements or together on their joint undertaking.

But in copartnerships there is no such several liability of

the copartners. The copartnerships are formed for joint

purposes. The members undertake joint enterprises, they

assume joint risks, and they incur in all cases joint liabil-

ities. In all copartnership transactions this common risk

and liability exist. Therefore it is that in suits upon these

transactions all the copartners must be brought in, except

where there is some ground of personal release from liabil-

ity, as infancy, or a discharge in bankruptcy ; and if not

brought in, the omission may be pleaded in abatement. The

1 See post, 270. And see the * See Kendall v. Hamilton (1879),

opinions in Kendall v. Hamilton L. R 4 App. Gas. 504.

(1879), 4 Apix Gas. 504. Mason v. Eldred (1867), 6 WalL

(U. S.) 231, Paige's Partn. Gas. 151.
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§ 210. Same subject-Judgment against one partner
releases others.- The obligation of firm contracts being
joint, if the creditor proceeds to judgment against one of
them alone he releases the others.2 In a leading cases in
the supreme court of the United States, where a creditor
who had taken judgment against one partner upon a firm
note in one state sought to recover against another partner
in another state, the court, through Mr. Justice Field, said:
" It is true that each copartner is bound for the entireamount due on copartnership contracts; and that this obligation is so far several that if he is sued alone, and does not
plead the non-joinder of his copartners, a recovery may behad against him for the whole amount due upon the contract, and a joint judgment against the copartners may be
enforced against the property of each. But this is a differ, ent thing from the liability which arises from a joint and
several contract. There the contract contains distinct engagements-that of each contractor individually, and that
of all jointly,-and different remedies may be pursued upon
each. The contractors may be sued separately on their
several engagements oi: together on their joint undertalcing.
But in copartners~ips there is no such several liability of'
the copartners. The copartnerships are formed for joint
purposes. The members undertake joint enterprises, they
assume joint risks, and they incur in all cases joint liabilities. In all copartnership transactions this common risk
and li~bility exist. Therefore it is that in suits upon thesetransactions all the copartners must be brought in, except
where there is some ground of personal release from liability, as infancy, or a discharge in bankruptcy; and if not,
brought in, the omission may be pleaded in abatement. The
J See Kendall v. Hamilton (1879), .
1 See post, § 270. And see the
opinions in Kendall v. Hamilton LR. 4 App. Cas. 504.
~Mason v. Eldred (1867), 6 Wall.
C1879), 4 App. Ca& 5~
(U. S.) 231, Paige's Partn. Oas. 151...
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211, 212.] LAW OF PAETNEKSHIP

§§ 211, 212.]

LA.W OF PARTNERSHIP

plea in abatement avers that the alleged promises, upon

which the action is brought, were made jointly with another

and not with the defendant alone a plea which would be

without meaning if the copartnership contract was the sev

eral contract of each copartner."

211. Same subject. " The general doctrine maintained

in England and the United States," continued the same

learned judge, " may be briefly stated. A judgment against

one, uj <vn a joint contract of several persons, bars an action

plea in abatement avers that the alleged promises, upon
which the acti<?n is brought, were made jointly with another
and not with the defendant alone - a plea which would be
without meaning if the copartnership contract was the several contract of each copartner."

against the others, though the latter were dormant partners

of the defendant in the original action and the fact was un-

known to the plaintiff when that action was commenced.

When the contract is joint, and not joint and several, the

entire cause of action is merged in the judgment. The joint

liability of the parties not sued with those against whom

the judgment is recovered being extinguished, their entire

liability is gone. They cannot be sued separately, for they

have incurred no several obligation; they cannot be sued

jointly with the others, because judgment has been already
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recovered against the latter, who would otherwise be sub-

jected to two suits for the same cause."

This rule, however, may be changed by statute where

part of the defendants in the first action who are sought to

be held liable in the second were not personally served with

process. 1

212. Same subject Release of one releases all. An-

other consequence of the joint character of partnership ob-

ligations is the rule that a release of one of the partners

releases all. 2 This rule applies, however, only to the case of

a technical release under seal, and does npt extend to a mere

covenant not to sue one partner, or to any other instrument

1 Mason v. Eldred, supra. for his liability " upon the obliga-

*1 Lindley on Partnership (Ew- tion, imports a technical release.

ell's ed.), 237. Thus a receipt under and therefore releases all. Hale v.

seal, given to one of two or more Spaulding (1888), 145 Mass. 482, 14

joint debtors, " in full satisfaction N. E. Rep. 534, 1 Am. St. Rep. 475.

142

§ 211. Same subject.-" The general doctrine maintained
in England and the United States," continued the same
learned judge, "may be briefly stated. A judgment against
one, u1 ~ha joint contract of several persons, bars an action
against ·the others, though the latter were dormant partners
of the defendant in the original action and the fact was unknown to the plaintiff when that action was commenced.
When the contract is joint, and not joint and several, the
entire cause of action is merged in th~ judgment. The joint
liability of the parties not sued with. those against whom
the judgment is recovered being extinguished, their entire
liability is gone. They cannot be sued separately, for they
have incurred no several obligatfon; they cannot be sued
jointly with the others, because judgment has been: already
. recovered against the latter, who would otherwise be subjected to two suits for the same aause."
This rule, however, may be changed by statute where
part of the defendants in the first action who are sought to
be held liable in the second were not personally served with
·
·
process.1
§ 212. Same subject-Release of one releases all.-Another consequence of the joint character of partnership obligations is the rule that a release of one of the partners
releases all.2 This rule applies, however, only to the case of
a technical release under seal, and does not extend to a mere
covenant not to sue one partner, or to any other instrument
l Mason v. Eldred, supra.
z 1 Lindley on Partnership (Ewell's ed.), 237. Thus a receipt under
seal, given to one of two or more
joint debtors, .. in full satisfaction

.for his liability" upon the obligation, imports a technical release.
and therefore releases all Hale v.
Spaulding (1888), 145 Mass. 482, 14
N. E. Rep. 534, 1 Am•.St. Rep. 475.

142

•

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

NATURE AND EXTENT OF LIABILITY. [ 213, 214.

NATURE .AND EXTENT OF LIABILITY.

reserving the creditor's rights against the other partners,

(§§ 213, 214.

which, though in the form of a release, may be treated as a

covenant not to sue rather than as an absolute release. 1

213. Partnership obligations arising from tort are

joint and several. The liability, however, of partners for

torts committed by one partner or by the servant of the

firm is joint and several, and the action may be brought

reserving the creditor's rights against the other partners,
which, though in the form of a release, may be treated as a
covenant not to sue rather than as an absolute release.1

against one or all or an intermediate number. 8

" To this general rule," says Mr. Justice Lindley, 8 " an ex-

ception occurs where an action ex delicto is brought against

several persons in respect of their ownership in land, for

then they are liable jointly, and not jointly and severally."

II. OP THE EXTENT OP PARTNERSHIP LIABILITY.

214. Each partner liable in solido for partnership ob-

ligations. Although the obligation of partnership liabili-

ties may be in nature joint, it does not follow that the

liability when established is to be jointly or ratably enforced

against the partners. The liability may be joint, but it is

also enti/re. Each partner, therefore, is personally and indi-
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vidually liable for the entire amount of all such obligations,

whether arising from contract or tort, as are binding upon

the firm. His liability, in ordinary partnerships, is not lim-

ited by the amount of his contribution to the partnership

§ 213. Partnership obligations arising from tort are
joint and several.-The liability, however, of partners for
torts committed by one partner or by the servant of the
firm is joint and several, and the action may be brought
against one or· all or an intermediate number.2
"To this general rule," says Mr. Justice Lindley,'" an ex- i
eption occurs where an action~ delicto is brought against
everal persons in respect of their ownership in land, for
hen they are liable jointly, and not jointly and severally."

t

capital, but extends to his entire property ; and it makes no

difference what may be his share or interest in the partner-

ship business, or whether he is an active or a secret partner,

II.

OF THE ExTENT OF

p A.RTNERSHIP

LIABILIT1'.

or whether the other partners are responsible or not; he is

liable in solido for the partnership obligations.

1 Lindley, uM supra; Hale v. Rich. (S. C.) L. 595; Howe v. Shaw

Spaulding, supra; Benjamin v. (1868), 56 Me. 291 ; Roberts v. John-

McConnell (1847), 4 Gilm. (111.) 536, son (1874), 58 N. Y. 61&

46 Am. Deo. 474; Berry v. Gillis *1 Lindley on Partnership (Ew-

(1845), 17 N. H. 9, 43 Am. Dec. 584 ell's ed.), 198, citing 1 Wma Saunds.

* See White T. Smith (1860), 12 291, / and g.
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§ 214:. Each partner liable in solido for partnership ob·
ligations.-Although the obligation of partnership liabilities may be in nature joint, it does not follow that the
liability when established is to be jointly or ratably enforced
against the partners. The . liability may be jomt, but it is
also entire. Each partner, therefore, is personally and individually liable for ·the entire amount of all such obligations,
whether :;trising from contract or tort, ·as are binding upon
the firm. His liability, in ordinary partnerships, is not limited by the amount of his contribution to the partnership
capital, but extends to his entire property; and it makes no
difference what may be his share or interest in the partnership business, or whether he is an active or a secret partner,
or whether the other parthers are responsible or not; he is
liable Vn, solido for the partnership obligations.
1 Lindley,

Rich. (S. C.) L. 595; Howe v. Shaw
(1868), 56 Me. 291; Roberts v. Johnson (1874), 58 N. Y. 613.
11 Lindley on Partnership (Ewell's ed.), 198, citing 1 Wm& Saunds.
291, f and g.
148

ubi 8Upra; Hale v.
Spaulding, 8Upra; Benjamin v.
McConnell (1847), 4 Gilm. (Ill.) 536,
46 Am. Dec. 474; Berry v. Gillis
• (1845), 17 N. H. 9, 48 Am. Dec. 584.
~ See White v. Smith (1860), 12

§§ 215, 216.]

LA.W. 017 PARTNERSHIP.

215, 216.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

215. Individual property of partner may be taken to

satisfy partnership debt. Moreover, if judgment be ob-

tained against the firm upon an obligation existing against

it, the execution, though in form against all, may, unless other

wise provided by statute, be levied directly upon the indi-

vidual property of any one or more of the partners without

regarding or exhausting the firm property. The creditor

further, is under no obligation to levy against all the part

ners ratably, but may select any one or more and levy exe

cution against him or them until the judgment is satisfied,

. leaving all questions of contribution to be settled afterwards

/ S between the partners themselves. 1 In case any partner is

not served with process, no personal judgment can ordinarily

be rendered against him, nor can his individual property

usually be taken, though the firm property may be seized.

If conflict arises between the firm creditors and the indi-

vidual creditors of the partner, as to the application of the

individual property of a partner, special rules apply which

will be hereafter considered.*
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216. Partner paying debt may have contribution.

Where one partner is thus compelled to pay or satisfy

the whole of a partnership debt, he has a remedy, usually

upon an accounting in ujuity, 1 to require the other part-

ners to contribute their pro rata shares. For though each

partner as to third persons is liable for all the partnership

debts, yet as between themselves each partner is liable only

for his own share. And even as to third persons, though

each is liable for all the debts of the firm, yet his liability

is said to be as a principal debtor for his own share, and as

surety for the other partners for the remainder.

§ 215. Individual property of partner may be taken to
satisfy partnership debt.- :Moreover, if judgment be obtained against the firm upon an obligation existing against
it, the execution, though in form against all, may, unless other·
wise provided by statute, be levied directly upon the individual property of any one or more of the partners without
regarding or exhausting the firm property. The creditor
further, is under no obligation to levy against all the part
ners ratably, but may select any one or more and levy exe
cution against him or them until the judgment is satisfied,
leaving all questions of contribution to be settled afterwards
between the partners themselves.1 In case any partner is
not served with process, no personal judgment can ordinarily
be rendered against him, nor can his individual property
usually be taken, though the firm property may be seized.
If conflict arises between the firm creditors and the individual creditors of the partner, as to the application of the
individual property of a partner, special rules apply which
•
will be hereafter considered.2

1 See Randolph v. Daly (1863). 16 partner Is not liable to attachment

N. J. Eq. 813; Clayton v. May (1881), for a firm debt fraudulently con-

68 Ga. 27; Stout v. Baker (1884), 32 tracted by another member of the

Kan. 113. But in Jaffray v. Jen- firm,

nings (1894), 101 Mich. 515, 25 L. *See pout, c h. XIX.

B. A. 645, it is held that the indi- See ante, 127.

vidual property of an innocent

144

§ 216. Partner paying debt may have contribution.Where one partner is thus compelled to pay or satisfy
the whole of a partnership debt, he has a remedy, usually
upon an accounting in cquity,1 to require the other partners to contribute their pro rata shares. For though each
partner as to third persons is liable for all the partnership
debts, yet as between themselves each partner is liable only
for his own share. And even as to third person:s, though
each is liable for all the debts of the firm, yet his liability
is said to be as a principal debtor for his own share, and as
surety for the other partners for the remainder.
1 See Randolph v. Daly (1863), 16
N. J. Eq. 113; Clayton v. May (1881),
68 Ga.. '}ff; Stout v. Baker (1884), 32
Kan. 113. But in Jaffray v. Jen·
nings (1894), 101 Mich. 515, 25 L.
R. A. 645, it is held that the individual property of an innocent

partner is not liable to attachment
for a firm debt fraudulently con·
tracted by another member of the
firm.
2 See poBt, ch. XIX.

144

a See ante, § 127.
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NATURE AND EXTENT OF LIABILITY. [ 217, 218.

NA.TURK A.ND EXTDT ~ LliBILITY.

217. Exemptions from execution on partnership prop-

(§§ 217, 218.

erty. The present seems an appropriate place to mention

the question of the right of the firm or of one partner to

claim the statutory exemptions from execution against the

partnership property. The authorities are very much in

conflict, but the clear weight of authority is to the effect

that, during the continuance of the partnership, neither the

fi rm nor one partner can claim such exemptions. 1 In Michi-

gan, Georgia, North Carolina and New York, the rule is

otherwise. 1

ill. OP THE BEGINNING AND ENDING OF LIABILITY.

218. In general. The liability of the partner is based

apon the theory that he was a principal in the business in

\vhich the obligation was incurred. It often becomes ma-

terial, therefore, to determine when he became or ceased to

be a partner, and whether he was such at the time the dis-

puted liability arose. He may contend that the obligation

was incurred before he became a partner; or that it arose

§ 217. Exemptions from execution on partnership prop·
erty.- The present seems an appropriate place to mention
the question of the right of the firm or of one partner to
claim the statutory exemptions from execution against the
partnership property. The authorities are very much in (\ ;
con.fl~ct, but the clear weight of authority is to the effect U
that, during ~he continuance of the partnership, neither the
n,rm nor one partner can claim such exemptions.1 In Michigan, Georgia, North Carolina and New York, the rule is
otherwise.•

after he had ceased to be such. Where the question is
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whether any partnership at all had then been organized, the

question will be governed by principles already referred to.

If the question is whether all partnerhip relations have

ill.

OF Tira BEGINNING A.ND ENDING OF LIABILITY.

ceased, considerations hereafter to be mentioned will con-

trol. But a person may be admitted as a partner to a firm

already existing, or he may retire from a firm which there-

after continues business, and his liability in either case re-

quires some special consideration.

1 See Cowan v. Creditors (1888V * See McCoy v. Brennan (1886),

CaL 403, 11 Am. St Rep. 294, arid 61 Mich. 862, 1 Am. St Rep. 589;

ss cited; Thurlow T. Warren Blanohard v. Pascal (1881), 68 Ga.

(1889), 82 Me. 164, 17 Am. St Rep. 82, 45 Am. Rep. 474; Evans v.

472; Aiken v. Steiner (1892)), 98 Bryan (1886), 95 N. CL 174, 59 Am.

Ala. 355, 39 Am. St Rep. 58; Pond Rep. 233; Stewart v. Brown (1867),

v. Kimball (1869), 101 Mass. 105; 37 N. Y. 350, 93 Am. Dec. 578.

Prosser v. Hartley (1886), 85 Minn.

340, 29 N. W. Rep. 156.

10 140

S218.

In general.- The liability of the partner is based
apon the theory that he was a principal in the business in
~hich the obligation was incurred. It often becomes ma.tf~rial, therefore, to determine when he became or ceased to
be a partner, and whet~er lie was such at the time the dis?uted liability arose. He may contend that the obligation
was incurred before he became a partn~r; or that it arose
after he had ceased to be such. Where the question is
whether any partnership at all had then been organized, the
question will be governed by principles already referred to.
If the question is whether all partnerhip relations have
ceased, considerations hereafter to be mentioned will control. Bµt a person may be admitted as a partner to a firm
already existing, or he may retire from a firm which thereafter continues business, ·and his liability in either case requires some 'special consideration.
1 See Cowan v. Creditors (1888~
1 See McCoy v. Brennan (1886),
77 Ca.L 403, 11 Am. St. Rep. 294.,
61 Mich. 862, 1 Am. St. Rep. 589;
· es cited; Thurlow v. Warren Blanchard v. Pascal (1881), 88 Ga.
(1889), 82 Me. 164, 17 Am. St. Rep. 32, 45 Am. Rep. 474; Evans , v.
472; Aiken v. Steiner (1892)), 98 Bryan (1886), 95 N. Cl 174, 59 Am.
Ala. 355, 39 Am. St. Rep. 58; Pond ;Rep. 233; Stewart v. Brown (1867),
v. Kimball (1869), 101 Mass. 105; 37 N. Y. 350, 98 Am. Dec. 578.
Prosser v. Hartley (1886), S5 Minn.
MO, sg N. W. Rep. 156.
10
HI

,zfil

219, 220.] JLAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

§§ 219, 220.]

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

219. Of an incoming partner. A person who enters a

previously existing firm is often called an incoming partner.

The admission of a new partner really constitutes in law a

dissolution of the old and the creation of a new partnership,

though in actual practice it is often not so regarded, the

firm by consent being treated as continuing, notwithstand-

ing the change in membership.

An incoming partner is not liable for the previously con-

tracted obligations of the firm to which he is thus admitted,

unless by special agreement he has assumed such a liability,

or has so conducted himself as to raise a presumption of such

an agreement. He acquires also no greater interest in the

property of the former partnership than the agreement which

provides for his admission may confer upon him. 1

220. Of an outgoing partner. A person who retires

from a firm which thereafter continues is said to be an

outgoing partner. His withdrawal is, of course, in law a dis-

solution of the firm, though in practice the firm is fre-

quently spoken of as continuing, and his further liability
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is governed by the general rules governing dissolution. He

is therefore, as will be seen, 1 in general liable for acts done

until he has not only withdrawn from the firm but has also

given due notice of his withdrawal. 1

§ 219. Of an incoming partner.-A person who enters a
previously existing firm is often called an incoming partner.
The admission of a new partner really constitutes in law a
dissolution of the old and the creation of a new partnership,
though in actual practice it is often not so regarded, the ·
firm by consent being treated as continuing, notwithstanding the change in membership.
An incoming partner is not liable for the previously ~n
tracted obligations of the firm to which he is t~us admitted,
unless by special agreem~nt he has assumed such & liability,
or has so conducted himself as to raise a presumption of such
an agreement. He acquires also no greater interest in the
property of the former partnership than the agreement which
provides for his admission may confer upon him.1

iSee Hatchett v. Blanton (1882), (1879), 64 Ga. 248; Love v. Payne

Ala. 423; Ringo v. Wing (1887), (1880), 73 Ind. 80, 88 Am. Kep. HL

t9 Ark. 467; Bracken v. Dillon * See post, 266.

> See post, 258-365.

146

§ 220. Of an outgoing partner.-A person who retires
from a firm which thereafter continues is said to be an
outgoing partner. His withdrawal is, of course, in law a dissolution of the firm, - though in practice the nrm is :frequently spoken of as continuing, - and his further liability
is governed by the general rules governing dissolution. He
is therefore, as will be seen,2 in general liable for acts done
until he has not only withdrawn from the firm but has also
given due notice of his withdrawal.•
1 See ~tchett

v. Blanton (188~), (1879), 64 Ga. 248; Love v. Payne
79 Ala. 423; Ringo v. Wing (1887), (1880), 73 Ind. 80, 88 Am. Rep. 11L
'9 Ark. 467; Bracken v. Dillon
:t See post, § 266.
I See poat, §§ 258-966.

146
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Of &.

CHAPTEK XIIL

OF ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST THE FIRM.

221. In general

L ACTIONS BY THB FIRM.

222. What questions involved.

1. In Contract.

223. a. Contracts made in firm

name.

224 b. Contracts made in name

of one partner for the

CHAPTER

firm.

225. Actions cannot usually be

xm

brought in firm name.

2. In Tort

OF ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST THE FIRM.

226. All partners sue for tort af-

fecting firm.

IL ACTIONS AGAINST THE FIRM.

l l ACTIONS AGAINST THB FIRK.

§ 22L In genera.L

227. What questions involved.

1. In Contract.

228. All actual and ostensible
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partners should be joined.

229. Dormant and secret part-

L

AOTIONS BY

§ 227. What questions involved.

THB FIRM.

222. What questions involved.

L In Contract.
228. All actual and ostensible
partners should be joined. ·
229. Dormant and s~cret part,.
ners proper but not necessary par ties.

L In Contract

ners proper but not neces-

sary parties.

2. Action of Tort.

230. Actions of tort may be

brought against all or any

of the partners.

221. In general. The question of actions by the firm

involves somewhat different considerations from those raised

228. a. Contracts ma.de in firm
name.
224. b. Contracts made i.n name
of one partner for t he
firm.
.825. Actions cannot usually

2. Action of Tort

be

230. Actions of tort may be
brought against all or any
of the partners.

when the action is against the firm.. Each subject will there-

fore be separately considered. What is here said has refer-

ence to actions brought during the continuance of the firm.

brought in firm name.
2. In Tort.

The rules applicable where the partnership is dissolved by

death or otherwise will be considered later when dealing

with the effect of dissolution. 1

226. All partners sue f'Or tort &ff ecting firm.

I. ACTIONS BY THE FIKM.

222. Who should sue in actions by the firm. The

question who should join as parties plaintiff may arise when

the action is (1) in contract, or (2) in tort. In the former

1 See post, 268etseq.
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§ 221. In general.-The question of actions by the firm
involves somewhat different considerations from those raised
when the action is ~gainst the firm. Each subject will therefore be separately considered. What is here said has reference to actions brought during the continuance of the firm.
The rules applicable where 'the partnership is dissolved by
death or otherwise will be considered later when dealing
with the effect of dissolution.1

I.

AOTIONB BY THE

FIRM.

§ 222. Who shon.ld sue in · actions by the firm.- The
question who should join.as parties plaintiff may arise when
the action is (1) in contract, or (2) in tort. In the former
1 See post,

§ 268 et se,q_.

147

223, 224.] LAW OF PARTNEBSHIP.

§§ 223, 224.]

L.A.W OF P A.RTNERSHIP.

case the contract may have been made (a) in the name of the

firm, or (&) in the name of one partner for the benefit of th-*

firm.

1. In Contract.

223. a. Contracts made in firm name. In actions npoi

contracts made in the name of the firm, the action should ba

brought in the individual names of all the persons who were

the actual and ostensible partners at the time the debt or

contract sued upon was made or incurred. If some of those

partners have since retired from the firm, the action must

still be in the names of those who were the partners at the

time, and cannot be maintained in the names of the present

partners, except in those cases in which the outgoing part-

ners have assigned their interests to the incoming partners,

and the statutes permit such assignees to sue in their own

names, or in which there has been a promise to pay to the

new firm.

If one has been admitted as a partner who was not such

at the time the contract was made, he cannot join in the ac-
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tion, although it were agreed as between the partners them-

selves that he should become equally interested with the

others in all the existing property and rights of the firm ;

unless, after the accession of the incoming partner, there has

been a new and binding promise to pay the firm as newly

constituted. DormanLpaxtners are admissible butju4 indis-

pensable parties. Nominal partners need not be joined un-

less they have been expressly namefKn the contract. 1

224. 5. Contracts made in name of one partner for

the fir'm. Where the contract was made in the name of

one partner but for the benefit of the firm, the action should

usually be brought, on simple contracts, in the name of all

the partners who constituted the firm at the time the con-

1 See Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Floss v. Loop (1833), 5 Vt 116, 26 Am.

(1887), 67 Md. 403, 10 AtL Rep. 139, Dec. 286; Monroe v. Ezzel (1847), 11

1 Am. St. Eep. 898; Wood v. O'Kelly Ala. 603; Seymour v. Railroad Co,

(1851), 8 Cush. (Mass.) 406; Hilllker (1882), 106 U. S. 820.
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case the contract may have been made (a) in the name of the
firm, or (b) in the name of one partner for the benefit of th4'1
firm.
1. In Contract.

§ 223. a. Contracts made in firm name.- In actions upo1
contracts made in the name of the firm, the action should be
brought in the individual names of all the persons who were
the actual and ostensible partners at the time the debt or
contract sued upon was made or incurred. If some of those
partners have since retired from the firm, the action must
still be in the names of those who were .the partners at the
time, and cannot be maintained in the names of the present
partners, except in those cases in which the outgoing partners have assigned their interests to the incoming partners,
and the statutes permit such assignees to sue in their own
names, or in which there has been a promise to pay to th&
new firm.
If one has been admitted as a. partner who was not such
at the time the contract was made, he cannot join in the action, although it were agreed as between the partners themselves that he should become equally interested with the
others in all the existing property and rights of the firm;
unless, after the accession of the incoming partner, there has.
been a new and binding promise to pay the firm as newly
constituted. Dorma.nt paxt·AArs are admissible bu~ indispensable parties. Nominal
rs need not be jol.!1e4 unless they have been expressly nam.@d"in the contraot.1

§ 224. b. Contracts made in name of one partner for·
the flrm.-Where the contract was made in the name of
one partner but for the benefit of the firm, the action should
usually be brought, on simple contracts, in the name of all
the partners who constituted the firm at the time the oon1 See Fireman's Ins. Co. v. F1oss ~. Loop (1833), 5 Vt. 116, 26 Am.
(1887), 67 Md. 403, 10 AtL Rep. 139, Dec. 286; Monroe v. Ezzel (1847), 11
1 Am. St. Rep. 898 ;. Wood v. O'Kelly Ala.. 603; Seymour v. Railroad Co.
(1851). 8 Cush. (Mass.) 406; Hilliker (1882), 106 U. S. 320.

148
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AOTIOKS BY AND AGAINST FIRM. [ 225, 226.

A<:mONS' BY AND AGAINST FIRM.

tract was maae > though, where the contract is expressly made

[§§ 225, 226.

with one partner, he alone might sue upon it; on contracts

under seal the action must bo brought in the name of the

partner who made it. 1

Where the firm sues on a contract made by one partner

who did not disclose the existence of the firm, the defendant

may usually avail himself of any defenses which might have

been open to him if the partner had sued in his own name. 2

225. Actions cannot usually be brought in firm name.

As has already been noticed, actions cannot be brought by the

firm in the firm name unless by virtue of a statute author-

izing it. In the absence of such a statute, partners sue col-

lectively, but as individuals. In their process and pleading it

is proper, though not usually necessary, to allege that they

tract was mane> though, where the contract is expressly made
with one partner, he alone might sue upon it; on contracts
under seal the action must be brought in the name of the
partner who made it.1
Where the firm sues on a contract made by one partner
who did not disclose the existence of the firm, the defendant
may usually av-ail himself of any defenses which might have
been open to him if the partner had sued in his own name.2

are partners .and constitute the firm named.

In many states, however, there are now statutes author-

izing suits in the firm name, either generally or where the

individual names are not known at the time the action is

commenced.
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2. In Tort.

226. All partners must sue for torts affecting firm.

In actions for torts committed against the firm as such, such

as trespass to its property, injury to its business, libels upon

it, and the like, all of the partners must join as plaintiffs.

One partner, therefore, cannot maintain an action to recover

damages for an injury to firm property.' There can be no

recovery, however, in the action by the firm, for injuries

which affect the partners personally. Thus, for example,

when suing for a libel upon the firm, the injury to the firm

business is only to be recovered for in the firm's action, and

not the injury to the feelings of the partners personally;

!See Metcalfe v. Rycroft (1817), See Sindelare v. Walker (1891),

6 Maule & SeL 75: Scott v. Good- 137 III 43, 27 N. E. Rep. 59. 31 Am.

win (1797), 1 Bos. & PuL 67; State St Rep. 353. See, also, White v.

§ 225. Actions cannot usually be brought in firm name...d.s has already been noticed, actions cannot be brought by the
firm in the firm name unless by virtue of a statute authorizing it. In the absence of such a statute, partners sue collectively, but as individuals. In their process and pleading it
is proper, though not usually necessary, to allege that they
are partners and constitute the firm named.
In many states, however, there are now statutes author:.
izing suits. in the firm name, either generally or where the
indiyidual names are not known at the time the action is
commenced.
2. In Tort.

T. Merritt (1879), 70 Ma 275. Campbell (1893), 18 R. L 150; Bige-

*See Gilbert v. Lichtenberg low v. Reynolds (1888), 68 Mich. 344,

(1894X 98 Mich. 417. 36 N. W. Rep. 95.
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§ 226. All partners must sue for torts affecting ftrm.ln actions for torts committed against the firm as such, such
as trespass tO its property, injury to its business, libels upon
it, and the like, all of the partners must join as plaintiffs.
One partner, therefore, cannot maintain an action to recover
damages for an injury to firm property.a There ~n be no
recovery, however, in the action by the firm, for injuries
which affect the partners personally. Thus, for example,
when suing for a libel upon the firm, the injury to the firm
business is only to be recovered for in the firm's action, and
not the injury to the feelings of the partners personally;
.1 See

Metcalfe v. Rycroft (1817),

I

See Sindelare v. Walker (1891),

6 Maule & Sel 75; Scott v. Good- 137 fil 43, 27 N. E. Rep. 59, 31 Am.
win (1797), 1 Bos. & Pul. _67; State St. Rep. 353. See, also, White v.

Campbell (1893), 18 R. L 150; Bigev. Merritt (1879), 70 Mo. 275.
2 See
Gilbert v. Lichtenberg low v. Reynolds (1888), 68 Mich. 844,
36 N. W. Rep. 95.
(1894), 98 Mich. 417.
149

§§ 227-229.]

LA.W OF P ABTNEBBBIP.

227-229.] LAW OP PABTNEBSHIP.

and when suing for the wrongful seizure of property, the

seizure of the individual property of one partner is not to

be considered. 1

II. ACTIONS AGAINST THE FlEM.

227. Who should be sued in actions against the firm.

and when suing for the wrongful seizure of property, the
seizure ·of the individual .property of one partner is not to
be ·considered.1

The question, who are proper parties defendant in actions

n.

against the firm, presents substantially the same considera-

tions as the question who should be plaintiffs,

1. In Contract.

228. All actual and ostensible partners should be

joined. The contract obligations of the firm being joint,

all of the actual and ostensible partners who were such at

the date of the contract must, as a rule, be joined as parties

defendant in actions of contract. This rule, however, has

been changed in several states by statutes which make joint

1. In Contract.

The fact that one who was a partner when the contract

neither can one who was not then a partner, but has since
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come in, be held liable unless by novation or otherwise he

has assumed liability.*

229. Dormant and secret partners proper bat not nec-

essary parties. Dormant and secret partners are proper

but not necessary parties. If the contract were made by

one partner in his own name, but really for the firm, that

partner or all of the partners may be sued, if it were a sim-

ple contract; but if it were a specialty, the partner named

in it can alone be sued. 4

1 Watts v. Rice (1883), 75 Ala. 289; sey, New Mexico, North Carolina

Donaghue v. Gaffy (1885), 53 Conn, and Tennessee.

43, 2 AtL Rep. 397. See ante, 218-220.

J This seems to be the case in Ala- * See Cleveland v. Woodward

bama, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, (1843), 15 Vt 302, 40 Am. Dec. 682,

Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Missis- North v. Bloss (1864), 30 N. Y. 874;

sippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jer- Page v. Brant (1856), 18 III 37;

Hatch v. Wood (1862), 43 N. H. 633.
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Frn.M.

§ 227. Who should be sued in actions against the ftrm.
The question, who are proper parties defendant in actions
against the firm, presents substantially the same considerations as the question who should be plaintiffs.

debts joint and several at the option of the obligee.*

was made has since retired will not relieve him from liability ;

AOTIONS AGAINST THE

§ 228. A.II actual and ostensibie partners should be
joined.~ The

contract obligations of the firm being joint,
all of the actual and osten~ible partners who were such at
the date of the contract must, as a rule, be joined as parties
defendant in actions of contract. This rule, however, has
been changed in several states by statutes which make joint
debts joint and several at the option of the obligee.2
The fact that one who was a partner when the contra.ct
was made has since retired will not relieve him from liability;
neither can one who was not then a partner, but has since
come in, be held liable unless by novation or otherwise he
has assumed liability.1

§ 229. Dormant and secret partners proper b11t not neeessary parties.- Dormant and secret partners are proper
but not necessary parties. If the contract were made by
one partner in his own name, but really for the firm, that
partner or all of the partners may be sued, if it were a simple contract; but if it were a specialty, the partner named
in it can alone be sued.'
1 Watts v. Rice (1883), 75Ala. 289; sey, New Mexico, North Carolina
Donaghue v. Gaffy (1885), 53 Conn. and Tennessee.
43, 2 Atl Rep. 397.
aSee ante, §§ 218-220.
2 This seems to be the case in Ala' See Cleveland v. Woodward
bama, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, (1848), 15 Vt. ~02, 40 Am. De~ 682,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Missis- North v. Bloss (1864), 30 N. Y. 874;
sippi, Missouri, Montana., New Jer- Page v. Brant (1856), 18 Ill 87;
Hatch v. Wood (1862), 43 N. H. 633.
150
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ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST FIRM.

[ 230.

.A.OTIOli8 BY AND A.EU.INST J'IRJ1.

'(§ 230.

2. Actions of Tori.

230. Actions of tort may be brought against all or any

of the partners. Causes of action in tort for wrongs com-

2. .Actions of Tori.

mitted either by the firm, or by a partner in its behalf, or

by its servants or agents, are not joint, but joint and several,

and the suit may be brought against all or any of the part-

ners.

An exceptM>n_fco_this rule is said to exist where Jhe action

ajrises in respect of their common interest in land, where all

c tight to be joined.
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. 161

§ 230. Actions of tort may be brought against all or any
of the partners.- Causes of action in tort for wrongs committed either by tlie firm, or by a partner in its behalf, or
by its servants or agents, are not joint, but joint and several,
and the suit may be brought against all or any of the partners.
An exception to this rule is said to exist whereJ!!!Laction
rises in r ect of their common interest in land, where all
ught to be joined.
--m

CHAPTER XIY.

OF THE TERMINATION OF THE PARTNERSHIP.

% 281. Of the methods of termina-

tion in general.

L TERMINATION BY ACT OF PAS-

TIES.

L Termination by Original Agree-

ment.

CHAPTER XIV.

233. What methods included.

233. Termination by lapse

OF THE TERMINATION OF THE P ARTNERBHIP.

of time.

234 Termination by accom-

plishment of object

& Dissolution by Subsequent Act of

Parties.

I

281. Of the methods of termin&- § 248. Method of dissolving by act

tion in generaL

of one partner.

235. In general.

230. Dissolution by act of all

Mutual consent.

237. Dissolution by act of one

L TERMINATION BY Ac:n OJ' P.ut-

n

TIES.

L Termination by Original Agree-

244. What methods included.

Partnership at will.

tion.
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288. Partnership on condi-

239. Dissolution by one partner

when created for definite

period.

240-243. Can there be an in-

dissoluble partnership?

ment.

1

232. What methods included. .
233. Termination by lapse
of time.
934. Termination by &eoomplishment of object.

243. Method of dissolving by let

of one partner.

H. TERMINATION BY ACT OB OPK&>

ATION OP LAW.

244 What methods included.

1. Events Causing Termination.

245. Death of a partner.

246. Insanity of a partner.

247. Bankruptcy of a partner

248. Marriage of a partner.

249. Guardianship of a partner.

250. War between countries of

partners.

2. Termination by Decree of Court,

251. Declaring void.

252. Dissolving in equity.

253. Causes for dissolution

Fraud.

254 Insanity or incapacity

Tlm:mNATION BY Aur OB OPDATION OP LA.W.

1. Eventa OaUsing Termination.

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Death. of a partner.
Insanity of a partner.
Bankruptcy of a partner.
Marriage of a partner.
Guardianship of a partner.
War between countries of
partners.

S. Dissolution by Subsequent Act o/
Parties.
235. In general
2. Termination by De.cree of Court.
236. Dissolution by aot of all 251. Declaring void.
Mutual consent.
252. Dissolving in equity.
287. Dissolution by aot of one 253. Causes for dissolution Partnership at will.
Fraud.
288. Partnership on condi2M. Insanity or incapacity
tion.
of partner.
!3G. Dissolution by one partner
255, 256. Misconduct of a
when created for definite
partner.
period.
257. Impossibility of sue>
Can there be an in240-242. cess.
dissoluble partnership?

of partner.

255, 256. Misconduct of a

partner.

257. Impossibility of suo

cess.

231. Of the methods of termination in general.

The methods by which the partnership relation may be ter-

minated may be classified, like those for terminating the re-

lation of principal and agent, under two heads : I. By the act

of the parties. II. By operation of law. The first of these

may be further subdivided as follows : 1. By virtue of the

original agreement of the parties. 2. By force of their sub-

sequent act.

152

§ 231. Of the methods of termination in general.The methods by which the partnership relation may be terminated may be classified, like those for terminating the relation of principal and agent, under two heads: I. By the act
of the parties. II. By op~ration of law. The first of these
may be further subdivided as follows: 1•. By virtue of the
original agreement of the parties. 2. By force of their subsequent act.
152
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TERMINATION OF PARTNERSHIP. [ 232-236.

TERllIN.A.TION OF PARTNERSHIP.

L TERMINATION BY ACT OF THE PARTIES.

(§§ 23.2-236.

1. Termination by Original Agreement.

232. What methods included. The partnership may

bo said to be terminated by original agreement where it

L

TERMINATION BY

AOT

OF THE PARTIES.

comes to an end by virtue of some limitation expressly or

impliedly put upon it by the parties at the time of its crea-

1. Termination l>y Original Agreement.

tion. There are two principal methods falling under this

head : a. By lapse of time ; b. By accomplishment of object.

233. Termination by lapse of time. a. Partner-

ship is terminated by lapse of time where the period for its

continuance was originally fixed by the agreement of the

partners, and that period has elapsed. It may be continued

afterwards by agreement, but this is practically the creation

of a new partnership. 1

234. Termination by accomplishment of object.

b. Partnership comes to an end by accomplishment of its

§ 232. What methods included.- The partnership may
bo said to be terminated by original agreement where it
comes to an end by virtue of some limitation expressly or
impliedly put upon it by the parties at the time of its creation. There are two principal methods falling under this
head: a. By lapse of time; b. By accomplishment of object.

object where it was originally created for a single or tem-

porary purpose, or a single transaction, and that purpose

has been accomplished or that transaction has come to an
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end. Such a partnership may be continued by agreement

or acquiescence, but otherwise it comes to an end. 1

2. Dissolution by Subsequent Act of Parties.

235. In general. The dissolution of the partnership

by the subsequent act of the parties may be the result of the

act of all of the partners or of one. That act may be taken

with the mutual consent of all, or it may be sought to be

§ .2 33. - - Termination by lapse of ti_me.- a. Partnership is terminated by lapse of time where the period for its
continuance was originally fixed by the agreement of the
partners, and that period has elapsed. It may be continued·
afterwards by agreement, but this is practically the creation
of a new partnership.1

taken by one against the wish of the others.

236. Dissolution by act of all Mutual consent.

Dissolution by the act of all of the partners finds its most

common form in dissolution by mutual consent. The same

i See Phillips v. Reeder (1866), 18 Drake (1885), 83 Minn. 408, 23 N.

N. J. Eq. 95. W. Rep. 840; Bank of Montreal v.

' See Sims v. Smith (1858), 11 Page (1881), 98 11L 109.

Rich, (S. G.) L. 565; Bohrer T.

153

§ 234. - - Termination by accomplishment of object.b. Partnership comes to an end by accomplishment of its
object where it was orj.ginally created for a single or ternporary purpose, or a single transaction, and that purpose
has been 'accomplished or that transaction has come to an
end. Such a partnership may be continued by agreement
or acquiescence, but otherwise it comes to an end. 2
/

2. IJissolutU>n l>y Subsequent .Act of PMties.

§ 235. In general.- The dissolution of the partnership
by the subsequent act of the parties may be the result of the
act of all of the partners or of one. That act may be taken
with the mutual consent of all, or it may be sought to be
taken by one against the wish of the others.
§ 236. Dissolution by act of all-Mutual consent.Dissolution by the act of all of the partners finds its most .
·common form in dissolution by mutual consent. The same
1 See Phillips v. Reeder (1866), 18 Drake (1885), 33 Minn. 408, 28 N.
N. J. Eq. 95.
W. Rep. 840; Bank of Montreal v.
2 See Sims v. Smith (1858), 11 Page (1881), 98 Ill 109.
Rioh. (S. C.} L. 565; Bohrer v.
153"

237, 238.] LAW OP PABTNEBSHIP.

§§ 237, 238. J

LAW Olr PARTNERSHIP.

persons who created the partnership may terminate it, and

they may do this as well where it was originally created to

endure for a fixed period, not yet expired, as where no pe-

riod was fixed. The same result will practically ensue

where all refuse to carry on the business or unite in wind-

ing it up and dividing the assets. 1

237. Dissolution by act of one partner Partnerships

at will. The question of the power and right of one part-

ner, or any number less than all, to dissolve the partnership

depends largely upon the period for which it was created.

persons who created the partnership may terminate it, and
they may do this as well where it was originally created to
endure for a fixed period, not yet expired, as where no period was fixed. The same result will practically ensuEJ
where all refuse to carry on the business or unite in winding it up and dividing the assets.1

If no time was fixed for its continuance, it is in law a part-

nership at will, and may be terminated by any partner with-

out liability at any time. 2

The civil, French and Scotch law declare that the right

to dissolve even a partnership at will is subject to the con-

ditions that it shall be exercised in good faith and at a rea-

sonable time;' but these limitations do not appear to be

recognized by the English common law. 4

238. Dissolution by act of one partner Partnership
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on condition. The partners may provide in their partner-

ship agreement or articles that one partner shall have the

right to terminate the partnership, though formed for a defi-

nite period, by giving a stipulated notice or upon the hap-

pening of a specified event. Where such a provision is

made, the partner, by acting iii pursuance of it, may law-

fully terminate the partnership even though the period for

which it otherwise would continue has not expired. 6

iSee Bank v. Page (1881), 98 IU 57, 12 N. E. Rep. 67; Fletcher T.

109; Wells v. Ellis (1885), 68 CaL Reed (1881), 131 Mass. 812, Paige's

243, 9 Pac. Rep. 80; Ligare v. Pea- Partn. Cas. 192; Howell v. Harvey

§ 237. Dissol~tion by aet of one partner-Partnerships
~t will.-The question of the power and right of one part.
ner, or any number less than all, to dissolve the partnership
depends largely upon the period for which it was created.
If no time was fixed for its continuance, it ii in law a partnership at will, and may be terminated by any partner without liability at any time.2
The civil, French and Scotch law decla~ that the right
to dissolve even a partnership at will is snbject to the conditions that it shall be exercised in good faith and at a reasonable time;' but these limitations do not appear to be
recognized by the English common law.'

cock (1884), 109 III 94; Richardson -1843), 5 Ark. 270. 39 Am. Dec. 376.

v. Gregory (1888), 126 IU 166, 18 N. See Howell v. Harvey, supra.

E. Rep. 777. 4 See Story on Partnership, 275.

See Walker v. Whipple (1885), See Swift v. Ward (1890), 80

58 Mich. 476, 25 N. W. Rep. 472; Iowa, 700, 45 N. W. Rep. 1044, 11 L.

Blake v. Sweeting (1887), 121 I1L R. A. 302.

154

§ 238. Dissolution by aet of one partner - Partnership
on eondition.-The partners may provide in their partnership agreement or articles that oiie partner shall have the
right to terminate the partnership, though formed for a definite period, by giving a stipulawd notice or upon the happening of a specified event. Where such a provision is
made, the partner, by acting lli pursuance of it, may lawfully terminate the partnershiy even though the period for
which it otJ;terwise would continue has not expired. 1
1 See Bank v. Page (1881), 98 ID
109; Wells v. Ellis (1885), 68 Cal
243, 9 Pac. Rep. 80; Ligare v. Peacock (1884), 109 m 94; Richardson
v. Gregory (1888), 126 Ill 166, 18 N.
E. Rep. 777.
2 See Walker v. Whipple (1885),
58 Mich. 476, 25 N. W. Rep. 472;
Blake v. Sweeting (1887), 121 m

67, 12 N. E. Rep. 67; Fletcher T.
Reed (1881), 131 Mass. 812, Paige's
Partn. Cas. 192; Howell v. Harvey
~1843), 5 Ark 270, 39 Am. Dec. 376.
aSee Howell v. Harvey, supra.
'See Story on Partnership,§ 275.
•See Swift v. Ward (1890), 80
:Iowa, 700, 45 N. W. Rep.·1044.11 L ·
B. A. 802..

154
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TERMINATION OF PARTNERSHIP. [ 239, 240.

239. Dissolution by one partner when for definite

TERMINATION OY P.ilTNRRSHIP.

(§§ 239, 240.

period. If, however, the partnership was originally created

to continue for a fixed period, and no provision is made for

its earlier dissolution, its dissolution by one partner before

that time has expired presents difficulties. The conduct of

the other partners may be such as to justify a dissolution,

or it may be sought at the mere will of one partner with-

out any justification. Although the authorities are not

uniform, the true principle is probably found in the same dis-

tinction which was observed in terminating the relation of

principal and agent, i. <?., that of the power to revoke as dis-

tinguished from the right to revoke. Every partner has

doubtless the power to withdraw from the firm and ter-

minate the right of his partner to further bind him, at any

time, even before the stipulated period, and without any

other reason than his own will ; but when he so revokes in

violation of his agreement he subjects himself to an action

for damages by his partner.

240. Same subject Can there be an indissoluble
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partnership? In a leading case l upon this subject it is said

that the right of one partner to dissolve the partnership " is

a right inseparably incident to every partnership. There

can be no such thing as an indissoluble partnership. Every

partner has an indefeasible right to dissolve the partnership,

as to all future contracts, by publishing his own volition to

that effect; and after such publication the other members

of the firm have no capacity to bind him by any contract.

Even where partners covenant with each other that the

partnership shall continue seven years, either partner may

dissolve it the next day by proclaiming his determination

for that purpose ; the only consequence being that he thereby

§ 239. Dissolution by one partner when for definite
period.- If, however, the partnership was originally created
to continue for a fixed period, and no provision is made for
its earlier dissolution, its dissolution by one partner before
that time has expired presents difficulties. The conduct of
the other partners may be such as to justify a dissolution,
or it may be sought at the mere will of one partner without any · justification. Although the authorities are not
uniform, the true principle is probably found in the same distinction which was observed in terminating the relation of
principal and agent, i. e., that of the power. to revoke as distinguished from the right to revoke. Every partner has
doubtless the power to withdraw from the firm and terminate the right of his partner to further bind him, at any
time, even before the stipulated period, and without any
other reason than his own will; but when he so revokes in
violatio:p. of his agreement he subjects himself to an action
for damages by his partner.

subjects himself to a claim for damages for a breach of his

1 Skinner v. Dayton (1822), 19 Rep. 336, Paige's Partn. Gas. 195;

Johns. (N. Y.) 513, 10 Am. Dec. 286. Mason v. Connell (1836), 1 Whart.

To same effect: Solomon v. Kirk- (Pa.) 381; Sleinmer's Appeal (1868),

wood (1884), 55 Mich. 256, 21 N. W. 58 Pa. St 169, 98 Am. Dec. 255.

155

§ !40. Same subjec~ - Can there be an indissoluble
partnership t-In a leading case 1 upon this subject it is said
that the right of one partner to dissolve the partnership "is
a right inseparably incident to every partnership. There
can be no such thing as an i:Q.dissoluble partnership. Every
partner has an indefeasible right to dissolve the partnership,
as to all future contracts, by publishing his own volition to
that effect; and
. after such publication the other members
of the firm have no capacity to bind him by any contract.
Even where partners covenant with each other that the ·
partnership shall continue seven years, either partner may
dissolve it the next day by proclaiming his determination
for that purpose; the only consequence being that he thereby
. subjects himself to a claim for damages for a breach of his
Skinner v. Dayton (1822), 19
Johns. (N. Y.) 513, 10 Am. Dec. 286.
To same effect: Solomon v. Kirkwood (1884), 55 'Mich. 256, 21 N. W.
l

Rep. 336,
Mason v.
(Pa.) 381;
58 Pa.. St.

155

Paige's Partn. Cas. 195;
Connell (1836), 1 Whart.
Sleinmer's Appeal (1868),
169, 98 Am. Dec. 255.

i

241.]

LAW OJ' P ABTNERSHIP.

241.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

covenant. The power given by one partner to another to

make joint contracts for them both is not only a revocable

power, but a man can do no act to divest himself of the ca-

pacity to revoke it."

In another case, 1 in which the foregoing language was ap-

proved, the court said : " There may be cases in which equity

would enjoin a dissolution for a time, when the circum-

stances were such as to make it specially injurious ; but no

question of equitable restraint arises here. "When one part-

ner becomes dissatisfied there is commonly no legal policy

to be subserved by compelling a continuance of the relation,

and the fact that a contract will be broken by the dissolu-

tion is no argument against the right to dissolve. Most

contracts may be broken at pleasure, subject, however, to

responsibility in damages. And that responsibility would

exist in breaking a contract of partnership as in other cases."

241. Same subject. But this right of one partner to

dissolve at will a partnership created for a fixed period has

been vigorously denied. Thus, Mr. Justice Story has said :
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" Whenever a stipulation is positively made that the partner-

ship shall endure for a fixed period, or for a particular ad-

venture or voyage, it would seem to be at once inequitable

and injurious to permit any partner, at his mere pleasure, to

violate his engagement and thereby to jeopard, if not sacri-

fice, the whole objects of the partnership; for the success of

covenant. The power given by one partner to another to
make joint contracts for them both is .not only a revocable
power, but a man can do no act to divest himself of the capacity to revoke it."
In another case,1 in which the foregoing language was approved, the court said: "There may be cases in which equity
would ·enjoin a dissolution for a time, when the circumstances .were such as to make it specially injurious; but no
·question of equitable restraint arises here. When one partner becomes dissatisfied there is commonly no legal policy
to be subserved by compelling a continuance of the relation,
.and the fact that a contract will be broken by the dissolution is no argument against the right to dissolve. Most
-contracts may be broken at pleasure, subject, however, to
responsibility in damages. And that responsibility w~uld
-exist in breaking a contract of partnership as in other cases."

the whole undertaking may depend upon the due accom-

plishment of the adventure or voyage, or the entire time be

required to put the partnership into beneficial operation.

It is no answer to say that such a violation of the engage-

ment may entitle the injured partners to compensation in

damages; for, independently of the delay and uncertainty

attendant upon any such mode of redress, it is obvious that

the remedy may be, nay, must be, in many cases utterly in-

adequate, and unsatisfactory. If there be any real and just

ground for the abandonment of the partnership, a court of

1 Solomon v. Kirkwood, supra.

156

§ 24:1. Sa~e subject.-But this right of one partner to
dissolve at will a partnership created for a fixed period has
been vigorously denied. Thus, Mr. Justice Story has said:
"Whenever a stipulation is positively made that the partnership shall endure for a fixed period, or for a particular adventure or voyage, it would seem to be at once inequitable
.and injurious to permit any partner, at his mere pleasure, to
violate his engagement and thereby to jeopard, if not sacrifice, the whole objects of the partnership; for the success of
the whole undertaking may depend upon the due accomplishment of the. adventure or voyage, or the entire time be
required to P1:1t the partnership into beneficial operation.
It is no answer to say that such a violation of the engagement may entitle the injured partners to compensation in
damages; for, independently of the delay and uncertainty
.attendant upon any such mode of redress, it is obvious that
the remedy may be, nay, must be, in many cases utterly inadequate. and unsatisfactory. If there be any real and just
.g round for the abandonment of the partnership, a court of
l

Solomon v. Kirkwood, aupra.
156
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TERMINATION OF PARTNERSHIP. [ 242-244.

TERMINATION OF PARTNERSHIP.

equity is competent to administer suitable redress. But

(§§ 242-244,

that is exceedingly different from tho right of the partner,

sua sponte, from mere caprice, or at his own pleasure, to dis-

solve the partnership." l

24:2. Same subject. Courts have in several cases en-

joined a dissolution where it would work irreparable injury

or denied a decree for dissolution when sought in violation

of the agreement. The unsettled condition of the law upon

the subject, and the fact that a dissolution, conceding the

equity is competent to administer suitable redress. But_
that is exceedingly different from tho right of the partner,.
sua spon-te, from mere caprice, or at his own pleasure, to dissolve the partnership." 1

right to make it, may often be impracticable of effect with-

out judicial assistance, render it usually desirable, if not nec-

essary, to have recourse to a court of equity when it is

sought to enforce the dissolution of a partnership created

for a fixed period. The reasons which will justify this pro-

ceeding will be discussed in later sections.

243. Method of dissolving by act of partner. No par-

ticular method of dissolving a partnership by the act of a

partner is necessary. A voluntary sale or transfer of his in-

terest by one partner works a dissolution. The same result,
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as has been seen, attends an involuntary sale by judicial pro-

cess, as upon execution against the partner. 2

In the absence of such a sale, an unconditional notice of

the dissolution given by the partner to his partners is suffi-

cient as between themselves. Even where the partnership

was created by written instrument, or by instrument under

seal, a dissolution by parol is usually held sufficient.*

II. TERMINATION BY ACT OB OPERATION OF LAW.

§ 24:2. Same subject.- Courts have in several cases enjoined a dissolution where it would work irreparable injury
or denied a decree for dissolution when sought in violation.
of the agreement. The µnsettled condition of the law upon
the subject, and the fact that a dissolution, conceding the·
right to make it, may often be impracticable of effect without judicial assistance, render it usually desirable, if not necessary, -to have recourse to a court of equity when it is
sought to enforce the dissolution of a partnership created
for a fixed period. The reasons which will justify this pro.ceeding will be discussed in later sections.

244. What methods included. Under this head will

be included, though possibly somewhat illogically, 1, disso-

1 Story on Partnership, 275. * See Green v. State Bank (1890),

2 See Blater v. Sands (1882), .29 78 Ter. 2; Swift v. Ward (1890), 80

Kan. 551; Wilson v. Waugh (1882), Iowa, 700, 45 N. W. Rep, 1044, 11

101 Pa. St. 233; Carter v. Roland L. R. A. 302.

(1880), 53 Tex. 540.
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§ 24:3. Method of dissolving by act of partner.-No particular method of dissolving a partnership by the act of a..
partner is necessary. A voluntary sale or transfer of his· interest by one par-tner works a dissolution. The same result,..
as has been seen, attends an involuntary sale by judicial process, as upon execution against the partner.2
In the absence of such a sale, an unconditional notice of
the dissolution given by the partner to his partners is sufficient as between themselves. Even where the partnershipwas created by written instrument, or by instrument under·
s~al, a dissolution by parol is usually held suflicient.1

II.

TERMINATION BY

AOT

oR OPERATION OF

LAw.

§ 244:. What methods included. - Under this head will
be included, though possibly somewhat illogically, 1, dissoa See Green v. State Bank (1890),
Story on Partnership, § 275.
Blater v. Sands (1882), .29 78 Tex. 2; Swift v. Ward (1890), so.
Kan. 551; Wilson v. Waugh (1882), Iowa, 700, 45 N. W. Rep. 1044, U .
101 Pa. St. 233; Carter v. Roland LR. A. 302.
(1880), 53 Tex. 540.
157
l

2 See

245-247.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP

lutions caused by the mere operation of law in case of the

happening of particular events, and 2, dissolutions decreed

by law at the suit of one or more partners.

1. Events Causing Dissolution.

245. Death of a partner. Death of one partner operates

to instantly dissolve an ordinary partnership, and this is usu-

ally held to be true even though the partnership articles

provide for a continuance of the partnership by his execu-

tors or others, this being deemed to be really the creation

of a new partnership rather than the mere continuation of

the old. 1

Where there were more than two partners, the death of

one not only dissolves the partnership as to him, but it dis-

solves the partnership between the survivors also.

246. Insanity of a partner. Although opinions have

differed upon the subject, the rule seems now to be settled

that the insanity of one partner does not of itself work a

dissolution of the firm, but may constitute sufficient ground

to justify a court in decreeing a dissolution.*
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247. Bankruptcy of a partner. Bankruptcy of one

partner by which is meant the public or statutory condi-

tion as distinguished from mere insolvency operates to dis-

solve the partnership.*

The same result must also ensue from his assignment of

all of his property including his partnership interest for

the benefit of his creditors, or from the seizure and sale of

i See Vincent v. Martin (1885), 79 Y. 838, 22 N. E. Rep. 160, 163, 5 L.

Ala. 540; Exchange Bank v. Tracy R. A. 410.

(1883), 77 Ma 594; Schmidt v. See Raymond v. Vaughn (1889),

Archer (1887), 113 Ind. 365, 14 N. E. 128 III 256, 21 N. E. Rep. 566, 15 Am.

Rep. 543; Durant v. Pierson (1891), St Rep. 112, 4 L. R. A. 440.

134 N. Y. 444, 26 N. E. Rep. 1095, 21 See Eustis v. Bolles (1888), 146

Am. St. Rep. 686; Van Kleeck v. Mass. 413, 16 N. E. Rep. 286, 4 Am.

Hammell (1891), 87 Mich. 599, 49 N. St Rep. 327; Siegel v. Chidsey

W. Rep. 872. 24 Am. St. Rep. 182; (1857), 28 Pa. St. 279, 70 Am. Dec.

Stewart v. Robinson (1889), 115 N. 124.
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.TERMINATION OF PARTNERSHIP. [ 248-251.

TERMINATION OF PARTNERSHIP.

his interest at the suit of his individual creditors. A fortiori

(§§ 248-251.

where all the partners unite in making an assignment of all

of the partnership property for the benefit of its creditors,

involving an entire suspension and winding up of partner-

ship affairs, the partnership is dissolved. 1

248. Marriage of partner. Marriage of a female part-

ner to a non-partner, at common law, but not under most of

the modern statutes, would operate to dissolve the partner-

ship. Even under such statutes, if a male and a female part-

ner intermarry the partnership would, in most states, be

his interest at the suit of his individual creditors. Af<n"tiori
where all the partners unite in making an assignment of all
of the partnership property for the benefit of its creditors,
involving an entire suspension and winding up of partnership affairs, the partnership -is dissolved.I

thereby dissolved. 2

249. Guardianship of a partner. Guardianship of one

partner, by virtue of which the management of his property

is taken from him, operates probably to dissolve the part-

nership, and at all events would, like insanity, be a ground

for decreeing a dissolution.'

250. War between countries of partners. War be-

tween the countries of which the partners are citizens at

least suspends, and probably works a dissolution of, a com
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mercial partnership. 4

§ 24:8. Marriage of partner.- Marriage of a female partner to a non-partner, at common law, but not under most of
the modern statutes, would operate to dissolve the partner·
ship. Even under such statutes, if a male and a female partner intermarry the partnership would, in most states, be
thereby dissolved.2

2. Termination by Decree of Court.

251. Declaring void. Before taking up the question

of dissolution by decree, the present seems a convenient place

for mentioning a remedy in the same line, but of far more

extensive effect. Thus, instead of dissolving the partnershi ] >

and thereby terminating it from the date of the decree, a

court of equity may find sufficient ground for rescinding the

contract of partnership altogether and declaring the part-

!See Wells v. Ellis (1885), 68 CaL *See Parsons on Partnership,

§ 249. Guardianship of a partner.-Guardianship of one
partner, by virtue of which the management of his property
is taken from him, operates probably to dissolve the partnership, and at all events would, like insanity, be a ground
for decreeing a dissolution.'

243, 9 Pac. Rep. 80. 303.

*See Brown v. Chancellor (1884), * Wood v. Wilder (1870), 43 N. Y.

61 Tex. 437; Basse tt v. Shepardson 164, 3 Am. Rep. 684; Hubbard v.

(1883), 52 Mich, 3, 17 N. W. Rep. 217. Matthews (1873), 54 N. Y. 43, 13

See, also, ante, 25. Am. Rep. 562; Griswold v. Wad-

dington, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 438, 491.
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§ 250. War between countries of partners.- War b&
·tween the countries of which the partners are citizens at
least suspends, and probably works a dissolution of, a commercial partnership.'
2. Termination by IJe(!l'ee

of Oowrt.

§ 251. Declaring void.- Before taking up the question
of dissolution by decree, the present seems a convenient place
for mentioning a remedy in the same line, but of far more
extensive effect. Thus, instead of dissolving the partnership
and thereby terminating it from the date of the decree, a
oourt of equity may find sufficient ground for rescinding the
contract .of partnership altogether and declaring the ·part-·
l See Wells v. Ellis (1885), 68 Cal
I See Parsons on Partnershi p,
. 243, 9 Pac. Rep. 80.
§ 303.
2 See

Brown v. Chancellor (1884),
'Wood v. Wilder (1870), 43 N. Y.
61 Tex. 43'l; Bassett v. Shepardson 164, 3 Am. Rep. 684; Hubbard v.
(1883), 52 Mich. S, 17 N. W. Rep. 217. Matthews (1873), 54 N. Y. 48, 13
See, also, ante, § 20..
Am. Rep. 562; Griswold v. Waddington, HS Johns. (N. Y.) 438, 491.
159

§ 252.]

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

252.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

nership void ab mitio. This may be done where one partr

ner has been induced through fraud, deception or oppression

to enter into the partnership in the first instance. 1 " Where

a person is induced," says Mr. Justice Lindley, 2 " by the false

representations of others to become a partner with them,

the court will rescind the contract of partnership at his in-

stance ; and will compel them to repay him whatever he may

have paid them, with interest, and to indemnify him against

all the debts and liabilities of the partnership, and, if the de-

fendants have been guilty of fraud, against all claims and

demands to which he may have become subject by reason

of his having entered into partnership with them, he on the

other hand accounting to them for what he may have re-

ceived since his entry into the concern."

252. Dissolving in equity. Many causes, however,

may exist which will justify a dissolution of the firm which

would not suffice to render the partnership void ab initio.

Of the causes for which a court will thus decree a disso-

lution several examples may be given. The courts of law,
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it may be noticed, have no jurisdiction for this purpose, and

the relief can be sought only in equity. The grounds for

the intervention of the court are usually acts occurring since

nership void ab ilnitif!. This may be done where one partner has been induced through fraud, deception or oppression
to enter into the partnership in the first instance.1 "Where
a person is-induced," says Mr. Justice Lindley,2 "by the false
representations of others to become a partner with them,
the court will rescind the contract of partnership at his instance; and will compel them to repay him whatever he may
have paid them, with interest, and to indemnify him against
all the debts and liabilities of the partnership, and, if the de-fendants have been guilty of fraud, against all claims and
demands to which he may have become subject by reason
of his having entered into partnership with them, he on the
other hand accounting to them for what he may have received since his entry into the concern.''

the formation of the partnership, but they may be acts or

events preceding its formation. The occasion for seeking a

dissolution in a court of equity arises usually only in those

cases in which it was to continue for a definite term not yet

expired, because, as has been seen, a partnership at will

merely is ordinarily dissolvable at any time by the mere

act of the parties.*

The fact that the articles provide for dissolution upon

i See Newbigging v. Adam (1886), U. & 578; Hynes v. Stewart (1850),

L. R. 34 Ch. Div. 582; My cock v. 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 429; Smith v. Ev-

Beatson (1879), 13 Ch. Div. 384; erett (1879), 126 Mass. 304; Richards

Fogg v. Johnston (1855), 27 Ala. v. Todd (1879), 127 Mass. 167.

432, 62 Am. Deo. 771; Howell T. * Lindley on Partnership, vol. II

Harvey (1843), 5 Ark. 270, 39 Am. (Swell's ed.), 482.

Dec. 376; Oteri v. Scalzo (1891), 145 > See ante, % 237.
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§ 252. Dissolving in equity.-Many causes, however,
may exist which will justify a dissolution of the firm which
would not suffice to render the partnership void ab initio.
Of the causes for which a court will thus decree a dissolution several examples may be given. The courts of law,
it may be noticed, have no jurisdiction for this purpose, and
the relief can be sought only _in equity. The grounds for
the intervention of the court are usually acts occurring since
the formation of the partnership, but they may be acts or
events preceding its formation. The occasion for seeking a
dissolution in a court of equity arises usually only in those
cases in which it was to continue for a definite term not yet
expired, because, as has been seen, a partnership at will
merely is ordinarily dissolvable at any time by the .mere
act of the parties.s
The fact that the articles provide for dissolution upon
1 See New bigging v. Adam .(1886),
L. R. 34 Ch. Div. 582; Mycock v.
Beatson (1879), 13 Ch. Div. 384;
Fogg v. Johnston (1855), 27 Ala.
432, 62 Am. Dec. 771; Howell "·
Harvey (1843), 5 Ark. 270, 39 Am.
Dec. 876; Oteri v. Scalzo (1891), 145

U.S. 578; Hynes v. Stewart (1850),
10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 429; Smith v. Everett (1879), 126 Mass. 304; Richards
v. Todd (1879), 127 Mass. 167.
2 Lindley on Partnership, vol. Il
(Ewell's ed.), 482.
s See ant6, § 287.
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TERMINATION OF PABTNEBSHIP. [ 253-255.

notice given by one partner to the other does not prevent

BRMINATION OF P.A.RTNE.RSHIP.

(§§ 253-255.

an application to a court of equity for dissolution. 1

253. Causes for dissolution Fraud. Fraud in the

creation of a partnership, as has been seen, may be a suffi-

cient ground for a rescission of the contract, but it may

notice given by one partner to the other does not prevent .
an application to a court of equity for dissolution.1

also be treated as a reason for decreeing a dissolution. 1

254. r Insanity or incapacity of partner. The in-

sanity or other physical incapacity of one partner, while not

sufficient of itself, as has been seen, to terminate the partner-

ship as matter of law, will, if of such a character as to

permanently disable the partner afflicted from performing

the duties of the partnership, be sufficient ground for de-

§ 253. Causes f~r dissolution - Fraud.- Fraud in the ·
creation of a partnership, as has been seen, may be a sufficient ground for a rescission of the contract, but it may
also be treated as a reason for decreeing _a dissolution.1

creeing a dissolution. 1

255. Misconduct of a partner. The misconduct

of one partner, other than the one praying for relief, if of

such a kind and degree as to render the further prosecution

of the partnership inexpedient, injurious or impossible, may

be ground for decreeing its dissolution. Courts will not in-

terfere upon every disagreement between the partners, nor
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" enter into a consideration of mere partnership squabbles,"

but they will interfere where the misconduct of one partner

or the dissension between the parties is so serious as to en-

danger the prosperity of the firm or destroy the confidence

which must exist between partners. Thus, abandonment of

§ 254-. - -. Insanity or incapacity of partner.- The insanity or other phy sical incapacity of one partner, while not
~uffieient of itself, as has been seen, to terminate the partner- .
ship as matter of law, will, if of such a character as to
permanently disable the partner afllicted from performing
the duties of the partnership, be sufficient ground for decreeing a dissolution.1

the business by one partner, his persistent violation of the

articles, excluding his copartner from participation, dishon-

esty, gross misconduct, and the like, have been held suffi-

cient. 4

i Adams v. Shewalter (1894), 139 1 Cox, 107; Whitwell v. Arthur

Ind. 178, 38 N. E. Rep. 607. (1865), 35 Beav. 140; Jones v. Noy

See Oteri v. Scalzo (1891), 145 (1833), 2 M. & K. 125.

U. S. 578, 12 Sup. Ct Rep. 895, 36 * See Seighortner v. Weissenborn

L. ed. 824; Rosenstein v. Burns (1869), 20 N. J. Eq. 172; Rosenstein

(1882), 41 Fed. Rep. 84t v. Burns (1882), 41 Fed. Rep. 841;

See Raymond v. Vaughn (1889), Groth v. Payment (1890), 79 Mich.

128 I1L 256, 15 Am. St Rep. 112, 4 290; Cottle v. Leitch (1868), 85 CaL

L.RA.440;Sayerv.Bennet(1783), 434; Holladay v. Elliott (1879), 8

11 161

§ 255. - - Misconduct of a partner.-The misconduct
of one partner, other than the one praying for relief, if of
such a kind and degree as to render the further prosecution
of the partnership inexpedient, injurious or impossible, may
be ground for decreeing its dissolution. Courts will not interfere upon every disagreement between the partners, nor
" enter into a consideration of mere partnership squabbles,"
but they will interfere where the misconduct of one partner
or the dissension between the parties is so serious as to endanger the prosperity of the firm or destroy the confidence
which must exist between partners. Thus, abandonment of
the business by one partner, his persistent violation of the
articles, excluding his copartner from participation, dishonesty, gross misconduct, and the like, have been held sufficient.'
1 Adams v. Shewalter (1894), 139 1 Cox, 107; Whitwell v. Arthur
Ind. 178, 38 N. E. Rep. 607.
,(1865), 35 Beav. 140; Jones v. Noy
t See Oteri v. Scalzo (1891), 145 (1833), 2 M. & K. 125.
U. S. 578, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 895, 36
' See Seighortner v. W eissenbom
L ed. 824; Rosenstein v. Burns (1869), 20 N. J. Eq. 172; Rosenstein
(1882), 41 Fed. Rep. 841.
v. Burns (1882), 41 Fed. Rep. 841;
a See Raymond v. Vaughn (1889), Groth v. Payment (1890), 79 Mich.
128 m 256, 15 Am. St. Rep. 112, 4 290; Cottle v. Leitch (1868), 85 CaL
LR. A. 440; Sayerv. Bennet (1783), 434; Holladay v. Elliott (1879), 8
11
161

256, 257.] LAW OF PABTNEBSHIP.

§§ 256, 257.]

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

256. Must not be misconduct of partner seeking

dissolution. But the partner who is himself at fault will

not be permitted to make use of his own misconduct to se-

cure a dissolution. "A party who is the author of the ill-

feeling between himself and his partners," said the court in

one case, 1 " ought not to be permitted to make the relation

he has induced the ground of a dissolution of the partner-

ship. His conduct may have been taken with a view to

that very result, and it would be inequitable to allow him

advantage from his own wrongful acts. It would allow one

partner, at his election, to put an end to his own deliberate

contract, when the other had been guilty of no wrongful

act or omission of duty."

257. Impossibility of success. So, though there

be no misconduct, if the further prosecution of the partner-

ship with profit or success has become impossible or imprac-

ticable, if its purpose or object has become unattainable, if

it is found that the scheme or theory upon which the part-

nership was based was illusory or erroneous, in these and
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like cases the court may decree its dissolution, as it is not

to the advantage of any one that the business should be con-

§ 256. - - Must not be misconduct o·r partner seeking
dissolution.-But the partner who is himself at fault will
not be permitted to make use of his own misconduct to s&cure a dissolution. "A party who is the author of the illfeeling between himself and his partners," said the court in
one case,1 "ought not to be permitted to make the relation
he has induced the ground of a dissolution of the partnership. His conduct may have been taken with a view to
that very result, and it would be inequitable to allow him
advantage from his own wrongful acts. It would allow one
partner, at his election, to put an end to his own deliberate
contract, when the other had been guilty of no wrongful
act or omission of duty."

tinued under such circumstances. 2

Oreg. 84; Harrison v. Tennant Fairthorne v. We&ton (1844), 8

(1856), 21 Beav. 482; Essel v. Hay- Hare, 387.

ward (1860), 30 Beav. 158. 2 See Rosenstein v. Burns (1882),

i Gerard v. Gateau (1876), 84 EL 41 Fed. Rep. 841; Holladay v. El-

121, 25 Am. Rep. 438. See, also, liott (1878), 8 Oreg. 84; Jennings v.

Baddeley (1856), 3 K. & J. 7&
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§ 257. - - Impossibility of success.- So, though there
be no misconduct, if the further prosecution of the partnership with profit or success has become impossible or impracticable, if its purpose or object has become unattainable, if
it is found that the scheme or theory upon which the partnership was based was illusory or erroneous,-in these and
like cases the court may decree its dissolution, as it is not
to the advantage of any one that the business should be continued under such circumstances.2
Oreg. 84; Harrison v. Tennant
(1856}, 21 Beav. 482; Essel v. Hayward (1860), 30 Beav. 158.
l Gerard v. Gateau (1876), 84 Ill.
121, 26 Am. Rep. 438. See, also,

Fairthorne v. W e!wton (1844), S
Hare; 387.
2 See Rosenstein v. Burns (1882),
41 Fed. Rep. 841; Holladay v. Elliott (1878), 8 Oreg. 84; Jennings v.
Baddeley (1856), 8 K. & J. 78.
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CHAPTER XV.

OF NOTICE OF THE DISSOLUTION.

258. The necessity of notice.

259. In what cases required

Not on dissolution by mere

operation of law.

260. Required on dissolution

by or through act of par-

ties.

261. To whom notice required.

262. How notice given 1. To

previous customers,

CHAPTER XV.

263. 2. To strangers.

264. Who should give notice

Actual and ostensible part-

OF NOTICE OF THE DISSOLUTION.

ners.

265. Dormant and secret

partners.

266. Effect of not giving notice.

258. The necessity of notice. The creation of a part-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

nership and the transaction of its business are notice to the

public that a relation has been entered into to which the law

attaches certain incidents and liabilities. If this relation is

terminated, it would seem to be a natural consequence that

some notice of the fact should also be given, if it is desired

to bring those incidents and liabilities to an end. And notice

is required by law in many cases. We are now to consider

§ 258. The necessity of notice.
§ 262. How notioe given - 1. To
269. In what cases required previous customers.
Not on dissolution by mere
263. 2. To strangers.
operation of law.
264. Who should give notice 260. Required on dissolution
Actual a.ndostensiblepartners.
by or through aot of parties.
265. Dormant and secret
281. To whom notice required.
partners.
266. Effect of not giving notice.

when notice is required, to whom, and how it may be given.

259. In what cases notice is required Not on disso-

lution by mere operation of law. As has been seen, the

dissolution may result either from the act of the law or the

act of the parties. The causes which will operate to dissolve

the partnership by mere operation of law have been consid-

ered, and it is obvious that the existence of these causes is

usually accompanied by facts and circumstances which must

of themselves give publicity to the event. Thus, the fact

that one of the partners has died is usually, if not always,

accompanied by circumstances which must give publicity to

the fact. The same is true of the bankruptcy of a partner,

or the declaration of war between the countries of which

163

§ 258. The necessity of notice.- The creation of a 'partnership and the transaction of its business are notice to the
public that a relation has been entered into to which the law
attaches certain incidents and liabilities. If this relation is
terminated, it would seem to be a natural consequence that
some notice of the fact should also be given, if it is desired
to bring those incidents and liabilities to an end. And notice
is required by law in many cases. We are now to consider
when notice is required, to whom, and how it may be given.
§ 259. In what cases notice is required - Not on disso·
lution by mere operat'i on of law.-As has been seen, the
dissolution may result either from the a.ct of the law or the
act of the parties. The causes which will operate to dissolve
the partnership by mere operation of law have been considered, and it is obvious that the existence of these causes is
usually accompanied by facts and circumstances which must
of themselves give publicity to the event. Thus, the fact
that one of the partners has died is usually, if not always,
accompanied by circumstances which must give publicity to
the fact. The same is true of the bankruptcy of a partner,
or the declaration of war between the countries of which
163

260, 261.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

§§ 260, 261.)

LAW 011' PARTNERSHIP.

partners respectively are citizens. The result of this neces-

sary and inherent publicity is the rule that no notice is

required where the partnership is dissolved upon the hap-

pening of one of the events which terminate a partnership

by mere operation of law. 1

t

260. Required on dissolution by or through act

of parties. But in the case of a dissolution by or through

the act of parties, no such publicity is necessarily incident

partners respectively are citizens. The result of thIS necessary and inherent publicity is the rule that no notice is
required where the partnership is dissolved upon the happening of one of the events which terminate a partnership
by mere operation of law.1

and therefore a different rule prevails. In such cases, whether

the partnership comes to an end by lapse of time or by mutual

consent, or by the act of one of the partners, notice must be

given.

It must be given also where the partnership is dissolved

by judicial decree at the suit of one of the partners.

261. To whom notice required. Notice may be re-

quired for two purposes and to two classes of persons :

1. If a partner intends to dissolve the partnership in pur-

suance of his power to do so, he must give his partners no-
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tice of that fact, both as a means to the dissolution, and also-

for the purpose of withdrawing the powers conferred upon

them at the time the partnership was created. This ques-

tion does not frequently arise, but the occasion exists. 8

1 See Griswold v. Waddington on Partnership, sees. 332-336; Ar-

§ 260. - - Required on dissolution by or through act
of parties.-But in the case of a dissolution by ~r through
the act of parties, no such publicity is necessarily incident
and therefore a different rule prevails. In such cases, whether
the partnership comes to an end by lapse of time or by mutual
consent, or !>y the act of one of the partners, notice must be·
given.
It must be given also where the partnership is dissolved
by judicial decree at the suit of.one of the partners.

(1818), 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 57, 16 id. nold v. Brown, 24 Pick (Mass.) 89,

438; Bank v. Matthews (1872), 49 94, 35 Am. Dec. 296; Marlett v.

N. Y. 12; Eustis v. Bolles (1888), Jackman, 3 Allen (Mass.), 287; But-

146 Mass. 413, 4 Am. St. Rep. 327, ler v. Mullen, 100 Mass. 45a"

16 N. E. Rep. 286. In this last case * Thus, in Eagle v. Bucher (1856),

it is said: "The bankruptcy, like 6 Ohio St. 295, 67 Am. Dec. 342, it

the death of a partner, dissolves is said : " That a partnership may

the partnership; and, as it is a be dissolved by the act of one of

public and notorious proceeding, the partners we do not . .

all creditors are bound to take no- intend to impugn. That is too

tice of it, and no further notice well settled to be now questioned,

need be given. The publication of But to effect that purpose, the act

bankruptcy or insolvency proceed- must be done with a view to its

§ 261. To whom notice required.- Notice may be re.
quired for two purposes and to two classes of persons:
1. If a partner intends to dissolve the partnership in pursuance of his power to do so, he must giv~ his partners. notice of that fact, both as a means to the dissolution, and also.
for the purpose of withdrawing the powers confer~ed upon
them at the time the partnership was created. This q uestion does not frequently arise, but the occasion ex:ists.1

ings is legal notice to all persons accomplishment. It should be

by which they are bound. Story communicated at once to the other
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I See Griswold v. Waddington on Partnership, secs. 332-836; Ar(1818), 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 57, 16 id. nold v. Brown, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 89,.
438; Ban)r v. Matthews (1872), 49 94, 35 Am. Dec. 296; Marlett v.
N. Y. 12; Eustis v. Bolles (1888), Jackman, 3 Allen (Mass.), 287; But146 Mass. 413, 4 Am. St. Rep. 327, ler v. Mullen, 100 Mass. 458."
16 N. E. Rep. 286. In this last case
I Thus, in Eagle Y. Bucher (1856),
it is said: "The bankruptcy, like 6 Ohio St. 295, 67 Am. Dec. 842, it
the death of a partner, dissolves is said: "That a partnership may
the partnership; and, as it is a be dissolved by the act of one of·
public and notorious proceeding, the partners we . do not • • •
all creditors are bound to take no- intend to impugn. That is too.
tice of it. and no further notice well settled to be now questioned.
need be given. The publication of But to effect that purpose, the act
bankruptcy or insolvency proceed- must be done with a view to its
ings is legal notice to all persons accomplishment. It should be
by which they are bound. Story communicated at once to the other
164
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NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION. [ 262.

2. But the question most frequently arising, and the one

N OTICE OF DISSOLUTION.

[§ 262.

giving most difficulty, is the question of notice to third per-

sons. Of these there are two classes : those who have had

previous dealings with the firm, and those who have not.

The former have necessarily knowledge of the existence of

the firm, and have had occasion to rely upon the credit of

its members, while the latter have not necessarily known

of it, and have been brought into no personal relation with

it. Notice to both classes may be necessary to the former

because they have already known and trusted to the part-

nership ; to the latter because if they do not already know

of its existence, they may learn of it and be deceived by

supposing it to continue; but the same kind of notice is

not required for both classes. Thus

262. How notice given 1. To those who have had

dealings with the firm. Persons of the first class, having

actual notice of the existence of the partnership, and having

given credit to it, should be given actual notice of its disso-

lution. It is immaterial how the notice is given or by whom ;
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the important thing is that they receive it.

In one case, 1 after referring to the method of giving notice

to strangers, the court said : " The rule is different in respect

to persons who have dealt with the firm before the dissolu-

tion. The rule in such cases in this state requires that, to

2. But the question most frequently arising, and the one
giving most difficulty, is the question of notice t o third persons. Of.these there are two classes: those who have had
previous dealings with the firm, and those who have not.
The form.er have necessarily knowledge of the existence of
the firm, and have had occasion to rely upon t he credit of
its members, while the latter have not necessarily known
of it, and have been brought into no personal relation with
it. Notice to both classes may be necessary- to t he former
because they have already known and trusted to the part- .
nership; to the latter because if they do not already know
of its existence, they may learn of it and be deceived by
supposing it to continue; but the same kind of notice is
not required for both classes. Thus -

relieve a retiring partner from subsequent transactions in

the partnership name, notice of the dissolution must be

brought home to the persons giving credit to the partner-

ship. If, in any way, by actual notice served, or by seeing

members of the firm. They should Abbot v. Johnson, 82 N. H. 9;

be advised of the new relations Jones v. Lloyd, L. R. IS Eq. 265,

created by the withdrawal of a 271.

member, or a transfer of his inter- l Austin v. Holland (1877), 69 N. Y.

est in the concern. Their future 571, 25 Am. Rep. 246. In this case

relations toward each other, and it was held that the mere mailing

their pursuit of the particular en- of a notice of dissolution was not

terprise, depend on the acquisition sufficient; it must be received.

of such knowledge." See, also,
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§ 262. How notice given -1. To those who have h ad
dealings ~ith the fi.r.m .-Persons of the first class, haring
actual notice of the existence of the partnership, and having
given credit to it, should be given actual notice of its dissolution. It is·immaterial how the notice is given or by whom;
the important t hing is that they receive it.
In·one case,1 after referring to the method of giving notice
to strangers, the court said: "The rule is different in respect
to persons who have dealt with the firm before the dissolu. tion. The rule in such cases in this state requires that, to
relieve a retiring partner from ~ubsequent transactions in
the partnership name, notice of the dissolution must be
brought home to the persons giving credit to the partnership. If, in any way, by actual notice served, or by seeing
members of the firm. They should
be advised of the new relations
ereated by the withdrawal of a
member, or a transfer of his interest in the concern. Their future
relations toward each other, and
their pursuit of the particular enterprise, depend on the acquisition
of such knowledge." See, also,

Abbot v. Johnson, 82 N. H. 9;
Jones v. Lloyd, L. R. 18 Eq. 265,
271.
l Austin v. Holland (1877), 69 N. Y.
571, 25 Am. Rep. 246. In t h is case
it was held that the m ere mailing
of a notice of dissolution was no'
sufficient; it must be received.
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263.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

the publication of the dissolution, or by information derived

from third persons, the party, at the time of the dealing, ia

made aware of the fact that the partnership has been dis-

solved, the contract will not bind the firm. It is sufficient

to exempt the firm from liability that the person so con-

tracting with a partner in the firm name knew or had rea-

son to believe that the partnership had been dissolved, but

this must appear and be found by the jury, or else the con-

tract will be treated as the contract of the partnership."

A common method of giving the notice is by personal

communication or by letter or circular addressed to and re-

ceived by all persons with whom the firm has had dealings.

Mailing the notice, properly addressed, raises a presumption

of its due receipt, but the presumption is not conclusive and

actual receipt must be shown. 1 Mere publication in a paper

is obviously not enough; it must appear further that the

party to be notified saw it or otherwise knew of it. 2

263. How notice given 2. To strangers. Of the

persons who have not had dealings with the firm, there are
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likewise two classes those who knew of the partnership but

had not dealt with it, and those who did not know of it, prior

to its dissolution. As to the latter class, it is said that no no-

tice at all is necessary, 3 upon the ground that, as they did not

Meyer v. Krohn, 114 I1L 574. enough. Robinson v. Floyd (1893),

1 Notice of dissolution was pub- 159 Pa. St. 165, 28 AtL Rep. 258.

lished in a paper and a copy of the See, also, Nicholson v. Moog (1880),

paper with a red line drawn about 68 Ala. 471: Stoddard Mfg. Co. v.

the publication of the dissolution, or by information derived
from third persons, the party, at the time of the dealing, is
made aware of the fact that the partnership has been dissolved, the contract will not bind the firm. It is sufficient
to exempt the firm from liability that the person so contracting with a partner- in the firm name knew or had reason to believe that the partnership had been dissolved, but
this must appear and be found by the jury, or else the contract will be treated as the contract of the partnership."
A common method of giving the notice is by personal
communication or by letter or circular addressed to and received by all persons with whom the firm has had dealings.
Mailing the notice, properly addressed, raises a presumption
of its due receipt, but the presumption is not conclusive and
actual receipt must be shown.1 Mere publication in a paper
is obviously not enough; it must appear further that the
party to b~ notified saw it or otherwise knew of it.2

the notice was mailed to a former Krause (1889), 27 Neb. 83, 42 N. W.

dealer residing in another town. Rep. 913; Long v. Garnett (1883),

Held not alone sufficient. Haynes 59 Tex. 229; Gilchrist v. Brande

v. Carter, 12 Heisk. (Tenn.) 7, 27 (1883), 58 Wis. 184, 15 N. W. Rep.

Am. Rep. 747. Proof of the publi- 817 ; Backus v. Taylor (1882), 84 Ind.

cation of the notice in a news- 503; Sibley v. Parsons (1892), 93

paper is not sufficient where it is Mich. 538, 53 N. W. Rep. 786.

not shown that the other party 8 See Austin v. Appling (1891), 88

either took or read the paper. Rose Ga. 54. 13 S. E. Rep. 955; Swigert

v. Coffield, 53 Md. 18, 36 Am. Rep. v. Aspden (1893), 52 Minn. 565, 54

889. Mere publication is not N. W. Rep. 738.
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§ 263. How notice given - 2. To strangers.- Of the
persons who have not had dealings with the firm, there are
likewise two classes-those who knew of the partnership but
had not dealt with it, and those who did not know of it, prior
to its dissolution. As to the latter class, it is said that no notice at all is necessary,3 upon the ground that, as they did not
1 Meyer

v. Krohn, 114 Ill 574.
enough. Robinson v. Floyd (1893), ·
Notice of dissolution was pu~ 159 Pa. St. 165, 28 AtL Rep. 258.
lished in a paper and a copy of the See, ~lso, Nicholson v. Moog (1880),
paper with a red line drawn about 68 Ala. 471: Stoddard Mfg. Co. v.
the notice was mailed to a former Krause (1889), 27 Neb. 83, 42 N. W.
dealer residing in another town. Rep. 913; Long v. Garnett (1883),
Held not alone sufficient. Haynes 59 Tex. 229; Gilchrist v. Brande
v. Carter, 12 H eisk. (Tenn.) 7, 27 (1883), 58 Wis. 184, 15 N. W. Rep.
Am. Rep. ·747. Proof of the publi- 817; Backus v. Taylor (1882), 84Ind.
cation of the notice in a news- 503; Sibley v. Parsons (1892), 93
paper is not sufficient where it is Mich. 538, 53 N. W. Rep. 786.
not shown that the other party
3 See Austin v. Appling (1891), 88
either took or read the paper. Rose Ga. 54. 13 S. E. Rep. 955; Swigert
v. Coffield, 53 Md. 18, 36 Am. Rep. v. Aspden (1893), 52 Minn. 565, M
889. Mere publication is not N. W. Rep. 738.
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NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION.

[ 263.

NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION•

[§ 263.

learn of the existence of the partnership until it had actually

been dissolved, they could have no reason for holding it lia-

ble ; and this is doubtless correct where no element of estop-

pel is involved, though notice by publication, even in such

cases, would be the safer course. As to the former, general

notice is enough, and this notice may be given in a variety

of ways, though publication for a reasonable period in a

newspaper of general circulation at the place where the

partnership business is carried on is deemed the most ef-

fectual and appropriate. 1

(1879), 56 Miss. 566; Richards v. But-

ler (1880), 65 Ga. 593; Central Nat.

Bank v. Frye (1889), 148 Mass. 498,

20 N. E. Rep. 325.

In Ellison v. Sexton, supra, the

court said: "It is often difficult to

determine what amounts to due

.1.earn of the existence of the partnership until it had actually
been dissolved, they could have no reason for holding it I.fable; and this is doubtless correct where no element of estoppel is involved, though notice by publication, even in such
cases, would be the safer course. As to the former, general
notice is enough, and this notice may be given in a variety
of ways, though publication for a reasonable period in a
newspaper of general circulation at the place where the
partnership business is carried on is deemed the most effectual and appropriate.1

and sufficient notice of the retire-
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ment of a partner; but the evidence

to prove it should be such as would

reasonably warrant the jury in

finding the fact of notice; that the

party to be charged with it act-

ually had it, or might, by reason-

able diligence, have learned of the

dissolution of partnership and the

retirement of the partner sought

to be charged, from the means and

opportunity supplied or afforded

for the purpose of giving notice of

the same. Generally, the reason-

ableness of the notice will be a

mixed question of law and fact to

be submitted to the jury, under

proper instructions of the court,

as to whether, under all the attend-

ing circumstances of the particu-

lar case, it was sufficient to war-

rant the inference of actual or

constructive knowledge of the dis-

solution."

in Love joy v. Spafford

(1876), 93 U. S. 480, 440, it is said:

"We think it is not an absolute,

inflexible rule that there must be

a publication in a newspaper to

protect a retiring partner. That

is one of the circumstances con-

tributing to or forming the general

notice required. It is an important

one, but it is not the only or an in-

dispensable one. Any means that,

in the language of Mr. Bell, are

fair means to publish as widely as

possible the fact of dissolution, or

which, in the words of Judge Ed-

monds, are public and notorious to

put the public on its guard; or, in

the words of Judge Nelson, notice

in any other public and notorious

manner: or, in the language of Mr.

Verplanck,notice by advertisement

or otherwise, or by withdrawing

the exterior indications of partner-

ship, and giving the public notice

in the manner usual in the com-

munity where he resides, are means

and circumstances proper to be

1 Thus, in Lovejoy v. Spafford (1879), 56 Miss. 566; Richards v. But(1876), 93 U.S. 430, 440, it is said: ler (1880), 65 Ga. 593; Central Nat.
"We think it is not an absolute, Bank v. Frye (1889), 148 Mass. 498,
inflexible rule that there must be 20 N. E. Rep. 325.
a publication in a newspaper to
In Ellison v. Sexton, supra, the
protect a retiring partner. That court said: "!tis often difficult to
is one of the circumstances con- determine what amounts to due
tributing to or forming the general and sufficient notice of the retirenotice required. It is an important ment of a partner; but the evidence
one, but it is not the only or an in- to prove it should be such as would
dispensable one. Any means that, reasonably warrant the jury in
in the language of Mr. Bell, are finding the fact of notice; that the
fair means to publish ~ widely as party to be charged with it act.possible the fact of dissolution, or ually had it, or might, by reasonwhich, in the words of Judge Ed- able diligence, have learned of the
monds, are public and notorious to dissolution of partnership and the
put the public on its guard; or, in retirement of the partner sought
the words of Judge Nelson, notice to be charged, from the means and
in any other public and notorious opportunity supplied or afforded
manner: or, in the language of Mr. for the purpose of giving notice of
Verplanck, notice by advertisement the same. Generally, the reasonor otherwise; or by withdrawing abl~ness of the notice will be a
the exterior indications of partner- mixed question of law and fact to
ship, and giving the public notice be submitted to the jury, under
in the manner usual in the com- proper instructions of the court,
munity where he resides, are means as to whether, under all the attendand circumstances proper to be ing circumstances of the particuconsidered on the question of no- lar case, it was sufficient to wartice." See, also, Ellison v. Sexton rant the inference of actual or
(1890), 105 N. C. 356, 18 Am. St. Rep. constructive knowledge of the die907, 11 S. E. Rep. 180; Polk v. Oliver solution."
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§§ 264-266.]

LAW

OF

PARTNERSHIP.

264. Who should give notice Actual and ostensible

partners. .Notice of the dissolution may be given by either

partner, and where the partnership is dissolved by mutual

consent all of the partners usually unite in giving it. Each

partner who withdraws from a firm is interested in giving

notice, for, as will be seen, 1 where notice is required, a part-

ner who retires, whether by sale of his interest or any other

means, will, until notice is duly given, continue liable as a

partner to those formerly dealing with the firm.

If the partner desiring to give notice is prevented by his

copartners from exercising that right, they may be com-

pelled to do what may be necessary to enable notice to be

given, as to sign advertisements or join in notices to former

customers. 1

265. Dormant and secret partners. A dormant

partner, i. <?., one both secret and passive, is not bound to

give notice of his withdrawal, for no one of the public knew

of his connection with the firm, and no one, therefore, could

have relied upon it ; but a mere secret partner is bound to
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give notice of his withdrawal to those who knew of his con-

nection with the firm, though not to those who had no

knowledge of it. A retiring dormant partner would also

be liable to one who knew of his existence, if he were not

§ 264. Who should give notice - Actual and ostensible
partners.-.N otice of the dissolution may be given by either ·
partner, and where the partnership is dissolved by mutual
consent all of the partners usually unite in giving it. Each
partner who withdraws from a firm is interested in giving
notice, for, as will b.e seen,1 where notice is required, a partner who retires, whether by sale of his intere;st o~ any other
means, will, until notice is duly given, continue liable as a
partner to those formerly dealing with the firm.
·
If the partner desiring to give notice is prevented by his
copartners from exercising that right, they may be compelled to do what may be necessary to enable notice to be
given, as to sign advertisements or join in notices to former
customers.2

given notice of his withdrawal 1

266. Effect of not giving notice. Where a partner-

ship is dissolved or a known member of the firm retires,

until the dissolution or retirement has been duly notified

i See post, 266. v. Appling (1891), 88 Ga. 54, 13 a E.

*lLindleyon Partnership (Ew- Rep. 955; Nussbaumer v. Becker

ell's ed.), 214; Troughton v. Hun- (1877), 87 111. 281, 29 Am. Rep. 53;

ter (1854), 18 Beav. 470; Hendry v. Lieb v. Craddock (1888), 87 Ky. 525,

Turner (1886), 32 Ch. Div. 355. 9. S. W. Rep. 838; Pitkin v. Benfer

See Elmira Iron Co. v. Harris (1892), 50 Kan. 108, 31 Pac. Rep.

(1891), 124 N. Y. 280, 26 N. E. Rep. 695, 34 Am. St. Rep. 110; Brown v.

541; Elkinton v. Booth (1887), 143 Foster (1894), S. a , 19 S. E,

Mass. 479, 10 N. E. Rep. 460, Austin Rep. 299,

168

§ 265. - - Dormant and secret partners.-A dormant
partner, i. e., one both secret and passive, is' not bound to
give notice of his withdrawal, for no one of the public knew
of his connection with the fi_rm, and no one, therefore, could
have relied upon it; but a mere secret partner is bound to
give notice of his withdrawal to those who knew of his connection with the firm, though not to those who had no
know ledge of it. A retiring dorman.t partner would also
be liable to one who knew of his existence, if he were not
given notice of his withdrawall
§ 266. Eft'ect of not giving notice.- Where a partner. ship is dissolved or a known member of th.e fi'.rm retires,
until the. dissolution or retirement has .been duly notified
1 See post,§ 266.
v. Appling (1891), 88 Ga. 54, 13 S. E.
21 Lindley on Partnership (Ew- Rep. 955; Nussbaumer v. Becker
ell's ed.), 214: Troughton v. Hun- (1877), 87 Ill. 281, 29 Am. Rep. 53;
ter (1854), 18 Beav. 470; Hendry v. Lieb v. Craddock (1888), 87 Ky. 525,
Turner (1886), 32 Ch. Div. 355.
9 S. W. Rep. 838; Pitkin v. Benfer
•See Elmira Iron Co. v. Harris (1892), 50 Kan. 108, 31 Pac. Rep.
(1891), 124 N. Y. 280, 26 N. E. Rep. 695, 34 Am. St. Rep. 1~0; Brown v.
541; Elkinton v. Booth (1887), 143 Foster (1894), - S. C.. - , 19 S. E.
Mass. 479, 10 N. E. Rep. 4.60, Austin Rep. 299.
.
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NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION.

NOTICB 0.., DISSOLUTION.

[ 266.

[§ 266.

the power of each partner to bind the others by contract

with third persons remains unimpaired, although as between

themselves such authority is at an end. 1

The retiring partner, in the absence of notice, remains

liable also, it is said, for the torts committed subsequently

by his late partners or their agents in the line of their for-

mer business. 1

iSee Merrill v. Bissell (1894), 99

Mich. 409, and note; Prentiss v.

Sinclair (1881), 5 Vt. 149, 26 Am.

Dec. 288, and note; Austin v. Hol-

land (1877), 69 N. Y. 571, 25 Ami

the power of each partner to bind the others by contract
with third persons remains unimpaired, although as between
themselves such authority is at an end.1
The retiring partner, in the absence of notice, remains
liable also, it is said, for the torts committed subsequently
by his late partners or their agents in the line of their former business.1

Bep.246,

168

'See 1 Lindley on Partnership

(Ewell's ed.), 214, citing Stables v.

Eley (1825), 1 Car. & P. 614. But

see Pollock's Digest of Partner-
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ship (6th ed.), 54

1 See

Morrill v. Bissell (1894), 99
Mich. 409, and note; Prentiss v.
Sinclair (1881), 5 Vt. 149, 26 Am.
Dec. 288, and note; Austin v. Holland (1877), 69 N. Y. 5'11, 25 Am:
Bep. 24&

See 1 Lindley on Partnership
(Ewell's ed.), 214, citing Stables v.
Eley (1825), 1 Car. & P. 614. But
see Pollock's Digest of Partnership (6th ed.), M.
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OHAPTEE XVL

OF THE EFFECT OF DISSOLUTION UPON THE POWEKS OF

PARTNERS.

287. In general.

268. Rights, powers and liabili-

ties of surviving partner.

269. How where he contin-

ues business under provis-

ions of will

OHAPTER XVL

870. Liability of estate of de-

ceased partner.

271. Powers of partners after

OF THE EFFECT OF DISSOLUTION UPON THE POWERS OP
PARTNERS.

dissolution Continue for

purpose of closing up the

business.

272. Have no power to cre-

ate new obligationa

273. Powers of settling or liqui-

dating partner.

267. In general. The firm being dissolved for some
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sufficient reason, and due notice having been given when

necessary, it remains to be considered what is the effect of

the dissolution, particularly as respects the powers and du-

§ 267. In generaL
§ 271. Powers of partners after
268. Rights, powers and liabilidissolution-Continue for
ties of surviving partner.
purpose of closing up the
269. How where he continbusiness.
ues business under provis- • 272. - .- Have no power to ~
ions of will
ate new obligations.
!70. Liability of estate.of de273. Powers of settling or liquiceased partner.
dating partner.

ties of the partners. For reasons which will be obvious,

dissolution by death, which completely removes one of the

partners, presents an aspect entirely different from that pre-

sented when dissolution results from any other cause, leav-

ing all partners alive and capable or desirous of acting.

The condition of the surviving partner, therefore, must be

separately considered.

268. Rights, powers and liabilities of the surviving

partner. The death of one partner operates, as has been

seen, to dissolve the partnership. Upon dissolution by death

the entire legal title to all the partnership assets passes to

the surviving partner or partners. 1 They alone, to the ex-

In Barry v. Briggs (1871), 22

Mich. 201, the rule is stated that a

sole surviving partner has the en-

tire legal title to all the partner-

ship assets. He has the right,

acting honestly and with reason-

§ 267. In general.-The firm being dissolved for some
sufficient reason, and due notice having been given when
necessary, it remains to be considered what is the effect of
the dissolution, particularly as respects the powers and duties of the partners. For reasons which will be obvious,
dissolution by death, which completely removes one of the
partners, presents an aspect entirely di:fierent from that presented when dissolution results from any other cause, leaving all partners alive and capable or desirous of a~ting.
The condition of the surviving partner, therefore, must be
separately considered.

able discretion and diligence, to

dispose of them as he pleases, to

settle all debts against the concern,

to make any compromise he may

deem necessary, and to turn the

assets into an available and dis

tributable form. As to partner

ship real estate, see ante, 111.
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§ 268 •. Rights, powers and liabilities of the surviving
partner .-The death of one partner operates, as has been
seen, to dissolve the partnership. Upon dissolution by death
the entire legal title to all the partnership assets passes to
the surviving partner or partners.1 They alone, to the ex1 In Barry v. Briggs (1871), 22
Mich. 201, the rule is stated that a
sole surviving partner has the entire legal title to all the partnel"ship assets. He has the right,
acting honestly and with reasonable discretion and diligence, to

dispose of them as he pleases, to
settle all debts against the concern,
to make any compromise he may
deem necessary, and to turn the
assets into an available and dis
tributable form. As tO partnPr
ship real estate, see ante,§ 111.

170

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

EFFECT, ETC., TJPON POWEKS OF PABTNEBS. [ 268.

elusion of the representatives of the deceased partner, have

EFFECT, ETO., UPON POWERS 01" PARTNERS.

[§ 268.

the right to the possession of the partnership property, and

to collect or receive debts due the firm. Causes of action,

at law, survive to or against them, and therefore they alone

are the ones to sue or be sued in respect to partnership deal-

ings. 1 But while they have the legal title, they hold it in

trust for the firm, and it is their duty to apply the assets to

the payment of the debts, to close up the business with rea-

sonable promptness, 2 and to account to the representatives

of the deceased partner for his share of the final balance. 8

In their dealings with partnership assets, the surviving part-

ners are charged with all the duties of fair dealing and re-

gard for the interests of the firm which are required of

other trustees. 4 While engaged in closing up the business,

the surviving partners may exercise such powers as are

reasonably necessary to accomplish that purpose. Thus they

may sell, mortgage or pledge the property, borrow money,*

*The last surviving partner or

partners are to sue and be sued in
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respect of partnership affairs. 1

Lindley on Partnership (EwelFs

ed.), 288.

2 See Clay v. Field (1888), 34 Fed.

Rep. 375, Paige's Partn. Cas. 213.

* See Valentine v. Wysor (1890),

123 Ind. 47, 7 L. R. A. 788.

4 A surviving partner occupies

the position of trustee, and cannot

be permitted to make gain for him-

elusion of the representatives of the deceased partner, have
the right to the possession of the partnership property, and
to collect or receive debts due the firm. Causes of action,
at law, survive to or against them~ and therefore they alone
are the ones to sue or be sued in respect to partnership dealings.1 But while they have the legal title, they hold it in
trust for the firm, and it is their duty to apply the assets to
the payment of the debts, to close up the business with reasonable promptness,2 and to account to the representatives
of the deceased -partner for his share of the final balance. 3
In their dealings with partnership assets, the surviving partners are charged with all the duties of fair dealing and regard for the interests of the firm which are required of
other trustees.' While engaged in closing up the business,
the .surviving partners may exercise such powers as are
_reasonably necessary to accomplish that purpose. Thus they
may seU, mortgage or pledge the property, borrow money, 5

self at the expense of the estate of

a deceased partner. Little v. Cald-

well (1894), 101 Cal. 553, 36 Pac.

Rep. 107, 40 Am. St. Rep. 89; Gal-

braith v. Tracy (1894), 153 III 54,

38 N. E. Rep. 937, 46 Am. St. Rep.

867, 28 L. R. A. 129. He cannot

buy of or sell to himself. Denholm

v. McKay (1889), 148 Mass. 434, 19

N. E. Rep. 551, 12 Am. St Rep. 574.

If he misappropriates the assets,

equity will give relief. Russell v.

McCall (1894), 141 N. Y. 437, 36 N.

E. Rep. 498, 38 Am. St. Rep. 807.

He is bound to keep accurate ac-

counts and to keep the representa-

tives of the deceased partner in-

formed of all that properly con-

cerns them. Heath v. Waters (1879),

40 Mich. 457.

6 Thus in Durant v. Pierson (1891),

124 N. Y. 444, 26 N. E. Rep. 1095, 21

Am. St. Rep. 686, 12 L. R. A. 146,

the court say: "When a partner-

ship is dissolved by the death of a

partner, the survivor is entitled to

the possession and control of the

joint property for the purpose of

closing its business, and to that

end and for that purpose he may,

according to the settled principles

of the law of partnership, admin-

ister the affairs of the firm, and by

sale, mortgage, or other reasonable

disposition of the property, make

provision for meeting its obliga-
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l The last surviving partner or
partners are to sue and be sued in
respect of partnership affairs. 1
Lindley on Partnership (Ewell's
ed.), 288.
2 See Clay v. Field (1888), 34 Fed.
Rep. 375, Paige's Partn. Cas. 213.
s See Valentine v. Wysor (189~),
123 Ind. 47, 7 L. R. A. 788.
'A surviving partner occupies
the position of trustee, and cannot
be permitted to make gain for himself at the expense of the estate of
a deceased partner. Little v. Caldwell (1894), 101 Cal. 553, 36 Pac.
Rep. 107, 40 Am. St. Rep. 89; Galbraith v. Tracy (1894), 153 IlL 54,
38 N. E. Rep. 937, 46 Am. St. Rep.
867, 28 L. R. A. 129. He cannot
buy of or sell to himself. Denholm
v. McKay (1889), 148 Mass. 434, 19
N. E. Rep. 551, 12 Am. St. Rep. 574.
If he misappropriates the assets,
equity will give relief. Russell v.

McCall (1894), 141 N. Y. 437, 36 N.
E. Rep. 498, 38 Am. St. Rep. 807.
He is bound to keep accurate ac-~
counts and to keep the representatives of the deceased partner in- ·
formed of all that properly concerns them. Heath v. Waters (1879),
40 Mich. 45'1.
5 Thus in Durant v. Pierson (1891),
124 N. Y. 444, 26 N. E. Rep. 1095, 21
Am. St. R ep. 686, 12 L. R. A. 146,
the court say: "When a partnership is dissolved by the death of a
partner, the survivor is entitled to
the possession and control of the
joint property for the purpose of
closing its business, and to that
end and for that purpose he may,
according to the settled principles
of the law of partnership, administer the affairs of the firm, ancl by
sale, mortgage, or other reasonable
disposition of the property, ma.ke ·
proviSion for meeting its obli~
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or make an assignment for the benefit of creditors. 1 They

should complete the executory contracts into which the

firm had entered, and for this purpose have the power to

purchase materials, employ assistance or make such other

incidental contracts as the case reasonably requires. 2 Upon

the death of the sole surviving partner before the estate

is closed, his powers and liabilities pass to his administrator

or executor. 8 The right of the survivor to compensation

has already been referred to in a previous section. 4

269. Same subject Continuing business under pro-

visions of will. The authority of the surviving partners

is to close up and not to continue the partnership affairs,

and they have therefore no right to make new contracts,

engage in fresh enterprises or to carry on the partnership

business for any longer period than is reasonably necessary

-or make an assignment for.the benefit of creditors.1 They
should complete the executory contracts into which the
. firm had entered, and for this purpose have the power to
purchase materials, employ assistance or make such other
incidental contracts as the case reasonably requires. 2 Upon
the death of the sole surviving partner before the es~
is closed1 his powers and liabilities pass to his administrator
-or executor.1 The right of ~he survivor to compensation
Iias already been referred to in ~previous section.'

I

to enable the affairs to be closed up without unnecessary

loss or injury. If, in violation of their duty, they do con-

tinue the business, they may be restrained by injunction, or

tions. He may, for that purpose, son v. Senter (1885), 118 U. S. 3, 30
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borrow money, and give a valid L. ed. 49; Williams v. Whedon

pledge of the copartnership prop- (1888), 109 N. Y. 333, 16 N. E. Rep.

erty for its repayment Williams 365, 4 Am. St. Rep. 460; Patton v.

v. Whedon, 109 N. Y. 333, 4 Am. Leftwich (1889), 86 Va. 421, 10 S. E.

St. Rep. 460; Emerson v. Senter, Rep. 686, 19 Am. St Rep. 902, 6 L. R.

118 U. S. 3, 8; Fitzpatrick v. Flan- A, 569); in the absence of a statute

nagan, 106 U. S. 648; Butchart v. forbidding. Shattuck v. Chandler

Dresser, 4 DeGex, M. & G. 542, 10 (1889), 40 Kan. 516, 20 Pac. Rep. 225,

Hare, 453; In re Clough, Bradford 10 Am. St. Rep. 227.

Commercial Banking Co. v. Cure, 2 gee Little v. Caldwell (1894), 101

L. R. 31 Ch. Div. 326." See, also, CaL 553, 36 Pac. Rep. 107, 40 Am.

§ 269. Same subject- Continuing business · under provisions of will.- The authority of the surviving partners
is to close up and not to continue the partnership affairs,
and they have therefore no right to make new contracts,
·engage in fresh enterprises or to carry on the partnership
business for any longer period than is reasonably necessary
·t o enable the affairs to be closed up without unnecessary
loss or injury. If, in violation of their duty, they do continue the business, they may be restrained by injunction, or

Barton v. Love joy (1894), 56 Minn. St. Rep. 89; Calvert v. Miller (1886),

380, 57 N. W. Rep. 935, 46 Am. St 94 N. C. 600; Oliver v. Forrester

Rep. 482. (1880), 96 111. 315.

Although there has been a little 'Galbraith v. Tracy (1894), 153

doubt about the power of the sur- I1L 54, 38 N. E. Rep. 937, 46 Am. St

vivor to make an assignment for Rep. 867, 28 L. R. A. 129; Dayton

the benefit of creditors, the weight v. Bartlett (1882), 38 Ohio St 357;

of authority undoubtedly sustains Brooks v. Brooks (1873), 12 Heisk.

it (Fitzpatrick v. Flannagan (1882), (Tenn.) 12.

106 U. S. 654, 27 L. ed. 211; Emer- <See ante, 118.
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-tions. He may, for that purpose,
borrow money, and give a valid
pledge of the copartnership prop-erty for its repayment. Williams
v. Whedon, 109 N. Y. 333, 4 Am.
St. Rep. 460; Emerson v. Senter,
118 U.S. 3, 8; Fitzpatrick v. Flannagan1 106 U. S. 648; Butchart v.
Dresser, 4 DeGex, M. & G. 542, 10
Hare, 453; In re Clough, Bradford
-Commercial Banking Co. v. Cure,
LR. 31 Ch. Div. 326." See, also,
Barton v. Lovejoy (1894), 56 Minn.
-380, 57 N. W. Rep. 935, 46 Am. St.
Rep. 482.
1 Although there has been a little
doubt about the power of the survivor to make an assignment for
the benefit of creditors, the weight
<>f authority undoubtedly sustains
it (Fitzpatrick v. Flannagan (1882),
1.06 U.S. 654, 27 L. ed. 211; Erner-

son v. Senter (1885), 118 U. S. 8, 30
L ed. 49; Williams v. Whedon
(1888), 109 N. Y. 333, 16 N. E. Rep.
365, 4 Am. St. Rep. 460; Patton v.
Leftwich (1889), 86 Va. 421, 10 S. E.
Rep. 686, 19 Am. St. Rep. 902, 6 L R.
A. 569); in the absence of a statute
forbidding. Shattuck v. Chandler
(1889), 40 Kan. {516, 20 Pac. Rep. 225,
10 Am. St. Rep. 227.
2See Little v. Caldwell (1894), 101
Cal 553, 36 Pac. Rep. 107, 40 Am.
St. Rep. 89; Calvert v. Miller (1886),
94 N. C. 600; Oliver v. Forrester
(1880), 96 Ill. 315.
aGalbraith v. Tracy (1894), 158
Ill 54, 38 N. E. Rep. 937, 46 Am. St.
Rep. 867, 28 L R. A. 129; Dayton
v. Bartlett (1882), 88 Ohio St. 857;
Brooks v. Brooks (1873), 12 Heislr.
(Tenn.) 12.
'See ante,§ 119.
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EFFECT, ETC., UPON POWEBS OF PABTNEE8. [ 270.

lWFJ!:OT, RTO., UPON POW:BRS OJ' P .A.B.TNERS.

they may be held accountable for interest or profits and

[§ 270.

will be charged personally with the losses. 1

they may 'be held accountable for interest or profits and·
will be charged personally with the losses.1
The deceased partner may, however, by his will authorizethe business to be carried on for a period limited therein,
either by the survivors alone or by the survivors and his-executors jointly, ~nd the business may be continued in pursuance of such a provision.2 In such a case, unless there is.
something in the will to indi_cate a contrary purpose, it will
be presumed that the deceased intended to subject to the
·hazard of the business only the capital already embarked in
it, and not the general residue of his estate.1
Where there is no will, the persons who are entitled to-.
receive the deceased partner's share may consent to a continuance of the business on such terms as they may deem,
advisable.'

The deceased partner may, however, by his will authorize

the business to be carried on for a period limited therein,

either by the survivors alone or by the survivors and his

executors jointly, and the business may be continued in pur-

suance of such a provision. 2 In such a case, unless there is

something in the will to indicate a contrary purpose, it will

be presumed that the deceased intended to subject to the

hazard of the business only the capital already embarked in

it, and not the general residue of his estate. 8

Where there is no will, the persons who are entitled to

receive the deceased partner's share may consent to a con-

tinuance of the business on such terms as they may deem

advisable. 4

270. Same subject Liability of estate of deceased

partner. Although^ as has been seen,^ causes of action

against the firm, at common law, survive against the sur-

viving partners only 1 _the estate of the deceased partner is
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not thereby released from alljiability in equity. The sur-

viving partners who had paid the debt might have contribu-

tion in equity from the estate of the deceased partner, and,

by extending this equity of the surviving partners to the

creditor himself, the rule is now established in England and

many of the United States that the creditor may proceed

either against the survivors at law, or, without having any

recourse to them or attempting to exhaust the partnership

assets, he may in equity proceed at once against the estate

of the deceased partner.' In several states by statute this

1 See Story on Partnership, 343; Walker (1880), 103 U. S. 444, 26 L.

Robinson v. Simmons (1888), 146 ed. 404, Paige's Partn. Gas. 209.

Mass. 167, 15 N. E. Rep. 558, 4 Am, < See Robinson v. Simmons, supra.

St. Rep. 299. 'See ante, 268.

3 See Stewart v. Robinson (1889), See Doggett v. Dill (1884), 108

115 N. Y. 328, 22 N. E. Rep. 160, 5 HL 560, 48 Am. Rep. 565, where

L. R. A. 410. many cases are collected; Nelson

'See Smith v. Ayer (1879), 101 v. Hill (1847), 5 How. (U. &) 127.

U. S. 320, 25 L. ed. 955; Jones v.

173

~

§ 270. Same subject - Liability of estate of deceased'
partner.-Althongh, ,as h3d, hee11 seen,~uses of action
against the firmJ..!.Lcommon· law, survive against the surviving partners only,, the estate of the deceased partner is-.
not thereby released rom a~ility in equity. T e surviving partners who had paid the debt might have contribution in equity from the estate of the deceased partner, and, .
by extending this equity of the surviving partners to the~
creditor himself, the rule is now established in England and
many of the United States that the creditor may proceed
either against the survivors at law, or, .without having any
recourse to.them or attempting to exhaust the partnership ·
assets, he may in equity proceed at once against the estate ·
of the deceased partner.• In several states by statute this .
1 See Story on Partnership,§ 343;
Robinson v. Simmons (1888), 146
Mass. 167, 15 N. E. Rep. 558, 4 Am.
St. Rep. 299.
.
:i See Stewart v. Robinson (1889),
115 N. Y. 328, 22 N. E. Rep. 160, 5
L. R. A. 410.
ISee Smith v. Ayer. (1879), 101
U. S. 820, 25 L. ed. 955; Jones v.

Walker (1880), 103 U. S. 444, 26. L.
ed. 404, Paige's Pa.rtn. Oas. 209.
'See Robinson v. Simmons,supra. .
6 See ante, § 268.
'See Doggett v. Dill (1884), 108m 560, 48 Am. Rep. 565, where ..
many cases are collected; Nelson1:.
v. Hill (1847)~ 5 How. (U.S.) 127.
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method of procedure is expressly authorized. 1 Other states,

however, such as New York, Georgia, Wisconsin and per-

haps some others have declined to adopt this rule, and per-

mit recourse to the estate of the deceased, only when the

firm and the survivors are insolvent. 1

271. Powers of partners after dissolution Powers

continue for the purpose of closing up the business.

The dissolution of the partnership terminates entirely the

power of each partner to continue to bind the firm by new

method of proced~re is expressly authorized.I Other states,
however, such as New York, Georgia, Wisconsin and perhaps some others have declined to adopt this rule, and permit recourse to the estate of the decease~ only when the
firm and the survivors are insolvent.'
·

contracts. The power of each partner is thenceforward

limited to closing up the partnership affairs, but for this pur-

pose his authority is deemed to continue, with all the rights

and incidents as before. Thus either partner may, after dis-

solution, receive payment of firm debts and give discharges

therefor ; sell the partnership property ; pay the firm debts ; or

do any other act respecting the closing up of previous trans-

actions which he might do if the partnership still continued. 1

Unless they agree otherwise, each of the former partners

has an equal right to the possession of the assets, and is
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under an equal duty to apply them to the discharge of part-

nership obligations. 4

Where there are more than two partners, the majority

have the same power to control the winding up of the busi-

ness that they have to direct its conduct before dissolution. 8

see Camp v. Grant (1851), El. 200; Ruffner v. Hewitt (1874),

21 Conn. 41, 54 Am. Dec. 321; Man- 7 W. Va. 585; Seldner v. Mt. Jack-

ning v. Williams (1851), 2 Mich. 105; son Nat Bank (1887), 66 Md. 488, 59

Ralston v. Moore (1885), 105 Ind, Am. Rep. 190; Perkins v. Butler

243, 4 N. E. Rep. 673; Blair v. Wood Co. (1895), 44 Neb. 110, 62 N. W.

(1884), 108 Pa. St 278; McLain v. Rep. 808; Western Stage Co. v.

Carson (1842), 4 Ark. 164, 37 Am. Walker (1856), 2 Iowa, 504, 65 Am.

Dec. 777. Dec. 789; Davis v. Megroz (1893),

2 See Pape v. Cole (1873), 55 N. Y. 55 N. J. L. 427.

124, 14 Am. Rep. 198; Sherman v. Gray v. Green (1894), 142 N. Y.

Kreul (1877), 42 Wis. 33; Fallen v. 316, 37 N. E. Rep. 124, 40 Am. St.

Whitfield (1875), 55 Ga. 174; Pear- Rep. 596.

son v. Keely (1845), 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 8 Western Stage Co. v. Walker,

128, 43 Am. Dec. 160. supra.

See Heart v. Walsh (1874), 75
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§ 271. Powers of partners after dissolution - Powers

-continue for the pui·pose of closing up the business.The dissolution of the partnership terminates entirely the ·
power of each partner to continue to bind the ~rm by new
contracts. The power of each partner is thenceforward
limited to closing up the partnership affairs, but for this purpose his authority is deemed to continue, with all the rights
and incidents as before. Thus either partner may, after dissoluti~n, receive payment of firm debts and give discharges
therefor; sell the partnership property; pay the firm debts; or
do any other act respecting the closing up of previous transactions which he might do if the partnership still continued. 1
Unless they agree otherwise, each of the former partners
has an equal right to the possession of the assets, and is
under an equal duty to apply' them to the discharge, of partnership obligations.'
Where there are more than two partners, the majority
have the same power to control the winding up of the business that they have to direct its conduct before dissolution. 6
I Thus, see Camp v. Grant (1851), Ill. 200; Ruffner v. Hewitt- (1874),
21 Conn. 41, 54 Am. Dec. 321; Man- 7 W. Va. 585; Seldner v. Mt. Jackning v. Williams (1851), 2 Mich. 105; son Nat. Bank (1887), 66 Md. 488, 59
Ralston v. Moore (1885), 105 Ind. Am. Rep. 190; Perkins v. Butler
243, 4 N. E. Rep. 673; Blair v. Wood Co. (1895), ·44 Neb. 110, 62 N. W.
(1884), 108 Pa. St. 278; McLain v. Rep. 808; Western Stage Co. v.
Carson (1842), 4 Ark. 164, 37 Am. Walker (1856), 2 Iowa, 504, 65 Am.
Dec. 789; Davis v. Megroz (1898),
Dec. 777.
2 See Pape v. Cole (1873), 55 N. Y. 55 N. J. L. 427.
124. 14 Am. Rep. 198; Sherman v.
4 Gray v. Green (1894), 142 N. Y.
Kreul (1877), 42 Wis. 33; Pullen v. 316, 37 N. E. Rep. 124, 40 Am. St.
Whitfield (1875), 55 Ga. 174; Pear- Rep. 596.
son v. Keely (1845), 6 B. Mon. (Ky.)
11 Western Stage Co. v. Walker,
128, 43 Am. Dec. 160.
supra.
1 See H eart v. Walsh (1874), 75
174
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EFFECT, ETC., UPON POWEBS OF P.AJBTNEBS. [ 272, 273.

272. No power to create new obligations. But

DTEOT, ETO., UPON POWERS OF P4RTNEBS.

(§§ 272, 273.

with the closing up or completion of old transactions the

power of each partner after dissolution ends. He cannot

create new obligations, or vary the character, form, or obliga-

tion of those already existing. Hence he cannot, after dis-

solution, bind his partners by making, accepting, indorsing

or renewing negotiable paper; create a new or revive an

old debt against them; remove the bar of the statute of lim-

itations as to them, or bind them by admissions or declara-

tions not relating to prior transactions; 1 provided, of course,

in all cases, that due notice of the dissolution had been

given. 2

273. Powers of settling or liquidating partner. In-

stead of all the partners participating in the settlement of

the partnership affairs after dissolution, as contemplated in

the last section, the partners may, upon such dissolution,

agree that one of the partners only shall proceed to liquidate

the affairs of the firm. An express agreement to this effect

is not indispensable ; it may be shown by acquiescence. The
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effect of such an agreement is not to enlarge the powers of

the settling partner, but to exclude the others from partici-

§ 272. - - No power to create new obligations.- But
with the closing . up or completion of old transactions the
power of each partner after dissolution ends. He cannot
create new obligations, or vary the character, form or obligation of those already existing. Hence he cannot, after dissolution, bind his partners by making, accepting, indorsing
or renewing negotiable paper; create a new or revive an
old debt against them; remove the bar of the statute of limitations as to them, or bind them by admissions or declarations not relating to prior transactions ;1 provided, of course,
in &1.1 cases, that due notice of the dissolution had been
given. 2

pation. Such an agreement could not, of course, affect third

persons who had no notice of it, but if they have notice they

will be subject to the equities of the partners if they do not

deal only with the partner so specified.

1 See Humphries v. Chastain There are cases holding other-

(1848), 5 Ga. 166, 48 Am. Dec. 247; wise as to the power of one part-

White v. Tudor (1860), 24 Tex. 639, ner to prevent the operation of the

76 Am. Dec. 126; Van Keuren v. statute of limitations by adtnis-

Parmelee (1849), 2 N. Y. 523, 51 sions or payments, following Whit-

Am. Dec. 322; Tate v. Clements comb v. Whiting, 2 Doug. (Eng.)

(1878), 16 Fla. 339, 26 Am. Rep. 709; 652, such as Beardsley v. Hall (1869),

Mayberry v. Willoughby (1877), 5 36 Conn. 270, 4 Am. Rep. 74; Mer-

Neb. 368, 25 Am. Rep. 491; Pen- ritt v. Day (1875), 38 N. J. L. 32, 20

noyer v. David (1860), 8 Mich. 407; Am. Rep. 362, but the weight of

Clement v. Clement (1887), 69 Wis. authority is opposed to these cases.

599, 35 N. W. Rep. 17, 2 Am. St 2 In Tate v. Clements, supra, it is,

Rep. 760. indeed, said that notice is not neo-
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§ 273. Powers of settling or liquidating partner.- Instead of all the partners participating in the settlement of
the partnership affairs after dissolution, as contemplated in
the last section, the partners may, upon such dissolution,
agree that one of the partners only shall proceed to liquidate
the affairs of the firm. An express agreement to this effect
is not indispensable; it may be shown by acquiescence. The
effect of such an agreement is not to enlarge the powers of
the settling partner, but to exclude the others from participation. Such an agreement could not, of course, affect third
persons who had no notice of it, but if they have notice they
will be subject to the equities of the partners if they do not
deal only with the partner so specified.
l See Humphries v. Chastain
There are cases holding other(1848), 5 Ga. 166, 48 Am. Dec. 247; wise as to the power of one part.
White v. Tudor (1860), 24 Tex. 639, ner to prevent the operation of the
76 Am. Dec. 126; Van Keuren v. statute of limitations by admisParmelee (1849), 2 N. Y. 523, 51 sions or payments, following WhitAm. Dec. 322; Tate v. Clements · comb v. Whiting, 2 Doug. (Eng.)
(1878), 16 Fla. 839, 26 Am. Rep. 709; 652, such as Beardsley v. Hall (1869),
. Mayberry v. Willoughby (1877), 5 36 Conn. 270, 4 Am. Rep. 74; Me:rNeh 368, 25 Am. Rep. 491; Pen- ritt v. Day (1875), 38 N. J. L. 82, 20
noyer v. David (1860), 8 Mich. 407; Am. Rep. 362, but the weight of
Clement v. Clement (1887), 69 Wis. authority is opposed to these cases.
599, 35 N. W. Rep. 17, 2 Am. St.
2 In Tate v. Clements. supra, it is,
Rep. 760.
indeed, said that notice is not neo175

273.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

§ 273.]

LAW OF P A.RTNERSHIP.

The liquidating partner is bound to be diligent and must

not unreasonably prolong the settlement. If he does, equity

may interfere. His duty of good faith and fair dealing is

perhaps intensified by his position as sole administrator.

He has, like any other partner after dissolution, power to

wind up and complete partnership transactions only, and

not to create new debts or obligations against his former

partners; but for the purposes of winding up, collecting

debts, discharging obligations, and reducing the assets to an

available and distributable form, all the powers of the part-

ners are concentrated in him and may be exercised accord-

ingly. 1

essary, as the requirement of notice 591; Gilmore v. Ham (1894), 142

has reference to future dealings N. Y. 1, 36 N. E. Rep. 826, 40 Am,

only; but see Clement v. Clement, St. Rep. 554. In Pennsylvania, see

supra; Sage v. Ensign (1861), 2 Estate of Davis (1840), 5 Whart.

Allen (Mass.), 245. 530, 34 Am. Deo. 574; Fulton v.

i See Palmer v. Dodge (1854), 4 Central Bank (1879), 92 Pa. St. 112;

Ohio St 21, 62 Am. Dec. 271; Hit Earon v. Mackey (1884), 106 Pa, St.
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ton v. Vanderbilt (1880), 82 N. Y. 452.

The liquidating partner is bound to be diligent.and must
not unreasonably prolong the settlement. If he does, equity
may interfere. His duty of good faith and fair dealing is
perhaps intensified by his position as sole administrator.
He has, like any other partner after dissolution, power to
wind up and complete partnership . transactions only, and
not to create new debts or obligations against his former
partners; but for the purposes of winding up, collecting
debts, discharging obligations, and reducing the assets to an
available and distributable form, all the powers of the partners a~e concentrated in him and may be exercised accordingly.1
essary, as the requirement of notice 591; Gilmore v. Ham (1894), 142·
has reference to future dealings N. Y. 1, 36 N. E. Rep. 826, 40 Am.
only; but see Clement v. Clement, St. Rep. 55'4. In Pennsylvania, see
8'Upra; Sage v. Ensign (1861), 2 Est~te of Davis (1840), 5 Whart..
Allen (Mass.), 245.
530, 34 Am. Dea. 574; Fulton v.
I See Palmer v. Dodge (1854), 4 Central Bank (1879), 92 Pa. St. 112;
Ohio St. 21, 62 Am. Dec. 271; Hil- Earon v. Mackey (1884), 106 P& St..
ton v. V a.nderbilt (1880), 82 N. Y. 452.
176
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CHAPTER XVIL

OF SPECIAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PARTNERS AT DIS-

SOLUTION.

274 Agreements as to distribu-

tion of property or pay-

ment of debts.

275. Agreements creating re-

lation of principal and

surety.

276. Creditor's assent to ar-

rangement.

274. Agreements as to distribution of property or pay-

ment of debts. It is not uncommon for the partners to

agree at dissolution as to the distribution of the partnership

property or the payment of the partnership debts. Thus, an

agreement that the continuing partner shall assume and pay

the partnership debts is often made, and, even though not

expressly made, would be implied to the extent of the firm

assets received by the continuing partners. 1 It is not an

I agreement to answer for the debt of another, and is there-
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I fore valid though not in writing. 2

Such agreements are entirely valid as between the part-

ners themselves, but they do not bind the firm creditors

unless the latter become a party to them. The liability of

each partner for the payment of the partnership debts con

tinues in solido after dissolution as before; and creditors

cannot be cut off from their remedies by any agreement be-

tween the partners alone. They neither lose their right to

proceed against the partner in whose favor the arrangement

is made, nor are they required to first exhaust their remedies

against the other.

iSee Hobbs T. Wilson (1865), 1 2 See Hunt v. Rogers (1863), 7

W. Va. 50; Peyton v. Lewis (1851), Allen (Mass.), 469; Vanness T. Dur

13 R Mon. (Ky.) 356. bois (1878), 64 Ind. 8381

13 177

275, 276.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

§§ 275, 276.]

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

275. Creating relation of principal and surety.

Such an agreement, however, it has been held, creates the

relation of principal and surety between the partners the

partner assuming the debts being the principal and the other

the surety, and creditors who have notice of this arrange-

ment have been held bound to respect the rights of the

surety as in other cases. 1 Thus, it has been held that an

extension of time to thp partner who has thus become the

principal debtor will release the other, 2 though this has been

denied; s and if the latter pays the debt he is entitled to the

benefit of the securities which the creditor held against the

principal debtor.*

276. Creditor's assent to arrangement. An as-

sent, however, by the creditor to the assumption by one

partner of the firm's debt to such creditor, and an agreement

by the creditor to look to such partner alone for payment,

if upon a sufficient consideration, will amount to a novation

and discharge the retiring partner ; but such assent must be

actual, and will not ordinarily be implied from mere silence. 5
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! And unless there is a sufficient consideration, the agreement

§ 275. - - Creating relation of principal and surety.
Such an agreement, however, it has been held, creates the
{ relation of principal and surety between the partners - the
partner assuming the debts being the principal and the other
the surety,- and creditors who have notice of this arrangement have been held bound to respect the rights of the
surety as in other cases. 1 Thus, it has been held that an
extension of time to tht3 partne~ who has thus become the
principal debtor will release the other,2 though this has been
denied; 3 and if _the latter pays the debt he is entitled to the
benefit of the securities which the creditor held against t)le
principal debtor.'

I of the creditor to release the retiring partner and look only

to the others will not be binding. 6

iSee Smith v. Sheldon (1876), 35 W. Va. 303, 12 S. E. Rep. 708; Na

Mich. 42, 24 Am. Rep. 529; John- tional Cash Register Co. v. Brown

son v. Young (1882), 20 W. Va. 614; (1897), 19 Mont 200, 61 Am. St. Rep.

Fernald v. Clark (1892), 84 Me. 234, 498.

24 AtL Rep. 823; Brill v. Hoile 4 See Fernald v. Clark, supra;

(1881), 53 Wis. 537, 11 N. W. Rep. Johnson v. Young, supra.

42; Bank v. Green (1884), 40 Ohio 8 See Bank v. Green (1884), 40

St. 431 ; Leithauser v. Baumeister Ohio St. 431 ; York v. Orton (1885),

(1891), 47 Minn. 151, 49 N. W. Rep. 65 Wis. 6, Paige's Partn. Cas. 160;

660, 28 Am. St. Rep. 336. Barnes v. Boyers (1890), 34 W. Va.

2 Smith v. Sheldon, supra; Brill 303, 12 S. E. Rep. 70a

v. Hoile, supra; Leithauser v. Bau- 6 Eagle Mfg. Co. v. Jennings

neister, supra. (1883), 29 Kan. 657, 44 Am. Rep. 668.

See Barnes v. Boyers (1890), 34

178

§ 276. - - Creditor's assent to arrangement.- An assent, however, by the· creditor to the assumption by one
partner of the firm's debt to such creditor, and an agreement
by the creditor to look to such partner alone for paynient,
if upon a sufficient consideration, will amount~ a novation
and discharge the retiring partner; but such assent must be
ac~ual, and will not ordinarily be implied from mere silence.5
And unless;there is a sufficient c?~sideration, the agreement
of the creditor to release the ret1rmg partner and look only
} to the others will not be binding. 6
1 See Smith v. Sheldon (1876), 35
Mich. 42, 24 Am. Rep. 529; Johnson v. Young (1882), 20 W. Va. 614;
Fernald v. Clark (1892), 84 Me. 234,
24 AtL Rep. 823; Brill v. Hoile
(1881), 53 Wis. 537, 11 N. W. Rep.
42; Bank v. Green (1884), 40 Ohio
St. 431; Leithauser v. Baumeister
U891), 47 Minn. 151, 49 N. W. Rep.
d60, 28 Am. St. Rep. 336.
2 Smith v. Sheldon, supra; Brill
v. Hoile, supra; Leithauser v. Bau"'leister, supra.
a See Barnes v. Boyers (1890), 34

W. Va. 303, 12 S. E. Rep. 708; Na
tional Cash Register Co. v. Brown
(1897), 19 Mont. 200, 61 Am. St. Rep.
498.

Fernald v. Clark, mpra;
Johnson v. Young, supra.
5 See Bank v. Green (1884), 40
Ohio St. 431; York v. Orton (1885),
65 Wis. 6, Paige's Part11:- Cas. 160;
Barnes v. Boyers (1890), 34 W. Va..
303, 12 S. E. Rep. 708.
6 Eagle Mfg. Co. v. Jennings
(1883), 29 Kan. 657, 44 Am. Rep. 668.
4 See

178 .

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

CHAPTER XVIH

OF THE LIEN OF PARTNER&

4 fc/7. la general.

278. Nature of the right.

273. When it becomes important.

280. To what lien attaches.

281. Against whom lien exists.

282. What the lien secures.

283. How lien is lost

284. No lien if partnership illegal.

277. In general. Something has been already said re-

CHAPTER

garding the right of each partner to insist that the partner-

xvm:

ship assets shall be applied to the payment of the partner-

OF THE LIBN OF PARTNERS.

ship debts ; and it has been noticed that the right is often

spoken of as the partner's lien. 1 Before taking up the sub-

ject of the application of the assets and the final accounting,

a little further consideration of this subject seems desirable.

In dealing with this matter, the language of Mr. Justice

Lindley will be largely adopted. 2

278. Nature of the right. In order to discharge him-
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self from his liabilities as a partner, every partner has a right

~

§ 281; Against whom lien exists.
tn. 14 general
282. What the lien secures.
!78. Nature of the right.
283. How lien is lost.
279. When it becomes important.
284. No lien if partnership illegal
280. To what lien attaches.

to have the property of the partnership applied in payment

of the partnership debts. In order, also, to secure a proper

division of the surplus assets, he has a right to have what-

ever may be due to the firm from his copartners, as members

thereof, deducted from what otherwise would be payable to

them in respect of their shares in the partnership. In other

words, each partner may be said to have an equitable lien

on the partnership property for the purpose of having it ap-

plied in payment of the partnership debts; and also a simi-

lar lien upon the surplus assets for the purpose of having

them applied in payment of what may be due to the part-

i See ante, 122.

2 See 1 Lindley on Partnership

(Ewell's 2d ed.), 352 et seq.
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§ 277; In general.- Something has been already said re, garding the right of each partner to insist that the partnership assets shall be applied to the payment of the partnership debts; and it has been noticed that the right is often
spoken of ~s the partner's lien.1 Before taking up the subject of the application of the assets and the final accounting;
a little further co_nsideration of this subject seems desirable.
In dealing with this matter, the language of Mr. Justice
Lindley will be largely adopted. 2
§ 278. Natnre of the right.- In order to discharge himself from his liabilities as a partner, ev~ry partner has a right
to have the property of the partnership applied in payment
of the partnership debts. In order, also, to secure a proper
• division of the. surplus assets, he has a right to have whatever may be due to the firm from his copartners, as members
thereof, deducted from what otherwise would be payable to
them in respect of their shares in the partnership. In other
words, each partner may be said ·to have an equitable lien
on the partnership property for the purpose of haVing it applied in payment of the partnership debts; and also a similar lien upon the surplus assets for the purpose of having
them applied in payment of what may be due to -the part1 See

ante, § 122.

2See 1 Lindley on Partnership
(Ewell's 2d ed.), 352 et seq.

179

279, 280.] LAW OP PABTNEESHIP.

§§ 279, 280.]

LAW OF P .A.BTNERSHIP.

ners respectively, after deducting what may be due from

them as partners, to the firm. 1

279. Same subject When it becomes important.

This right or lien does not exist for any practical purpose

ners respectively, after deducting what may be due from
them as partners, to the :firm.1

until the affairs of the partnership have to be wound up, or

the share of a partner has to be ascertained ; nor has any

partner thereby, as has been seen, 1 a right to insist that firm

creditors shall exhaust the firm assets before having recourse

to the partners as individuals. But when partnership ac-

counts have to be taken, and the shares of the partners have

to be ascertained, the lien of the partners on the firm assets

and on each other's shares becomes of the greatest impor-

tance.

280. To what the lien attaches. During the continu-

ance of the partnership the lien attaches to everything which

can be considered partnership property. It is not lost by

substitution of new stock for old, and on the death or bank

ruptcy of a partner his lien continues in favor of those who

represent him until his share has been ascertained and pro-
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vided for by the other partners. After the partnership has

been dissolved, however, the lien is confined to what was

partnership property at the time of the dissolution, and does

not extend to what may have been subsequently acquired

§ 279. Same subject- When it becomes important.This right or lien does not exist for any practical purpose
until the affairs of the partnership have to be wound up, or
the share of a partner has to be ascertained; nor has any·
partner thereby, as has been seen,2 a right to insist that firm
creditors shall exhaust the firm assets before having recourse
to ~he partners as individuals. But when partnership a~
counts have to be taken, and the shares of the partners have
to be ascertained, the lien of the partners on the firm assets
and on each other's shares becomes of the great~t importance.

by those who continue to carry on the business.

As the lien extends only to that which is firm property, if

the partnership be one in the profits only, the lien can attach

to the profits alone and not to the means by which those

profits were produced.' And as it is an incident of partner-

ship, it does not exist where there is really no partnership

but only a joint adventure, in respect of which each retains

the title to his own goods and their proceeds. 4

1 See 1 Lindley, supra; Pearson 2 See ante, 215.

v. Keedy (1845), 6 R Hon. (Ky.) 128, 8 See ante, 52.

43 Am. Dec. 160; Bardwell v. Perry 1 Lindley, 353 (Ewell's 2d ed.>,

(1847), 19 Vt. 292, 47 Am. Dec. 687.

1 80

§ 280. To what the lien attaches.-During the continuance of the partnership the lien attaches to everything which
can be considered partnership property. It is not lost by
substitution of new stock for old, and on the death or bank
ruptcy of a partner his lien continues in favor of those who
represent him until his share has been ascertained and provided for by the other partners. After the partnership has
been dissolved, however, the lien is confined to wl;tat was
partnership property at the time of the dissolution, and does
not extend to what may have been subsequently acquired
by those who continue to carry on the business.
As the lien extends only to that which is firm property, if
the partnership be one in the profits only, the lien can attach
to the profits alone and not to the means by which those
profits were produced.1 And as it is an incident of partnership, it does not exist where there is really no partnership
but only a joint adventure, in respect of which each retaina
the title to his own goods and their proceeds.'
l See 1 Lindley, BUrpra; Pearson
v. Keedy (1845), 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 128,
43 Am. Dec. 160; Bardwell v. Perry
(1847), 19 Vt. 292, 47 Am. Dec. 687.

180

1 See

1 See

ante, § 215.
ante, § 52.

'1 Lindley, 353 (Ewell'• Id ed.).

I
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LIEN OF PABTNEBS. [ 281-283.

281. Against whom lien exists. The lien of each part-

LIEN OF PARTNERS.

[§§ 281-283.

ner exists not only as against the other partnflrg, brj^lgo I

against all persons claiming through them or any of them. 1 /

I It is available, therefore, against their executors, execution

' creditors and assignees or trustees in bankruptcy. 2 While,

however, it exists against the share of each partner and

against a person who purchases that share from him, it

would defeat the purposes of the partnership to enforce it

tagainst the purchaser of firm property in the ordinary course

I of business; and a person,, therefore, who in good faitt^pr-

/ chases from one partner- specific chattels belonging to the

/ firm, acquires a good title thereto notwithstanding the liens

' which the other partners might have had prior to the sale. 1

282. What the lien secures. The lien of the partners

is intended to secure whatever is due to or from the firm by

or to the members thereof as such. It does not, therefore,

extend to debts incurred between the firm and its members

otherwise than in their capacity as partners, and in case of

the bankruptcy of a partner his assignees may claim his share
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without regard to such a debt; as, for example, a debt for

money borrowed by one partner from the firm for a purely

private purpose of his own. 4

283. HOTT lien is lost. The partner's lien on partner-

§ 281. Against whom lien exists.-The lien of each partner exists not only as against the other partner§. hnt...,also/
against all persons claiming through them or any of them.1
It is available, therefore, against their executors, execution
creditors and assignees or trustees in bankruptcy.2 While,
however, it exists against the share of each partner and
- against a person who purchases that share from him, it
would defeat the purposes of the partnership to enforce it
·a gainst the purchaser of firm property in the ordinary course
()f business; and a persan,..therefore, who in good fa,ith,BUrchases from one p~rtnei:. specific chattels belonging to the
firm, acquires a good title thereto notwithstanding the liens
which the other partners might have had prior to the sale.1

ship property is lost by the conversion of such property into

the separate property of another partner, or into the prop-

erty of a stranger with the other partner's consent. If,

therefore, on dissolution the property of the firm is divided

between the partners upon the understanding that the debts

shall be paid in some specified way, the lien is gone and the

partners cannot reclaim tne property, although the debts

remain unpaid. 6 So where one partner sells out all of his

1 1 Lindley, 854 (Ewell's 2d ed.). * See 1 Lindley, ubi supra.

*See Kirby v. Schoonmaker (1848), 4 See 1 Lindley, 854 (Ewell's 2d ed.).

8 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 46, 49 Am. Deo. See 1 Lindley, 355 (Ewell's 3d ed.) ;

160. Miller v. Estill (1856), 5 Ohio St. 508,

181

§ 282. What the lien secures.-The lien of the partners
is intended to secure whatever is due to or from the firm by
-0r to the_members thereof as such. It does not, therefore,
extend to debts incurred between the firm and its members
otherwise than in their capacity as partners, and in case of
the bankruptcy of a partner his assignees may claim his share
without regard to such a debt; as, for example, a debt for
money borrowed by one partner from the firm for a purely
private purpose of his own.'
§ 283. How lien is lost.-The partner's lien on partnership property is lost by the conversion of such property into
the separate property of another partner, or into the property of a stranger with the other partner's consent. If,
therefore, on dissolution the property of the firm is divided
between the partners upon the understanding that the debts
shall be paid in some specified way, the lien is gone and the
partners cannot reclaim t e property, although the debts
remain unpaid.6 So where one partner sells out all of his
11 Lindley, 854 (Ewell's 2d ed.).
aSee 1 Lindley, ubi BUpra.
2See Kirby v. Schoonmaker (1848},
'See 1Lindley,854 (Ewell's 2d ed.).
8 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 46, 49 Am. Dec.
5See 1 Lindley,355(Ewell's2ded.};
160.
Miller v. Estill (1856), 5 Ohio St. 008,
181

284.]

§ 284.]

LAW OF .PABTNJCBSHIP.

LAW OF PAKTNKESHIP.

interest in the firm to his copartner, and the latter agrees to

pay the debts of the partnership, the lien of the selling part-

ner is gone, and, as an incident, as will be seen, 1 the rights

of the firm creditors to priority of payment out of the assets, f

which is a right worked out through the right of the part- 1

ner, 2 is, in many cases, held to be gone also. 1

284. No lien if partnership illegal. If the partnership

is illegal, its members have no lien upon their common prop-

erty or upon each other's shares therein, unless it be by virtue

interest 1n the firm to his copartner, and the latter agrees to
pay the debts of the partnership, the lien of the selling partner is gone, and, as an incident, as will be seen,1 the rights
of the firm creditors to priority of payment out of the assets, {
which is a. right worked out through the right of the pa.rtner,2 is, in many cases, held to be gone also.1

of some agreement not affected by the illegality. 4

67 Am. Deo. 305; Smith v. Edwards

(1846), 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 106, 46 Am.

Dec. 71.

See post, 398.

See ante, 124

* See Miller v. Estill, supra; Ladd

§ 284:. No lien if partnership illegal.- If the partnership
is illegal, its members have no lien upon their common property or upon each other's shares therein, unless it be by virtue
of some agreement not affected by the illegality.'

v. Griswold (1847), 4 Gilm. (I1L) 25,

46 Am. Dec. 443. But see more
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f ully, post, 29a

1 Lindley, 355 (Swell's 3d ed>

139

u

a See .Miller v. Estill, tmpra; Ladd
67 Am. Dec. 305; ;S mith v. Edwards
(1846), 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 106, 46 Am. v. Griswold (1847), 4 Gihn. (Ill) 26,
46 Am. Dec. 448. But see more
Dec. 71.
fully, post, § 298.
1 See pod, § 298.
tSee ante,_§ 1K.
' 1 Lindley, 355 (Ewell's Sci ed.).

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

CHAPTEK XIX.

OF THE APPLICATION OF THE PARTNERSHIP ASSETa

285. In general.

286. What principles govern.

•

287. Application by partners

themselves while partner-

ship continues.

288. Right of firm to assume

individual debts of part-

ner.

289. Application by court Firm

creditors have priority.

CHAPTER XIX.

290. Joint but not firm cred-

itors postponed.

291. Partner cannot com-

OF THE APPLICATION OF THE PARTNERSIDP ASSETS.

pete with firm creditors.

292. Individual creditors

postponed to partners'

claims.

293. Individual creditors usually
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have priority in individ-

ual assets.

294 The contrary view.

295k Rules apply only where

there are two funds.

296. Firm cannot compete

with separate creditors.

297. Right of partner to

apply individual assets to

firm debts.

298. Right of partners to convert

firm property into indi-

vidual property.

299. Application where there was

no ostensible partnership.

300. Equitable rules do not de-

feat legal priorities.

285. In general. The question of the proper applica-

tion and distribution of the partnership assets has given rise

§ 293. Individual oreditors usually
§ 285. Ingener~l
286. What principles govern.
have priority in individ287. Application by partners
ual assets.
themselves while partner294. -The contrary view.
ship continues.
295. Rules apply only where
288. -Right of firm to assume
there are two furids.
individual debts of part296. Firm cannot compete
with separate creditors.
ner.
289. Application by court-Firm
297. Right of partner to
apply individual assets t.o
creditors have priority.
firm debts.
290. Joint but not firm creditors postponed.
298. Right of partners to convert
firtn property into indi291. Partner cannot comvidual property.
pete with firm creditors.
299. Application where there was
292. Individual creditors
postponed to partners'
no ostensible partnership.
800. Equitable rules do not declaims.
feat legal priorities.

to no little difficulty and conflict of decision. The chief

sources of difficulty have been disputes between the credit-

ors of the partnership and the creditors of the individual

§_285. ln general.-The question of the proper applica-

partners. May the creditors of the individual partners ob-

tain, in any way, the application of partnership funds to

their claims ? May partnership creditors, whose claims are

not satisfied out of the partnership property, have recourse

to the individual property of the partner, and in such case

may they share equally with individual creditors or must

they be postponed until individual creditors are paid ? These

and similar questions indicate the difficulties which arise.

183

tion and distribution of the partnership assets has given rise
to no little difficulty and conflict of decision. The chief
sources of difficulty have been disputes between the creditors of the partnership and the creditors of the individual
. partners. May the creditors of the individual partners obtain, in any way, the application of partnership funds to
their claims~ May partnership creditors, whose claims are
not satJsfied out of the partnership property, have recourse
to the individual property of the partner, and in such.case
may they share equally with individual creditors or must
they be postponed until individual creditor$ are paid 1 These
and similar questions indicate the difficulties which arise.
183

286, 287.] LAW OF PABTNEBSHIP.

286. What principles control. At the foundation o\

the matter lies the rule, already noticed, 1 which must con-

stantly be kept in mind. The capital or property of the

firm has been contributed for partnership purposes, and it

is part of the implied, if not the express, understanding be-

tween the partners, that the partnership property shall be

used only for partnership purposes, e. g., to pay partnership

debts. Each partner has therefore the right to insist that

the partnership property shall be so applied. This right is

the right of the partners as between themselves; but it has

sometimes been regarded, not as the right of the partners,

but as the right of the partnership creditors, and many cases

have been decided upon this erroneous assumption. If it is

a right of the partners, it is one which they may waive if

they see fit to do so ; but if it is a right of the creditors, then

it is not one which the partners can waive.

The question may present a different aspect if it arises

while the partnership is still going on than it will if it arises

after the partnership has been dissolved and the affairs are
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being wound up under judicial direction, and we will there-

fore separately consider each phase.

287. Application of the assets of a going partnership

by the partners themselves. "While the affairs of the part-

nership are still going on and its property and business are

still in the hands of the partners themselves, it is, in general,

true that they may make such disposition of the property as

they see fit. It has sometimes been said that the partnership

creditors have a kind of lien upon the partnership assets, but

this is not true. It is the property of the partners, which

they may, in general, deal with as they please. 1 Thus they

1 See ante, 122-124 with their property as they see fit.

2 Thus in Reyburn v. Mitchell The firm creditors have no lien on

(1891), 106 Mo. 865, 16 8. W. Rep. the partnership property for the

592, 27 Am. St. Rep. 350, the court, payment of their debts while the

§§ 286, 287.]

LAW OF P .A.RTNERBHIP•

•
§ 286. What principles eontrol.-At the foundation ct
the matter lies the rule, already noticed,1 which must constantly be kept in mind. The capital or property of the
firm has been contributed for partnership purposes~ and it
is part of the implied, if not the express, understanding between the partners, that the partnership property shall be
used only for partnership purposes, e.g., to pay partnership
debts. Each partner has therefore the right to insist that
the partnership property shall be so applied. This right is
the right of the partners as between themselves; but it has
sometimes been regarded, not as the right of the partners,
but as the right of the partnership creditors, and many cases
have been decided upon this erroneous assumption. If it is
a right of the partners, it is one which they may waive if
they see fit to do so; but if it is a right of the creditors, then
it is not one which the partners can waive.
The question may present a different aspect if it arises
while the partnership is still going on than it will if it arises
after the partnership has been dissolved and the affairs are
being wound up under judicial direction, and we will therefore separately consider each phase.

quoting from Sexton v. Anderson, firm continues to exist Partners

95 Mo. 381, say: "The partners have a right to have the partner-

may, so long as the firm exists, do ship property applied to partner-

184

§ 287. Application of the assets of a going partnership
by the partners themselves.-W.hile the affairs of the partnership are still going on and its property and business are
still in the hands of the partners themselves, it is, in general,
true that they may make such disposition of the property as
they see fit. It has sometimes been said that the partnership
creditors have a kind of lien upon the partnership assets, but
this is not true. It is the property of the partners, which
they may, in general, deal with as they please.1 Thus they
1 See

ante, §§ 122-124.

with their property as they see fit.
2 Thus in Reyburn v. Mitchell The firm creditors have no lien on
(1891), 106 Mo. 865, 16 S. W. Rep. the partnership property for the
592, 27 Am. St. Rep. 350, the court, payment of their debts while the
quoting from Sexton v. Anderson, firm continues to exist. Partners
95 Mo. 381, say: "The partners have a right to have the partner·
may, so long as the firm exists, do ship property applied to partne~
1S.
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APPLICATION OF PARTNERSHIP ASSETS. [ 288.

may sell it, mortgage it, or turn it out in payment of their

APPLICATION OF P .A..RTNERSHIP ASSETS.

[§ 288.

partnership debts. They may sell it all in good faith, and the

purchaser will get a good title, even though the firm was in-

solvent. They may also, it is held, transfer the firm property

to pay their joint debt, though it be not a partnership debt,

and the joint creditor will thereby obtain a good title to the

firm property. 1

288. Same subject Right of firm to assume or pay

individual debts of the partners. Whether, however, the

partners may apply the partnership property in payment of

the individual debt of one of the partners has been much

disputed. It is conceded that they may do this if they re-

serve enough to satisfy the partnership creditors ; 2 but where

may sell it, mortgage it, or turn it out in payment of their
partnership debts. They may sell it all in good faith, and the
purchaser will get a good title, even though the firm was insolvent. They may also, it is held, transfer the firm property
to pay their joint debt, though it be not a partnership debt,
and the joint creditor will thereby obtain a good title to the
firm property .1

the partnership is already insolvent, or where such an ap-

plication will leave it insolvent and unable to pay the part-

nership debts, there is controversy.

It is held, on the one hand, that if the firm is then in-

solvent, or if such an application of their assets will make

them insolvent, it would be fraud upon the partnership cred-
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ship purposes, but this is a right or erty. Instead of selling for cash,

lien which they may waive. Hence they may transfer firm property

the great majority of adjudicated to pay a firm debt. And they may

cases are to this effect: that all the transfer the firm property to pay

partners may, by their joint act, a joint debt for which they are

dispose of partnership property in jointly liable outside of the busi-

liquidation and payment of a debt ness of the firm, and v the joint

owing by an individual member of creditor will obtain a good title to

the firm. The qualification is that the firm property." To same effect:

the transaction must be in good Citizens' Bank v. Williams (1891),

faith, and not for fraudulent pur- 128 N. Y. 77, 28 N. E. Rep. 33, 26

poses." Am. St. Rep. 454.

1 Thus in Saunders v. Reilly * See Schmidlapp v. Currie (1878),

(1887), 105 N. Y. 12, 12 N. E. Rep. 55 Miss. 597, 30 Am. Rep. 530; Hage

§ 288. Same subject - Right of firm to assume or pay
individual debts of' the partners.- Whether, however, the
partners may apply the partnership property in payment of
the individual debt of one of the partners has been much
disputed. It is conceded that they may do this if they reserve en.o ugh to satisfy the partnership creditors; :z but where
the partnership is already insolvent, or where such an application will leave it insolvent and unable to pay the partnership debts, there is controversy.
It is held, on the one hand, that if the firm is then insolvent, or if such an application of their assets will make
them insolvent, it would be fraud upon the partnership cred-

170, 59 Am. Rep. 472, the court v. Campbell (1891), 78 Wis. 572, 47

say: "All members of a firm may N. W. Rep. 179, 23 Am. St. Rep.

sell the partnership property, even 422; Woodmansie v. Holcomb

if wholly insolvent, to a purchaser (1885), 34 Kan. 35, 7 Pac. Rep. 603;

in good faith, and thus convey, Jewett v. Meech (1884), 101 Ind.

free from the claim of firm credit- 289.

ors, a good title to the firm prop-

185

ship purposes, but this is a right or erty. Instead of selling for cash,
lien which they may waive. Hence they may transfer firm property
the great majority of adjudicated to pay a firm debt. And they may
cases are to this effect: that all the transfer the firm property to pay
partners may, by their joint act, a joint debt for which they are
dispose of partnership property in jointly liable outside of the busiliquidation and payment of.a debt ness of the firm, and . the joint
owing by an individual member of creditor will obtain a good title to
the firm. The qualification is that the firm property." To same effect:
the transaction must be in good Citizens' Bank v. Williams (1891),
faith, and not for fraudulent pur- 128 N. Y. 77, 28 N. E. Rep. 33, 26
Am. St. Rep. 454.
pose&"
2 See Schmidlapp v. Currie (1878),
l Thus in Saunders v. Reilly
(1887), 105 N. Y. 12, 12 N. E. Rep. 55 Miss. 597, 30 Am. Rep. 530; Hage
170; 59 Am. Rep. 472, the court v. Campbell (1891), 78 Wis. 572, 47
say: "All members of a firm may N. W. Rep. 179, 23 Am. St. Rep.
sell the partnership property, even 422; W oodmansie v. Holcomb
if wholly insolvent, to a purchaser (1885), 34 Kan. 35, 7 Pac. Rep. 603;
in good faith, and thus convey, Jewett . v. Meech (1884), 10i Ind.
free from the claim of firm credit- 289.
ors, a good title to the firm prop185

288.]

§ 288.]

LAW OF P .A..RTNERsHIP

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP

itors to permit such an application, and it will therefore not

be allowed. 1

It is contended, on the other hand, that if done while the

partners are still in control of their business, they may make

such an application, if they act in good faith, though they

were already or thereby became insolvent.*

The weight of modern authority seems to support the

latter view.

1 See Ransom v. Vandeventer

(1863), 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 307; Wilson

v. Robertson (1860), 21 N. Y. 587;

Hage v. Campbell, supra; Menagh

itors to permit such an application, and it will therefore not
be allowed.1
It is contended, on the other hand, that if done while the
partners are still in control of their business, they may make
such an application, if they act in good faith, though they
were already or thereby became insolvent. 2
The weight of modern authority seems .to support the
latter view.

v. Whitwell (1873), 52 N. Y. 146, 11

Am. Rep. 683, Ames' Cases on

Partn. 229; Kurner v. O'Neil (1894),

39 W. Va. 515, 20 S. E. Rep. 589;

Hill v. Draper (1894), 58 Ark. 625,

24 S. W. Rep. 1075.
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In Arnold v. Hagerman (1888), 45

N. J. Eq. 186, 17 AtL Rep. 93,14 Am.

St. Rep. 712, the court, adopting

the language of Clements v. Jes-

sup, 36 N. J. Eq. 569, says: "Part-

nership creditors, in equity, have

an inherent priority of claim upon

partnership property over individ-

ual creditors; and a transfer of

partnership property by one part-

ner, with the consent of the other

partners, or by all the partners, to

pay individual debts, is fraudulent

and void as to firm creditors, unless

the firm was then solvent and had

sufficient property remaining to

pay the partnership debts."

The indorsement of a note in

the firm name to secure the liabil-

ity of one of the partners when the

firm is insolvent is not fraudulent

as against firm creditors, provided

it is done for an honest purpose,

wj*.h the consent of the members

of W*> firm, and the indorsee did

not know that the firm was in-

solvent. Bernheimer v. Rindskopi

(1889), 116 N. Y. 428, 22 N. E. Rep.

1074, 15 Am. St. Rep. 414.

2 In Goddard-Peck Grocery Co.

v. McCune (1894), 122 Ma 426, 25

8. W. Rep. 904, 29 L. R. A. 681, the

court say: " No principle of law is

better settled than that, in the ad-

ministration of an insolvent part-

nership estate, the assets of the

firm must be applied to the satis-

faction of the firm creditors to the

exclusion of the creditors of the

individual partners. Hundley v.

Farris, 103 Mo. 78, 12 L. R. A. 254;

First Nat Bank v. Brenneisen, 97

Ma 148, and cases cited in each.

The principle we think equally

well settled by the more recent de-

cisions of this court, as well as by

the weight of judicial authority in

other jurisdictions, that the assets

of an insolvent firm, before disso-

lution, may, with the consent of all

Ransom v. Vandeventer not know that the firm was in·
(1863), 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 307; Wilson solvent. Bernheimer v. Rindskopl
v. Robertson (1860), 21 N. Y. 587; (1889), 116 N. Y. 428, 22 N. E. Rep.
Hage v. Campbell, supra; Menagh 1074. 15 Am. St. Rep. 414.
v. Whitwell (1~73), 52 N. Y. 146, 11
2 In Goddard-Peck Grocery Co.
Am. Rep. 683, Ames' Cases on v. McCune (1894), 122 Mo. 428, 26
Part;n. 229; Kurner v. O'Neil (1894), S. W. Rep. 904, 29 L. R. A. 681, the
39 W. Va. 515, 20 S. E. Rep. 589; court say: "No principle of law is
Hill v. Draper (1894), 58 Ark. 625, better settled than that, in the ad24 S. W. Rep. 1075.
ministration of an insolvent part.
In Arnold v. Hagerman (1888), 45 nership estate, the assets of the
N. J. Eq. 186, 17 Atl Rep. 93,14Am. firm must be applied to the satisSt. Rep. 712, the court, adopting faction of the firm creditors to the
the language of Clements v. Jes- exclusion of the creditors of the
sup, 36 N. J. Eq. 569,--says: "Part- individual partners. · Hundley v.
nership creditors, in equity, have Farris, 103 Mo. 78, 12 L R. A. 254;
an inherent priority of claim upon First Nat. Bank v. Brenneisen, 97
partnership property over individ- Mo. 148, and cases cited in each.
ual creditors; and a transfer of The principle we think equally
partnership property by one pa.r t- well settled by the more recent dener, with t.he consent of the other cisions of this court, as well as by
partners, or by all the partners, to the weight of judicial authority in
pay individual debts, is fraudulent other jurisdictions, that the assets
and void as to firm creditors, unless of an insolvent firm, before dissothe firm was then solvent and had lution, may, with the consent of all
sufficient property remaining to the partners, be applied to the satpay the partnership debts."
isfaction of all the individual debts
The in dorsement of a note in of the members of the firm, when
the firm name to secure the liabil- done in good faith. Sexton v. Anity of one of the partners when the derson, 95 Mo. 380; Reyburn v.
firm is insolvent is not fraudulent Mitchell, 106 Mo. 365 {supra), and
as a~ainst firm creditors, provided cases cited in each; Seger's Sons
it is done for an honest purpose, v. Thomas Bros., 107 Mo. 635. As '
wit.h the consent of the members Phelps v. McNeely, 66 Mo. 555, 27
of ~ firm, and the indorsee did Am. Rep. 378, is in conflict with
186
1 See
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APPLICATION OF P .A.RTNERSHIP .A..SSETS.

[§ 289.

[ 289.

289. Application of assets when distributed by court

Firm creditors first paid out of firm assets. When, how-

ever, the management of the partnership assets is taken out

of the hands of the partners who have made no previous

disposition of them 1 and put under the control of the

rington (1889), 119 Ind. 164,25 N. E,

Rep. 904, 4 L. R. A. 535; Winslow

v. Wallace (1888), 116 Ind. 317, 17

§ 289. Application of assets when distributed by courtFirm creditors first paid out of firm assets.·. When, however, the management of the partnership assets is taken out
of the hands of the partners-who have made no previous
• disposition of them 1 - and put under the control of the

N. E. Rep. 923, 1 L. R. A. 179; Elli-

son v. Lucas (1891), 87 Ga. 223, 13

S. E. Rep. 445, 27 Am. St. Rep. 242;

Smith v. Smith (1893), 87 Iowa, 93,

54 N. W. Rep. 73, 43 Am. St. Rep.

359; Teague v. Lindsey (1895),

Ala. , 17 So. Rep. 538; Huiskamp

v. Moline Wagon Co. (1886), 121

U. S. 310, 30 L. ed. 971, 7 Sup. Ct

Rep. 899; Case v. Beauregard (1878),
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99 U. S. 119; Pepper v. Peck (1890),

17 R L 55, 20 AtL Rep. 16; Wood-

mansie v. Holcomb (1885), 34 Kan.

35, 7 Pac. Rep. 603; Myers v. Tyson

(1896), Kan. , 43 Pac. Rep. 91;

Farwell v. Huston (1894), 151 III

239, 37 N. E. Rep. 864, 42 Am. St.

Rep. 237.

iThus, in Case v. Beauregard

(1878), 99 U. S. 119, it is said: "The

right of each partner extends only

to the share of what may remain

after payment of the debts of the

firm and a settlement of its ac-

counts. Growing out of the right,

or rather included in it, is the

right to have the partnership prop-

erty applied to the payment of the

partnership debts in preference to

those of any individual partner.

This is an equity that partners

have between themselves, and in

certain circumstances it inures to

the benefit of the creditors of the

firm. The latter are said to have

the privilege or preference, some-

the cases last cited and the great

weight of authority, it should not

be followed and is overruled."

In Fisher v. Syfers (1887), 109 Ind.

514, 10 N. E. Rep. 306, it is said:

" The rule that obtains in the dis-

tributioB of the estate of partners,

and under which partnership cred-

itors are entitled to priority of

payment out of the partnership

assets, is an equitable doctrine for

the benefit and protection of the

partners respectively. Partnership

creditors have no lien upon part-

nership property; their right to

priority of payment out of the firm

assets, over the individual cred-

itors, is always worked out through

the liens of the partners. Warren

v. Farmer, 100 Ind. 593; Trentman

v. Swartzell, 85 Ind. 44a Upon

the death of one partner, or where

the firm becomes bankrupt, or

where the partnership assets are

the cases last cited and the great rington (1889), 119 Ind.164. 25 N. E.
weight of authority~ it shoUld not Rep. 904, 4 L. R. A. 535; Winslow
be followed and is overruled."
v. Wallace (1888), 116 Ind. 317, 17 ·
In Fisher v. Syfers (1887), 109 Ind. . N. E. Rep. 923, 1 L. R. A. 179; Elli514, 10 N. E. Rep. 306, it is said: son v. Lucas (1891), 87 Ga. 223, 13
"The rule that obtains in the dis- S. E. Rep. 445, 27 Am. St. Rep. 242; .
tributioll of the estate of partners, Smith v. Smith (1893), 87 Iowa, 93,
and under which partnership cred- 54 N. W. Rep. 73, 43 Am. St. Rep.
itors are entitled to priority of 359; Teague v. Lindsey (1895), payment out of the partnership Ala. - , 17 So. Rep. 538; H uiskamp
assets, is an equitabJe doctrine for v. Moline W agori Co. (1886), 121
the benefit and protection of the U. S. 310, 30 L. ed. 971, 7 Sup. Ct.
partners respectively. Partnership Rep. 899; Case v. Beauregard (1878),
creditors have no lien upon part- 99 U.S. 119; Pepper v. Peck (1890),
nership property; their right to 17 R. L 55, 20 AtL Rep. 16; Woodpriority of payment out of the firm mansie v. Holcomb (1885), 34-Kan.
assets, over the indiVidual cred- 35, 7 Pac. Rep. 603; Myers v. Tyson
itors, is always worked out through (1896), - Kan. - , 43 Pac. Rep. 91;
the liens of the partners. Warren Farwell v. Huston (1894), 151 Ilt
v. Farmer, 100 Ind. 593; Trentman 239, 37 N. E. Rep. 864, 42 Am. St.
v. Swartzell, 85 Ind. 443. Upon Rep. 237.
1 Thus, in Case v. Beauregard
the death of one partner, or where
the firm becomes bankrupt, or (1878), 99 U.S. 119, it is said: "The
where the partnership assets are right of each partner extends only
· being administered by a court, the to the share of what may remain
rule of equitable distribution is after payment of the debts of the
applicable to' its fullest extent. firm and a settlement of its ac·
Where, however, the partners have counts. Growing out of the right,
the possession and control of their or rather included in it, is the
o'wn property, they have the right right to have the partnership propto make any honest disposition of erty applied to the payment of the
it they see fit; each has the right partnership debts in preference to
to waive his equitable lien, and to- those of any individual partner.
.gether they may sell, assign or This is an equity that partners
mortgage the property of the firm have between themselves, and in
to pay or secure either an individ- certain circumstances it inures to
ual debt of one of the partners, or the benefit of the creditors of the
the debts of the firm."
firm. The latter are said to have
To same effect: Purple v. Far- the privilege or preference, som&
187

'§ 289.]

LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

289.] LAW OP PARTNERSHIP.

court as in case of dissolution, bankruptcy proceedings and

the settlement of insolvent estates in courts of equity, a dif-

ferent rule prevails. Acting here upon the presumed inten-

tion and desire of each partner that the partnership assets

shall be applied to the discharge of the partnership liabil-

ities, the courts apply them first to that purpose, and exclude

the individual creditors of the partners from participation

until the firm creditors are paid.

So where firm property has been levied upon for the indi-

vidual debt of one partner, inasmuch as the only interest

which can be so sold is the partner's share in the final sur-

plus, 1 such levy must yield priority to subsequent levies for

debts due to the firm creditors. 2 And the same result will

ensue where one partner has mortgaged or otherwise incum-

bered his separate interest to secure his separate creditors. 3

But where all of the partners themselves, while the assets

remained under their control, have created valid liens upon

the property, the court in administering the estate will give

such liens effect. 4
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times loosely denominated a ' lien,' itors of the firm to avail them-

to have the debts due to them paid selves of his equity and enforce

out of the assets of a firm in course through it the application of those

of liquidation to the exclusion of assets primarily to the payment of

the creditors of its several mem- the debts due them whenever the

bers. This equity is a derivative property comes under its adminis-

one. It is not held or enforceable tration."

in their own right It is practi- 1 See ante, 100.

cally a subrogation to the equity of 2 Jarvis v. Brooks (1853), 27 N. H.

the individual partner, to be made 37, 59 Am. Dec. 359; Conroy v.

effective only through him. Hence, Woods (1859), 13 CaL 626, 73 Am.

court as in case of dissolution, bankruptcy proceedings and
the settlement of insolvent estates in courts of equity, a different rule prevails. Acting here upon the presumed intention and desire of each partner that the partnership assets
shall be applied to the discharge of the partnership liabilities, the courts apply them first to that purpose, and exclude
the individual creditors of the partners from participation
until the firm creditors are paid.
So where firm property has been levied upon for :he individual debt of one partner, inasmuch as the only interest
which can be so sold is the partner's share-in the final surplus,1 such levy must yield priority to subsequent levies for
debts due to the firm creditors.2 ....\..nd the same result will
ensue where one partner has mortgaged or otherwise incumbered his separate interest to secure his separate creditors.3
But where all of the partners themselves, while the assets
remained under their control, have created valid liens upon
the property, the court in administering the estate will give
such liens effect.'

if he is not in a condition to en- Dec. 605; Bullock v. Hubbard

force it. the creditors of the firm (1863), 23 CaL 495, 83 Am, Dec. 130;

cannot be. Rice v. Barnard, 20 Pierce v. Jackson (1810), 6 Mass.

Vt 479, 50 Am. Dec. 54; York 242, Ames' Partn. Cas. 293.

County Bank's Appeal, 32 Pa. St. 'Ewart v. Mercantile Co. (1895),

446. But so long as the equity of Mo. , 31 S. W. Rep. 1041.

the partner remains in him so * Smith v. Smith (1893), 87 Iowa,

long as he retains an interest in 93, 54 N. W. Rep. 73, 43 Am. St.

the firm assets as a partner a Rep. 359.

court of equity will allow the cred-
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times loosely denominated a 'lien,'
to have the debts due to them paid
-out of the assets of a firm in course
of liquidation to the exclusion of
the creditors of its several members. This equity is a derivative
one. It is not held or enforceable
in their own right. It is practically a subrogation to the equity of
the individual partner, to be made
effective only throug~ him. Hence,
if he is not in a condition to enforce it. the creditors of the firm
cannot be. Rice v. Barnard, 20
Vt. 479, 50 Am. Dec. 54; York
County Bank's Appeal, 32 Pa. St.
446. But so long as the equity of
the partner remains in him - so
long as he retains an interest in
the firm assets as a partner - a
court of equity.will allow the cred-

·itors of the firm to avail themselves of his equity and enforce
through it the application of those
assets primarily to the payment of
the debts due them whenever the
property comes under its administration."
I See ante, § 100.
2 Jarvis v. Brooks (1853), 27 N. H.
37, 59 Am. Dec. 359; Conroy v.
Woods (1859), 13 Cal 626, 73 Am.
Dec. 605; Bullock v. Hubbard
(1863), 23 Cal 495, 83 Am. Dec. 130;
Pierce v. Jackson (1810), 6 Mass.
242, Ames' Partn. Cas. 293.
3 Ewart v. Mercantile, Co. (1895),
- Mo. - , 31 S. W. Rep. 1041.
'Smith v. Smith (1893), 87 Iowa,
93, 54 N. W. Rep. 73, 43 Am. St.
Rep. 359.
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APPLIO.A.TION Oi' PARTNERSHIP ASSETS.

(§§ 290-292..

290. Same subject Joint but not partnership cred-

itors not preferred. The reasons which operate to give

firm creditors as such a preference in payment out of firm

assets operate to exclude from such priority any who do

not stand in that relation. It is consequently held that the

joint creditors of the partners as individuals, not being part-

nership creditors, must be excluded from participation in

the partnership assets until the firm creditors are paid. 1

291. Same subject Partner cannot compete with

firm creditors. So, if the firm be indebted to one partner,

inasmuch as he is himself, as a member of the firm, one of

the persons from whom his claim is due, and is therefore at

once both debtor and creditor, while as to the claims of

strangers against the firm he is a debtor simply, it is clear

§ 290. Same subject- Joint but not partnership creditors not preferred.-The reasons which operate to givefirm creditors as such a preference in payment out of firm
assets operate to exclude from such priority any who do
not stand in that relation. It is consequently held that the-~
joint crewtors of the partners as individuals, not being partnership creditors, must be excluded from participation in.
the partnership assets until the firm creditors are paid.1

that he is not strictly a firm creditor within the rule which

gives such creditors priority. It is settled, therefore, that

he cannot compete with the latter class in securing payment

out of the assets of the firm ; neither can his own creditors,

by virtue of his claim, be permitted to so compete. 2
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/ An exceptionjio this rule has been made where the firm

/ and the partner were carrying on separate trades, and the

/ claim was due in respect of goods furnished by one to the

I other as such separate traders. 8

292. Same subject One partner's share cannot be

reached by his creditors till partners' claims against firm

are satisfied. So, though the share or interest of one part-

ner in the final surplus may, as has been seen, be rendered

. available to his creditors, it must be kept in mind that that

surplus is not ascertained until not only the firm creditors

as such are paid, but also not until the claims of the re-

iSeeForsythv. Woods (1870), 11 AtL Rep. 952; Ex parte Ely the

Wall (U. S.) 484; Second Nat Bank (1881), 16 Ch, Div. 620.

v. Burt (1883), 93 N. Y. 233; Turner 8 See Ex parte Sillitoe (1824), 1

v. Jaycox (1869), 40 N. Y. 470. Glyn & Jameson, 374, Ames' Caa

2 See Edison Illuminating Co. v. on Partn. 428; Ex parte Cook (1831),

DeMott (1893), 51 N. J. Eq. 16, 25 Montagu, 228, Ames' Cas. on Partn.

432.
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§ 291. Same subject-Partner cannot compete withftrm creditors.- So, if the firm be indebted to one partner,
inasmuch as he is himself, as a member of the firm, one or
the persons from whom his claim is due, and is therefore at
once both debtor and creditor, while as to the claims of
strangers against the firm he is a debtor simply, it is clear
that he is not strictly a firm creditor within the rule which.
gives such creditors priority. It is settled, therefore, that.
he cannot compete with the latter class in securing payment
out of the assets of the firm; neither can his own creditors,
by virtue of his claim, be permitted to so compete. 2
An excepJipnJ;o this rule has been made where the firm
and the partner were carrying on separate trades, and the
claim was due in respect of goods furnished by one to theotber as such separate t.raders. 3

l

§ 292. Same subject - One partner's share cannot bereached by his creditors till partners' claims against firm
are satisfied.- So, though the share or interest of one partner in the final surplus may, as has been seen, be rendered
• available to his creditors, it must be kept in mind that that .
surplus is not ascertained until not only the firm creditor.s
as such are paid, but also not until the claims of the reAtl Rep. 952; Ex parte Blythe
(1881), 16 Ch. Div. 620.
3 See Ex parte Sillitoe (1824), 1
Glyn & Jameson, 374, Ames' Cas.
on Partn. 428; Ex parte Cook (1831),
Montagu, 228, Ames' Cas. on Partn.~
432.
189

1 See Forsyth v. Woods (1870), 11
Walt (U.S.) 484; Second Nat. Bank
v. Burt (1883 ), 93 N. Y. 233; Turner
v. Jaycox (1869), 40 N. Y. 470.
2See Edison illuminating Co. v.
DeMott (1893), 51 N. J. Eq. 16, 25
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LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

spective partners against the firm, as for advances made or

money loaned to it, are satisfied. In equity, therefore, the

individual creditors of one partner cannot reach his share

until the claims of partners against the firm have been sat-

isfied. 1

293. Individual creditors usually given priority in

individual assets of a partner. The right of the firm

creditors to priority of payment out of the firm assets being

spective partners against the firm, as for advances made or
money loaned to it, are satisfied. In equity, therefore, the
individual creditors of one partner cannot reach his share
until the claims of partners against the firm have been satisfied.1

conceded, it has been urged that the separate creditors of

the partner were entitled to a like priority of payment out

of the separate assets of the partner, and this right has been

maintained by many, perhaps by a majority, of the cases in

the United States, following the early English precedents. 2

"The correctness of this rule, however," it was said in a lead-

ing case,* " has been much controverted, and there has not al-

1 See Buchan v. Sumner (1847), 2 found to have been in practice in

Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 165, 47 Am. Dec.

305; Crooker v. Crooker (1863), 52
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Me. 267, 83 Am. Dec. 509; Divine v.

Mitchum (1844), 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 488,

41 Am. Dec. 241.

2 See Hundley v. Farris (1890),

103 Mo. 78, 15 a W. Rep. 312, 23

Am. St Rep. 863, 12 L. R. A. 254;

§ 293. Individual creditors usually given priority in
individual assets of a partner.-The right of the firm
creditors to priority of payment out of the firm assets being
conceded, it has been urged that the separate creditors of
the partner were entitled to a like priority of payment out
of the separate assets of the partner, and this right has been
maintained by many, perhaps by a majority, of the cases in
the United States, following the early English precedents.2
"The correctness of this rule, however," it was said in a leading .case,s "has been much controverted, and there h~s not al-

Claflin v. Behr (1889), 89 Ala. 503,

8 So. Rep. 45; Moody v. Lucier

(1883), 62 N. H. 584; Greene v. But-

terworth (1889), 45 N. J. Eq. 738, 17

AtL Rep. 949; Peters v. Bain (1889),

133 U. S. 670, 10 Sup. Ct Rep. 354;

New Market Nat. Bank v. Locke

(1883), 89 Ind. 428; Rodgers v. Me-

randa (1857), 7 Ohio St. 180, Paige's

Partn. Gas. 22a

* Rodgers v. Meranda, supra.

In Murrill v. Neill (1850), 8 How.

(U. S.) 414, it is said: " The rule in

equity governing the administra-

tion of insolvent partnerships is

one of familiar acceptance and

practice; it is one which will be

this country from the beginning of

our judicial history, and to have

been generally if not universally

received. This rule, with one or

two eccentric variations in the

English practice which may be

noted hereafter, is believed to be

identical with that prevailing in

England, and is this: That partner-

ship creditors shall, in the first in-

stance, be satisfied from the part-

nership estate: and separate or

private creditors of the individual

partners from the separate and

private estate of the partners with

whom they have made private and

individual contracts; and that the

private and individual property of

the partners shall not be applied

in extinguishment of partnership

debts until the separate and indi-

vidual creditors of the respective

partners shall be paid. The reason

and foundation of this rule, or its

equality and fairness, the court ia

190

1 See Buchan v. Sumner (1847), 2
Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 165, 47 Am. Dec.
305; Crooker v. Crooker (1863), 52
Me. 267, 83 Am. Dec. 509; Divine v.
Mitchum (1844), 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 488,
t1 Am. Dec. 241.
2 See Hundley v. Farris (1890),
103 Mo. 78, 15 S. W. Rep. 312, 23
Am. St. Rep. 863, 12 L. R. A. 254;
Claflin v. Behr (1889), 89 Ala. 503,
s So. Rep. 45; Moody v. Lucier
{1883), 62 N. H. 584; Greene v. Butterworth (1889), 45 N. J. Eq. 738, 17
Atl Rep. 949; Peters v. Bain (1889),
133 U. S. 670, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 354;
New Market Nat. Bank v. Locke
(1883), 89 Ind. 428; Rodgers v. Meranda (i857), 7 Ohio St. 180, Paige's
Partn. Cas. 223.
s Rodgers v. Meranda, supra.
In Murrill v. Neill (1850), 8 How.
(U. S.) 414, it is said: "The rule in
equity governing the administration of insolvent partnerships is
one of familiar acceptance and
practice; it is one which will be

found to have been in practice iii
this country from the beginning of
our judicial history, and 'to have
been generally if not universally
received. This rule, with one or
two eccentric variations in the
English practice which may be
noted hereafter, is believed to be
identical .w ith that prevailing in
England, and is this: That partnership creditors shall, in the first instance, be satisfied from the p'1-rtnership estate; and separate or
private creditors of the individual
partners from the separate and
private estate of the partners with
whom they have made private and
individual contracts; and that the
private and individual property of
the partners shall not be applied
in extinguishment of partnership
debts until the separate and individual credito~ of the respective
partners shall be paid. The reason
and foundation of this rule, or its
equality and fairness, the court ia
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ways been a perfect concurrence in the reasons assigned for

A.PPLIOA.TION 01!' P ARTNEBSHIP ASSETS.

[§ 293.

it by those courts which have adhered to it. By some, it

has been said to be an arbitrary rule, established from con-

siderations of convenience; by others, that it rests on the

basis that a primary liability attaches to the fund on which

the credit was given that, in contracts with a partnership,

credit is given on the supposed responsibility of the firm;

while in contracts with a partner as an individual, reliance

is supposed to be placed on his separate responsibility. And

again, others have assigned as a reason for the rule that the

joint estate is supposed to be benefited to the extent of every

credit which is given to the firm, and that the separate es-

tate is, in like manner, presumed to be enlarged by the debts

contracted by the individual partner; and that there is con-

sequently a clear equity in confining the creditors, as to

preferences, to each estate respectively which has been thus

benefited by their transactions. But these reasons are not

entirely satisfactory. So important a rule must have a bet-

ter foundation to stand upon than mere considerations of

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

convenience; and practically it is undeniable that those who

give credit to a partnership look to the individual responsi-

bility of the partners as well as that of the firm; and, also,

those who contract with a partner in his separate capacity

place reliance on his various resources or means, whether in-

dividual or joint. And inasmuch as individual debts are

often contracted to raise means which are put into the busi-

ness of a partnership, and also partnership effects often with-

drawn from the firm and appropriated to the separate use

of the partners, it cannot be practically true that the sepa-

rate estate has been benefited to the extent of every credit

given to each individual partner, nor that the joint estate

has retained from the separate estate of each partner the

benefit of every credit given to the firm." The court, how-

not called upon to justify. Were of this rule to stay the hand of in-

these less obvious than they are, it novation at this day, at least under

were enough to show the early any motive less strong than the

adoption and general prevalence most urgent propriety."
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ways been a perfect concurrence in the reasons assigned for
it by those courts which have adhered to it. By some, it
has been said to be an arbitrary rule, established from considerations of convenience; by others, that it rests . on the
basis that a primary liability attaches to the fund on which
the credit was given - that, in contracts with a partnership,
credit is given on the supposed responsibility of the firm;
while in contracts with a partner as an individual, reliance
is supposed to .be placed on his separate responsibility. And
again, others have assigned as a reason for the rule that the
joint estate is supposed to be benefited to the extent of every
credit which is given ·to the firm, and that the separate estate is, in like manner, presumed to be enlarged by the debts
contracted by the individual partner; and that there is consequently a clear equity in confining the creditors, a.s to
preferences, to each estate respectively which has been thus
benefited by their transactions. But these reasons are not
entirely satisfactory. So important a rule must have a better foundation to stand upon than mere considerations of
convenience; and practically it is undeniable that those who
give credit to a partnership look to the individual responsibility of the partners as well as that of the firm; and, also,.
those who contract with a partner in his separate capacity
place reliance on his various resources or means, whether· individual or joint. And inasmuch as individual debts are
often cantracted to raise means which are put into the business of a partnership, and also partnership effects often withdrawn from the firm and appropriated to the separate use
of the partners, it cannot be practically true that the separ
rate estate ·has been benefited to the extent of ~very credit
given to each individual partner, nor that the joint estate
has retained from · the separate estate of each partner the
· benefit of every credit given to the firm." The court, hownot called upon to justify. Were of this rule to stay the hand of inthese less obvious than they are, it novation at this day, at .l east under
were enough to show the early · any motive less strong than the
adoption and general prevalence most urgent propriety,,,
191
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ever, concluded that the rule was well established, saying:

" Some general rule is necessary, and that must rest on the

basis of the unalterable preference of the partnership credit-

ors in the joint effects, and their further right to some claim

in the separate property of each of the several partners.

The preference, therefore, of the individual creditors of a

partner in the distribution of his separate estate, results as

a principle of equity from the preference of partnership

creditors in the partnership funds, and their advantage in

having different funds to resort to, while 'the individual

creditors have but one." But whether the reasons assigned

for the rule are satisfactory or not, the rule itself seems to

be established by the clear weight of authority.

294. Same subject The contrary view. But not-

withstanding the quite general concurrence in the rule giv-

ing each class of creditors priority in the respective funds,

it has met with some forcible dissent, 1 and upon principle

it is difficult to be sustained. The true rule, from the

standpoint of principle, would seem to be that inasmuch as
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each partner is individually liable for the partnership debts,

the creditors of the firm (and therefore of each partner as

ever, concluded that the rule was well established, saying:
''Some general rule is necessary, and that must rest on the
basis of the unalterable preference of the partnership creditors in the joint effects, and their further right to some claim
in the separate property of each of the several partners.
The preference, therefore, of the individual creditors of a
partner in the distribution of his separate estate, results as
a principle of equity from the preference of partnership
creditors in the partnership funds, and their advantage in
having different funds to resort to, while· the individual
creditors have but one." But whether the reasons assigned
for the rule are satisfactory or not, the rule itself seems to
be established by the clear weight of authority.

well), after exhausting the partnership assets, are entitled to

share equally with the separate creditors in the separate as-

sets of the partners. The basis of this rule is founL4n the

fact that the partnership creditor has recourse_toJ20 funds

(i. <?., the partnership assets and the individual assets), while

the individual creditor has recourse to but azfcdrfund, namely,

the individual assets; and it is a principle of equity that

where one creditor has access to two funds while another

creditor has access to but one, the former shall exhaust the

separate fund before resorting to the common fund.

1 See Hutzler v. Phillips (1887), 26 Camp v. Grant (1851), 21 Conn. 41,

S. C. 136, 1 S. E. Rep. 502, 4 Am. St 54 Am. Dec. 321, to the effect that

Rep. 687; Blair v. Black (1889), 31 partnership creditors may share

S. C. 346, 9 S. E. Rep. 1033, 17 Am. equally with individual creditors

St. Rep. 30; Pettyjohn v. Woodruff in the separate asseta

(1890), 86 Va. 478, 10 & E. Rep. 715;
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§ 294:. Same subject- The contrary view.- But notwithstanding the quite general concurrence in the rule giving each class of creditors priority in the respective .fund~
it has met with some forcible dissent,1 and upon principle
it is difficult to be sustained. The true rule, from the
standpoint of principle, would seem to be that inasmuch as
each partner is individually liable for the partnership debts,
the creditors of the firm (and therefore of each partner as
well), after exhausting the partnership assets, are entitled to
share equally with the separate creditors in the separate assets of the partners. The basis of this rule is foun~the
fact that the partnership creditor has recourse to two funds
(i. e., the partnership assets and the individual assets), while
the individual creditor has recug.rse to but ®e fund, namely,
the individual assets; and it is a principle of ~uity that
where one creditor has access to two funds while another
creditor has access to but one, the former shall exhaust the
separate fund before resorting to the common fund.
Hutzler v. Phillips (1887), 26 Camp v. Grant (1851), 21 Conn. 41,
S. C. 136, 1 S. E. Rep. 502, 4 Am. St. 54 Am. Dec. 321, to the effect that
Rep. 687; Blair v. Black (1889), 31 partnership creditors may share
S. C. 346, 9 S. E. Rep. 1033, 17 Am. equally with individual creditors
St. Rep. 30; Pettyjohn v. Woodruff in the separate assets.
(1890), 86 Va. 478, 10 S. E. Rep. 715;
192
1 See
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APPLIOA'.1'10N 01!' PARTNERSHIP ASSBTS.

(§§ 295..,..297.

295. Same subject Rules apply only where there

are two funds. But either rule applies only where there

are two funds. Thus, where there are no partnership assets

and no solvent partner, it is usually held that the partner-

ship creditors may share equally with the individual credit-

ors in the separate assets of the partner. 1

296. Same subject Firm cannot compete with indi-

ridnal creditors. Passing next from the right of firm

creditors as such to compete with the individual creditors in

the separate estate of one partner, the question arises whether,

if that partner was indebted to the firm, the firm or those

§ 295. Same subject- Rules apply only where there
are two funds.- But either rule applies only where there
are two funds. Thus, where there are no partnership assets ·
a.nd no solvent partner, it is usually held that the partnership creditors may share equally with the individual creditors in the separate assets of the partner.1

who represent it can compete with the individual creditors

of that partner in the distribution of his assets. As to this,

the general rule is that the firm or those who represent it

§ 296. -Same subject- Firm cannot compete with indi·

cannot be permitted to compete with the separate creditors

of one partner in the distribution of his estate. 2 An excep-

tion to the rule exists where the claim of the firm against

the partner is founded upon his wrongful and fraudulent

appropriation of firm assets to his own use. 8
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297. Same subject Right of partner to apply indi-

vidual assets to firm debts. Whether one partner will be

permitted to apply his individual assets to the payment of

the firm creditors and thereby exclude his own separate

creditors, as by making an assignment for their benefit or

1 See In re Lloyd (1884), 22 Fed. 'See Read v. Bailey (1877), 8 App.

Rep. 88; In re West (1889), 39 Fed. Gas. 94, Ames' Partn. Gas. 409; In

Rep. 203; Harris v. Peabody (1881), re Hamilton (1880), 1 Fed. Rep. 800;

73 Me. 262; Curtis v. Woodward Cowan v. Gill (1883), 11 Lea (Tenn.),

(1883), 58 Wis. 499, 46 Am. Rep. 647; 674; Lodge v. Fendal (1790), 1 Vesey,

Alexander v. Gorman (1886), 15 R. L Jr. 166, Ames' Partn. Gas. 394

421. Contra, Howe T. Lawrence Contra, Bird v. Bird (1885), 77 Me.

(1852), 9 Gush. (Mass.) 553, 57 Am. 499, 1 AtL Rep. 455.

Dec. 68; Warren v. Farmer (1884), See Ex parte Sillitoe (1824), 1

rid ual creditors.- Passing next from the right of firm
~reditors as such to compete with the individual creditors in
the separate estate of one partner, the question arises-whether,
if that partner was indebted to the firm, the firm or those
who represent it can compete with the individual creditors
of that partner in the distribution of his assets. As to this,
the general rule is that the firm or those who represent it
cannot be permitted to compete with the separate creditors
of one partner in the distribution of his estate.2 An exception to the rule exists where the claim of the firm against
the partner is founded upon his wrongful and fraudulent ·
appropriation of firm assets to his own use.1 -

100 Ind. 593; In re Gray (1888), 111 Glyn & Jameson, 874, Ames' Caa

N. Y. 404. on Partn. 428.
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§ 297. Same subject - Right of partner to apply individual assets to firm debts.-Whether one -partner will be
permitte.d to apply his individual assets to the payment of
the firm creditors a~d thereby exclude his own separate
creditors, as by making an assignment for their benefit or
l See In re Lloyd (1884), 22 Fed.
Rep. 88; In re West (1889), 39 Fed.
Rep. 203; Harris v. Peabody (1881),
73 Me. 262; Curtis v. Woodward
(1883), 58 Wis. 499, 46 Am. Rep. 647;
Alexander v. Gorman (1886), 15 R. L
421. Oontra, Howe v. Lawrence
(1852), 9 Cush. (MasS.) 553, 57 Am.
Dec. 68; Warren v~ Farmer (1884),
100 Ind. 593; In re Gray (1888), 111
N. Y. 404.

13

2 See Read v. Bailey (1877), 3 App.
Cas. 94, Ames' Partn. Cas. 409; In
re Hamilton (1880),_1 Fed. Rep. 800;
Cowan v. Gill (1883), 11 Lea (Tenn.),
_674; Lodge v. Fendal (1790), 1 Vesey,
Jr. 166, Ames' Partn. Cas. 894.
Oon.tra, Bird v. Bird (1885), 77 Me.
499, 1 Atl Rep. 455.
asee Ex parte Sillitoe (1824), 1
Glyn & Jameson, 874, Ames' Cas.
on Partn. 428.
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giving them the preference in assigning his estate, is a ques-

tion upon which the authorities are in conflict, as they have

been seen to be respecting the right of firm creditors to share

equally with the individual creditors in the partner's separate

estate. 1 Substantially similar considerations apply to each

question. It is said, on the one hand that inasmuch as the

firm creditors are equally creditors of the partners as in-

dividuals, there is no reason why the individual partner

should not pay them out of his own estate if he so prefers. 2

On the other hand, it is urged that the separate creditors

have a first claim upon the separate assets, and to permit

them to be diverted to the payment of the firm creditors

is a fraud upon the separate creditors.* The former would

seem to be the better view.

298. Right of partners to convert firm property into

individual property. Intimately connected with the ques-

tions already considered is that of the power of the part-

ners, by any arrangement among themselves, to so divest

themselves of their own lien upon the partnership property
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that the right of the firm creditors to priority of payment

out of that property which right, as has been seen, depends

upon the partners' right shall be cut off. 4 Thus, for ex-

ample, may one partner on retiring from the firm sell out

giving them the preference in assigning his estate, is a question upon which the authorities are in conflict, as they have
been seen to be respecting the right of firm creditors to share
equally with the individual creditors in the partner's separate
estate.1 Substantially similar considerations apply to each
question. It is said, on the one hand, that inasmuch as the
firm creditors are equally creditors of the partners as individuals, there is no reason why the individual partner
should not pay them out of his own estate if he so prefers. 2
On the other hand, it is urged that the separate creditors
have a first claim upon the separate assets, and to permit
them to be diverted to the payment of the firm creditors
is a fraud upon the separate creditors.' The former would
seem to be the better view.

all of his interest in the partnership assets to his copartner,

who continues the business, in such a way that the latter

may thereafter apply those assets to the payment of his in-

dividual debts to the exclusion of the firm creditors ? May

both partners by selling to a third person thus divest their

firm creditors of their priorities in the property so sold ?

These questions are but another form of that already con-

1 See ante, 285, 286. See Holton v. Holton (1860), 40

2 See Newman v. Bagley (1835), N. H. 77, Ames' Partn. Cas. 332;

16 Pick. (Mass.) 570; Gadsden v. Jackson v. Cornell (1844). 1 Sandt

Carson (1857), 9 Rich. Eq. (a C.) 252; (N. Y.) Ch. 348.

Chessher v. Clam (1895), Tex. < See ante, 288.

Civ. App. , 30 & W. Rep. 466.
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§· 298. Right of partners to convert firm property Into
individual property.- Intimately connected with the questions already considered is that of the power of the partners, by any arrangement among themselves, to so divest
themselves of their own lien upon the partnership property
that the right of the firm creditors to priority orpayment
out of that property-which right, as has been seen, depends
.upon the partners' right-shall be cut off.' Thus, for example, may one partner on retiring from the firm sell out
all ~f his interest in the partnership assets to his copartner,
who continues the business, in such a way that the latter
may thereafter apply those assets to the payment of his individual debts to the exclusion of the firm creditors~ May
both partn~rs by selling to a third person thus divest their
firm creditors of their priorities in the property so sold¥
These questions are but another form of that already conSee ante, §§ 285, 286.
•See Holton v. Holton (1860), 40
Newman v. Bagley '(1835), N. H. 77, Ames' Partn. Cas. 332;
16 Pick. (Mass.) 570; Gadsden v. Jackson v. Cornell (1844). 1 Sandt
Carson (1857), 9 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 252; (N. Y.) Ch. 3·18.
Chessher v. Clam (1895), - Tex.
'See ante, § 288.
Civ. App. - , 80 S. W. Rep. 466.
l

2 See
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APPLICATION OF PARTNERSHIP ASSETS. [ 298.

sidered, namely, the right of the partners to apply firm

APPLICATION OF PARTNERSHIP ASSETS.

[§ 298.

assets to the payment of individual debts. 1 They rest upon

substantially the same considerations and present substan-

tially the same conflict of opinion. That solvent partners,

acting in good faith, may do so, seems to be conceded. 2 That

it may also be done, though the partners are not solvent, if

done in good faith and for a valuable consideration, has also

been held.* Whether the mere assumption of the debts by

the continuing partner is a sufficient consideration is in

question. In a late case 4 it is said : " It is clear that while

the partnership is solvent and going on, the partners may,

by unanimous assent or joint act, do what they please with

the assets, if the act is ~bona fide. Where, in such case, one

partner sells or assigns his interest to the other, bond fide,

for a valuable consideration, or an agreement to pay the

debts of the firm, and indemnify against them, this will

change the joint into a separate property. The only ques-

tion is upon the bona fides of the transaction. If such an

arrangement could not be made, a partner could never re-
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tire. On the other hand, according to the better reason and

the weight of authority, if the firm is insolvent, or on the

eve of insolvency, and both of the partners are insolvent, a

purchase by one partner of the interest of the other, in con-

sideration of the former's assumption of all the debts of the

firm, will be regarded as a purchase upon a consideration

which is of no value whatever; and, no equivalent having

been given, the transfer is in effect voluntary, and its only

effect, if sustained, would be to hinder partnership creditors,

and hence is deemed ineffectual to convert the joint prop-

erty into separate property as against the firm creditors."

See ante, 2S& (1851), 21 Conn. 130, 54 Am. Dec.

2 See Fulton v. Hughes (1885), 63 333; Howe v. Lawrence (1852), 9

Miss. 61 ; Stanton v. Westover (1886), Gush. (Mass.) 553, 57 Am. Dec. 68.

101 N. Y. 265; Ketchum v. Durkee * Darby v. Gilligan (1889), 33 W.

(1846), 1 Barb. (N. Y.) Ch. 480, 45 Va. 246, 10 S. E. Rep. 400,6 L. R A,

Am. Dec. 412. 740, citing many cases.

*8ee Allen v. Center Valley Co.

Itt

sidered, namely, the right of the partners to apply firm
assets to the payment of individual debts.1 They rest upon
substantially the same considerations and present substantially the same conflict of opinion. That solvent partners,
acting in good faith, may do so, seems to be conceded.2 That
it may also be done, though the partners are not solvent, if
done in good faith and for a valuable consideration, has also
been held.1 Whether the mere assumption of the debts by
the continuing partner is a sufficient consideration is in
question. In a late case' it is said: "It is clear that while
the partnership is solvent and going on, the partners may,
by unanimous assent or joint act, do what they please with
the assets, if the act is bona fide. Where, in such case, one
partner sells or assigns his interest to the other, bona ,fUM,
for a valuable consideration, or an agreement to pay the
debts of the firm, and indemnify against them, this will
change the joint into a separate property. The only ques. tion is upon the bona fides of the transaction. If such an
arrangement could not be made, a partner could n~ver retire. On the other hand, according to the better reason and
the weight of authority, if the firm is insolvent, or on the
eve of insolvency, and both of the partners are insolvent, a
purchase by one partner of the interest of the other, in consideration .of the former's assumption of all the debts of the
firm, will be regarded as a purchase upon a consideration
which is of no value whatever; and, no equivalent having
been given, the transfer is in effect voluntary, and its only
effect, if sustained, would be to hinder partnership creditors,
and hence is deemed ineffectual to convert the joint property into separate property as against the firm creditors."
l See ante, ~ 288.
2See Fulton v. Hughes (1885), 63
Miss. 61; Stanton v. Westover (1886),
101 N. Y. 265; Ketchum v. Durkee
(1846), 1 Barb. (N. Y.) Ch. 480, 45
Am. Dec. 412.
ISee Allen -Y. Center Valley Co.

(1851), 21 Conn. 130, 54 Am. Dec.
333; Howe v. Lawrence (1852), 9
Cush. (Mass.) 553, 57 Am. Dec. 68.
'Darby v. Gilligan (1889), 33 W.
Va. 24.6, 10 S. E. Rep. 400, 6 L. R. A.
740, citing many cases.
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Another view of similar transactions leading to the same

result is that the stipulation that the continuing partner

shall pay the debts operates not to release but to continue

the selling partner's lien upon the assets, unless expressly

waived, and therefore the firm creditors may still work out

their priority through his lien, until the property has come

into the hands of a lona fide purchaser. 1

299. Application of assets when there was no osten-

sible partnership When there was merely an ostensible

but not an actnal partnership. Questions as to the proper

application of the assets also arise where there was really a

partnership between the parties, but there was none osten-

sibly, as where, of two partners, one was dormant and the

other appeared to the public as the sole dealer. " In such a

case," say the court in Tennessee, 3 " the ordinary rules touch-

ing partnership transactions and partnership property do not

apply. The dormant partner has clearly no equity to re-

quire the application of the partnership property to the

payment of the firm debts to his exoneration, as against the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

creditors of the ostensible partner who has been dealt with

as the sole owner. 1 And the creditors of the firm, who have

no equity except such as can be worked out through the

dormant partner, cannot -require that the partnership prop-

erty be first applied to the satisfaction of their debts. 4 It is

a race of diligence between the two classes of creditors, and

equity will not interfere to deprive either of a legal advan-

tage."

The reverse of this case also arises where two persons are

ostensibly partners, but are not really such. The rule ap-

See Bulger v. Rosa (1890), 119 * Whitworth v. Patterson (1880),

N. Y. 459, 24 N. E. Rep. 853; Olson 6 Lea, lia

v. Morrison (1874), 29 Mich. 395; Cammack T. Johnson (1839), 2

Thayer v. Humphrey (1895), Wis. N. J. Eq. 16&

, 64 N. W. Rep. 1007, 30 L. R A. French v. Chase (1829), 8 Me.

649. 166; Lord v. Baldwin (1828). 6 Pick.

(Mass.) 848.
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Another view of similar transactions leading to the same
result is that the stipulation that the continuing partner
shall pay the debts operates not to release bu·t to continue
the selling partner's lien upon the assets, unless expressly
waived, and therefore the firm creditors may still work out
their priority through his lien, until the property has come
into the hands of a bona fide purchaser.1
.
§ 299. Application of assets when there was no osten-

sible partnership - When there w~s merely an ostensible
but not an actual partnership.- Questions as to the proper
application of the assets also arise where there was ree.lly a
partnership between the parties, but there. was none ostensibly, as where, of two partners, one was dormant and the
other appeared to the public as the sole dealer. "In such a
case," say the court in Tennessee,2 "the ordinary rules touching partnership transactions and partnership property do not
apply. The dormant partner has clearly no equity to r&
quire the application of the partnership property to the
payment of the firm debts to his exoneration, as ·a gainst the
creditors of the ostensible partner who has been dealt with
as the sole owner. 1 And the creditors of the firm, who have
no equity except such as can be worked out through the
dormant partner, can~ot ·require that the partnership property be first applied to the satisfaction of their debts.• It is
a race of diligence between the two classes of creditors, and
equity will not interfere to deprive either of a legal advantage."
The reverse of this case also arises where two persons are
ostensibly partners, but are not really such. The rule ap1 See Bulger v. Rosa (1890), 119
s Whitworth v. Patterson (1880),
N. Y. 459, 24 N. E. Rep. 853; Olson 6 Lea, 119.
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[§ 300.

plied here, as declared in a recent case in "Wisconsin, 1 is,

" that if a person allows another to carry on business in such

a way as to amount to a holding out to persons generally

that he and such other are partners, and credit is given to

both on the supposition tiiat they are partners in fact, the

property with which such business is carried on, though in

law that of such person, in equity will be treated as the

joint property of such person and such other; and neither

of them, nor the creditors of either, can prove up in insolv-

ency in competition with the creditors who have trusted the

two as partners and the business as that of the two."

300. Equitable rules do not defeat legal priorities.

But these rules of distribution prevailing in courts of equity

do not usually operate to defeat priorities previously ac-

quired in legal proceedings. Thus, it has been held that the

lien of a judgment, rendered after the death of one partner,

but for a partnership debt, and attaching to the individual

real estate of the surviving partner, will not be disturbed

in favor of a later judgment against such survivor for his in-

plied here, as declared iQ a recent case in Wisconsin,1 is,
" that if a person allows another to carry on business in such
a way as to amount to a \;iolding out to pe~sons generally
that he and such other are partners, and credit is given to
both on the supposition '\hat they are partners in fact, the
property with which such business is carried on, though in
law that of such person, in equity will be treated as the
joint property of such person and such other; and neither
of them, nor the creditors of either, can prove up in insolvency in competition with the creditors who have trusted the
two as partners and the business as that of the two."
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dividual debt, even though such later judgment cannot other-

wise be satisfied, and it was alleged that the prior one might

have been satisfied out of the estate of the deceased part-

ner. 2 Selden, J., after referring to the rule prevailing in

courts of equity, as already noticed, said : " This, however, is

a rule which prevails in courts of equity in the distribution

of equitable assets only. Those courts have never assumed

to exercise the power of setting aside, or in any way inter-

fering with, an absolute right of priority obtained at law.

In regard to all such cases the rule is, Equitas sequitur legem,"

So where the individual credits of one partner had been

attached at the suit of the firm creditors and were subse-

i Thayer v. Humphrey (1895), 91 699, 49 N. W. Rep. 872, 24 Am. St

Wis. 276, 64 N. W. Rep. 1007, 30 L. Rep. 182.

R. A. 549. To same effect: Van 2 Meech v. Allen (1858), 17 N. Y.

Kleeck v. McCabe (1891), 87 Mich. 300, 72 Am. Deo. 465, Ames' Caa

on Partn. 326.
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§ 300. Equitable rules do not defeat legal priorities.But these rules of distribution prevailing in courts of equity
do not usually operate to defeat priorities .previously acquired in legal proceedings. Thus, it has been held that the
iien of a judgment, rendered after the death of one partner,
but for partnership debt, and attaching to the individual
real estate of the surviving partner, will not be disturbed
in favor of a later judgment against such survivor for his individual debt, even though such later judgment cannot otherwise be satisfied, and it was alleged that the prior one might
have been satisfied out of the estate of the deceased partner.2 Selden, J., after referring to the rule prevailing in
courts of equity, as already noticed, said: "This, however, is
a rule which prevails in courts of equity in the distribution
of equitable assets only. Those courts have never assumed
to exercise the power of setting aside, or in any way interfering w_:ith, an absolute right of priority obtained at law.
In regard to all such cases the rule is, Equitas Bequitur legem."
So where the individual credits of one partner had been
attached at the suit of the firm creditors and were subse-

a

1 Thayer

v. Humphrey (1895), 91 599, 49 N. W. Rep. 872, 24 Am. St.
Wis. 276, 64 N.- W. Rep. 1007, SO L. Rep. 182.
2 Meech v. Allen (1858), 17 N. Y.
R. A. 549. To same effect: Van
Kleeck v. McCabe (1891), 87 Mich. 300, 72 Am. Dec. 465, Ames' . Cas.
on Partn. 326.
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quently attached by his individual creditor, it was held that

the prior lien was effectual. 1 The court said that it was

settled law in Massachusetts, though otherwise in New

Hampshire, that " in a suit against two or more copartners

upon their joint debt, the separate property of any one of

the partners may be attached, and the lien so acquired is

not discharged or impaired by a subsequent attachment of

the same property upon a suit in favor of a separate cred-

itor of the same partner."

i Stevens v. Perry (1873), 113 Mass, like effect: Allen v. Wells (1839), 22

880, Ames' Gas. on Partn. 330. To Pick. (Mass.) 450, *3 Am. Dec. 757.
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quently attached by his individual creditor, it was held that
the prior lien was effectual.1 The court said that it was
settled law in Massachusetts, though otherwise in New
Hampshire, that "in a suit against two or more copartners
upon their joint debt, the separate property of any one of
the partners may be attached, and the lien so acquired is
not discharged or impaired by a subsequent attachment of
the same property upon a suit in favor of a separate creditor of the same partner."
1 Stevens v. Perry.(1873), 113 Mass.

like effect: Allen v. Wells (1839), 22
880, Ames' Oas. on Partn. 830. To Pick. (Mass.) 450, ~Am. Dec- '157.
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CHAPTER XX.

OF THE FINAL ACCOUNTING.

301. Necessity for accounting.

303. Basis of accounting.

30a Same subject Rights of

general creditors to pre-

sent claims.

804 Partnership debts to be first

paid.

CHAPTER XX.

805, 306. Manner of accounting.

307, 308. Same subject Loss of

OF THE FINAL ACCOUNTING.

capital, how borne.

309. Opening and restating ac-

counts.

301. Necessity of accounting. Upon the termination

of the partnership, either by the act of the parties or the act

of law, an accounting becomes necessary. If the firm is

solvent, and the partners agree, they may close up their

affairs, pay their debts and distribute the surplus, by their

own act ; but if they cannot agree, or if the firm is insolvent
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and there are conflicting claims, an accounting in court be-

comes necessary. As has been already seen, 1 the court of

§ 805, 806. Manner of accounting.
§ 301. Necessity for accounting.
302. Basis of accounting.
807, 308. Same subject- Loss of
capital, how borne.
303. Same subject - Rights of
309. Opening and restating aogeneral creditors to present claims.
counts.
804. Partnership debts to be first
paid.

equity is the forum in which partnership accounts are to be

settled, and something has been already said as to who is

entitled to demand an accounting. 2 It has been sometimes

said that the right to demand an accounting is a test of being

a partner, but the true theory seems to be that the right to

an accounting follows because one is a partner

302. Basis of the accounting. It has been seen 1 that

it is the duty of each partner to keep full and accurate ac-

counts of his partnership transactions, and that if he fails

to do so, every uncertainty resulting therefrom will be re-

solved against him. It has been seen also 4 that all profits

and advantages resulting from firm transactions must be

accounted for, even though done in the name of one part-

i Ante, 153.

Ante, 154

See ante, 116.

Ante, 112.
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§ 301. Necessity of accounting.- Upon the termination
of the partnership, either by the act of the parties or the act
of law, an accounting becomes necessary. If the firm is
- solvent, and the partners agree, they may close up their
affairs, pay their debts and distribute the surplus, by their
own act; but if they cannot agree, or if the firm is insolvent
and there are conflicting claims, an accounting in court becomes necessary. As has been already seen,1 the court of
equity is the forum in which partnership accounts are to be
settled, and something has been already said as to who is
entitled to demand an accounting. 2 It has been sometimes
said that the right to demand an accounting is a test of being
a partner, but the true theory seems to be that the right to
ari accounting follows because one is a partner
§ 302. Basis of the accounting.- It has been seen 1 that
it is the duty of each partner to keep full and accurate accounts of his partnership transactions, and that if he fails
to do so, every uncertainty resulting therefrom will be resolved against him. It has been seen also' that all profits
and advantages resulting from firm transactions must be
accounted for, even though done in the name of one part1 Ante,
2

• See ante, § 116.
' Ante, § 112.

§ 153.

Ante, § 154.
199
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§§ 303, 304.J

LAW

OF PARTNERSIDP.

ner only; and that a partner is not entitled to extra com

pensation or interest in the absence of an agreement to pay

it. 1 It has been seen, moreover, that the claims of partners

for contribution as to debts paid, for reimbursement for ad-

vances, for indemnity against liability, and most other claims

and demands arising between the partners themselves, are to

be settled upon the final accounting. 2 Such an accounting

becomes, therefore, the one great occasion for a comprehen-

sive and effective settlement of partnership demands, between

the partners.

303. Same subject Right of general creditors to

present their demands. But the claims of the partners as

between themselves are not the only ones to be adjusted on

the accounting. The claims of firm creditors are also to be

ascertained and paid, and they may be presented for that

purpose and proven without the commencement of separate

actions to enforce them.

ner only; and that a partner is not entitled to extra com
pensation or interest in the absence of an agreement to pay
it.1 It has been seen, moreover, that the claims of partners
for contribution as to debts paid, for reimbursement for advances, for indemnity against liability, and most other claims
and demands arising between the partners themselves, are to
be settled upon the final accounting.2 Such an accounting
becomes, therefore, the one great occasion for a comprehensive and effective settlement of partnership demands, between
the partners.

A sale of the partnership assets is then to be made, and is

practically a matter of course, unless for special reason shown
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some other method of disposition is ordered.

When the assets have thus been reduced to an available

and distributable form, and the claims of the partners among

themselves and of creditors against the firm have been as-

certained, the estate is ready for distribution among those

entitled according to the priorities which the law establishes.

304. Partnership debts to be first paid. It follows

from what has been said as to the application of the firm

assets s that the partnership debts are to be paid first, and

that claims of the individual partners against the firm or

each other cannot compete with the claims of the firm cred-

itors. It is thus said to be a general rule that by no form

of claim can one partner compete with the firm creditors in

the distribution of the firm assets. 4

1 Ante, 119, 120. See ante, 289, 291.

1 Ante, 127. 4 See Edison Illuminating Co. v.
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§ 303. Same subject-Right of general creditors to
present their demands.- But the claims of the partners as
l)etween themselves are not .the only ones to be adjusted on
the accounting. The claims of firm creditors are also to be
ascertained and· paid, and they may .be presented for that
purpose and proven without the commencement of separate
a~'tions to enforce them.
A sale of the partnership assets is then to be made, and is
practically a matter of course, unless for special reason shown
some other method of disposition is ordered.
When the assets have thus been reduced to an available
and distributable form, and the claims of the partners, among
themselves and of creditors against the .firm have been ascertained, the estate is ready for distribution among those
entitled according to the priorities which the law establishes.
§ ~04:. Partnership debts to be first paid.- It follows
from what has been said as to the application of the firm
assets 3 that the partnership debts are to be paid first, and
that claims Qf the individual partners against the firm or
each other cannot compete with the claims of the firm creditors. It is thus said to be a general rule that by. no form
of claim can one partner compete with the firm creditors in
the distribution of the firm assets.•
a See ante, §§ 289, 291.
•See Edison lliuminatin.g Co. •·

1 Ante,

t

§§ 119, 120.
Ante, § 127.
200
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TOTAL ACCOUNTING. [ 305, 306.

J'lll'..U. AOOOUNTING.

[§§ 305, 306. .

305. Manner of accounting. Mr. Justice Lindley lays

down the following rules, 1 which have been generally adopted,

as to the manner of accounting: " In adjusting the accounts

of partners, losses ought to be paid first out of assets exclud

ing capital, next out of capital, and lastly by having recourse

to the partners individually ; and the assets of the partner-

ship should be applied as follows:

" 1. In paying the debts and liabilities of the firm to non-

partners.

" 2. In paying to each partner ratably what is due from the

firm to him for advances as distinguished from capital

" 3. In paying to each partner ratably what is due from the

firm to him in respect of capital.

" 4:. The ultimate residue, if any, will then be divisible as

profit between the partners in equal shares, unless the con-

trary be shown."

306. Same subject. " If the assets are not sufficient to

pay the debts and liabilities to non-partners," continues Mr.

Justice Lindley, " the partners must treat the difference as
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a- loss and make it up by contributions inter se. If the as-

sets are more than sufficient to pay the debts and liabilities

of the partnership to non-partners, but are not sufficient to

repay the partners their respective advances, the amount of

unpaid advances ought, it is conceived, to be treated as a

loss to be met like other losses. In such a case the advances

ought to be treated as a debt of the firm, but payable to one

of the partners instead of to a stranger. If, after paying all

§ 305. Manner of accounting.- Mr. J nstice Lindley lays
down the following rules,1 which have been generally adopted,
as to the manner of accounting: "In adjusting the accounts
of partners, losses ought to be paid first out of assets exclud·
ing capital, next out of capital, and lastly by having recourse
to the partners individually; and the assets of the partnership should be applied as follows:
"1. In paying the debts and liabilities of the firm to nonpartners.
"2. In paying to each partner ratably what is due from the
firm to him for advances as distinguished from capital
"3. In paying to each partner ratably what is due from the
firm to him in respect of capital.
"4. The ultimate residue, if any, will then be divisible as
profit between the partners in equal shares, unless the contrary be shown."

the debts and liabilities of the firm and the advances of the

partners, there is still a surplus, but not sufficient to pay

f each partner his capital, the balances of capitals remaining

I unpaid must be treated as so many losses, to be met like

other losses."

DeMott (1893), 51 N. J. Eq. 16,25 1 2 Lindley on Partnership, 409

AtL Rep. 952; Ex parte Ely the (Swell's 2d Am. ed).

<1881), 16 Ch. Div. 620.
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§ 306. Same subject.-" If the assets are not sufficient to
pay the debts and liabilities to non-partners," continues :Mr.
Justice Lindley, "the partners must treat the difference as
a- loss and malrn it up ·by contributions ilnter ae. If the assets are more than sufficient to pay the debts and liabilities
of the partnership to non-partners, but are not sufficient to
repay the partners their respective advances, the amount of
unpaid advances ought, it is conceived, to be treated as a
loss to be met like other losses. In such a case the advances
ought to be treated as a .d ebt of the firm, but payable to one
of the partners instead of to a stranger. If, after paying all
the debts and liabilities of the firm and the advances of the
partners, there is still a surplus, but not sufficient to pay
each partner his capital, the balances of capitals remaining ~....___
unpaid .must be treated as so many losses, to be met like
other losses."
DeMott (1893), 51 N. J. Eq. 16, 25 - 19 Lindley on Partnership. 4ma
Atl Rep. 952; Ex parte Blythe (Ewell's 2d Am. ed).
(1881), 16 Ch. Div. 620.

307, 308.] LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

§§ 307, 308.]

LAW OF P .A.RTNERSHIP.

307. Same subject Loss of capital, hoTT borne.

" In the absence of controlling agreement," said the court in

a leading case, 1 " partners must bear the losses in the same

proportion as the profits of the partnership, even if one con-

tributes the whole capital and the other nothing but his

labor or services. "Whether a loss of capital is a partnership

loss, to be borne by all the partners, depends upon the nat-

ure and extent of the contract of partnership.

" If, as is not infrequently the case in a partnership for a

single adventure, the mere use of the capital is contributed

by one partner, and the partnership is in the profits and

losses only, the capital remains the property of the individual

partner to whom it originally belonged, any loss or destruc-

tion of it falls upon him as the owner, and, as it never be-

comes the property of the partnership, the partnership owes

him nothing in consideration thereof.

" But where, as is usual in an ordinary mercantile part-

nership, a partnership is created not merely in profits and

losses, but in the property itself, the property is transferred
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from the original owners to the partnership and becomes

the joint property of the latter; a corresponding obligation

arises on the part of the partnership to pay the value thereof

to the individuals who originally contributed it ; such pay-

ment cannot, indeed, be demanded during the continuance of

the partnership, nor are the contributors, in the absence of

agreement or usage, entitled to interest; but, if the assets

of the partnership upon a final settlement are insufficient to

satisfy this obligation, all the partners must bear it in the

same proportion as other debts of the partnership."

308. Same subject. In accordance with these princi-

ples, it is held that where one partner contributes experience

and the other money, the former is not, upon dissolution, en-

titled to any part of the cash capital, but each takes back

what he put in one his experience, and the other his

money.* If, however, where one contributes labor and the

i Whitcomb v. Converse (1875), Shea v. Donahue (1885), 15 Lea

119 Mass. 88, 20 Am. Rep. 31L (Tenn.), 160, 54 Am. Rep. 407; <.'<m-
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§ 307. Same subject - Loss of capital, how borne." In the absence of controlling agreement," said the court in
a leading case,1 "partners must bear the losses in the same
proportion as the profits of the partnership, even if one contributes the whole capital and the other nothing but his
labor or services. Whether a loss of capital is a. partnership
. loss, to be borne by all the partners, depends upon the nat
are and extent of the contract of partnership.
"If, as is not infrequently the case in a partnership for a
single adventure, the mere use of the capital is contributed
by one partner, and the partnership is in the profits and
losses only, the capital remains the property of the individual
partner to whom it originally belonged, any loss or destruction of it falls upon him as the owner, and, as it never becomes the property of the partnership, the partnership owes
hlm nothing in consideration thereof.
"But where, as is usual in an ordinary mercantile part..iersh~p, a partnership is created not merely in profits and
losses, but in the property itself, the property is transferred
from the original owners to the ·partnership and becomes
the joint property of the latter; a corresponding obligation
arises on the part of the partnership to pay the value thereof
to the individuals who originally contributed it; such payment cannot, indeed, be demanded during the continuance of
the partnership, nor are the contributors, in the absence of
agreement or usage, entitled to interest; but, if the assets
of the partnership upon a final settlement are insufficient to
satisfy this obligation, all the partners must bear it in the
same proportion as other debts of the partnership."
§ 308. Same subject.- In accordance with these principles, it is held that where one partner contributes experience
and the other money, the former is not, upon dissolution, entitled to any part of the cash capital, but each takes back
what he put in - one his experience, and the other his
money.2 If, however, where one contributes labor and the
1 Whitcomb

v. Converse (1875),

119 Mass. 88, 20 Am. Rep. 811.

s Shea v. Donahue (1885), 15

~

. (Tenn.), 160, M Am. Rep. 4-07; 1.<>.11202
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FINAL ACCOUNTING [ 309.

FINAL ACCOUNTING

[§ 309.

other money, there is, upon dissolution, a loss of capital, the

one who contributed his labor must aid in making good the

loss of the other who contributed money. 1

In making contribution at law, the loss is divided equally

among the whole number, without regard to their solvency

or insolvency ; but in equity the loss is made to rest upon

the solvent partners alone. 1

309. Opening and restating accounts. When once a

partnership account has been settled, it will not be easily

disturbed, particularly if much time has elapsed. Still, even

after long acquiescence, an account may be reopened and

corrected if fraud was practiced in the first accounting; and,

other money, there is, upon dissolution, a loss of capital, the
one who contributed his labor must aid in making good the
loss of the other who contributed money.1
In making contribution at law, the loss is divided equally
among the whole number, without regard to their solvency
or insolvency; but in equity the loss is made to rest upon
the solvent partners alone. 2

within a reasonable time, an account may be reopened for

the correction of errors or omissions. The fraud, however,

must be clearly stated and proved, and the mistake or omis-

sion must be as to some matter not known to the complain-

ing party at the time it was committed. 1

roy v. Campbell, 13 Jones & Sp. (1890), 123 Ind. 47, 23 N. E. Rep.

(N. Y.) 336. 1076, 7 L. R. A. 788; Merri wether
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1 Whitcomb T. Converse, supra, v. Hardeman (1879X 51 Tex. 436;

'Whitcomb v. Converse, supra; Varner's Appeal (18 ),2Monaghan

1 Lindley on Partnership (E well's (Pa.), 228; Cobb v. Cole (1890), 44

3d Am. ed.), 376. Minn. 278, 46 N. W. Rep. 364; King

See Claflin v. Bennett (1892), 51 v. White (1890), 63 Vt 158, 2?. AtL

Fed. Rep. 693; Valentine v. Wysor Rep. 535, 25 Am. St.

203

§ 309. Opening and restating accounts.- When once a.
partnership account has been settled, it will not be easily
disturbed, particularly if much timo has elapsed. Still, even
after long acquiescence, an account may be reopened and
corrected if fraud was practiced in the first accounting; and,
within a. reasonable time, an account may be reopened for
the correction of errors or omi~sions. The fraud, however,
must be clearly stated and proved, and the mistake or omission must be as to some matter not known to the complaining party at the time it was committed.' ·
roy v. Campbell, 13 Jones &; Sp. (1890), 123 Ind. 47, 23 N. E. Rep.
(N. Y.) 326.
1076, 7 L R. A 788; Merriwether
1 Whitcomb v. Converse, supra. v. Hardeman (1879), 51 Tex. 436;
2 Whitcomb v. Converse, supra; Varner's Appeal (18---), 2 Monaghan
1 Lindley on Partnership (Ewell's (Pa.), 228; Cobb v. Cole (1890), 44

2d Am. ed.), 376.
Minn. 278, 46 N. W. Ret;>. 364; King
a See Claflin v. Bennett· (1892), 51 v. White (1890), 63 Vt. t~, 2,. Atl
Fed. Rep. 693; Valentine v. W ysor Rep. 535, 25 Am. St. -qpl' 't'"f~
203

CHAPTER XXL

OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIPa

810. Of the nature of such part-

nershipa

811. They must be authorized by

statute.

313. The usual statutory require-

ments.

313. Necessity for compliance

with statute.

CHAPTER XXL

814 What business may be con-

ducted.

815. How business conducted.

OF LIMITED PARTNERSIDPS.

816. Dissolution and notice.

310. Of the nature of such partnerships. Something

has been already said in relation to these partnerships, 1 but

they require a little fuller consideration. The purpose of

such organizations is to permit the formation of partner-

ships in which some of the partners who manage the busi-

ness shall have the general personal liability of ordinary
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partners, while other of the partners who take no part in

the management may contribute a given amount of capital

•§ 810. Of the nature of such part- § 813. Necessity for

nerships.
811. They must be authorized by
statute.
812. The usual statutory require·
ments.

compliance
with statute.
814. What business may be conducted.
815. How business conducted.
816. Dissolution and notice.

and assume no liability beyond the amount so contributed.

311. Must be authorized by statute. Partnerships of

§ 310. Of the nature of such partnerships.- Something

this nature can be organized only when permitted by stat-

ute, but statutes have been enacted for this purpose in the

majority of the states.

312. The usual statutory requirements. The statu-

tory provisions are not entirely uniform, but they are sub-

stantially so. They require usually the execution of a cer-

tificate which shall set forth who the partners are, with their

residence; who are to be the general partners, and who the

special partners; the name under which the partnership is

to do business; the amount of capital actually contributed

i Ante, 7.

204

·h as been already said in relation to these partnerships,1 but
they require a little fuller consideration. The purpose of
-such organizations is to permit the formation of partnerships in which some of the partners who manage the business shall have the general personal liability of · ordinary
partners, while other of the partn~rs who take no part in
the management may contribute a given amount of capital
and assume no liability beyond the amount so contributed.

§ 311. Must be authorized by statute.- Partnerships of
this nature can be organized only when permitted by statute, but statutes have been enacted for this purpose in the
majority of th~ states.

§ 312. The usual statutory requirements.-The statutory provisions are not entirely uniform; but they are substantially so. They require usu~lly the execution of acertificate which shall set forth who the partners are, with their
residence; who are to be the general partners, and who the
tipecial partners; the name under which the partnership is
·to do business; the amount of capital actually contributed
l.Ant~

204

§ 7.

I
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LIMITED P ABTNERSHIPS.

LIMITED PABTNEBSHIPS. [ 313.

[§ 313..

by the special partners; the business to be conducted, and

the date at which the partnership is to begin and end.

This statement or certificate is to be published for a desig-

nated period, and is also to be recorded in some specified

public office.

The names of all the general partners must usually appear

in the firm name (though the statutes are not uniform on

this point), but the names of the special partners must not

appear. Where the names of all the general partners are

required to be in the firm name, there must usually be no

such addition as " & Co.," indicating that there are other

general partners. They are sometimes required to add the

word " limited " to the firm name.

The contribution of the special partners is usually required

to be in cash, and when this is the requirement the courts

are very strict in refusing to recognize anything but cash as

sufficient. 1

313. Necessity for compliance with requirements.

Inasmuch as the effect of such organizations is to restrict the
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ordinary liabilities of partners, it is held that there must be

at least a substantially full and exact compliance with the

statutory requirements. 2

And since it is only by force of the statute that the lim-

ited liability is secured, it follows that a failure to comply

with the statutory requirements will render the special part-

ners liable to third persons like general partners. 8 As is

iSee Lineweaver v. Slagle (1885), (1885), 109 Pa. St 372, 1 AtL Rep.

64 Md. 465, 54 Am. Rep. 775; In re 174.

by the special partners; the business to be conducted, and·
the date at which the partnership is to begin and end.
This statement or certificate is to be published for a designated period, and is also to be recorded in some specified
public office.
The names of all the general partners must usually appear
in the firm name (though the statutes are not uniform on
thu point), but the names of the special partners must not
appear. Where the names of all the general partners are
required to be ~the firm name, there must usually be no
sueh addition as " & Co.," indicating that there are other
general partners. They are sometimes required to add the·
word "limited" to the firm name.
The contribution of the special partners is usually required'
to be in cash, and when this is the requirement the courts,
are very strict in refusing to recognize anything but cash as,
sufficient.1

AUen (1889), 41 Minn. 430, 43 N. W. See Sheble v. Strong (1889), 128

Rep. 382. Pa. St. 315, 18 AtL Rep. 397; Van-

2 See Selden Y. Hall (1886), 21 Mo. horn v. Corcoran (1889), 127 Pa. St.

App. 452; White v. Eiseman (1892), 255, 4 L. R. A. 386, 18 AtL Rep. 16;

134 N. Y. 101, 31 N. E. Rep. 276; Manhattan Co. v. Laimbeer (1888),

Lineweaver v. Slagle (1885), 64 Md. 108 N. Y. 578, 15 N. E. Rep. 712;

465, 54 Am. Rep. 775, 2 AtL Rep. Briar Hill C. & L Co. v. Atlas

693; Haddock v. Grinnell Mfg. Co. Works (1891), 146 Pa. St 290, 23 AtL,

Rep. 326.
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§ 313. Necessity for compliance with requirements.Inasmuch as the effect of such organizations is to restrict theordinary liabilities of partners, it is held that there must be
at least a substantially full and exact compliance with the
statutory requirements.2
And since it is only by force of the statute that the limited liability is secured, it follows that a failure to comply ·
with th,e statutory requirements will render the special part- .
ners liable to third persons like general partners.1 As is-.
1 See

Lineweaver v. Slagle (1885),
64 Md. 465, 04 Am. Rep. 775; In re
Allen (1889), 41Minn.430, 43 N. W.
Rep. 382.
t See Selden v. Hall (1886), 21 Mo.
App. 452; White v. Eiseman (1892),
134 N. Y. 101, 31 N. E. Rep. 276;
Lineweaver v. Slagle (1885), 64 Md.
465, 54 Am. Rep. 775, 2 Atl Rep.
693; Haddock v. Grinnell Mfg. Co.

(1885), 109 Pa. St. 372, 1 Atl Rep.
174.
a See Sheble v. Strong (1889), 128,
Pa. St. 315, 18 Atl Rep. 397; Vanhorn v. Corcoran (1889), 127 Pa. St.
255, 4 L. R. A. 386, 18 AtL Rep. 16;
Manhattan Co. v. Laimbeer (1888), .
108 N. Y. 578, 15 N. E. Rep. 712;
Briar Hill .C. & L Co. v. Atlas ..
Works '(1891), 146 Pa. St. 290, 23 Atl.

Rep. 326.
205

314r-316.] LAW OF PABTNEBSHIP.

§§ 314-316.]

LAW OF P .A.ln.NERSHIP.

said in a recent case, 1 "prima facie, a firm transacting busi-

ness is a general partnership. ... A limited partnership

that has not complied with the law of its creation is not a

limited partnership at all. It is, however, a partnership in

which all the members are liable as at common law."

314. For what business authorized. In many of the

states no restrictions are placed upon the kind of business

that may be carried on by a special partnership ; in others

certain kinds of business, usually insurance and banking, are

said in a recent case,1 "prima f acie, a firm transacting busi.
ness is a general partnership. . . . A limited partnership
that has not complied with the law of its creation is not u
limited partnership at all. It is, however, a partnership in
which all the members are liable as at common law."

excepted.

315. Conduct of business. The general partners alone

represent the firm and carry on its business. If the special

partner takes part in its management he becomes liable as

a general partner. Contracts must therefore be made by

and in the name of the general partners, and suits must be

brought by and against them. 1

316. Dissolution and notice. The partnership may be

renewed by a renewal of the certificate, publication and

§ 314:. For what business anthorized.-In many of the
states no restrictions are placed upon the kind of business
that may be carried on by a special partnership; in others
certain kinds of business, usually insurance and banking, are
excepted.

record. Otherwise it comes to an end as a limited partner-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ship at the time designated, and if continued afterward it

will be as a general partnership. It may also be terminated

before by operation of law or the act of the partners, like

general partnerships. Where it is so terminated before the

time limited has expired, and no statutory provision for no-

i Blumenthal v. Whitaker (1895), defeat it (Manhattan Co. v. Laim-

170 Pa. St 309, 33 AtL Rep. 103. The beer, supra), unless the party was

statutes themselves often provide himself in fault. Henkel v. Hey-

that a false statement in the cer- man (1878), 91 11L 96.

tificate shall defeat the limited lia- 2 See Columbia Land and Cattle

§ 315. Conduct of business.- The general partners alone
represent the firm and carry on its business. If the special
par.t ner takes part in its management he becomes liable as
a general partner. Contracts must therefore be made by
and in the name of the general partners, and suits must be
brought by and against them.2

bility. Sheble v. Strong, supra; Co. v. Daly (1891), 46 Kan. 504, 26

Durant v. Abendroth (1877), 69 N. Pac. Rep. 1043; Sharp v. Hutchin-

Y. 148, 25 Am. Rep. 158. But the son (1885), 100 N. Y. 533; Jaffe v.

failure of the recording officer to Krum (1885), 88 Mo. 669.

properly record will not usually

206

§ 316. Dissolution and notice.-The partnership may be
renewed by a renewal of the certificate, publication and
record. Otherwise it comes to an end as a limited partnership at the time designated, and if continued afterward it
will be as a general partnership. It may also be terminated
before by operation of law or the act of the partners, like
general partnerships. Where it is so terminated before the
time limited has expired, and no statutory provision for noI Blumenthal v. Whitaker (1895), defeat it (Manhattan Co. v. Laim170 Pa. St. 309, 33 Atl Rep. 103. The beer, supra), unless the party was
statutes themselves often provide himself in fault. Henkel v. Heythat a false statement in the cer- man (1878), 91 m 96.
tificate shall defeat the limited lia2 See Columbia Land and Cattle
bility. Sheble v. Strong, supra; Co. v. Daly (1891), 46 Kan. 504, 26
Durant v. Abendroth (1877), 69 N. Pac.. Rep. 1042; Sharp v. HutchinY. 14:8, 25 Am. Rep. 158. But the son (1885), 100 N. Y. 533; Jaffe v.
failure of the recording officer to · Krum (1885), 88 Mo. 669.
properly record will not usually
206
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•

LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS. [316.

LDrlITED PARTNERSHIPS.

[§ 316.

tice is made, notice must usually be given in the same cases

and manner as upon the dissolution of a general partnership ;

though where it is terminated by the act of the partner be-

fore the expiration of the stipulated term, the statutes usu-

ally require that notice shall be published and recorded like

the original certificate. Where it comes to an end by ex-

piration of the time fixed, no notice is necessary, as the

published and recorded certificate gives notice to all the

world.
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tice is made, notice must usually be given in the same cases
and manner as upon the dissolution of a general partnership;
though where it is terminated by the act of the partner before the expiration of the stipulated term, the statutes usually require that notice shall be published and recorded like
the original certificate. Where it comes to an end by expiration of the time fixed, no notice is necessary, as the
published and recorded certificate gives notice to all the
world.
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APPENDIX A.

THE ENGLISH PARTNERSHIP ACT, 1890

(53 & 54 Viet, ch. 39.)

AH Aoi to declare and amend the Law of Partnership

(14th August, 1890.)

Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by

and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and

Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assem-

bled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

APPENDIX A.

1. (1) Partnership is the relation which subsists between

persons carrying on a business in common with a view of

profit.

(2) But the relation between members of any company OP

association which is

(a) Registered as a company under the Companies

Act, 1862, or any other Act of Parliament for the time

THE ENGLISH PARTNERSHIP A.OT, 1890

being in force and relating to the registration of joint-

(58 & 54 Viet., ch. .89.)

stock companies ; or

(b) Formed or incorporated by or in pursuance of

any other Act of Parliament or letters patent, or Royal

AN

~en

to declare and amend the Law of Partnershi\\o
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Charter; or

(14th August, 1890.)

(c) A company engaged in working mines within and

subject to the jurisdiction of the Stannaries:

is not a partnership within the meaning of this Act.

2. In determining whether a partnership does or does not

exist, regard shall be had to the following rules:

(1) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, joint property,

common property, or part ownership does not of itself cre-

ate a partnership as to anything so held or owned, whether

14 209

Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by
and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and
Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assem·
bled, and. by the authority of the same, as follows:
1. (1) Partnership is the relation which subsists between
persons carrying on a business in common with a view of
profit.
(2) But the relation between members of any company or
association which is (a) Registered as a company under the Companies
Act, 1862, or any other Act of Parliament for the time
being in force and relating to the registration of jointstock companies; or
(b) Formed or incorporated by or in pursuance ol
any other Act of Parliament or letters patent, or Royal
Charter; or
(c) A company engaged in working mines within and
subject to the jurisdiction of the Stannaries:
is not a partnership within the meaning of this Act.
2. In determining whether a partnership does or does not
exist, regard shall be had to the following rules:
(1) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, joint property,
common property, or part ownership does not of itself create a partnership as to anything so held or owned. whether
14
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the tenants or owners do or do not share any profits made

by the use thereof.

(2) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself create

a partnership, whether the persons sharing such returns have

or have not a joint or common right or interest in any prop-

erty from which or from the use of which the returns are

derived.

(3) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a

business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the

business, but the receipt of such a share or of a payment

contingent on or varying with the profits of a business does

not of itself make him a partner in the business ; and in par-

ticular

(a) The receipt by a person of a debt or other liqui-

dated amount by instalments or otherwise out of the

accruing profits of a business does not of itself make him

a partner in the business or liable as such.

(b) A contract for the remuneration of a servant or

agent of a person engaged in a business by a share of
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the profits of the business does not of itself make the

* servant or agent a partner in the business or liable as

such.

(c) A person being the widow or child of a deceased

partner, and receiving by way of annuity a portion of

the profits made in the business in which the deceased

person was a partner, is not by reason only of such re-

ceipt a partner in the business or liable as such.

(d) The advance of money by way of loan to a person

engaged or about to engage in any business on a con-

tract with that person that the lender shall receive a

rate of interest varying with the profits, or shall receive

a share of the profits arising from carrying on the busi-

ness, does not of itself make the lender a partner with

the person or persons carrying on the business or liable

as such. Provided that the contract is in writing and

signed by or on behalf of all the parties thereto.

(e) A person receiving by way of annuity. or otbo;--
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the tenants or owners do or do not share any profits ma.de
by the use thereof.
(2) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself create
a partnership, whether the persons sharing such returns have
or have not a joint or common right or interest in any property from which or from the use, of which the returns are
derived.
(3) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a
business is prima f acie evidence that he is a partner in the
business, but the receipt of such a share or of a payment
contingent on or varying with the profits of a business does
not of itself make him a partner in the business; and in particular (a) The receipt by a person of a debt or other liquidated amount by instalments or otherwise out of the
accruing profits of a business does not of itself make him
a partner in the business or liable as such.
(b) A contract for the remuneration of a servant or
agent of a person engaged in a business by a share of
the profits of the business does not of itself make the
• servant or agent a partner in the business or liable as
such.
(c) A person being-the widow or child of a deceased
partner, and receiving by way of annuity a portion of
, the profits made in the business in which the deceased
person was a partner, is not by reason only of such receipt a partner in the business or liable as sucq.
(d) The advance of money by way of loan to a person
engaged or about to engage in any business on a contract with that person that the lender shall receive a
rate of interest varying with the profits, or shall receive
a share of the profits arising from carrying on the business, does not of itself make the lender a partner with
the person or persons carrying on the business or liable
as such. Provided that the contract is in writing and
signed by or on behalf of all the parties thereto.
(e} A person receiving by way of annuity .or otb 1':'·
210
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wise a portion of the profits of a business in considera-

tion of the sale by him of the good-will of the business

is not by reason only of such receipt a partner in the

business or liable as such.

3. In the event of any person to whom money has been

advanced by way of loan upon such a contract as is men-

tioned in the last foregoing section, or of any buyer of a

good-will in consideration of a share of the profits of the

business, being adjudged a bankrupt, entering into an ar-

rangement to pay his creditors less than twenty shillings in

the pound, or dying in insolvent circumstances, the lender

of the loan shall not be entitled to recover anything in re-

spect of his loan, and the seller of the good-will shall not be

entitled to recover anything in respect of the share of profits

contracted for, until the claims of the other creditors of the

borrower or buyer for valuable consideration in money or

money's worth have been satisfied.

4. (1) Persons who have entered into partnership with

one another are for the purposes of this Act called collect-
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ively a firm, and the name under which their business is

carried on is called the firm name.

(2) In Scotland a firm is a legal person distinct from the

partners of whom it is composed, but an individual partner

may be charged on a decree or diligence directed against

the firm, and on payment of the debts is entitled to relief

pro rata from the firm and its other members.

5. Every partner is an agent of the firm and his other

partners for the purpose of the business of the partnership ;

and the acts of every partner who does any act for carry-

ing on in the usual way business of the kind carried on by

the firm of which he is a member, bind the firm and his

partners, unless the partner so acting has in fact no author-

ity to act for the firm in the particular matter, and the per-

son with whom he is dealing either knows that he has no

authority, or does not know or believe him to be a partner.

6. An act or instrument relating to t^he business of the

firm and done or executed in the firm name, or in any other
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wise a portion of the profits of a business in consideration of the sale by him of the good-will of the business
is not by reason only of such receipt a partner in the
business or liable as such.
3. In the event of any person to whom money has been
advanced by way of loan upon such a contract as is mentioned in the last foregoing section, or of any buyer of a
good-will in consideration of a share of the profits of the
business, being adjudged a bankrupt, entering into an arrangement to pay his creditors less than twenty shillings in
the pound, or dying in insolven:t circumstances, the lender
of the loan shall not be entitled to recover anything in respect of his loan, and the seller of the good-will shall not be
entitled to recover anything in respect of the share of profits
contracted for, until the claims of the other creditors of the
borrower or buyer for valuable consideration in money or
money's ~orth have been satisfied.
4:. (1) Persons who have entered into partnership with
one another are for the purposes of this Act called collectively a firm, and the name under which their business is
carried on is called the firm name.
(2) In Scotland a firm is a legal person distinct from the
~partners o.f whom it is composed, but an individual partner
may be charged on a decree or diligence directed against
the firm, and on payment of the debts is entitled to relief
pro rata from the firm and its other mem hers.
.5. Every partner is an agent of the firm and his other
partners for the purpose of the business of the partnership;
and the acts of every partner who does any act for carrying on in the usual way business of the kind carried on by
the firm of which he is a member, bind the firm and his
partners, unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority to act for the firm in the particular matter, and the person with whom he is dealing either knows that he has no
authority, or does not know or believe him to be a partner.
6. An act or instrument relating to \he business of the
firm and done or executed in the firm name, or in any other
211
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manner showing an intention to bind the firm, by any per-

son thereto authorized, whether a partner or not, is binding

on the firm and all the partners.

Provided that this section shall not affect any general rule

of law relating to the execution of deeds or negotiable in-

struments.

7. Where one partner pledges the credit of the firm for a

purpose apparently not connected with the firm's ordinary

course of business the firm is not bound, unless he is in fact

specially authorized by the other partners; but this section

does not affect any personal liability incurred by an individ-

ual partner.

8. If it has been agreed between the partners that any re-

striction shall be placed on the power of any one or more of

them to bind the firm, no act done in contravention of the

agreement is binding on the firm with respect to persons

having notice of the agreement.

9. Every partner in a firm is liable jointly with the other

partners, and in Scotland severally also, for all debts and ob-
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ligations of the firm incurred while he is a partner; and after

his death his estate is also severally liable in a due course of

administration for such debts and obligations, so far as they

remain unsatisfied, but subject in England or Ireland to the

prior payment of his separate debts.

10. Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any part-

ner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the firm,

or with the authority of his copartners, loss or injury is

caused to any person not being a partner in the firm, or any

penalty is incurred, the firm is liable therefor to the same

extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act.

11. In the following cases, namely :

(a) Where one partner acting within the scope of his

apparent authority receives the money or property of a

third person and misapplies it; and

(b) Where a firm in the course of its business receives

money or property of a third person, and the money or

212

manner showing an intention to bind the firm, by any person thereto authorized, whether a partner or not, is binding
on the firm and all the partners.
Provided that this section shall not affect any general rule
of law relating to the execution of deeds or negotiable instruments.
7. Where one partner pledges the credit of the firm for a
purpose apparently not connected with the firm's ordinary
course of business the firm is not bound, unless he is in fact
specially authorized by the other partners; but this section
does not affect any personal liability incurred by an individual partner.
8. If it has been agreed b~tween the partners that any restriction shall be placed on the power of any one or more of
them to bind the firm, no act done in contravention of the·
agreement is binding on the firm with respect to persons
having notice of the agreement.
9. Every partner in a firm is liable jointly with the otherpartners, and in Scotland severally also, for all debts and obligations of the firm incurred while he is a partner; and after
his death his estate is also severally liable in a due course of·
administration for such debts and obligations, so far as they
remain unsatisfied, but subject in England or Ireland to th&
prior payment of his separate debts.
10. Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the firm,.
or with the authority of his copartners, loss or injury is
caused to any person not being a partner in the firm, or any
penalty is incurred, the firm is liable therefor to the sam&
extent as the partner so acting or omitting to aot.
11. In the following cases, namely:
. (a) Where one partner acting within the scope of his
apparent authority receives the money or property of a
third person and misapplies it; and
(b) Where a firm in the course of its business receives
money or property of a third person, and the money or
212

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

()i..

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ENGLISH PARTNERSHIP ACT.

property so received is misapplied by one or more of
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the partners while it is in the custody of the firm;

the firm is liable to make good the loss.

12. Every partner is liable jointly with his copartners and

also severally for everything for which the firm while he is

a partner therein becomes liable under either of the two

last preceding sections.

13. If a partner, being a trustee, improperly employs

trust property in the business or on the account of the part-

nership, no other partner is liable for the trust property to

the persons beneficially interested therein.

Provided as follows :

(1) This section shall not affect any liability incurred by

any partner by reason of his having notice of a breach of

trust; and

(2) Nothing in this section shall prevent trust money from

being followed and recovered from the firm if still in its

possession or under its control.

14. (1) Every one who by words spoken or written or by
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conduct represents himself, or who knowingly suffers him-

self to be represented, as a partner in a particular firm, is

liable as a partner to any one who has on the faith of any

such representation given credit to the firm, whether the

representation has or has not been made or communicated

to the person so giving credit by or with the knowledge of

the apparent partner making the representation or suffering

it to be made.

(2) Provided that where after a partner's death the part-

nership business is continued in the old firm name, the con-

tinued use of that name or of the deceased partner's name

as a part thereof shall not of itself make his executors' or

administrators' estate or effects liable for any partnership

debts contracted after his death.

15. An admission or representation made by any partner

concerning the partnership affairs, and in the ordinary course

of its business, is evidence against the firm.
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property so received . is misapplied by one or more of
the partners while it is in the custody of the firm;
the firm is liable to make good the loss.
12. Every partner is liable jointly with his copartners and
also severally for everything for which the firm while he is
a partner therein becomes liable under either of the two
last preceding sectio~s.
13. If a partner, being a trustee, improperly employs
trust property in the business or on the account of the partnership, no other partner is liable for the trust property to
the persons beneficially interested therein.
Provided as follows:
(1) This section shall not affect any liability incurred ·b y
any partner by reason of his having notice of a breach of
trust; and
(2) Not hing in this section shall prevent trust money from
being.followed and recovered from the firm if still in its
possession or under its control.
14. (1) Eyery one who by words spoken or written or by
-conduct represents himself, or who knowingly suffers himself to be represented, as a partner in a particular firm, is
liable as a partner to any one who has on the faith of any
-such representation given credit to the firm, whether the
representation has or has not been made or communicated
to the person so giving credit by or with the knowledge of
the apparent partner making the representation or suffering
it to be made.
(2) Provided that where after a partner's death the partnership business is continued in the old firm name, the continued use of that name or of the deceased partner's name
as a part thereof shall not of. itself make his execut ors' or
administrators' estate or effects liable for any partnership
debts contracted after his death.
15. An admission or representation made by any partner
concerning the partnership affairs, and in th~ ordinary course
of its business, is evidence against the firm.
213
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16. Notice to any partner who habitually acts in the

partnership business of any matter relating to partnership

affairs operates as notice to the firm, except in the case of a

fraud on the firm committed by or with- the consent of that

partner.

17. (1) A person who is admitted as a partner into an

existing firm does not thereby become liable to the creditors

of the firm for anything done before he became a partner.

(2) A partner who retires from a firm does not thereby

cease to be liable for partnership debts or obligations in-

curred before his retirement.

(3) A retiring partner may be discharged from any exist-

ing liabilities by an agreement to that effect between him-

self and the members of the firm as newly constituted and

the creditors, and this agreement may be either express or in-

ferred as a fact from the course of dealing between the cred-

itors and the firm as newly constituted.

18. A continuing guaranty or cautionary obligation given

either to a firm or to a third person in respect of the trans-
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actions of a firm is, in the absence of agreement to the con-

trary, revoked as to future transactions by any change in

the constitution of the firm to which, or of the firm in re-

spect of the transactions of which, the guaranty or obliga-

tion was given.

19. The mutual rights and duties of partners, whether

ascertained by agreement or defined by this Act, may be

varied by the consent of all the partners, and such consent

may be either express or inferred from a course of dealing.

20. (1) All property and rights and interests in property

originally brought into the partnership stock or acquired,

whether by purchase or otherwise, on account of the firm,

or for the purposes and in the course of the partnership

business, are called in this Act partnership property, and

must be held and applied by the partners exclusively for

the purposes of the partnership and in accordance with the

partnership agreement.

(2) Provided that the legal estate or interest in any land,
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16. Notice to any partner who habitually acts in the
partnership business of any matter relating to partnership
affairs operates as notice to the firm, except in the case of a
fraud on the firm committed by or with-the consent of that
partner.
17. (1) A person who is admitted as a partner into an
existing firm does not thereby become liable to the creditors
of the firm for anything done before he became a partner.
(2) A partner who retires from a firm does not thereby
cease to be liable for partnership debts or obligations incurred before his retirement.
(3) A retiring partner may be discharged from any existing liabilities by an agreement to that effect between himself and the members of the firm as newly constituted and
the creditors, and this agreement may be either express or inferred as a fact from the course of dealing between the creditors and the firm as newly constituted.
18. A continuing guaranty or cautionary obligation given
either to a firm or to a third person in respect of the tranB"
actions of a firm is, in the absence of agreement to the con·
trary, revoked as to future transactions by any change in
the constitution of the firm to which, or of the firm in respect of the transactions of which, the guaranty or obligation was given.
19. The mutual rights and duties of partners, whether
ascertained by agreement or defined by this Act, may be
varied by the consent of all the partners, and such consent
may be either express or inferred from a course of dealing.
20. (1) All property and rights and interests in property
originally brought into the partnership stock ~r acquired,
whether by purchase or otherwise, on account of the firm,
or for the purposes and in the course of the partnership
business, are· called in this Act· partnership property, and
must be held and applied by the partners exclusively for
the purposes of the partnership and in accordance with the
partnership agreement.
·
(2) Provided that the legal estate or interoot in any land,
214
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or in Scotland the title to and interest in any heritable es-

tate, which belongs to the partnership, shall devolve accord-

ing to the nature and tenure thereof, and the general rules

of law thereto applicable, but in trust, so far as necessary,

for the persons beneficially interested in the land under this

section.

(3) Where co-owners of an estate or interest in any land,

or in Scotland in any heritable estate, not being itself part-

nership property, are partners as to profits made by the use

of that land or estate, and purchase other land or estate out

of the profits to be used in like manner, the land or estate

so purchased belongs to them, in the absence of an agree-

ment to the contrary, not as partners, but as co-owners for

the same respective estates and interests as are held by them

in the land or estate first mentioned at the date of the pur-

chase.

21. Unless the contrary intention appears, property bought

with money belonging to the firm is deemed to have been

bought on account of the firm.
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22. "Where land or any heritable interest therein has be-

come partnership property, it shall, unless the contrary in-

tention appears, be treated as between the partners (includ-

ing the representatives of a deceased partner), and also as

between the heirs of a deceased partner and his executors or

administrators, as personal or movable, and not real or herit-

able estate.

23. (1) After the commencement of this Act, a writ of

execution shall not issue against any partnership property,

except on a judgment against the firm.

(2) The high court, or a judge thereof, or the chancery

court of the county palatine of Lancaster, or a county court,

may, on the application by summons of any judgment cred-

itor of a partner, make an order charging that partner's

interest in the partnership property and profits with pay-

ment of the amount of the judgment debt and interest

thereon, and may by the same or a subsequent order ap-

point a receiver of that partner's share of profits (whether
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or in Scotland the title to and interest in any heritable estate, which belongs to the partnership, shall dev-olve according to the nature and tenure thereof, and the general rules
of law thereto applicable, but in trust, so far as necessary,
for the persons beneficially interested in the land under this
section.
(3) Where co-owners of an estate or interest in any land,
or in Scotland in any heritable estate, not being itself partnership property, are partners as to profits made by the use
of that land or estate, and purchase other land or estate out
of the profits to be used in like manner, the land or estate
so purchased belongs to them, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, not as partners, but as co-owners for
the same respective estates and interests as are held by them
in the land or estate first mentioned at the date of the purchase.
21. Unless the contrary intention appears, property bought
with money belonging to the firm is deemed to have been
bought on account of the firm.
22. Where land or any heritable interest therein has become partnership property, it shall, unless the contrary intention appears, be treated as between the partners (including the · representatives of a deceased partner), and also as
between the heirs of a deceased partner and his executors or
administrators, as personal or movable, and not real or heritable estate.
23. (1) After the commencement of this Act, a writ of
execution shall not issue against any partnership property,
except on a judgment against the firm.
(2) The high court, or a judge thereof, or the chancery
court of the county palatine of Lancaster, or a county court,
may, on the appli.c ation by summons of any judgment creditor of a partner, make an order charging that partner's
interest in the partnership property and pro.fits with payment of the amount of the judgment debt and interest
thereon, and may by the same or a subsequent order appoint a receiver of that partner.,s share of profits (whether
215
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already declared or accruing), and of any other money whick

may be coming to him in respect of the partnership, and di-

rect all accounts and inquiries, and give all other orders and

directions which might have been directed or given if the

charge had been made in favor of the judgment creditor by

the partner, or which the circumstances of the case may re-

quire.

(3) The other partner or partners shall be at liberty at

any time to redeem the interest charged, or, in case of a sale

being directed, to purchase the same.

(4) This section shall apply in the case of a cost-book com-

pany as if the company were a partnership within the mean-

ing of this Act.

(5) This section shall not apply to Scotland.

24. The interests of partners in the partnership property

and their rights and duties in relation to the partnership

shall be determined, subject to any agreement, express or

implied, between the partners, by the following rules:

(1) All the partners are entitled to share equally in the
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capital and profits of the business, and must contribute

equally towards the losses, whether of capital or otherwise,

sustained by the firm.

(2) The firm must indemnify every partner in respect of

payments made and personal liabilities incurred by him

(a) In the ordinary and proper conduct of the busi-

ness of the firm; or,

(b) In or about anything necessarily done for the

preservation of the business or property of the firm.

(3) A partner making, for the purpose of the partnership,

any actual payment or advance beyond the amount of capi-

tal which he has agreed to subscribe, is entitled to interest

at the rate of five per cent, per annum from the date of the

payment or advance.

(4) A partner is not entitled, before the ascertainment of

profits, to interest on the capital subscribed by him.

(5) Every partner may take part in the management of

the partnership business.
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already declared or accruing), and of any other money whic~
may be coming to him in respect of the partnership, and direct all accounts and inquiries, and give all other orders and
directions which might have been directed or given if the
charge had been made in favc;r of the judgment creditor by
the partner, or which the circumstances of the case may reqmre.
(3) The other partner or partners shall be_ at liberty at
any time to redeem the interest charged, or, in case of a sale
being directed, to purchase the same.
(4) This section shall apply in the case of a cost-book company as if the company were a partnership within the meaning of this Act.
(5) This section shall not apply to Scotland.
24:. The interests of partners in the partnership property
and their rights and duties in relation to the partnership
shall be determined, subject to any agreement, express or
implied, between the partners, by the following rules:
(1) All the partners are entitled to share equally in the
capital and profits of the business, and must contribute
equally towards the losses, whether of capital or otherwise,
sustained by the· firm.
(2) The firm must indemnify every partner in respect of
payments made and personal liabilities incurred by him(a) In the ordinary and proper conduct of the business of the firm; or,
(b) In or about anything necessarily done for the
preservation of the business or property of the firm.
(3) A partner making, for the purpose of the partnership,
any actual payment or advance beyond the amount of capital which he has agreed to subscribe, is entitled to interest
at t he rate of five per cent. per annum from the date of the
payment or advance.
(4) A partner is not entitled, before the ascertainment of
profits, to interest on the capital subscribed by him.
(5) Every partner may take part in the management of
the partnership business.
216
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ENGLISH PARTNERSHIP ACT.

ENGLISH PARTNERSHIP A.OT.

(6) No partner shall be entitled to remuneration for act-

ing in the partnership business.

(7) No person may be introduced as a partner without the

consent of all existing partners.

(8) Any difference arising as to ordinary matters con-

nected with the partnership business may be decided by a

majority of the partners, but no change may be made in

the nature of the partnership business without the consent

of all existing partners.

(9) The partnership books are to be kept at the place of

business of the partnership (or the principal place, if there

is more than one), and every partner may, when he thinks

fit, have access to and inspect and copy any of them.

25. No majority of the partners can expel any partner

unless a power to do so has been conferred by express agree-

ment between the partners.

26. (1) Where no fixed term has been agreed upon for

the duration of the partnership, any partner may determine

the partnership at any time on giving notice of his inten-
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tion so to do to all the other partners.

(2) Where the partnership has originally been constituted

by deed, a notice in writing, signed by the partner giving

it, shall be sufficient for this purpose.

27. (1) Where a partnership entered into for a fixed term

is continued after the term has expired, and without any ex-

press new agreement, the rights and duties of the partners

remain the same as they were at the expiration of the term,

so far as is consistent with the incidents of a partnership at

wilL

(2) A continuance of the business by the partners or such

of them as habitually acted therein during the term, with-

out any -settlement or liquidation of the partnership affairs,

is presumed to be a continuance of the partnership.

28. Partners are bound to render true accounts and full

information of all things affecting the partnership to any

partner or his legal representatives.
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(6) No partner shall be entitled to remuneration for act.ing in the partnership business. ·
(7) No person may be introduced as a partner without the
.consent of all existing pa~tners. .
(8) Any difference arising as to ordinary matters connected with the partnership business may be decided by a
majority of the partners, but no change may be made in
the nature of the partnership business without the consent
of all existing partners.
(9) The partnership books are to be kept at the place of
business of the partnership (or the principal place, if there
is more than one), and every partner may, when he thinks
fit, have access to and inspect and copy any of them.
25. No majority of the partners can expel any partner
unless a power to do so has been conferred by express agreement between the partners.
26. (1) Where no fixed term has been agreed upon for
the duration of the partnership, any partner may determine
t he partnership at any time on giving notice of his intent ion so to do to all the other partners.
(2) Where the partnership has originally been constituted
by deed, a notice in writing, signed by the partner giving
it, shall be sufficient for this purpose.
27. (1) Where a partnership entered into for a. fixed term
is continued after the term has expired, and without any express new agreement, the rights and duties of the partners
remain the same as they were at the expiration of the term,
so far as is consistent with the incidents of a partnership at
will
(2) A continuance of the business by the partners or such
of them as habitually acted therein during the term, with-0ut any -settlement or liquidation of the partnership affairs,
· is presumed to be a continuance of the partnership.
28. Partners are bound to render true accounts and full
information of all things affecting the partnership to any
partner or his legal representatives.
217

APPENDIX A.

APPENDIX A.

29. (1) Every partner must account to the firm for any

benefit derived by him without the consent of the other

partners from any transaction concerning the partnership,

or from any use by him of the partnership property, name

or business connection.

(2) This section applies also to transactions undertaken

after a partnership has been dissolved by the death of a part-

ner, and before the affairs thereof have been completely

wound up, either by any surviving partner or by the rep

resentatives of the deceased partner.

30. If a partner, without the consent of the other part-

ners, carries on any business of the same nature as and com-

peting with that of the firm, he must account for and pay

over to the firm all profits made by him in that business.

31. (1) An assignment by any partner of his share in the

partnership, either absolute or by way of mortgage or re-

deemable charge, does not, as against the other partners,

entitle the assignee, during the continuance of the partner-

ship, to interfere in the management or administration of
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the partnership business or affairs, or to require any ac

counts of the partnership transactions, or to inspect the

partnership books, but entitles the assignee only to receive

the share of profits to which the assigning partner would

otherwise be entitled, and the assignee must accept the ac

count of profits agreed to by the partners.

(2) In case of a dissolution of the partnership, whether as

respects all the partners or as respects the assigning part-

ner, the assignee is entitled to receive the share of the part-

nership assets to which the assigning partner is entitled as

between himself and the other partners, and, for the pur-

pose of ascertaining that share, to an account as from the

date of the dissolution.

32. Subject to any agreement between the partners, a

partnership is dissolved

(a) If entered into for a fixed term, by the expiration

of that term.
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29. (1) Every partner must account to the firm for any
benefit derived by him without the consent of the other
partners from any transaction concerning the partnership,
or from any use by him of. the partnership property, name
or business connection.
(2) This section applies also to transactions undertaken
after a partnership has been dissolved by the death of a partner, and before the affairs thereof have been· completely
wound up, either by any surviving partner or by the representatives of the deceased partner.
30. If a partner, without the consent of the other partners, carries on any business of the same nature as and competing with that of the firm, he must account for and pay
over to the firm all profits made by him in that business.
31. (1) An assignment by any partner of his share in the
partnership, either absolute or by way of mortgage or redeemable charge, does not, as against the other partners,
entitle the assignee, during the continuance of the partnership, to interfere in the management or administration of
the partnership business or affairs, or to require any accounts of the partnership transactions, or to inspect the
partnership books, but entitles the assignee only to receive
the share of profits to which the assigning partner would
otherwise be entitled, and the assignee must accept the account of profits agreed to by the partners.
(2) In case of a dissolution of the partnership, whether as
respects all the partners or as respects the assigning partner, the assignee is entitled to receive the share of the part. nership assets to which the assigning partner is entitled as
between himself and the other partners, and, for the purpose of ascertaining that share, to an account as from the
date of the dissolution.
·
32. Subject to any agreement between the partners, a
partnership is dissolved(a) If entered into for a fixed term, by the expiration
of that term.
118
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ENGLISH PARTNERSHIP ACT.

ENGLISH PARTNERSHIP ACT.
(b) If entered into for a single adventure or under-

taking, by the termination of that adventure or under-

taking.

(c) If entered into for an undefined time, by any part-

ner giving notice to the other or others of his intention

to dissolve the partnership.

In the last-mentioned case the partnership is dissolved as

from the date mentioned in the notice as the date of disso-

lution, or, if no date is so mentioned, as from the date of the

communication of the notice.

33. (1) Subject to any agreement between the partners,

every partnership is dissolved as regards all the partners by

the death or bankruptcy of any partner.

(2) A partnership may, at the option of the other part-

ners, be dissolved if any partner suffers his share of the part-

nership property to be charged under this Act for his sepa-

rate debt.

34. A partnership is in every case dissolved by the hap-

pening of any event which makes it unlawful for the busi-
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ness of the firm to be carried on or for the members of the

firm to carry it on in partnership.

35. On application by a partner the court may decree a

dissolution of the partnership in any of the following cases :

(a) "When a partner is found lunatic by inquisition, or

in Scotland by cognition, or is shown to the satisfaction

of the court to be of permanently unsound mind, in

either of which cases the application may be made as

well on behalf of that partner by his committee or next

friend or person having title to intervene as by any

other partner.

(b) When a partner, other than the partner suing,

becomes in any other way permanently incapable of

performing his part of the partnership contract.

(c) When a partner,. other than* the partner suing, has

been guilty of such conduct as, in the opinion of the

court, regard being had to the nature of the business, is
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(b) If entered into for a single ad~enture or under-taking, by the termination of that adventure or undertaking.
(c) If entered into for an undefined time, by any partner giving notice to the other or others of his intention
to dissolve the partnership.
In the last-mentioned case the partnership is dissolved as
from the date mentioned in the notice as the date of dissolution, or, if no date is so mentioned, as from the date of the
communication of the notice.
33. (1) Subject to any agreement between the partners,
every partnership is dissolved as regards all the partners by
the death or bankruptcy of any partner.
(2) A partnership may, at the option of the other partners, be dissolved if any partner suffers his share of the partnership property to be charged under this Act for his separ
rate debt.
~4:. A partnership is in every case dissolved by the happening of any event which makes it unlawful for the business of the firm to be carried on or for the members of the
firm to carry it on in partnership.
35. On application by a partner the court may decree a
dissolution of the partnership in any of the following cases:
(a) When a partner is found lunatic by inquisition, or
in Scotland by cognition, or is shown to the satisfaction
of the court to be of permanently unsound mind, in
either of which cases the application may be made as
well on behalf of that partner by his committee or next
friend or person having title to intervene as by any
other partner.
(b) When a partner, other than the partner suing,
becomes in any other way permanently incapable of
performing his part of the partnership contract.
(c) When a partner,.other tharl the partner suing, has
been guilty of such conduct as, in the opinion of the
court, regard being had to the nature of the business, is
219
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calculated to prejudicially affect the carrying on of the

business.

(d) "When a partner, other than the partner suing,

wilfully or persistently commits a breach of the part-

nership agreement, or otherwise so conducts himself in

matters relating to the partnership business that it is

not reasonably practicable for the other partner or par-

ners to carry on the business in partnership with him.

(e) When the business of the partnership can only be

carried on at a loss.

(f) "Whenever in any case circumstances have arisen

which in the opinion of the court render it just and

equitable that the partnership be dissolved.

36. (1) "Where a person deals with a firm after a change

in its constitution, he is entitled to treat all apparent mem-

bers of the old firm as still being members of the firm until

he has notice of the change.

(2) An advertisement in the London Gazette as to a firm

whose principal place of business is in England or "Wales; in
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the Edinburgh Gazette as to a firm whose principal place of

'business is in Scotland, and in the Dublin Gazette as to a

firm whose principal place of business is in Ireland, shall be

notice as to persons who had not dealings with the firm

before the date of the dissolution or change so advertised.

(3) The estate of a partner who dies, or who becomes

bankrupt, or of a partner who, not having been known to

the person dealing with the firm to be a partner, retires

from the firm, is not liable for partnership debts contracted

after the date of the death, bankruptcy or retirement re-

spectively.

37. On the dissolution of a partnership or retirement of a

partner, any partner may publicly notify the same, and may

require the other partner or partners to concur for that pur-

pose in all necessary or proper acts, if any, which cannot be

done without his or their concurrence.

38. After the dissolution of a partnership, the authority

of each partner to bind the firm, and the other rights and
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--calculated to prejudicially affect the carrying on of the
business.
(d) When a partner, other than the partner suing,
wilfully or persistently commits a. breach of the partnership agreement, or otherwise so conducts himself in
matters relating to the partnership business that it is
not reasonably practicable for the other partner or parners to carry on the business in partnership with him.
(e) When the business of the partnership can only be
carried on at a loss.
(f) Whenever in any case circumstances have arisen
which in the opinion of the court render it · just and
equitable that the partnership be dissolved.
36. (1) Where a person deals with a firm after a change
i n its constitution, he is entitled to treat all apparent members of the old firm as still being members of the firm until
·he has notice of the change.
(2) An advertisement in the London Gazette as to a firm
whose principal place of business is in England or Wales; in
the Edinburgh Gazette as to a firm whose principal place of
·business is in Scotland, and in the Dublin Gazette as to a
firm whose principal place of business is in Ireland, shall be
notice as to persons who had not dealings with the firm
·before the date of the dissolution or change so advertised.
(3) The estate of a partner who dies, or who becomes
bankrupt, or of a partner who, not havipg been known to
the person dealing with the firm to be a partner, retires
from the firm, is not liable for partnership debts contracted
after the date of the death, bankruptcy or retirement respectively.
37. On the dissolution of a partnership or retirement of a
partner, any partner may publicly notify the same, and may
require the other partner or partners to concur for that purpose in all necessary or proper acts, if any, which cannot be
done without his or their concurrence.
38. After the dissolution of a partnership, the authority
of each part ner to bind the firm, and the other rights and
220
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obligations of the partners, continue notwithstanding the-

dissolution so far as may be necessary to wind up the affairs

of the partnership, and to complete transactions begun but

unfinished at the time of the dissolution, but not otherwise.

Provided that the firm is in no case bound by the acts of

a partner who has become bankrupt ; but this proviso does

not affect the liability of any person who has, after the

bankruptcy, represented himself, or knowingly suffered him-

self to be represented, as a partner of the bankrupt.

39. On the dissolution of a partnership every partner is

entitled, as against the other partners in the firm, and all

persons claiming through them in respect of their interests

as partners, to have the property of the partnership applied-

in payment of the debts and liabilities of the firm, and to

have the surplus assets after such payment applied in pay-

ment of what may be due to the partners respectively after

deducting what may be due from them as partners to the firm ;

and for that purpose any partner or his representatives may

on the termination of the partnership apply to the court to
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wind up the business and affairs of the firm.

40. Where one partner has paid a premium to another on

entering into a partnership for a fixed term, and the part-

nership is dissolved before the expiration of that term other-

wise than by the death of a partner, the court may order

the repayment of the premium, or of such part thereof as it

thinks just, having regard to the terms of the partnership

contract and to the length of time during which the part-

nership has continued; unless

(a) The dissolution is, in the judgment of the court,

wholly or chiefly due to the misconduct of the partner

who paid the premium, or

(b) The partnership has been dissolved by an agree-

ment containing no provision for a return of any part of

the premium.

41. Where a partnership contract is rescinded on the

ground of the fraud or misrepresentation of one of the par-
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obligations of ·the partners, continue notwithstanding the..
· dissolution so far as may be necessary to wind up the affairs-.
of the partnership, and to complete transactions begun but
unfinished at the time of the dissolution, but not otherwise.
Provided that the firm is in no case bound by the acts of<
a partner who has become bankrupt; but this proviso does
not affect the liability of any person who has, after the bankruptcy, represented himself, or knowingly suffered himself to be represented, as a partner of the bankrupt.
39. On the dissolution of a partnership every partner is-.
entitled, as against the other partners in the firm, and all.
persons claiming through them in respect of their interests ..
as partners, to have the property of the partnership appliedA
in payment of the debts and liabilities of the firm, and to
have the surplus assets after such payment applied in payment of what ·may be due to the partners respectively after
deducti~g what may be due from them as partners to the firm; ~
and for that purpose any partner or his representatives may
on the termination of the partnership apply to the court to .
wind up the business and affairs of the firm.
40. Where one partner has paid a premium to another on .
entering into a partnership for a fixed term, and the partnership is dissolved before the expiration of that term otherwise than by the death of a partner, the court may order the repayment of the premium, or of such part thereof as itthinks just, having regard to the terms of the partnership ..
contract and to the length · of time during which the partnership has continued; unless
(a) The dissolution is, in the judgment of the court, ~
wholly or chiefly due to the misconduct of the partner ·
who paid the premium, or
. (b) The partnership has been dissolved by an agreement containing no provision for a return. of any part of,.
the premium. .
41. Where a partnership contract is rescinded on the ground of the fraud or misrepresentation of one of the par- .
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ties thereto, the party entitled to rescind is, without preju

dice to any other right, entitled

(a) to a lien on, or right of retention of, the surplus of

the partnership assets, after satisfying the partnership

liabilities, for any sum of money paid by him for the

purchase of a share in the partnership, and for any

capital contributed by him, and is

(b) to stand in the place of the creditors of the firm

for any payments made by him in respect of the part-

nership liabilities, and

(c) to be indemnified by the person guilty of the fraud

or making the representation against all the debts and

liabilities of the firm.

42. (1) Where any member of a firm has died or other-

wise ceased to be a partner, and the surviving or continuing

partners carry on the business of the firm with its capital

or assets without any final settlement of accounts as between

the firm and the outgoing partner or his estate, then, in the

absence of any agreement to the contrary, the outgoing part-
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ner or his estate is entitled at the option of himself or his

representatives to such share of the profits made since the

dissolution as the court may find to be attributable to the

use of his share of the partnership assets, or to interest at

the rate of five per cent, per annum on the amount of his

share of the partnership assets.

(2) Provided that where by the partnership contract an

option is given to surviving or continuing partners to pur-

chase the interest of a deceased or outgoing partner, and

that option is duly exercised, the estate of the deceased part-

ner, or the outgoing partner or his estate, as the case may

be, is not entitled to any further or other share of prof-

its ; but if any partner assuming to act in exercise of the

option does not in all material respects comply with the

terms thereof, he is liable to account under the foregoing

provisions of this section.

43. Subject to any agreement between the partners, the

amount due from surviving or continuing partners to an out-
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ties thereto, the party entitled to rescind is, without preju
·
dice to any other right, entitled(a) to a lien on, or right of retention of, the surplus of
the partnership assets, after satisfying the partnership
liabilities, for any sum of money paid by him for the
purchase of a share in the partnership, and for any
capital contributed by him, and is
(b) to stand in the place of the creditors of the firm
for any payments made by him in respect of the partr
nership liabilities, and
(c) to be indemnified by the person guilty of the fraud
or making the representation against all the debts and
liabilities of the firm.
42. (1) vVhere any member of a firm has died or otherwise ceased to be a partner, and the surviving or continuing
partners carry on the business of the firm with its capital
or assets without any final settlement of accounts as between
the firm and the outgoing partner or his estate, then, in the
absence of any agreement to the contrary, the outgoing partner or his estate is entitled at the option of himself or his
representatives to such share of the profits made since the
dissolution as the court may find to be attributable to the
use of his share of the partnership assets, or to interest at
the rate of five per cent. per annum on the amount of his
share of the partnership assets.
(2) Provided that where by the partnership contract an
option is given to surviving or continuing partners to purchase the interest of a deceased or outgoing partner, and
that option is duly exercised, the estate of.the deceased partner, or the outgoing partner or his estate, as the case may
be, is not entitled to any further or other share of profits; but if any partn~r assuming to act in exercise of the
option does not in all material respects comply with the
terms thereof, he is liable to account under the foregoing
provisions of this section.
43. Subject to any agreement between the partners, the
amount due from surviving or continuing partners to an out222

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

'

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ENGLISH PARTNERSHIP .A.OT.

ENGLISH PARTNERSHIP ACT.

going partner or the representatives of a deceased partner

in respect of the outgoing or deceased partner's share is a

debt accruing at the date of the dissolution or death.

44. In settling accounts.between the partners after & dis-

solution of partnership, the following rules shall, subject to

any agreement, be observed :

(a) Losses, including losses and deficiencies of capital,

shall be paid first out of profits, next out of capital, and

lastly, if necessary, by the partners individually in the

proportion in which they were entitled to share profits.

(b) The assets of the firm, including the sums, if any,

contributed by the partners to make up losses or de-

ficiencies of capital, shall be applied in the following

manner and order :

(1) In paying the debts and liabilities of the firm

to persons who are not partners therein.

(2) In paying to each partner, ratably, what is

due from the firm to him for advances as distin-

guished from capital.
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(3) In paying to each partner, ratably, what is

due from the firm to him in respect of capital.

(4) The ultimate residue, if any, shall be divided

among the partners in the proportion in which

profits are divisible.

45. In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears

The expression "court" includes every court and judge

having jurisdiction in the case.

The expression "business" includes every trade, occupa-

tion or profession.

46. The rules of equity and of common law applicable to

partnership shall continue in force except so far as they are

inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act.

47. (1) In the application of this Act to Scotland the

bankruptcy of a firm or of an individual shall mean seques-

tration under the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Acts, and also in

the case of an individual the issue against him of a degree of

cessio bonorum.
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going partner or the representatives of a deceased partner
in respect of the outgoing or deceased partner's share is a
debt accruing at the date of the dissolution or death.
4:4:. In settling accounts.between the partners after r.. dissolution of partnership, the following rules shall, subject to
any agreement, be observed:
(a) Losses, including losses and deficiencies of capital,
shall be paid first out of profits, next out of capital, and
lastly, if necessary, by the partners individually in the
proportion in which they were entitled to share profits.
(b) The assets of the firm, including the sums, if any,
contributed by the partners to make up losses or deficiencies of capital, shall be applied in the following
manner and order:
(1) In paying the debts and liabilities of the firm
to persons 'Yho are not partners therein.
(2) In paying to each partner, ratably, what is
due from the firm to him for advances as distinguished from capital.
(3) In paying to each partner, ratably, what is
due from the firm to him in respect of capital.
(4) The ultimate residue, if any, shall be divided
among the partners in the proportion in which
profits are divisible.
45. In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears The expression " court" includes ~very court and judge
having jurisdiction in the case.
The expression "business" includes every trade, occu pation or profession.
4:6. The rules of equity and of common law applicable to
partnership ·shall continue in force except so far as they are
inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act.
4:7. (1) In the application of this Act to Scotland · the
bankruptcy of a firm or of an individual shall mean seque&tration under the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Acts, and also in
the case of an individual the issue against him of a degree of
cessio bonO'l"Um.
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(2) Nothing in this Act shall alter the rules of the law of

Scotland relating to the bankruptcy of a firm or of the in-

dividual partners thereof.

48. The Acts mentioned in the schedule to this Act are

hereby repealed to the extent mentioned in the third column

of that schedule.

49. This Act shall come into operation on the first day of

January, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-one.

50. This Act may be cited as the Partnership Act, 1890
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(2) Nothing in this Act shall alter the rules of the law of
Scotland relating to the bankruptcy of a. firm or of the individual partners thereof.
4:8. The Acts mentioned in the schedule to this Act are
hereby repealed to the extent mentioned in the third column
of that schedule.
4:9. This Act shall come into operation on the first day of
. January, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-one.
60. This Act may be cited as the Partnership Act, 1890
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AMERICAN CODES.

The following are the sections of the California code

upon the subject of Partnership. It has been re-enacted in

Dakota and Montana with such variations as are noted.

ARTICLE L

WHAT CONSTITUTES A PARTNERSHIP.

SEO. 2395. Partnership is the association of two or mor*

persons for the purpose of carrying on business together, and

dividing its profits between them._

AMERICAN CODES.

SEO. 2396. Part owners of a ship do not, by simply using

it in a joint enterprise, become partners as to the ship.

(Not in Montana statutes.)

SEC. 2397. A partnership can be founded only by the

consent of all the parties thereto, and therefore no new part-

ner can be admitted to the partnership without the consent

of every existing member thereof.

ARTICLE IL

The following are the sections of the California code
upon the subject of Partnersh!p. It has been re-enacted in
Dakota. and Montana with such variations as are noted.

PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY.

SEO. 2401. The property of a partnership consists of all

ARTICLE

that is contributed to the common stock at the formation

I.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

of the partnership, and all that is subsequently acquired

WHAT CONSTITUTES · A. PARTNERSHIP.

thereby.

SEO. 2402. The interest of each member of a partnership

~

extends to every portion of its property.

SEC. 2403. In the absence of any agreement on the sub-

ject, the shares of partners in the profit or loss of the busi-

ness are equal, and the share of each in the partnership

15 225

SEo. 2395. Partnership is the association of two or more.
persons for the purpose of carrying on business together, and
dividing its profits between them.SEO. 2396. Part owners of a ship do not, by simply using
it in a joint enterprise, become partners as to the ship.
(Not in Montana statutes.) ·
SEo. 2397. A partnership can be founded only by the
consent of all the parties thereto, and therefore no new part- .
ner can be admitted to the partnership Without the consent
• of every existing member thereof.

PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY.

Soo. 2401. The property of a partnership consists of all
that is contributed to the common stock at the formation
of the partnership, and. all that is subsequently acquired
thereby.
SEO. 2402. The interest of each member of a partnership
extends to every portion of its property.
Soo. 2403. In the absence of any agreement o~ the subject, the shares of partners in the profit or loss of the business are equaJ, and the share of · each in the partnership
15

225

APPENDIX .A..
APPENDIX A.

property is the value of his original contribution, increased

or diminished by his share of profit or loss.

SEC. 2404. An agreement to divide the profits of a busi-

ness implies an agreement for a corresponding division of

its losses, unless it is otherwise expressly stipulated.

SEC. 2405. Each member of a partnership may require

its property to be applied to the discharge of its debts, and

has a lien upon the shares of the other partners for this pur-

pose, and for the payment of the general balance, if any,

due to him.

SEC. 2406. Property, whether real or personal, acquired

with partnership funds, is presumed to be partnership prop-

erty.

ARTICLE III.

MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS OF PARTNERS.

SEC. 2410. The relations of partners are confidential

They are trustees for each other within the meaning of

chapter I of the title on trusts, and their obligations as such

trustees are defined by that chapter.
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SEC. 2411. In all proceedings connected with the forma-

tion, conduct, dissolution and liquidation of a partnership,

every partner is bound to act in the highest good faith to-

property is the value of his original contribution, increased
or diminished by his share of profit or loss.
SEo. 2404. An agreement to divide the profits of a business implies an agreement for a corresponding division of
its losses, unless it is otherwise expressly stipulated.
SEo. 2405. Each member of a partnership may require
its property to be applied to the discharge of its debts, and
has a lien upon the shares of the other partners for this purpose, and for the payment of the general balance, if any,
due to him.
SEo. 2406. Property, whether real or personal, acquired
with partnership funds, is presumed to be partnership prop·
.arty.
ARTICLE

ward his copartners. He may not obtain any advantage

m.

over them in the partnership affairs by the slightest mis-

representation, concealment, threat or adverse pressure of

MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS OF PARTNERS.

any kind.

SEC. 2412. Each member of a partnership must account

to it for everything that he receives on account thereof, and

is entitled to reimbursement therefrom for everything that

he properly expends for the benefit thereof, and to be in-

demnified thereby for all losses and risks which he neces-

sarily incurs on its behalf.

SEC. 2413. A partner is not entitled to any compensation

for services rendered by him to the partnership. (In Mon-

tana statutes the following is added: "unless there is an

agreement to that effect.")

Sxo. 2410. The relations of partners are confidential.
They are trustees for each other within the meaning of
chapter I of the title on trusts, and their obligations as such
·
trustees are defined by that chapter.
SEo. 2411. In all proceedings· connected with. the formation, conduct, dissolution and liquidation of a partnership,
every partner is bound to act in the highest good faith toward his copartners. He may not obtain any advantage
over them in the partnership affairs by the slightest misrepresentation, concealment, threat or adverse pressure of
any kind.
SEo. 2412. Each member of a partnership must account
to it for everything that he receives on account thereof, and
is entitled to reimbursement therefrom for everything that
he properly expends for the benefit thereof, and to be indemnified thereby for all losses and risks which he necessarily incurs on its behalf.
SEo. 2413. A partner is not entitled to any compensation
for services rendered by him to the partnership. (In Montana statutes the following is added:-" unless there is an
agr~ement to that effect.")
226
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AMERIOAlf OOD::e:s.

AMERICA!? CODES.

ARTICLE TV.

ARTIOL11: IV.

RENUNCIATION OF PARTNERSHIP.

SEC. 2417. A partner may exonerate himself from all

future liability to a third person on account of the partner-

ship by renouncing in good faith all participation in its future

RENUNCIATION OF PARTNERSHIP.

profits, and giving notice to such third person and to his

own copartners that he has made such renunciation, and

that so far as may be in his power he dissolves the partner-

ship and does not intend to be liable on account thereof for

the future.

SEO. 2418. After a partner has given notice of his renun-

ciation of the partnership he cannot claim any of its subse-

quent profits, and his copartners may proceed to dissolve

the partnership.

CHAPTER IL

ARTICLE I.

WHAT IS A GENERAL PARTNERSHIP.

SEC. 2424. Every partnership that is now formed in ac-

cordance with the law concerning special or mining partner-
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ships, and every special partnership so far only as the gen-

eral partners are concerned, is a general partnership.

ARTICLE IL

POWERS AND AUTHORITY OF PARTNERS.

SEC. 2428. Unless otherwise expressly stipulated, the de-

cision of the majority of the members of a general partner-

SEO. 2417. A partner may exonerate himself from all
future liability to a third person on account of the partnership by renouncing in good faith all participation in its future
profits, and giving notice to such third person and to his
own copartners tha,t he has made such renunciation, and
that so far as may be in his power he dissolves the partnership and does not intend to be liable on account thereof for
the future.
SEo. 2418. After a partner has given notice of his renunciation of the partnership he cannot claim any of its subsequent profits, and his copartners may proceed to dissolve
the partnership.

ship binds it in the conduct of its business.

SEC. 2429. Every general partner is agent for the part-

CHAPTER IL

nership in the transaction of its business, and has authority

to do whatever is necessary to carry on such business in the

ordinary manner, and for this purpose may bind his copart-

ARTICLE

ners by an agreement in writing.

237

I.

WHAT IS A. GENERAL PARTNERSHIP.

SEO. 2424. Every partnership that is now formed in accordance with the law concerning special or mining partnerships, and every special partnership ~o far only as the general partners are concerned, is a general partnership.
ARTIOLE

IL

POWERS A.ND AUTHORITY OF P ABTNERS.

SEO. 2428. Unless otherwise expressly stipulated, the d&cision of the majority of the members of a general partnership binds it in the conduct of its business.
. SEO. 2429. Every general partner is agent for the partnership in the transact!on of its business, and has authority
to do whatever is necessary to carry on such business in the
ordinary manner, and for this purpose may bind his copartners by a.n agreement in wri~ing.
.
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SBO. 2430. A partner, as such, has not authority to do

any of the following acts, unless his partners have wholly

abandoned the business to him, or are incapable of acting:

1. To make an assignment of the partnership property or

any portion thereof to a creditor, or to a third person in

trust for the benefit of a creditor or of all creditors.

2. To dispose of the good-will of the business.

3. To dispose of the whole of the partnership property at

once, unless it consists entirely of merchandise. (The ital-

icised part of last clause is not in the Montana statute.)

4. To do any act which would make it impossible to carry

on the ordinary business of the partnership.

5. To confess a judgment.

6. To submit a partnership claim to arbitration.

7. To do any other act not within the scope of the preced-

ing section.

SEC. 2431. A partner is not bound by any act of a co-

partner in bad faith toward him, though within the scope

of the partner's powers, except in favor of persons who have
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in good faith parted with value in reliance upon such act

ARTICLE IIL

MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS OF PARTNERS.

SEO. 2435. All profits made by a general partnership, in

the course of any business usually carried on by the part-

nership, belong to the firm.

SEO. 2436. A general partner, who agrees to give his per-

sonal attention to the business of the partnership, may not

engage in any business which gives him an interest adverse

to that of the partnership, or which prevents him from giv-

ing to such business all the attention which would be ad-

vantageous to it.

SEC. 2437. A partner may engage in any separate busi-

Soo. 2430. A partner, as such, has not authority to do
any of the following acts, unless his partners have wholly
abandoned the business to him, or are incapable of acting:
1. To make an assignment of the partnership property o~
any portion thereof to a creditor, or to .a third person in
trust for the benefit of a creditor or of all creditors.
2. To dispose of the good-will of the business.
3. To dispose of the whole of the partnership property at
once, unless it consiata entilreV!J of mercha'ftdiae. (The italicised part of last clause is not in the Montana statute.}
4. To do any act which would make it impossible to carry
on the ordinary business of the partnership.
5. To confess a judgment.
6. To submit a partnership claim to arbitration.
7. To do any other act not within the scope of the preceding section.
SEO. 2431. A partner is not bound by any act of a copartner in bad faith toward him, though within the scope
of the partner's powers, except in· favor of persons w~o have
in good faith parted with value in reliance upon such act.

ness, except as otherwise provided by the last two sections

SEO. 2438. A general partner transacting business con

trary to the provisions of this article may be required bj

228

ARTICLE

IIL

MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS OJ' P.A.RTNEB&

SEo. 2435. All profits made by a general partn~rship, in
the course of any business usually carried on by the partnership, belong to the firm.
SEo. 2436. A general partner, who agrees to give his personal attention to the business of the partnership, may not,
engage in any business which gives him an interest adverse
to that of the partnership, or which prevents him from giv·
ing to such business all the attention which would be advantageous to it.
SEc. 2437. A partner may engage in any separate busi·
ness, except as otherwise provided by the last two sections.
S&o. 2438. A general partner transacting business con·
trary to the provisions of this article may be required bJ
228
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AMERICAN CODES.

any copartner to account to the partnership for the profits

of such business.

ARTICLE IY.

LIABILITIES OF PARTNERS.

SEC. 2442. Every general partner is liable to third per-

any copartner to aoooun~ to the partnership for the profits
of such business.

sons for all the obligations of the partnership, jointly with

his copartners.

ARTIOLB

IV..

Sec. 2443. The liability of general partners for each

other's acts is defined by the title on agency.

LIABILITIES OF PARTNERS.

SEC. 2444. Any one permitting himself to be represented

as a partner, general or special, is liable, as such, to third

persons to whom such representation is communicated, and

who, on the faith thereof, give credit to the partnership.

SEO. 2445. No one is liable as a partner who is not such

in fact, except as provided in the last section,

ARTICLE V.

TERMINATION OF PARTNERSHIP.

SEC. 2449. If no term is prescribed by agreement for its

duration, a general partnership continues until dissolved by
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a partner or by operation of law.

SEO. 2450. A general partnership is dissolved as to all

the partners :

1. By lapse of the time prescribed by agreement for its

duration.

. By the expressed will of any partner, if there is no

such agreement.

3. By the death of a partner.

4. By a transfer to a person, not a partner, of the inter-

SEO. 2442. Every general partner , is liable to third persons for all the obligations of the partnership, jointly with
his copartners.
Sec. 2443. The liability of general partners for each
·
other's acts is defined by the title on agency.
S100. 2444. Any one permitting himself to be represented ·
as a partner, general or special, is liable, as such, to third
persons to whom such representation is communicated, and
who, on the faith thereof, give credit to the partnership.
SEO. 2445. No one is liable as a partner who is not such
in fact, .e xcept as provided in the last section.

est of any partner in the partnership property.

5. By war, or the prohibition of commercial intercourse

between the country in which one partner resides and that

ARTIOLB

v.

in which another resides; or,

6. By a judgment of dissolution.

239

TERMINATION OF PARTNERSHIP.

Sm. 2449. If no term is prescribed by agreement for its
duration, a general partnership continues until dissolved by
a partner or by operation of law.
S100. 2450. A general partnership is diSsolved as to all
the partners:
1. By lapse of the time prescribed by agreement for its
duration.
~)<J' 2. By the expressed will of any partner, if there is no
such agreement.
3. By the death of a partner.
4. By a transfer to a person, not a partner, of the inter. ~t of any partner in the partnership property.
5. By war, or the prohibition of commercial interco~rse
between the country .i n which one partner resides and that
in which another resides; or,
6. By a judgment of dissolution.
229

APPENDIX A.

SEO. 2451. A general partnership may be dissolved, as to

APPENDIX A.

himself only, by the expressed will of any partner, notwith-

standing his agreement for its continuance; subject, how-

ever, to liability to his copartners for any damage caused to

them thereby, unless the circumstances are such as entitle

him to a judgment of dissolution.

SEO. 2452. A general partner is entitled to a judgment of

dissolution :

1. When he, or another partner, becomes legally incapa-

ble of contracting.

2. "When another partner fails to perform his duties under

the agreement of partnership, or is guilty of serious miscon-

duct; or,

3. When the business of the partnership can be carried on

only by a permanent loss.

SEO. 2453. The liability of a general partner for the acts

of his copartners continues, even after a dissolution of the

copartnership, in favor of persons who have had dealings

with and given credit to the partnership during its exist-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ence, until they have had personal notice of the dissolution ;

and in favor of other persons until such dissolution has been

advertised in a newspaper published in every county where

the partnership, at the time of its dissolution, had a place of

business, if a newspaper is there published, to the extent in

either case to which such persons part with value in good

faith, and in the belief that such partner is still a member

of the firm.

SEC. 2454. A change of the partnership name, which

plainly indicates the withdrawal of a partner, is sufficient

notice of the fact of such withdrawal to all persons to whom

it is communicated ; but a change in the name, which does

not contain such an indication, is not notice of the with-

drawal of any partner.

230

Soo. 2451. A general partnership may be dissolved, as to
himself only, by the expressed will of any partner, notwithstanding his agree,m ent for its continuance; subject, however, to liability to his copartners for any damage caused to
them thereby, unless the circumstances are such as entitle
him to a judgment of dissolution.
SEo. 2452. A general partner is entitled to a judgment of
dissolutiOn:
1. When he, or another partner, becomes legally incapable of contracting.
2. When another partner fails to perform his duties under
the agreement of partnership,·or is guilty of serious misconduct; or,
3. When the business of the partnership can be carried on
only by a permanent loss.
SEo. 2453. The liability of a general partner for the acts
of his copartners continues, even after a dissolution of the
copartnership, in favor of persons who have had dealings
with and given credit to the partnership during its existence, until they have had personal notice of the dissolution;
and in favor of other persons until such dissolution has been
advertised in a newspaper published in every county where
the partnership, at the time of its dissolution, had a place of
business, if a newspaper is there published, to the extent in
either case to which such persons part with value in good
faith, and in the belief that such partner is still a member
of the firm.
SEc. 2454. A change of the partnership name, which
plainly indicates the withdrawal of a partner, i$ sufficient
notice of the fact of such withdrawal to all persons to whom
it is communicated; but a change in the name, which does
not contain such an indication, is not notice of the withdrawal of any partner.
230
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AMERIOA.N OODJCS.

AMEJRICAN CODES.

AETIOLB VL

LIQUIDATION.

ARTIOLE

SBC. 2458. After the dissolution of a partnership, tle

VL

powers and authority of the partners are such only as are

prescribed by this article.

LIQUIDATION.

SEC. 2459. Any member of a general partnership may act

in liquidation of its affairs, except as provided by the next

section.

SEC. 2460. If the liquidation of a partnership is commit-

ted, by consent of all the partners, to one or more of them,

the others have no right to act therein ; but their acts are

valid in favor of persons parting with value, in good faith,

upon credit thereof.

SEC. 2461. A partner authorized to act in liquidation may

collect, compromise or release any debts due to the partner-

ship, pay or compromise any claims against it, and dispose

of partnership property.

SEC. 2462. A partner authorized to act in liquidation may

indorse, in the name of the firm, promissory notes, or other
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obligations held by the partnership, for the purpose of col-

lecting the same, but he cannot create any new obligation

in its name, or revive a debt against the firm, by an ac-

knowledgment, when an action thereon is barred under the

provisions of the code of civil procedure.

ARTICLE YIL

OF THE USE OF FICTITIOUS NAMES.

SEC. 2466. Except as otherwise provided in the next section^

every partnership transacting business in this state under a

fictitious name, or a designation not showing the names of

the persons interested as partners in such business, must file

with the clerk of the county in which its principal place of

business is situated a certificate stating the names in fuJJ of

231

8100. 2458.' After the dissolution of a partnership, tltd
powers and authority of the partners are such only as are
prescribed by this article.
•
SEC. 2459. Any member of .a general partnership may act
in liquidation of its affairs, except as provided by the next .
section.
SEo. 2460. If the liquidation of a partnership is commit.
ted, by consent of all the partners, to one or more of them,
the others have no right to act therein; but their acts are
valid in favor of persons . parting with value, in good faith,
upon credit thereof.
SEo. 2461. _A partner authorized to act in liquidation may
collect, compromise or release any debts due to the partnership, pay or compromise any claims against it, and dispose
of partnership property.
·
·
SEo. 2462. A partner authorized to act in liquidation· may
indorse, in the name of the firm, promissory notes, or other
obligations held by the partnership, for the purpose of collecting the same, but he cannot create any new obligation
in its name, or revive a debt against the firm, by an ac. knowledgment, when an action thereon is barred under the
provisions of the code of civil procedure.
ARTICLE

vn.

OF THE USE OF FIOTITIOUS NAMES.

SEO. 2466. .&cept aa otherwise provided in the newt section,
every partnership transacting business in this state under a
·fictitious name, or a designation not showing the names of
the persons interested as partners in such business, :must file
with the clerk of the county .i n which its principal place of
business is situated a certificate stating the names in fuJJ of
.

~1

I

APPENDIX A.

.A.Pl'ENDIX A.

all the members of such partnership and their places of resi.

dence, and publish the same once a week for four successive

weeks, in a newspaper published in the county, if there be

one, and if there be none, in such county, then in a news-

paper published in an adjoining county. (In Montana stat-

ute the preceding italicised clause and section 2467 are

omitted.)

SEC. 2467. A commercial or banking partnership, estab-

lished and transacting business in a place without the United

States, may, without filing the certificate, or making the

publication prescribed in the last section, use in this state

the partnership name used by it there, although it be ficti-

tious, or does not show the names of the persons interested

as partners in such business.

SEC. 2468. The certificate filed with the clerk, as provided

in section 2466, must be signed by the partners, and ac-

knowledged before some officer authorized to take the ac-

knowledgment of conveyances of real property. Where the ,

partnership is hereafter formed, the certificate must be filed,
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and the publication designated in that section must be made

within one month after the formation of the partnership, or

within one month from the time designated in the agree-

ment of its members for the commencement of the partner-

ship ; where the partnership has been heretofore formed, the

certificate must be filed and the publication made within six

months after the passage of this act. Persons doing busi-

ness as partners contrary to the provision of this article

shall not maintain any action upon or on account of any

contracts made or transactions had in their partnership

name, in any court in this state, until they have first filed

the certificate and made the publication herein required.

SEC. 2469. On every change in the members of a partner-

ship transacting business in this state under a fictitious

name, or a designation which does not show the names of

the persons interested as partners in its business, except in

the case mentioned in section 2467, a new certificate must

232

all the members of such partnership and their places of resi.
dence, and publish the same once a week for four successive
weeks, in· a newspaper published in the county, if there be
one, and if there be none, in such county, then in a newspaper published in an adjoining county. (In Monta_na statute the preceding italicised clause and section 2467 are
omitted.)
$Ee. 2467. A commercial or banking·partnership, established and transacting business in a place without the United
States, may, without filing the certificate, or making the
publication prescribed in the last section, use in this state
the partnership name used by it there, although it be fictitious, or does not show the names of the persons interested
as partners in such business.
·
SEo. 2468. The certificate filed with the clerk, as provided
in section .2466, must be signed by the partners, and acknowledged before some officer authorized to take the acknowledgment of conveyances of real property. Where the ,
partnership is hereafter formed, the certificate must be filed,
and the publication designated in that section must be made
within one month after the formation of the partnership, or
within one month from the time designated in the agreement of its members for the commencement of the pa~tner
ship; where the partnership has been heretofore formed, the
certificate must be filed and the publication made within six
months after the ·passage of this act. Persons doing business as partners contrary to the p;ovision of this article
shall not maintain any action upon or on account of any
contracts made or transactions had in their partnership
name, in any court in this state, until they have first filed
the certificate and made' the publication herein required.
SEc. 2469. On every change in the members of a partnership transacting business in this state ·under a fictitious
name, or a designation which does not show the names of·
the persons interested as partners in ·its business, except in
the case mentioned in section 2467, a new certificate must
232
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AMERICAN CODES.

be filed with the county clerk, and a new publication made,

as required by this article on the formation of such partner-

ship.

SEC. 2470. Every county clerk must keep a register of the

names of firms and persons mentioned in the certificates

filed with him, pursuant to this article, entering in alpha-

betical order the name of every such partnership, and of

each partner therein.

SEC. 2471. Copies of the entries of a county clerk, as

herein directed, when certified by him, and affidavits of publi

cation, as herein directed,- made by the printer, publisher or

chief clerk of a newspaper, are presumptive evidence of the

facts therein stated.

CHAPTER

SPECIAL PARTNERSHIP.

ARTICLE L

FORMATION OP PARTNERSHIP.

SEC. 2477. A special partnership may be formed by two

or more persons, in the manner and with the effect pre-
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scribed in this chapter, for the transaction of any business

except banking or insurance.

SEO. 2478. A special partnership may consist of one or

more persons called general partners, and one or more per-

sons called special partners.

SEC. 2479. Persons desirous of forming a special partner-

be :filed with the county clerk, and a new publication made,
as required by this article on the formation of such partnership.
· SEC. 24·7o: Every county clerk must keep a register of the
names of firms and persons mentioned in the certificates
filed with him, pursuant to this article, entering in alphabetical order the name of every such partnership, and of
each partner therein.
SEo. 2471. Copies of th~ entries of a county clerk, as
herein directed, when certified by him, and affidavits of publi
cation, ·as herein directed,. made by the printer, publisher or
chief clerk of a newspaper, are pr~sumptive evidence of the
facts therein stated.
·

f

~ i; 7i

ship must severally sign a certificate, stating:

1. The name under which the partnership is to be con-

adq

fa
CHA.PTER rrf.
Sf..

I ?t> '/

I .1/p.3-

ducted.

2. The general nature of the business intended to be trans-

acted.

SPECIAL PARTNERSHIP.

3. The names of all the partners and their residences, speci-

ARTICLE

fying which are general and which are special partners.

233

L

FORMATION OF P ARTNEBSHIP.

SEO. 2477.

A special partnership may be formed by two
or more persons, in the manner and with the effect prescribed in this chapter, for the transaction of any business
except banking or insurance. ·
SEO. 2478. A special partnership may co~sist of one or
more persons called general partners, and one or more persons called special partners.
SEC. 2479. Persons desirous of forming a special partnership must severally sign a eertificate, stating:
1. The name under which the partnership is to be con·ducted.
2. The general nature of the business intended to be transacted.
·
3. The names of all the partners and their residences, specifying which are genel1tl and which are special partners.
233
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APPENDIX .A.

4. The amount of capital which each special partner has

contributed to the common stock.

5. The periods at which such partnership will begin and

end.

SEO. 2480. Certificates under the last section must be ac-

knowledged by all the partners before some officer authorized

to take acknowledgment of deeds; one to be filed in the

clerk's office, and the other recorded in the office of the re-

corder of the county in which the principal place of business

of the partnership is situated, in a book to be kept for that

purpose, open to public inspection ; and if the partnership

has places of business situated in different counties, a copy

of the certificate, certified by the recorder in whose office it

is recorded, must be filed in the clerk's office and recorded

in like manner in the office of the recorder in every such

county. If any false statement is made in any such certifi-

cate, all the persons interested in the partnership are liable

as general partners for all the engagements thereof.

SEC. 2481. An affidavit of each of the partners stating
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that the sums specified in the certificate of the partnership

as having been contributed by each of the special partners

have been actually and in good faith paid, in the lawful

money of the United States, must be filed in the same office

with the original certificate.

g*

SEO. 2482. No special partnership is formed until the

provisions of the last five sections are complied with.

SEO. 2483. The certificate mentioned in this article or a

statement of its substance must be published in a newspaper

printed in the county where the original certificate is filed

(" recorded " in Montana), and if no newspaper is there printed

then in a newspaper in the state nearest thereto. Such pub-

lication must be made once a week for four successive weeks,

beginning within one week from the time of filing the cer-

tificate. In case such publication is not so made the part-

nership must be deemed general.

SEO. 2484. An affidavit of the making of the publication

mentioned in the preceding section, made by the printer,

234

4. The amount of capital which each special partner has
contributed to the common stock.
5. The periods at which such partnership will begin and
end.
SEo. 2480. Certificates under the.last section must be acknowledged by all the partners before some officer authorized
to take acknowledgment of deeds; one to be filed in the
clerk's office, and the other recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in which the principal place of business
of the partnership is situa.ted, in a book to be kept for that
purpose, open to public inspection; and if the partnership
has places of business sit~ated in different counties, a copy
of the certificate, certified by the recorder in whose office it
is recorded, must be filed in the clerk's office and recorded
in like manner in the office of. the recorder in every such
county. If any false statement is made in any such certificate, all the persons interested in the partnership are liable
as general partners for all the engagements thereof.
SEo. 2481. An affidavit of each of the partners stating
that the sums specified in the certificate of the partnership
as having been contributed by each of the special partners
have been actually and in good faith paid, in the lawful
money of the United States, must be filed in the same office
with the original certificate.
SEo. 2482. No special partnership is formed until the
provisions of the last five sections are complied with.
SEo. 2483. The certificate mentioned in this article or a
statement of its substance ffi:USt be published in a newspaper
printed in the county where the original certificate is filed
("recorded" in Montana), and if no newspaper is there printed
then in a newspaper in the state nearest thereto. Such publication must be made once a week for four successive weeks,
beginning within one week from the time of filing the certificate. In case such publication is not so made the partnership must be deemed general.
SEO. 2484. An affidavit of the making of the publication
mentioned in the preceding section, . made by the printer,
234
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publisher or chief clerk of the newspaper in which such pub-

lication is made, may be filed with the county recorder with

whom the original certificate was filed, and is presumptive

evidence of the facts therein stated.

SEC. 2485. Every renewal or continuance of a special

partnership must be certified, recorded, verified and pub-

lished in the same manner as upon its original formation.

(In Montana the statutes added, "if not renewed it shall be

deemed a general partnership.")

ABTICLE IL

POWEBS, BIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE PABTNEB8.

SEO. 2489. The general partners only have authority to

transact the business of a special partnership.

SEC. 2490. A special partner may at all times investigate

the partnership affairs and advise his partners or their agents

as to their management.

publisher or chief clerk of the newspaper in which such publication is made, may be filed with the county recorder with
whom the original certificate was filed, and is presumptive
evidence of the facts therein stated.
SEC. 2485. Every renewal or continuance of a special
partnership must be certified, recorded, verified and published in the same manner as upon its original formation.
(In Montana the statutes added, "if not renewed it shall be
deemed a general partnership.")

SEC. 2491. A special partner may lend money to the part-

nership, or advance money for it, and take from it security

therefor, and as to such loans or advances has the same rights

ARTICLE

IL
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as any other creditor; but in case of the insolvency of the

partnership, all other claims which he may have against it

must be postponed until all other creditors are satisfied.

SEC. 2492. In all matters relating to a special partner-

POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE PARTNERS.
\

ship, its general partners may sue and be sued alone, in the

same manner as if there were no special partners.

SEC. 2493. No special partner, under any pretense, may

withdraw any part of the capital invested by him in the

partnership, during its continuance.

SEC. 2494. A special partner may receive such lawful in-

terest and such proportion of profits as may be agreed upon,

if not paid out of the capital invested in the partnership by

him, or by some other special partner, and is not bound to

refund the same to meet subsequent losses,

235

SEO. 2489. The general partners only have authority to
transact the business of a special partnership. ·
SEc. 2490. A special partner may at all times investigate
the partnership affairs and advise his partners or their agents
as to their management.
SEc. 2491. A special partner may lend money to the partnership, or advance money for it, and take from it security
therefor, and as to such loans or advances has the same rights
as any other creditor; but in case of the insolvency of the
partnership, all other claims which he may have against it
must be postponed until all ·other creditors are satisfied.
SEc. 2492. In all matters relating to a special partnership, its general partners may sue and be sued alone, in the
same manner as if there were no special partners.
SEo. 2493. No special partner, .under any pretense, may
withdraw any part of the capital invested by him in the
partnersliip, during its continuance.
SEo. 2494. A special partner may receive such lawful in. terest and such proportion of profits as may be agreed upon,
if not paid out of the capital invested in the partnership by
him, or by some other special partner, and is no.t bound to
refund the same to meet subsequent losses.
235
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SEC. 2495. If a special partner withdraws capital from

the firm, contrary to the provisions of this article, he thereby

becomes a general partner.

SEC. 2496. Every transfer of the property of a special

partnership, or of a partner therein, made after or in con-

templation of the insolvency of such partnership or partner,

with intent to give a preference to any creditor of such part-

nership or partner over any other creditor of such partner-

ship, is void against the creditors thereof; and every judg-

ment confessed, lien created, or security given, in like manner

and with the like intent, is in like manner void.

ABTTOLE IIL

LIABILITY OF PAKTNEK8.

SEO. 2500. The general partners in a special partnership

are liable to the same extent as partners in a general part-

nership.

SEC. 2501. The contribution of a special partner to the

capital of the firm, and the increase thereof, is liable for its

SEO. 2495. If a special partner withdraws capital from
"the firm, contrary to the provisions of tliis article, he thereby
becomes a general partner.
·
. SEo. 2496. Every transfer of the property of a special
partnership, or of a partner therein, made after or in con·-iem plation of the insolvency of such partnership or partner,
with intent to give a preference to any creditor of such partnership or partner over any other creditor of such partnership, is void against the creditors thereof; and every judgment confessed, lien created, or security given, in like manner
-and with the like intent, is in like manner void.

debts, but he is not otherwise liable therefor, except as
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follows :

1. If he has wilfully made or permitted a false or materi-

ARTICLE

IIL

ally defective statement in the certificate of the partnership,

the affidavit filed therewith, or the published announcement

LIABILITY OF PARTNERS.

thereof, he is liable, as a general partner, to all creditors of

the firm.

2. If he has wilfully interfered with the business of the

firm, except as permitted in article II of this chapter, he is

liable in like manner; or,

3. If he has wilfully joined in or assented to an act con-

trary to any of the provisions of article II of this chapter,

he is liable in like manner.

SEC. 2502. When a special partner has unintentionally

done any of the acts mentioned in the last section, he is lia-

ble as a general partner to any creditor of the firm who has

been actually misled thereby to his prejudice.

236

SEo. 2500. The general partners in a special partnership
:are liable to the same extent as partners in a general partnership.
SEc. 2501. The contribution of a special partner to the
·capit~l of the firm, and the increase thereof, is liable for its
-debts, but he is not otherwise liable therefor, except 'as
follows:
'
1. If he has wilfully made or permitted a false or materi.ally defective statement in the certificate of the partnership,
the affidavit filed therewith, or the published announcement
thereof, he is liable, as a general partner, to ·an creditors of
the firm.
2. If he has wilfully interfered with the business of the
. firm, except as permitted in article II of .this chapter, he is
liable in like manner; or,
3. If he has wilfully joined in or assented to an act contrary to any of the provisions of article II of this chapter,
he is liable in like manner.
SEo. 2502. When a special partner has unintentionally
done any of the acts mentioned in the last section, he is lia·
ble as a general partner to any creditor of the firm who has
been actually misled thereby to his prejudice.
236
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SEC. 2503. One who, upon making a contract with a part-

nership, accepts from or gives to it a written memorandum

of the contract, stating that the partnership is special, and

giving the names of the special partners, cannot afterwards

charge the persons thus named as general partners upon that

contract, by reason of an error or defect in the proceedings

for the creation of the special partnership, prior to the ac-

ceptance of the memorandum, if an effort has been made by

the partners, in good faith, to form a special partnership in

the manner required by article I of this chapter.

ABTICLE IV.

ALTERATION AND DISSOLUTION.

SEC. 2507. A special partnership becomes general if, within

ten days after any partner withdraws from it, or any new

partner is received into it, or a change is made in the nature

of its business or in its name, a certificate of such fact, duly

verified and signed by one or more of the partners, is not

SEo. 2503. One who, upon making a contract with a pa~
nership, accepts from or gives t<;> it a written memorandum
of the contract, stating that the partnership i~ special, and
giving the names of the special partners, cannot afterwards..
charge the persons thus named as general partners upon that
contract, by reason of an error or defect in the proceedings .
for the creation of the special partnership, prior to the acceptance of the memorandum, if an effort has been made by
the partners, in good faith, to form a special partnership ilL
the manner required by article I of this chapter.

filed with the county clerk and the recorder with whom the

original certificate of the partnership was filed.
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SEC. 2508. New special partners may be admitted into a

ARTICLE

IV.

special partnership upon a certificate, stating the names,

residences and contributions to the common stock of each

of such partners, signed by each of them and by the general

ALTERATION AND DISSOLUTION.

partners, verified, acknowledged or proved according to the

provisions of article I of this chapter, and filed with the

county clerk and recorder with whom the original certificate

of the partnership was filed.

SEC. 2509. A special partnership is subject to dissolution in

the same manner as a general partnership, except that no dis-

solution by the act of the partners is complete until a notice

thereof has been filed and recorded in the office of the county

clerk and recorder with whom the original certificate was

recorded, and published once in each week for four succes-

237

SEo. 2507. A special partnership becomes general if, within~
ten days after any partner withdraws from it, or any new
partner is received .into it, or a change is made in the nature·of its business or in its name, a certificate of such fact, duly
verified and signed by one or more of the partners, is not
filed with the county clerk and the recorder with whom the ·
original certificate o.f the partnership was filed.
BEc. 2508. ·New-special partners may be admitted into a-..
special partnership upon a certificate, stating the names, _
residences and contributions to the common stock of each
of such partners, signed by each of them and by the general•
partners, verified, acknowledged or proved according to the··
provisions of article I of this chapter, and filed with the
county clerk and recorder with whom the original certificate,
of the partnership was :filed.
SEc. 2509. A special partnership is subject to dissolution in .
the same manner as a general partnership, except that no dis. solution by the act of the partners is complete until a notice
thereof has been :filed and recorded in the office of the county
clerk and recorder with whorn the original certificate was ..
recorded, and published once in each week for four succeg..237
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sive weeks in a newspaper printed in each county wnere the

partnership has a place of business.

SEC. 2510. The name of a special partner must not be

used in the firm name of the partnership unless it be accom-

panied with the word "limited."

In Montana statutes the section ( 3343) corresponding to

section 2510 of the California statutes differs somewhat, and

reads as follows : " The business of the partnership shall be

conducted under a firm name, in which names of the gen-

eral partners only shall be inserted. If the name of any

special partner shall be used in such firm name with his con-

sent, or if he shall personally make any contract respecting

or concerning the partnership with any person except the

general partner, he becomes liable as a general partner."

CHAPTER IV.

MINING PARTNERSHIP.

SEC. 2511. A mining partnership exists when two or

more persons who own or acquire a mining claim for the

purpose of working it and extracting the mineral there-
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from actually engage in working the same.

SEC. 2512. An express agreement to become partners or

to share the profits and losses of mining is not necessary to

the formation or existence of a mining partnership. The

sive weeks in a newspaper printed in each county wnere the
partnership has a place of business.
SEc. 2510. The name of a special partner must not be
used in the firm name of the partnership unless it be accompanied with the word "limited."
In Montana statutes the section(§ 3343) corresponding to
section 2510 of the California statutes differs somewhat, and
reads as follows: " The business of the partnership shall be
conducted under a firm name, in which names of the general partners only shall be inserted. If the name of any
special partner shall be ,used in such firm name with his consent, or if he shall personally make any contract respecting
or concerning the partnership with any person except the
general partner, he becomes liable as a general partner."

relation arises from the ownership of shares or interest in

the mine, and working the same for the purpose of extract-

ing the minerals therefrom.

SEC. 2513. A member of a mining partnership shares in

CHAPTER IV.

the profits and losses thereof in the proportion in which the

interest or share he owns in the mine bears to the whole

MINING PARTNERSHIP.

partnership capital or whole number of shares.

SEC. 2514. Each member of a mining partnership has a

lien on the partnership property for the debts due the cred-

itors thereof, and for money advanced by him for its use.

238

SEc. 2511. A mining partnership exists when two or
more persons'who own or acquire a. mining claim for the
purpose of working it and extracting the mineral therefrom actually engage in working the same.
SEc. 2512. An express agreement to become partners or
to share the profits and losses of mining is not necessary to
the formation or existence of a mining partnership. 'fhe
relation arises· from the ownership of shares or interest in
the mine, and working the same for the purpose of extracting the minerals therefrom.
SEc. 2513. A member of a mining partnership shares in
the profits and losses thereof in the proportion in which the
interest or share he owns in the mine bears to the whole
partnership capital or whole number of shares.
8Ec. 2514. Es.ch member of a mining partnership has a
lien on the partnership property for the debts due the creditors thereof, and for money advanced by him for its use.
238
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This lien exists, notwithstanding there is an agreement

among the partners that it must not.

SEC. 2515. The mining ground owned and worked by part-

ners in mining, whether purchased with partnership funds

or not, is partnership property.

SEC. 2516. One of the partners in a mining partnership

may convey his interest in the mine and business without

dissolving the partnership. The purchaser, from the date of

his purchase, becomes a member of the partnership.

SEO. 2517. A purchaser of an interest in the mining ground

of a mining partnership takes it subject to the liens existing

in favor of the partners for debts due all creditors thereof,

or advances made for the benefit of the partnership, unless

he purchased in good faith, for a valuable consideration,

without notice of such lien.

SEO. 2518. A purchaser of the interest of a partner in a

mine when the partnership is engaged in working it takes

notice of all liens resulting from the relation of the partners

to each other and to the creditors of the partnership.
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SEO. 2519. No member of a mining partnership or other

agent or manager thereof can, by a contract in writing, bind

the partnership, except by express authority derived from

the members thereof.

SEC. 2520. The decision of the members owning a majority

of the shares or interest in a mining partnership binds it in

the conduct of its business.

This lien exists, notwithstanding there is an agreement
among the partners that it must not.
SEc. 2515. The mining ground owned and worked by partners in mining, whether purchased with partnership funds
or not, is partnership property.
SEo. 2516. One of the partners in a mining partnership
may convey his interest in the mine and business without
dissolving the partnership. The purchaser, from the date of
his purchase, becomes a member of the partnership.
SEo. 2517. A purchaser of an interest in the mining ground
of a mining partnership takes it subject to the liens existing
in favor of the partners for debts due all creditors thereof,
or advances made for the benefit of the partnership, unless
he purchased in good faith, for a valuable consideration,
without notice of such lien.
SEo. 2_518. A purchaser of the interest of a partner in a
mine w}?.en the partnership is engaged in working it takes
notice of all liens resulting from the relation of the partners
to each other and to the creditors of the partnership.
SEo. 2519. No member of a mining partnership or other
agent or manager thereof can, by a contract in writing, bind
the partnership, except by express authority derived from
the members thereof.
SEO. 2520. The decision of the members owning a majority
of the shares or interest in a mining partnership binds it in
the conduct of its business.
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REVISED CIYIL CODE OF LOUISIANA.

TITLE XL

OF PARTNERSHIP.

CHAPTER 1.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

REVISED CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA.

AST. 2801. Partnership is a synallagmatic and commuta-

tive contract made between two or more persons for the

mutual participation in the profits which may accrue from

property, credit, skill or industry, furnished in determined

TITLE XL

proportions by the parties.

AET. 2802. It may be made by all persons capable of con-

OF PARTNERSHIP.

tracting.

ABT. 2803. It is regulated by the rules laid down in the

title: of conventional obligations, in all things not differ-

CHAPTER 1.

ently provided for by this title.

ART. 2804. All partnerships are null and void which are

GENERAL PROVISIONS.

formed for any purpose forbidden by law or good morals.

But all the partners in such a partnership are liable in aolido

to third persons who may contract with them without a

ship.
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knowledge of the illegal or immoral object of the partner-

AET. 2805. Partnerships must be created by the consent

of the parties.

AET. 2806. A community of property does not of itself

create a partnership, however that property may be ac-

quired, whether by purchase, donation, accession, inheritance

or prescription.

AET. 2807. The community of property created by mar-

riage is not a partnership ; it is the effect of a contract gov-

erned by rules prescribed for that purpose in this code.
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ART. 2801. Partnership is a synallagmatic and commutative contract made between two or more persons for the
mutual participation in the profits which may accrue from
property, credit, skill or industry, furnished in determined
proportions by the parties.
ART. 2802. It may be made by all persons capable of contracting.
ART. 2803. It is regulated by the rules laid down in th&
title: of conventional obligations, in all things not differently provided for by this title.
ART. 2804. All partnerships are null and void which are
formed for f).ny purpose forbidden by law or good morals.
But all the partners in such a partnership are liable in aolido
to third persons who may .contract with them without a
knowledge of the illegal or immoral object of the partnership.
ART. 2805. Partnerships must be· created by the consent
of the parties.
ART. 2806. A community of property does not of itself
create a partnership, however that property may be acquired, whether by purchase, donation, accession, inheritance
or prescription.
ART. 2807. The community of property created by ma~
riage is not a partnership; it is the effect of a contract governed by rules prescribed for that purpose in this code.
240
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ART. 2808. Property, when brought into partnership or

acquired by it, and the profits when they are kept undivided

for the benefit of the partnership, are called partnership

stock.

ART. 2809. Property, credit, skill and industry being the

sources from which a partnership may be drawn, each of

the partners may furnish either or all of these in such pro-

portions as they may mutually agree.

ART. 2810. By credit, in the foregoing article, is meant

not only a reputation for responsibility as to pecuniary con-

cerns, but also any quality or other circumstance that may

acquire the good-will of others, and contribute to the pros-

perity of the partnership.

ART. 2811. It is of the essence of this contract that a

profit is contemplated, and that each of the parties is to par-

take therein ; the proportion they are respectively to receive

is regulated by the stipulation of the parties, where they

make any; where none are made for this purpose, the propor-

tion is regulated by law.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:20 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ART. 2812. It is not necessary, under the last article, that

the contract of partnership should provide for the actual

partition of the profits. A stipulation that the profits shall

be converted into stock for the benefit of all the parties in

determined proportions is valid.

ART. 2813. A participation in the profits of a partnership

carries with it a liability to contribute between the parties

to the expenses and losses. But the proportion, like that of

the profits, may be regulated by the stipulation of the par-

ties ; and where they make none, is provided for by law.

ART. 2814. A stipulation that one of the contracting

parties shall participate in the profits of a partnership, but

shall not contribute to losses, is void, both as it regards the

partners and third persons. But in the case of a partnership

in commendam, hereinafter provided for, the liability to loss

may be limited to the amount of stock furnished.

ART. 2815. f ne foregoing article does not prevent the

partners, or any one of them, from making a donation of
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A:Ifi. 2808. Property, when brought into partnership or
acquired by it, and the profits when they are kept undivided
for the benefit of the partnership, are called partnership
stock.
ART•. 2809. Property, credit, skill and industry being the
sources from which a partnership may be drawn, each of
the partners may furnish either or all of these in such pro.
portions as they may mutually agree.
ART. 2810. By credit, in .the foregoing article, is meant
not only a reputation for responsibility as to pecuniary con- .
cerns, but also any quality or other circumstance that may
acquire the good-will of others, and contribute to the prosperity of the partnership.
ART. 2811. It is of the essence of this contract that a
profit is contemplated, and that each of the parties is to par- ·
take therein; the proportion they are respectively to receive
is regulated by the stipulation of the parties, where they
make any; where none are made for this purpose, the proportion is regulated by law.
ART. 2812. It is not nece.ssary, under the1ast article, that
the contract of partnership should provide for the. actual
partition of the profits. A stipulation that the profits shall
be converted into stock for the benefit of all the parties in
determined proportions is valid.
·
ART. 2813.- A participation in the profits of a partnership
carries with it a liability to contribute between the parties
tQ the expenses and losses. But the proportion, like that of
the profits, .may be regulated by the stipulation of the parties; and where they make none, is provided for by law.
ART. 2814. A stipulation that one of the contracting
parties shall participate in the profits of a partnership, but
shall not contribute to. losses, is void, both as it regards the
partners and third persons. But in the case of a partnership
in commendam, hereinafter provided for, the liability to loss
may be limited to the amount of stock furnished.
A:B.T. 2815. The foregoing article does not prevent the
partners, or any one of them, from making a donation of
16
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iheir or his profits arising from the partnership stock to an-

other, or even from selling the same for a valuable consid-

eration ; but the donee or vendee is not on that account

considered as a partner.

ART. 2816. A partnership cannot be executor, curator or

tutor, and cannot exercise any other private office.

ART. 2817. By private office, in this code, is meant such

trust as relates solely to the interest or affairs of one or

more designated individuals, but which cannot be executed

without the assent of the magistrate.

ART. 2818. The nomination of a partnership to any pri-

vate office is not of itself void ; where it is a trust suscepti-

ble of being exercised by more than one person, it shall be

considered as a nomination of all the members of the part

nership, individually, who belonged to it at the time of such

nomination; where the trust can, by law, only be exercised

by one person, the first-named partner shall be deemed to

have been the person intended.

ART. 2819. A partnership may be appointed attorney or
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agent for the performance of any act or duty which comes

within the object for which the partnership is formed ; and

the responsibility of such trust or agency attaches to all the

members; and they are also entitled to all the advantages

resulting therefrom, although one of them may execute the

trust in the name of the partnership, unless it be differently

provided in the appointment.

ART. 2820. Where a partnership is appointed to perform

a trust or agency, foreign to the object for which the part-

nership was formed, the appointment is not void; it may be

performed in the name of the partnership if all the partners

assent, and then the like responsibilities and advantages at-

tach to the parties as are set forth in the last preceding

article; if the assent of all the parties be not given, the trust

or agency cannot be performed under the power.

ART. 2821. If the trust or agency is executed by writing,

whether required by law to be so done or not, the assent re-

quired by the last article must also be in writing.
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their or his profits arising from the partnership stock to another, or even from selling the same for a valuable consideration; but the donee or vendee is not on that account
considered as a partner.
ART. 2816. A partnership cannot be executor, curator or
tutor, and cannot exercise any other private office.
ART. 2817. By pivate ojfioe, in this code, is meant such
trust as relates solely to the interest or affairs of one or
more designated individuals, but which cannot be executed
without the ass~nt of the magistrate.
ART. 2818. The nomination of a partnership to any private office is not of itself void; where it is a trust susceptible of being exercised by more than one person, it shall be
considered as a nomination of all the members of the part.
nership, individually, who belonged to it at the time of such
nomination; where the trust can, by law, only be exercised
by one person, the first-named partner shall be deemed to
have been the person intended.
ART. 2819. A partnership may be appointed attorney or
agent for the performance of any act or duty which comes
within the object for which the partnership is formed; and
the responsibility of such trust or agency attaches to all the
members; and they are also entitled to all the advantages
resulting therefrom, although one of them may execute the
trust in the name of the partnership, unless it be differently
provided in the appointment.
ART. 2820. Where a partnership is appointed to perform
& trust or agency, foreign to the object for which the partnership was formed, t1:ie appointment is not void; it may be
performed in the name of the partnership if all the partners
assent, and then the like responsibilities and advantages attach to the parties as are set forth in the last preceding
article; if the assent of all the parties be not given, the trust
or agency cannot be performed under the power.
ART. 2821. If the trust or agency is executed by writing,
whether required by law to be so done or not, the assent required by the last article must also be in w~iting.
242
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AET. 2822. In an ordinary partnership, if a partner hav-

ing no authority to make purchases for the joint account

shall make any purchase in the name of the partnership or

in his own name with the partnership funds, the other part-

ners may elect whether they will take such purchase on the

joint account or not.

ART. 2823. The partnership property is liable to the

creditors of the partnership, in preference to those of the

individual partner; but the share of any partner may, in due

course of law, be seized and sold to satisfy his individual

creditors, subject to the debts of the partnership; but such

seizure, if legal, operates as a dissolution of the partnership.

CHAPTER 2.

RULES RELATING TO THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF PARTNER-

SHIPS.

SECTION 1.

OP THE DIVISION OF PARTNERSHIPS.

ART. 2824. Partnerships are divided, as to their object,

into commercial partnerships and ordinary partnerships.
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ART. 2825. Commercial partnerships are such as are

formed :

1. For the purchase of any property, and the sale thereof,

either in the same state or changed by manufacture.

2. For buying or selling any personal property whatever,

as factors or brokers.

3. For carrying personal property for hire, in ships or

other vessels.

ART. 2826. Ordinary partnerships are all such as are not

commercial; they are divided into universal and particular

partnerships.

ART. 2827. Commercial partnerships are divided into two

kinds, general and special.

ART. 2828. There is also a species of partnership which

may be incorporated with either of the other kinds, called

r rtnership in commendam.
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SECTION 2.

OF UNIVERSAL PARTNERSHIPS.

ART. 2829. Universal partnership is a contract by which

SEOTION

2.

the parties agree to make a common stock of all the prop-

erty they respectively possess; they may extend it to all

property, real or personal, or restrict it to personal only;

011' UNIVEBSAL P ARTNERSBIPS.

they may, as in other partnerships, agree that the property

itself shall be common stock, or that the fruits only shall be

such ; but property which may accrue to one of the parties,

after entering into the partnership, by donation, succession

or legacy, does not become common stock, and any stipula-

tion to that effect, previous to the obtaining the property

aforesaid, is void.

ART. 2830. A universal partnership of profits includes

all the gains that may be made from whatever source?

whether from property or industry, with the restriction

contained in the last article, and subject to all legal stipula-

tions to be made by the parties.

ART. 2831. If nothing more is agreed between the par-
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ties than that there should be a universal partnership, it

shall extend only to the profits of the property each shall

possess, and of their credit and industry.

ART. 2832. If commercial business be carried on under a

universal partnership, it must, as to that business, be gov-

erned by the rules prescribed for other commercial partner-

ships.

ART. 2833. Universal partnership shall only be contracted

between persons who are not respectively incapacitated by

law from conveying to or receiving from each other, to the

injury of others.

ART. 2834. Universal partnership cannot be created with-

out writing signed by the parties, and registered in the man-

ner hereafter prescribed.
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A-Jn. 2829. UniverBal partnership is a contract by which
the parties agree to make a common stock of all the property they respectively possess; they may extend it to all
property, real or personal, or restrict it to personal only;
they may, as in other partnerships, agree that the property
itself shall be common stock, or that the fruits only shall be
such; but property which may accrue to one of the parties,
after entering into the partnership, by donation, succession
or legacy, does not become comm.on stock, and any stipulation to that effect, previous to the obtaining the property
aforesaid, is void.
.
ART. 2830. A universal partnership of pro.fits includes
all the gains that may be made from whatever source,.
whether from property or industry, with the restriction
contained in the last article, and subject to all legal stipulations to be made by the parties.
· ART. 2831. If nothing more is agreed between the parties than that there should be a universal partnership, it
shall extend only to the profits of the property each shall
possess, and of their credit and industry.
ART. 2832. If commercial business be carried on under a
.universal partnership, it must, as to that business, be governed by the rules prescribed for other commercial partnerships.
ART. 2833. Universal partnership shall only be contracted
between persons who are not respectively incapacitated by
law from conveying to or receiving from each other, to the
injury of others.
ART. 2834. Universal partnership cannot be created without writing signed by the parties, and registered in the manner hereafter prescribed.
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SECTION 3.

OF PARTICULAR PARTNERSHIPS.

SEOTION

3.

ABT. 2835. Particular partnerships are such as are formed

for any business not of a commercial nature.

01!' P ARTIOULAR PARTNERSHIPS.

ABT. 2836. If any part of the stock of this partnership

consists of real estate, it must be in writing, and made ac-

cording to the rules prescribed for the conveyance of real

estate, and recorded as is hereafter prescribed with respect

to partnership in commendam.

ART. 2837. The business of this partnership must be con-

ducted in the name of all the persons concerned, unless a

firm is adopted by the articles of partnership reduced to

writing, and recorded in the manner directed by the last

article.

ART. 2838. If the articles be recorded, the parties may

themseh T es adopt a firm which shall be composed of the

name of one or more of the partners, but no other name

than those of the parties concerned shall enter in such firm.

SECTION 4.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:20 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

OF PARTNERSHIP IN OOMMENDAM.

ART. 2839. Partnership in commendam is formed by a

contract, by which one person or partnership agrees to fur-

nish another person or partnership a certain amount, either

in property or money, to be employed by the person or

partnership to whom it is furnished, in his or their own

name or firm, on condition of receiving a share in the profits,

in the proportion determined by the contract, and of being

liable to losses and expenses to the amount furnished and

no more.

ART. 2840. He who makes this contract is called, with

ABT. 2835. Particular partnerships are such as are formed
for any business not of a commercial nature.
ART. 2836. If any part of the stock of this partnership
consists of real estate, it must be in writing, and made according to the rules prescribed for the conveyance of real
estate. and recorded as is hereafter prescribed with respect
to partnership in CO'Tll(mendam.
ART. 2837. The business of this partnership must be conducted in the name of all the persons concerned, unless a
firm is adopted by the articles of partnership reduced to
writing, and recorded in the manner directed by the last
article.
ART. 2838. If the articles be recorded, the parties may
themselves adopt a firm which shall be composed of the
name of one or more of the partners, but no other name
than those of the parties concerned shall enter in such firm.

respect to those to whom he makes the advance of capital,

a partner in commendam. Every species of partnership

may receive such partners. It is therefore a modification,

SEOTION

4.

of which the several kinds of partnerships are susceptible,

rather than a separate division of partnerships.
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01!' PARTNERSHIP IN OOM:MEND.A.M.

AJJ:r. 2839. Partnership in

<XYmlrnendam, is formed by a

contract, by which one person or partnership agrees to furnish another person or partnership a certain amount, either
in property or money, to be employed by the person or
partnership to whom it is furnished, in his or their own
name or firm, on condition of receiving a share in the profits,
in the proportion determined by the contract, and of being
liable to losses and expenses to the amount furnished and
no more.
.!.RT. 2840. He who makes this contract is called, with
respect to those to whom he makes the advance of capital,
a partner in C0171/17Um,dam. Every species of partnership
may receive such partners. It is therefore a modification,
of which the several kinds of partners.hips are susceptible,
rather than a separate division of partnerships.
245
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ART. 2841. The proportion of profits to be received by

the partner in commendam may be regulated by the cove-

nant of the parties, as may also, with respect to each other,

the proportion of losses and expenses to be borne by each

of the partners; but, as respects third persons, the whole

sum furnished, or agreed to be furnished, by such partner, is

liable for the debts of the partnership.

ART. 2842. In no case, except as is hereinafter expressly

provided, shall the other partner who has no other interest

in the concern than that of partner in commendam, be liablt

to pay any sum beyond that which he has agreed to furnish

by his contract. If it has been paid and lost in the business

of the partnership, he is exonerated from any other pay

ment. If only part be unpaid, he is liable for that amount,

and no more, to the creditors of the partnership.

ART. 2843. The partner in commendam cannot be called

upon by the partnership or its creditors to refund any divi-

dend he may have received of net profits (fairly made dur-

ing the solvency of the partners and lonafide), at a time
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stipulated in the articles of partnership.

ART. 2844. The partner in commendam cannot bind the

other partner by any act of his; he is not considered as a

partner further than is specially provided in this section.

ART. 2845. Partnership in commendam must be made in

writing, and must be recorded in the manner hereinafter di-

rected, or otherwise the partner in commendam will be con-

sidered as a common partner in the concern, and will be

subject to all the responsibilities towards third persons that

would attach to any of the other parties in the business for

which he made his advance.

ART. 2846. The contract must express the amount fur-

nished, or agreed to be furnished, by the partner in com-

mendam, the proportion of profits he is to receive, and of

the expenses and losses he is to bear. It must state whether

it has been received, and whether in goods, money, or how

otherwise; and if not received, it must contain a stipulation

to pay or deliver it. It must be signed by the parties ir
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A.RT. 2841. The proportion of profits to be received by
the partner in com,menda!m may be regulated by the covenant of the parties, as may also, with respect to each other,
the proportion of losses and expenses to be borne by each
of the partners; but, as respects third persons, the whole
sum furnished, or agreed to be furnished, by such partner, is
liable for the debts of the partnership.
ART. 2842. In no case, except as is hereinafter expressly
provided, shall the other partner who has no other interes~
in the concern than that of partner in commendam, be liablt
to pay any sum beyond that which he has agreed to furnist
by his contract. If it has been paid and lost in the busines~
of the partnership, he is exonerated from any other pay
ment. If only part be unpaid, he is liable for that amount,
and no more, to the creditors of the partnership.
ART. 2843. The partner in commendam cannot be called
upon by the partnership or its creditors to refund any dividend he may have received of net profits (fairly made during the solvency of the partners and bona fide), at a time
stipulated in the articles of partnership.
ART. 2844. The partner in commendam cannot bind the
other partner by any act of his; he is not considered as a
partner further than is specially provided in this section.
ART. 2845. Partnership in commendam must be made in
writing, and must be recorded in the mannel'. hereinafter directed, or otherwise the partner in commiendam will be considered as a common partner in the concern, and will be
subject to all the responsibilities towards third persons that
would attach to any of the other parties in the business for
which he made his advance.
ART. 2846. The contract must express the amount furnished, or agreed to be furnished, by the partner in commendam, the proportion of profits he is to receive, and of
the expenses and losses he is to bear. It must state whether
it has been received, and whether in goods, money, or how
otherwise; and if not received, it must contain a stipulation
to pay or deliver it. It must be signed by the parties ir
246
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the presence of one or more witnesses, and shall be recorded

in full by the officer authorized to record mortgages in the

place where the principal business of the partnership is car-

ried on. If it be a commercial partnership, and consists of

several houses or establishments, in different parts of the

state, such recording shall be made in each of such places.

ART. 284 Y. The record mentioned in the preceding ar-

ticle shall be made in six days from the time of the execution

of the contract, in the place where the principal establish-

ment is situated, and if there are more than one, then allow-

ing one day for every two leagues distance between such

principal establishment and the others.

ART. 2848. The officer authorized to record mortgages

shall keep a separate book for the purpose of recording acts

of partnership, which shall be, at all office hours, open for

the inspection of any person who may choose to consult the

same, and shall receive the same fees to which he is entitled

for the recording of mortgages and for certificates and popies.

When the act is under private signature, the record shall be
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only made on the acknowledgment of the act, before a re-

corder, a notary, or the person authorized to make the rec-

ord, or by a proof of the execution made in the same manner

by one of the subscribing witnesses.

ART. 2849. The business of the partnership to which the

partner in commendam has contributed his advance must

not be carried on in the name of such partner, or in his name

jointly with others, or by him or by his agency as agent, or

attorney for the other partners, but by those to whom he

has made the advance, and in their name or firm ; and if the

advance in commendam has been made to one person only,

such person must carry on the business in his sole name, and

must not make the addition " and company " or adopt any

firm that may cause it to be understood that he has any

partners.

And if the partner in commendam shall take any part in

the business of the partnership, or permit his name to be

used in the firm, or knowingly permit any single person to
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the presence of one or more witnesses, and shall be recorded
in full by the officer authorized to record mortgages in the
place where the principal business of the partnership is carried on. If it be a commercial partne.rship, and consists of
several houses or establishments, in different parts of the
state, such recording shall be made in each of such places.
ART. 2847. The record mentioned in the preceding article shall be made in six days from the time of the execution
of the contract, in the place where the principal establishment is situated, and if there are more than one, then allowing one day for every two leagues distance between such
principal establishment and the others.
ART. 2848. The officer authorized to record mortgages
shall keep a separate book for the purpose of record,i ng acts
of partnership, which shall be, .at all office hours, open for
the inspection of any person who may choose to consult the
same, and shall receive the same fees to which he is entitled
for the recording of mortgages and for certificates and ~opies.
When the act is under private signature, the record shall be
only made on the acknowledgment of the act, before a recorder, a notary, or the person authorized to make · the record, or by a proof of the execution made in the same manner
by one of the subscribing witnesses.
ART. 2849. The business of the partnership to which the
partner in commendam has contributed his advance must
not be carried on in the name of such partner, or in his name
jointly with others, or by him or by his agency as agent, or
attorney for the other partners, but by those to whom he
has made the advance, and in their name or firm; and if the
advance in com'TJ'l.,endam has been made to one person only,
such person must carry on the business in his sole name, and
must not make the addition "and company" or adopt any
firm that may cause it to be understood that he has any
partners.
And if the partner in aommendam shall take any part in
the business of the partnership, or permit his name to be
used in the firm, or knowingly permit any single person to
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whom he has made the advance to add any words to his

name or firm that may imply that he has other partners

besides the partner in commendam^ when in fact he has none,

such partner in commendam shall be liable to all the re-

sponsibilities of a general partner in the business for which

he has made the advance.

ART. 2850. If the person to whom the partner in com-

mendam has made the advance shall, without his consent,

use his name in the firm, or if, nor having any other part-

ner, he shall adopt or use any such addition as is expressed

in the last preceding article, the partner in commendam may

immediately withdraw the sum he has advanced, and, on

giving notice in two of the public newspapers, shall be freed

from all responsibility, either to the partners or to the third

persons from the time of such notice.

AKT. 2851. The partner in commendam cannot withdraw

the stock he has furnished at a time when those to whom

he has advanced it are in failing circumstances, or when

there is a reasonable apprehension that they will become in-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:20 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

solvent.

SECTION 5.

OP COMMERCIAL PARTNERSHIPS.

ART. 2852. All the provisions of this title are also appli-

cable to commercial partnerships, except as otherwise pro-

vided for.

CHAPTEE 3.

OF THE OBLIGATIONS OF PARTNERS TOWARDS EACH OTHER

AND TOWARDS THIRD PERSONS.

SECTION 1.

OP THE OBLIGATIONS OF PARTNERS TOWARDS EACH OTHER.

ART. 2853. When a partnership is made without specify-

ing any time for its commencement, it begins at the time

the contract is made.

ART. 2854. If there has been no agreement respecting

the time the partnership is to last, it is supposed to have

MB
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been entered into for the whole time of the life of the part-

ners, under the modifications mentioned in article 2884; or

if the partnership be entered into for some affair the dura-

tion of which is limited, for the whole time such affair is to

last.

ART. 2855. The contract of partnership may depend upon

conditions.

AKT. 2856. Every partner owes to the partnership all that

he has promised to bring into the same.

When this proportion consists of a certain thing, and the

partnership is evicted from the same, such partner is ac-

countable for it towards the partnership in the same man-

ner as a seller is answerable to the purchaser who buys from

him.

AET. 2857. The partner who promised to bring into the

partnership a certain thing is bound, in case of eviction of

it, in the same manner as a seller towards the purchaser who

buys from him.

AET. 2858. The partner who promised to put a sum of
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money into the partnership owes the interest of the same

from the day when he was bound to pay such sum.

In the same manner he owes the interest on such sums as

he may have taken out of the funds of the partnership from

the day he has received them.

AET. 2859. Any partner who has bound himself to bring

into the partnership his skill, industry or credit, owes the

partnership all the profits which he has made by the exer-

cise of such skill, industry or credit, or of such proportion

thereof as he was bound to furnish.

ART. 2860. When one of the partners is, for his own par-

ticular account, creditor of a person who is at the same

time indebted unto the partnership for a debt of the same

nature which is due likewise, the partner is bound to apply

what he receives from the debtor to the discharge of what

is due to the partnership and to him, in the proportion of

both debts, although by his receipt he should have applied

the whole sum paid to what is due to him in particular.
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been entered into for the whole time of the life. of the partners, under the modifications mentioned in article 2884; or
if the partnership be entered into for some affair the duration of which is limited, for the whole time such affair is to
last.
ART. 2855. The contract of partnership may depend upon
conditions.
ART. 2856. Every partner owes to the partnership all that
he has promised to bring into the same.
When this proportion consists of a certain thing, and the ·
partnership is evicted from the same, such partner is accountable for it towards the partnership in the same manner as a seller is answerable to the purchaser who buys from
him.
ART. 2857. The partner who promised to bring into the
partnership a certain thing is bound, in case of eviction of
it, in the same manner as a seller towards the purchaser who
buys from him.
ART. 2858. The partner who promised to put a sum of
money into the partnership' owes the interest of the same
from the day when he was bound to pay such sum.
In the same manner he owes the interest on such sums as
he may have taken out of the funds of the partnership from
the day he ha8 received· them. ·
ART. 2859. Any partner who has bound himself to bring
into the partnership his skill, industry or credit, owes the
partnership all the profits which he has made by the .exercise of such skill, industry or credit, or of such proportion
thereof as he was bound to furnish.
ART. 2860. · Whe~ one of the partners is, for his own particular account, creditor of a person who is at the sams
time indebted unto the partnership for a debt of the same
nature which is due likewise, the partner is bound to apply
what he receives from the debtor to the discharge of what
is due to the partnership and. to. him, in the proportion of
both debts, although by his receipt he should have applied
the whole sum paid to what is due to him in particular.
24:9
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APPENDIX A..

AST. 2861. When one of the partners has received his

full share of what is due to the partnership, if the debtor

has become insolvent since, the partner who has received

his full share is bound to return the same to the partnership,

although he should have given a receipt for his own share.

ART. 2862. Every partner is answerable to the partner-

ship for the damages which it may have suffered by his

fault, without being able to compensate such damages by

the profits which his industry, skill or credit may have pro-

duced in the business of the partnership ; provided that no

partner shall be held liable for any loss which has happened

in consequence of anything bona fide done or omitted by

him in the legal exercise of his power, either as administra-

tor or partner, although such act or omission should be in-

judicious and injurious to the partnership.

ART. 2863. If the use only of certain specified property

has been brought into partnership, and that property is of

such a nature that it may be used and enjoyed without de-

stroying it, the ownership remains in the partner who
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brought it in and is at his risk. But if such property be de-

stroyed, or grow worse by the keeping or the use that is

made of it, if it was brought into partnership with the in-

tent that it should be sold, or if it was taken at an estimated

value ascertained by an inventory or some other writing, in

either of these cases, although the use only was contributed,

the property is at the risk of the partnership ; and in case

of loss or injury, the partner who brought it in is a creditor

of the partnership to the amount of the credit or loss; pro-

vided that all the provisions of this article may be controlled

by the covenants of the parties.

ART. 2864. A partner may be a creditor of the partner-

ship not only for the sums which he has disbursed, but like-

wise for the obligations he has entered into bona fide for the

partnership and for losses reasonably incurred in his admin-

istration.

ART. 2865. When the contract of partnership does not

determine the share of each partner in the profits or losses,
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ART. 2861. When one of the partners has received his
full share of what is due to the partnership, if the debtor
has become insolvent since, the partner who has received
his full share is bound to return the same to the partnership,
although he should have given a receipt for his own share.
ART. 2862. Every partner is answerable to the partnership for the damages which it may have suffered by his
fault, without being able to compensate such damages by
the profits which his industry, skill or credit may have produced in the business of the partnership; provided that no
partner shall be held liable for any loss which has happened
in consequence of anything bona fide done or omitted by
him in the legal exercise of his power, either as administrator or partner, although such act or omission should be in·
judicious and injurious to the partnership.
ART. 2863. If the use only of certain specified property
has been brought into partnership, and that property is of
such a nature that it may be used and enjoyed without destroying it, the ownership remains in the partner who
brought it in and is at his risk. But if such property be destroyed, or grow worse by the keeping or the use that is
made of it, if it was brought into partnership·with the intent that it should be sold, or if it was taken at an estimated
value ascertained by an inventory or some other writing, in
either of these cases, although the use only was contributed,
the property is at the risk of the partnership; and in case
of loss or injury, the, partner who brought it in is a creditor
of the partnership to the amount of the credit or loss; provided that all the provisions of this article may be controlled
by the covenants of the parties.
ART. 2864. A partner may be a creditor of the partnership not only for the sums which he has disbursed, but likewise for the obligations he has entered into bona fide for the
partnership and for losses reasonably incurred in his administration.
ART. 2865. When the contract of partnership does not
determine the share of each partner in the profits or losses,
250
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each one shall be entitled to an equal share of the profits,

and must contribute equally to the losses.

ART. 2866. If the partners have agreed to refer to one of

them or to a third person for the regulation of the shares,

this regulation cannot be annulled, unless it be by certain

proofs that it is contrary to equity.

AKT. 2867. The partner intrusted with the administra-

tion of the affairs of the partnership by a special power

given in writing, either by the articles of partnership or

otherwise, may, without the assent of the other partners and

contrary to their prohibition, do any act which they have

authorized him to do by such power, provided it be without

fraud, and in his opinion for the advantage of the society.

This power, if contained in the articles of copartnership,

cannot be revoked, without a lawful cause, as long as the

partnership lasts. But if the power of administering be

given subsequent to the articles of partnership, it is a simple

mandate and may be revoked.

' ART. 2868. "When several partners are intrusted with the
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administration without their duties being pointed out, or

when it is not expressed that one shall not be able to act

without the other, they may do separately all the acts relat-

ing to such administration.

ART. 2869. If it has been stipulated that one of the ad-

ministrators shall not do anything without the other, one

alone cannot act, even when the other is prevented by sick-

ness or otherwise from taking a part in the acts which relate

to the administration, until there be a new agreement be-

tween the partners.

ART. 28TO. When there is no agreement respecting admin-

istration in the act of partnership, the following rules are

adhered to:

1. The partners are supposed to have given, reciprocally,

to each other the power of administering one for the other;

what one does is valid, even for the share of his partners,

vdthout receiving their approbation, saving the right which
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each one shall be entitled to an equal share of the profits,
and must contribute equally to the losses.
ART. 2866. If the .partners have agreed to refer to one of
them or to a third person for the regulation of the shares,
this regulation cannot ·be annulled, unless it be by certain
proofs that it is contrary to equity.
ART. 2867. The partner intrusted with the administration of the affairs of the partnership by a special power
given in writing, either by the articles of partnership or
otherwise, may, without the assent of the other partners and
contrary to their prohibition, do any act which they have
authorized him to do by such power, provided it be without
fraud, and in his opinion for the advantage of the society.
This power, if contained in the articles of copartnership,
cannot be revoked, without a lawful cause, as long as the
partnership lasts. But if the power of adminiatering be
given .subsequent to the articles of partnership, it is a simple
mandate and may be revoked.
J ART. 2868.
When several partners are intrusted with the
administration without their duties being pointed out, or
when it is not expressed that one shall not be able to act
without the other, they ·m ay do separately all the acts relating to such administration.
ART. 2869. If it has been stipulated that one of the administrators shall not do anything without the other, one
alone cannot act, even when the other is prevented by sickness or otherwise from taking a part in the acts which relate
to the administration, until there be a new agreement between the partners. •
ART. 2870. When there is no agreement respecting administration in the act of partnership, the following rules are
adhered to:
1. The partners are supposed to have given, reciprocally,
to each other the power of administering one for the other;
what one does is valid, even for the share of his partners,
without receiving their approbation, saving the right which
251

APPENDIX A.

they or every one of the partners has to oppose the opera-

tion before it be concluded.

2. Every partner may make use of the things belonging

to the partnership, provided he employs the same to the

uses for which they are intended, and he does not use them

in such a manner as to prevent his partners from using them

according to their rights, or against the interest of the part-

nership.

3. Every partner has a right to bind his partners to con-

tribute with him to the expenses which are necessary for the

preservation of the things of the partnership.

4. A partner can neither dispose of nor make any change

in any real property belonging to the partnership, without

the consent of his partners, should even this disposition or

change be advantageous to the partnership.

5. In other than commercial partnerships a partner can-

not as partner only, and if he has not the administration,

alienate or engage the things which belong to the partner-

ship.
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ART. 2871. Every partner may, without the consent of

his partners, enter into a partnership with a third person

for the share which he has in the partnership, but he cannot,

without the consent of his partners, make him a partner

in the original partnership, should he even have the admin-

istration of it.

He is responsible for the damages occasioned by this third

person to the partnership, in the same manner as he answers

for those he has occasioned himself, according to article

2862.

SECTION 2.

OF THE OBLIGATIONS OP PARTNERS TOWARDS THIRD PERSONS.

ART. 2872. Ordinary partners are not bound in solido for

the debts of the partnership, and no one of them can bind

his partners, unless they have given him power so to do,

either specially or by the articles of partnership.

Commercial partners are bound in golido for the debts of

the partnership.

252

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:20 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:20 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

EBVISED OTV1L CODE OF LOUISIANA.

AET. 2873. In the ordinary partnership each partner is

bound for his share of the partnership debt, calculating such

share in proportion to the number of the partners, without

any attention to the proportion of the stock or profits each

is entitled to.

ART. 2874. If a debt be contracted by one of the part-

ners of an ordinary partnership, who is not authorized,

either in his own name or that of the partnership, the other

partners will be bound, each for his share, provided it be

proved that the partnership was benefited by the transaction.

ABT. 2875. All engagements made relative to the part-

nership affairs, by the person appointed to administer the

business of an ordinary partnership by articles of partner-

ship duly recorded and pursuant to those powers, shall bind

all the partners.

CHAPTER 4.

OF THE DIFFERENT MANNERS IN WHICH PARTNERSHIPS

END.

ART. 2876. A partnership ends:
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1. By the expiration of the time for which such partner-

ship was entered into.

2. By the extinction of the thing, or the consummation of

the negotiation.

3. By the death of one of the partners, or by his interdic-

tion.

4r. By bankruptcy.

5. By the will of all the parties, legally expressed, or by

the will of any of them, founded on a legal cause, and ex-

pressed in the manner directed by law.

AET. 2877. When a partnership has been entered into

for a limited time, it ends of course at the expiration of that

time.

AET. 2878. The prorogation which may be agreed upon

between the parties shall be made and proved in the same

manner as the contract of partnership itself.
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ART. 2879. If a partnership has been entered into the

stock of which is to be formed with the proceeds of a sale,

to be made in common, of several things belonging to each

partner, and if it happen that the thing belonging to one of

them is destroyed, the partnership shall be extinguished.

ART. 2880. Every partnership ends of right by the death

of one the partners, unless an agreement has been made to

the contrary.

AKT. 2881. The death of one partner dissolves the part-

nership between the surviving parties, unless there be a con-

trary stipulation.

ART. 2882. If it has been stipulated that, in case of the

death of one of the partners, the partnership should con-

tinue between the heir of the deceased and the surviving

partners, or between the surviving partners only, either of

these stipulations shall be observed.

But if the stipulation be that the partnership shall con-

tinue between the survivors only, the heir of the deceased

shall be entitled to a division of the partnership property as
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it stood at the day of the death of his ancestor, and to a

share in the profits of any partnership operation in which

his share of the stock was employed, and which was unfin-

ished at that time.

AKT. 2883. The interdiction of one of the partners or his

bankruptcy has as to the dissolution of the partnership, the

same effect as the death of one of the partners.

ART. 2884. If the partnership has been contracted with-

out any limitation of time, one of the partners may dissolve

the partnership by notifying to his partners that he does

not intend to remain any longer in the partnership, pro-

vided, nevertheless, the renunciation to the partnership be

made bonajide, and it does not take place unseasonably.

ART. 2885. The renunciation is not lona fide when the

partner renounces for the purpose of appropriating to him-

self the profits which the partners expected to receive from

the partnership.
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ART. 2879. If a partnership .has been entered into th~
stock of which is to be formed with the proceeds of a sale,
to be made in common, of several things belonging to each
partner, and if it happen that the thing belonging to one of
them is destroyed, the partnership shall be extinguished.
ART. 2880. Every partnership ends of right by the death
of one the partners, unless an agreement has been made to
the contrary.
ART. 2881. The death of one partner dissolves the partr
nership between the surviving parties, ~nless there be a contrary stipulation.
A.RT. 2882. If it has been stipulated that, in case of the
death of one of the partners, the partnership should continue between the heir of the deceased and the surviving
partners, or between the surviving partners only, either of
these stipulations shall be observed.
But if the stipulation be that the partnership shall continue between the survivors only, the heir of the deceased
shall be entitled to a division of the partnership property as
it stood at the day of the death of his ancestor, and to a
share in the profits of any partnership operation in which
his share of the stock was employed, and which was unfinished at that time.
ART. 2883. The interdiction of one of the partners or his
bankruptcy has as to the dissolution of the partnership, the
same effect as the death of one of the partners.
ART. 2884. If the partnership has been contracted with. ·out any limitation of time, one of the partners may dissolve
the partnership by notifying to his partners that he does
not intend to remain any longer in the partnership, provided, nevertheless, the renunciation to the partnership be
made bona fide, and it does not take place unseasonably.
ART. 2885. The renunciation is not bona fid8 when the
partner renounces for the purpose of appropriating to himself the profits which the partners expected to receive from
the partnership.
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ART. 2886. The renunciation is made unseasonably if it

be made at the time when things are no longer entire, and

when the interest of the partnership requires that its disso-

lution be postponed. The common interest of the partner-

ship is considered, and not the interest of the partner who

opposes the renunciation.

ART. 2887. Although the partnership may have been en-

tered into for a limited time, one of the partners may, pro-

vided he has just cause for the same, dissolve the partnership

before the time, even where inconveniences might result for

the partners, and although it might have been stipulated that

the partners could not desist from the partnership before the

stipulated time.

ART. 2888. There is just cause for a partner to dissolve

the partnership before the appointed time, when one or

more of the partners fail in their obligations, or when an

habitual infirmity prevents him from devoting himself to

the affairs of the partnership, flrhich require his presence or

his personal attendance.
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ART. 2889. The renunciation of the partnership by one

of the partners does not operate the dissolution of the part-

nership, unless it be notified to all the other partners.

ART. 2890. The rules concerning the partition of succes-

sions, the manner of making such partition, and the obliga-

tions which result from the same, between heirs, apply to

partners.
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ART. 2886. The renunciation is made unseasonably if it
be made at the time when things are no longer entire, and
when . the interest of the partnership requires that its dissolution be postponed. The common interest of the partnership is considered, and not the interest of the partner who
opposes the renunciation.
ART. 2887. Although the partnership may have been entered into for a 1imited time, Qne of the partners may, provided he has just cause for the same, dissolve the partnership
before the time, even where inc.Qnveniences might result for
the partners, and although it might have been stipulated that
the partners could not desist from the partnership before the
stipulated time.
ART. 2888. There is just cause for a partner to dissolve
the partnership before the appointed time, when one or
more of the partners fail in their obligations, or when an
habitu~l infirmity prevents him from devoting himself to
the affairs of. the partnership, ·Nhich require his presence or
his personal attendance.
ART. 2889. The renunciatJon of the partnership by one
of the partners does not operate the dissolution of the partnership, unless it be notified to all the other partners.
ART. 2890. T.he rules concerning the partition of successions, the manner of making such partition, and the obligations which result from the same, between heirs, apply to
partners..

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:20 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

··..

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:20 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:20 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

APPENDIX B.

PARTNERSHIP FORMS.

The following simple form may prove suggestive. It is

divided into distinct clauses, to a greater extent than might

otherwise be thought advisable, in order to give prominence

to each. A great variety of special clauses, not here in-

cluded, are in use in special cases.

AKTICLES OF PAKTNEKSHIP.

APPENDIX B.

This agreement, made this first day of January, A. D.

1894, between Adam Smith, Edwin Arnold and Kobert

Burns, all of the city of Ann Arbor, "Washtenaw county, and

state of Michigan, witnesseth :

1. The said parties hereby agree that they will become

PARTNERSHIP FORMS.

and be partners in business for the purpose and upon the

terms hereinafter stated.

2. The firm name of the partnership shall be Adam Smith

& Company.

3. The business to be carried on by said partnership is

that of buying and selling dry goods at wholesale and re-

tail, and carrying on a general dry goods business.
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4. The place at which the said business is to be carried on

is the said city of Ann Arbor.

5. The term for which the said partnership is organized is

The following simple form may prove . suggestiv~ It is
divided into distinct clauses, to a greater extent than might
otherwise be thought advisable, in order to give prominence
to each. A great variety of special clauses, not here included, are in use in special cases.

five years from and after February 1, 1894.

6. The capital of said firm is to be the sum of $15,000, of

ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP.

which each of the said partners is to contribute one-third

part in cash, on or before February 15, 1894, and they are

to share in the profits and losses of said business in the same

proportion.

17 2W

This agreement, made this first day of January, A. D.
1894, between Adam Smith, Edwin Arnold and Robert
Burns, ~11 of the city of Ann Arbor, Washtenaw county, and
state of 'Michigan, witnesseth:
1. The said parties hereby agree that they will become ..and be partners in business for the purpose and upon the
terms hereinafter stated.
2. The firm name of the partnership shall be Adam Smith ~
& Company.
8. The business to be carried on by said partnership- is ./
that of buying . and selling dry goods at wholesale and retail, and carrying on a general dry goods business.
4. The place at which the said business is to be carried on ~
is the said city of Ann Arbor.
5. The term for which the said partnership is organized is .. ,.
five years from and after February 1, 1894.
6. The capital of said firm is to be the sum of $15,000, of
which each of the said partners is to contribute one-third -part in cash, on or before February 15, 1894, and they are
to share in the profits and losses of said business in.the same
proportion.
17

2l11

APPENDIX B.
APPENDIX B.

7. Each of said partners is to give his undivided time and

/ attention to the said business, and is to use his utmost en-

deavors to promote the interests of the said firm.

8. Books of account of the transactions of said partner-

ship shall be kept at the place of business, and shall be at all

times open to inspection by any partner. Each partner

shall cause to be entered upon said books a just and true

account of all his dealings, receipts and expenditures for or

on account of said firm.

9. In the month of January in each year, a full and com-

plete inventory of stock shall be taken, and a complete state-

ment of the condition of said partnership shall be made, and

/ an accounting between the said partners shall be had, and

the profits or losses of the preceding year shall be then di-

vided and paid or contributed.

10. Each of said partners shall be permitted to draw

from the funds of said firm, the sum of $100 per month for

his living expenses. Such sums so drawn shall be charged

to him, and at the annual accounting shall be charged against
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his share of the profits. If his share of the profits shall not

be equal to the sum so drawn, he shall pay the deficiency

into the said firm.

11. Neither of said partners shall, without the consent of

the others, compromise or release debts except upon full

payment thereof, or engage in any unusual transaction or

make any contract on the partnership account involving

more than $500 ; or use the firm's name, credit or property

for other than partnership purposes ; or sign or indorse ne-

gotiable paper or become surety for third persons; or en-

gage in any speculation ; or knowingly do any act by which

the interests of said partnership shall be imperiled or preju-

diced.

12. All questions of difference as to the management of

the business shall be decided by a majority of said partners,

and no partner shall knowingly do any act in relation thereto

contrary to the decision of the majority.

13. Either of said partners may retire from the said part-
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7. Each of said partners is to give his undivided time and.
/ attention to the said business, and is to use his utmost en.
deavors to promote the interests of the said firm.
8. Books of account of the transactions of said partnership shall be kept at the place of business, and shall be at all
times open to inspection by any partner. Each partner
shall cause to be entered upon said books a just and true
--;;:ccount of all his dealings, receipts and expenditures for or
·on account of said firm.
·
9.. In the month of January in each year, a full and com- _
plete inventory of stock shall be taken, and a complete statement of the condition of said partnership shall be made, and
/ ~n accounting between the said partners shall be had, and
the profits or losses of the preceding year shall be then divided and paid or contributed.
10. Each of said partners shall be permitted to draw
from the funds of said firm the sum of $100 per month for
his living expenses. Such sums so drawn shall be charged
/ to him, and at the annual accounting shall be charged against
his share of the profits. If his share of the profits shall not
be equal to the sum so drawn, he shall pay the deficiency
in to the said firm.
11. Neither of said partners shall, without the consent of
the others, compromise or release debts except upon full
payment thereof, or engage in any unusual transaction or
make any contract on the · partnership account involving
more than $500; or use the firm's name, credit or property
for other than partnership purposes; or sign or indorse negotiable paper or become surety for third persons; or engage in any speculation; or knowingly do any act by which
the interests of said partnership shall be imperiled or prejudiced.
12. All questions of difference as to the management of
the business shall be decided by a majority of said partners,
~nd no partner shall knowingly do any act in relation thereto
contrary to the decision of the majority.
13. Either of said partners may retire from the said part258
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PAJSTNERSHir FORMS.

F ABTNERSHIP FORKS.

nersbip at any time upon giving his said partners three

months' notice of his intention so to do.

14. Upon the dissolution of said partnership, by reason of

the death, withdrawal or other act of any partner, the re-

maining partners shall have the right to purchase the inter-

est of such partner in the business, assets and good-will, by

paying the value of such interest as determined by the last

annual inventory and accounting, together with six per

cent, interest upon such value since said inventory. Upon

such payment the retiring partner or his representatives

shall execute and deliver to the remaining members all nec-

essary conveyances of such interest.

15. Upon the final dissolution of said firm by lapse of

time or otherwise, the said business shall be wound up, the

debts paid, and the surplus divided between the partners in

accordance with their interest therein.

In witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hands, the

day and year first above written. ADAM SMITH.

EDWIN ARNOLD.
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KOBEBT BURNS.

NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION.

(To be published and also delivered to all previous customers.)

Notice is hereby given that the copartnership heretofore

existing between Adam Smith, Edwin Arnold and Robert

Burns, under the firm name of Adam Smith & Company,

and doing business at Ann Arbor, Michigan, has been this

day dissolved by mutual consent. {If desired, add; Kobert

Burns has retired from said firm and business, but the said

Adam Smith and Edwin Arnold will continue the business

nership at any time upon giving his said partners three
months' notice of his intention so to do.
14. Upon the dissolution of said partnership, by reason of
the death, withdrawal or other act of any partner, the remaining partners shall have the right to purchase the interest of such partner in the business, assets and good-will, by
paying the value of such interest as determined by the last
annual inventory and accounting, together with six per
cent. interest upon such value since said inventory. Upon
such payment the retiring partner or his representatives
shall execute and deliver to the remaining members all necessary conveyances of such interest.
15. Upon the final dissolution of said firm by lapse of
time or otherwise, the said business shall be wound up, the .debts paid, and the surplus divided between the partners in
accordance with their interest therein.
In witp.ess whereof, we have hereunto set our hands, the
day and year first above written.
An.AM SMITH.

at the same place and under the same firm name.]

Dated, Ann Arbor, Michigan, May 1, 1896.

.

EDWIN ARNOLD.

ROBERT BURNS.

ADAM SMITH.

EDWIN ARNOLD.

KOBEBT BURNS,
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NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION.
(To be published and also delivered to all previous customers.)

Notice is hereby given that the copartnership heretofore
existing between Adam Smith, Edwin Arnold and Robert
Burns, under theiirm name of Adam Smith & Company,
and doing business at Ann Arbor, Michigan, has been this
day dissolved by mutual consent. [..lf desired, add: Robert
Burns has retired from said firm and business, but the said
Adam Smith and Edwin Arnold will continue the business
at the same place and under the same firm name.]
Dated, Ann Arbor, Michigan, :May 1, ·189-6.
An.AM SMITH.
EDWIN ARNOLD.

RoBimT
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APPENDIX B.

APPENDIX B.

CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP.

(To be filed and recorded in office of the clerk of the county in which

the principal place of business is to be located.)

CERTIFICATE OF IJMJTED PARTNERSHIP.

The undersigned, being desirous of forming a limited part-

nership in pursuance of the statutes of the state of Michigan

authorizing their formation (the same being chapter 78 of

Howell's Annotated Statutes), do hereby make and severally

sign the following certificate for that purpose :

1. The name under which the partnership is to be con-

ducted is Adam Smith & Company.

2. The general nature of the business to be transacted is

that of buying and selling dry goods at wholesale and re-

tail.

3. The names of all the general and special partners are

Adam Smith, Edwin Arnold and Robert Burns, and the

place of residence of each is the city of Ann Arbor, Michi-

gan. Of these partners, Adam Smith and Edwin Arnold

are the general partners, and Robert Burns is the special

partner.
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4. The amount of capital which said Robert Burns has

contributed to the stock of said partnership is $5,000 in

cash.

5. The period at which said partnership is to commence

is July 1, 1896, and the period when it will terminate is

July 1, 1899.

In witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hands and

seals this 25th day of June, A. D. 1896.

ADAM SMITH.

EDWIN ARNOLD.

ROBEKT BUKNS.

STATE OF MICHIGAN, )

County of Washtenaw. f

On this 25th day of June, A. D. 1896, before me, a no-

tary public in and for said county and state, personally

came the above-named Adam Smith, Edwin Arnold and

Robert Burns, to me known to be the persons named in and

260

(To be filed and recorded in .office of the clerk of the county in which
the principal place of business is to be located.)

The undersigned, being desirous of forming a limited partnership in pursuance of the statutes of the state of Michigan
authorizing their formation (the same being chapter 78 of
Howell's Annotated Statutes), do hereby make and severally
sign the following certificate for that purpose:
1. The name under which the partnership is to be conducted is Adam Smith & Company.
2. The general nature of the business to be transacted is
that of buying and selling dry goods at wholesale and r&tail.
3. The names of all the general and special partners are
Adam Smith, Edwin Arnold and Robert Burns, and the
place of residence of each is the city of Ann Arbor, Michigan. Of these partners, Adam Smith and Edwin Arnold
are the general partners, and Robert Burns is the special
partner.
.
4. The amount of capital.which said Robert Burns has.
contributed to the stock of said partnership is $5,000 in
cash.
5. The period at which said partnership is to commenoeis July 1, 1896, and the period when it will terminate is
July 1, 1899.
In witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hands and
· seals this 25th day of June, A. D. 1896.
ADAM SMITH.

Enwm
Ro~ERT
STATE Oii' MiomGAN,

ARNoLD.

Bumrs.

} SS.

County of Washtenaw.
On this 25th day of June, A. D. 1896, before me, a no-tary public in and for said county and state, personally
came the above-named Adam Smith, Edwin Arnold and
Robert Burns, to me known to be the persons named in and
260
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PABTNBESHTP FOBM8.

who executed the foregoing certificate, ^-nd they severally

acknowledged the execution thereof for the intents and

purposes therein specified. RICHARD ROB,

Notary Public in and for Washtenaw

County, Michigan.

AFFIDAVIT.

(To be filed with the above certificate.)

STATE OF MICHIGAN.

1 ss.

who executed the .foregoing certi:flcate, p.nd they severally
acknowledged the execution thereof for the intents and
purposes therein specified.
RrOHARD RoE,
Notary Public in and for Washtenaw
County, Michigan.

County of Washtenaw. f

Adam Smith, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he

An1DAVIT.

is one of the general partners named in the above certificate;

and that the sum therein specified to have been contributed

(To be filed with the above certiflcate.)

by Robert Burns, the special partner, to the common stock

has actually and in good faith been contributed and applied

to the same. ATAM SMITH.

Subscribed and sworn before me this 25th day of June,

A. D. 1896. RIOHAED ROB,

Notary Public [as above].
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The county clerk then designates two newspapers in which

notice shall be published, and the terms of the partnership,

as set forth in clauses 1-5, are to be published for six weeks

immediately after recording the certificate. Affidavits show-

ing due publication are then to be filed with the county

clerk.

261

ST.A.TB

oIP MromGAN,

}

~unty of Washtenaw. ss.
Adam Smith, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he
is one of the general partners named in the above certificate;
and that the sum therein specified to have been contributed
by Robert Burns, the special partner, to the common stock
has actually and in good faith been contributed and applied
to the same.
An.AM SMITH.
Subscribed and sworn before me this 25th day of June,
A. D. 1896.
R10I1A.1ID RoE,
Notary Public [a.a ®ave].

The county clerk then designates two newspapers in which
notice shall be published, and the terms of the partnership,
as set forth in clauses 1-5, are to be published for six weeks
immediately after recording the certificate. Affidavits showing due publication are then t.o be filed with the county
clerk.
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INDEX.

References are to section*.

ACCEPTANCE (see BILLS AND NOTES).

ACCOMMODATION

partner no implied power to bind firm for accommodation of

stranger, 188.

ACCOUNT STATED

INDEX.

action at law may be brought upon, when, 130.

ACCOUNTING

who may demand, 154

in what court, 153, 154.

all profits and advantages must be accounted for, 112.

Beferenoea are to aectf.cma.

not usually ordered of illegal transactions, 20.

usually had only on dissolution, 153.

ACCEPTANCE (see BILUl

AND

Ni>Ti:s).

basis of, 302.

manner of, 305.

reopening or restating, 309.

ACCOUNTS

ACCOMMODATION partner no implied power to bind firm for aooommodation of
stranger, 188.

duty of each partner to keep, 118.

presumption against partner who fails, lift.
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ACTIONS

respecting partnership transactions not usually cognizable at law,

130 et seq.

one partner cannot sue another at law, when, 130-134

one partner can sue another at law, when, 135-146.

one partner cannot sue firm at law, 130.

firm cannot sue partner at law, 131.

in equity, what may be brought, 148-150.

who should sue in actions by the firm, 222-220.

who should sue in actions against the firm, 237-230,

cannot usually be brought in firm name, 225.

ADMINISTRATOR (see EXECUTOB).

ADMISSIONS

partner cannot bind firm by, when, 109.

after dissolution, 272.

as evidence of partnership, 36.

power to make, after dissolution, 272.

263

ACCOUNT STATED action at law maybe brought upon, when, 130.
.A.CCOUNTINGwho may demand, 154.
in what court, 153, 154.
all profits and adTantages must be accounted for, 112.
not usually ordered of illegal trallSt'ctioDS, 20.
usually had only on dissolution, 163.
basis of, 302.
manner of, 305.
reopening or restating, 809.
ACCOUNTSduty of each partner to keep, 118.
presumption against partner who fails, 118.
ACTIONSrespecting partnership transactions not usually cognizable at law 1
130 et

seq.

·

one partner cannot sue another at law, when, 130-184..
one partner can sue another at law, when, 185-146.
one partner cannot sue firm at law, 180.
firm cannot sue partner at law, 131.
in eq~ty, what may be brought, 148-156.
who should sue in actions by the firm, 222-228.
who should sue in actions against the firm, 227-280cannot usually be brought in firm name, 225.
ADMINISTRATOR (see Ex:ECUTOR).
ADMISSIONSpartner cannot bind firm by, when, 169.
after dissolution, 272.
as evidence of partnership, 36.
power to make, after dissolution, 272.
263

INDEX.

References are to sections

ADVERTISEMENT

of dissolution, see NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION.

AGENCY

as a test of partnership, 58-68.

partner's, for the firm, 164 et seq.

AGENT

of the implied powers of partners as agents for the firm, 164

power of partnership to be, 170.

power of partner to appoint, 170.

liability of firm for acts of, 207.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN PARTNERS

action for breach of, 135 et seq.

on dissolution, effect of, 274-276.

AGREEMENT TO ENTER INTO PARTNERSHIP

how enforced, 186.

AGREEMENTS

what operate to create partnership, 45-54.

ALIEN
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power of , to be a partner, 22.

APPLICATION OF ASSETS

how assets of firm to be applied, 285 et seq.

by going partnership, 287.

by court, 289-300.

ARBITRATION

power of partner to submit claims to, 171.

ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP (see PARTNERSHIP ARTICLES),

ASSETS (see PROPERTY; APPLICATION OP ASSETS).

ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS

power of partner to make, 172.

power of surviving partner to make, 268.

ASSOCIATIONS

other than partnerships, 7.

ASSUMING DEBTS

on dissolution, 274.

action for not paying, 141.

ATTORNEYS

power of partner to employ, 178.

liability of firm of, for partner's negligence, 804.

AUTHORITY (see POWERS OF PARTNERS).

264
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INDEX.

INDEL ·

References are to sections.

BANKRUPTCY

effect of, to dissolve the firm, 247.

BILLS AND NOTES

implied power of partner to make, indorse or accept, 174

power of surviving partner, 268.

of partner after dissolution, 271.

of partner in non-trading firm, 174

BREACH OF TRUST

liability of firm for partner's, 200.

BURDEN OF PROOF

of partnership, 87.

BUYING (see PURCHASED

CAPACITY

to be partner, see PABTNEB,

CAPITAL

of firm, what constitutes, 90.

amount and interests in, 91.

in what contributed, 92.
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loss of, how borne, 807.

CARE AND SKILL

duty of partner to exercise, 114

CHANGE IN FIRM

operates as dissolution, 29.

CLASSIFICATION

of partners and partnerships, 15, 10.

CLUBS

are not partnerships, 7.

COMMITTEES

not partnerships, 7.

COMMON MEMBER

effect where two firms have, 203.

cannot sue at law, 147.

COMPENSATION

partner not entitled to extra, unless stipulated for, 119.

COMPETITION

duty of partner not to carry on business in competition of firm, 118,

of conflicting claimants to assets, 291, 298.

see APPLICATION OF ASSETS.

COMPROMISE

power of partner to, 178L

CONSTRUCTION

of partnership articles, 77.

885

Beterenoea are to aeottom.
BANKRUPTCY effect of, to dissolve the firm, 247.
BILLS AND NOTES - ·
implied power of partner to make, indorse or accept, 174..
power of surviving partner, 268.
of partner after dissolution, 271.
of partner in non-trading firm, 174..
BREACH OF TRUSTliability of firm for partner's, 20G.
BURDEN OF PROOFof partnership, 87.
BUYING (see PuRCHASB).
CAPAqITYto be partner, see P ARTNEB.
CAPITALof firm, what constitutes, 90.
amount and interests in, 91.
in what contributed, 92.
loss of, how borne, 807.

CARE AND SKILL duty of partner to exercise, 114.
CHANGE IN FIRMoperates as dissolution, 29.
CLASSIFICATION of partners and partnerships. 13, 18.
CLUBSare not partnerships, 7.
COMMITTEESnot part~erships, 7.
COMMON MEMBEReffect where two firms have, 202.
cannot sue at law, 147.
COMPENSATION partner not entitled to extra, unlea atipulate4 for, 119.
COMPETITION duty of partner not to carry on business in competition of firm, 118.
of conflicting claimants to assets, 291, 296.
see APPLIOA.TION OF Asar.rs.
COMPROMISEp<;>wer of partner to, 178.
CONSTRUCTIONof .p artnership articles, '1'1.

INDEX.

Beferenoes are to sections.

CONSULTING

duty of partners as to, 117.

CONTEMPLATED PARTNERSHIPS

when become charged with liability, 13, 14, 84

CONTINUING PARTNER

right of, to use former firm name, 86.

CONTINUING PARTNERSHIP

under old articles, 79.

CONTRACT RELATION

partnership is, &

CONTRACTS

implied power of partner to make, 164

who are bound by, 192.

how when made by partner in his own name, 194 195.

how when made in individual names of all partners, 300.

how when firm does business in name of one partner, 201.

how when two firms of same name have common member, 202k,

obligations of partners upon, is joint, 209.
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who should be sued in actions upon, 228 et seq.

who should sue in actions upon, 223 et seq.

illegal effect of, 17-20.

CONTRIBUTION

partner entitled to, who pays more than his share, 125-127.

how enforced, 127.

when entitled, if transaction illegal, 128.

CONVERSION

of firm property into individual property, 298.

CO-OWNERSHIP (see JOINT TENANCY; TENANCY IN COMMON),

CORPORATION

how partnership differs from, 6.

what constitutes de facto corporation, 1L

whether members of defectively organized corporations are part

ners, 10, 11.

power of corporations to enter into partnership, 20.

COX tx HICKMAN

effect of, on law of partnership, 58-68.

CREDITORS

priority of, in partnership assets, 289 et seq.

firm creditors first paid out of firm assets, 289.

individual creditors first paid out of individual assets, 293.

266
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INDEX.

INDEX.

References are to section*.

DEATH

operates to dissolve partnership, 245.

DEBTS

order of payment of, out of assets, 285 et seq.

priority of, 289 et seq.

power of firm to assume debts of partner, 288.

of partner to assume debts of firm (see ASSUMING DEBTS)

DECEASED PARTNER

interest of estate of, in partnership assets, 268.

liability of his estate, 270.

DECEIT

dissolving partnership for, 251.

DECLARATIONS (see ADMISSIONS),

DECREE

of dissolution, 251 et seq.

DE FACTO CORPORATION

what constitutes, 11.

DEFECTIVELY ORGANIZED CORPORATIONS
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are not partnerships, when, 10, 1L

DELECTUS PERSONARUM

right of, 2&

DISSENT

power of partner to dissent from contemplated acts, 169

DISSOLUTION

causes for, 231 et seq.

by original agreement, 232-284

by act of parties, 235-243.

by act of law, 244-257.

by death, 245.

by marriage, 248.

by war, 250.

by guardianship, 249.

by insanity, 246.

by bankruptcy, 247.

by sale of partner's interest, 99, 243.

notice of, 258 et seq.

to whom given, 261.

when required, 260.

how given, 262.

by whom given, 264.

effect on powers of partners, 267 et seq.

of surviving partner, 268, 269

of liquidating partner, 273.

of partners generally, 271, 272.

267

Beferenoes are to aecrtion.a.

DEATHoperates to dissolve partnership, 245.
DEBTSorder of payment of, out of asset.a, 285 et aeq_.
p:riority of, 289 et seq.
power of firm to assume debts of partner, 288.
of partner to assume debts of firm (see AssUMING DBBTB)
DECEASED PARTNERinterest of estate of, in partnership assets, 268.
liability of his estate, 270.
DECEITdissolving partnership for, 251.
DECLARATIONS (see ADllISSIONS).
DECREEof dissolution, 251 et ~q.
DE FACTO CORPORATION what coi;istitutes, 11.
DEFECTIVELY ORGANIZED CORPORATIONSare not partnerships, when, 10, 11.
DELECTUS PERSONARUMright of, 29.
DISSENTpower of partner to dissent from contemplated acts, 18'
DISSOLUTION causes for, 281 et 1eq.
by original agreement, 282-284..
by act of partfos, 235-248.
by act of law, 244-257.
by death, 245.
by marriage, 248.
by war, 250.
by guardianship, 249.
by insanity, 246.
by bankruptcy, 247.
by sale of partner's interest, 99, MB.
notice of, 258 et seq.
to whom givan, 261.
when required, 260.
how given, 269.
by whom given, 264.
effect on powers of partners, 267 et Be<J..
of surviving partner, 268, 269
of liquidating partner, 273.
of partners generally, 271, 272.
267

;

INDEL
INDEX.

Befere:D.Oe9 are to MOtlona.

Bef erenoes axe to sections.

DORMANT PARTNER

who is, 16.

how liable, 193.

wheb should be party to action, 223, 229.

when should give notice of dissolution, 265.

has no lien as against creditors of ostensible partners, 290.

DOWER

when widow of partner entitled to, in partnership lands, 109.

DUTIES

of partners to each other, 112-127.

DORMANT PARTNEBwho is, 16.
how liable, 19a.
wheL should be party to action, 228, 229.

when

s~ould

give notice of dissolution, 2M.

has no lien as against creditors of ostensible partners, 299.

DOWER-

to exercise good faith, 112.

not to compete in business, 113.

when widow of partner entitled to, in ~nhip Janda, tot.

to exercise care and skill, 114

to conform to partnership agreements, 115.

to keep accounts, 116.

to consult with other partners, 117.

to permit others to participate in management, 118.

to indemnify copartners, 125-127.
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ENTITY

partnership as a distinct, 4

EQUITY

the forum for partnership actions, 148L

what actions maintainable in, 148-156.

ESTOPPEL

partnership by, 69-781

DUTIESof partners to each other, 112-127.
to exercise good faith, 112.
not to compete in business, 118.
to exercise care and skill, 114..
to conform to partnership agreement.a, 111L
to keep accounts, 116.
to consult with other partners, 117.
to permit others to participate in manageme-. 11&
to indemnify copartners, 126-127.

EVIDENCE

of existence of partnership, 85-87.

of partnership by holding out, 69 et seq,

ENTITYpartnership as a distinct, 4..

EXECUTION

sale of partner's interest upon, 100.

levy on partner's property for firm debt, 815.

exemptions from, 217.

EXECUTOR

interest of in partnership assets, 268,

EQUITYthe forum for partnership actions, 148.
what actions maintainable in, 148-156.
E.STOPPEL-

EXEMPTIONS

power of firm or partner to claim, 217.

partnership by, 69-78.

FIRM

ii waning of term, L

see PAKTNKRSHIP.

268

EVIDENCE-

of existence of partnership, 85-87.
of partoorship by holding out, 69 et aeq.
EXECUTION-

sale of partner's interest upon, 100.
levy on partner's property for firm debt, 115.
exemptions from, 217•
.\XECUTORinterest of in partnership assets, 268.
.~MPTIONS-

.power of firm or partner to claim, 217.
FIRM-

u-ieaning of term, 1.
lee P ..l.RTNBBSHIP.
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BOOK.

References art to sec flan*,

FIRM NAME

necessity of, 82.

what may be, 83.

what may be done in, 84

property in, 85.

right to, upon sale or dissolution, 86, 89.

FRAUD

as ground for dissolving partnership, 351, 253.

FIRH NAMEnecessity of, 82.
what may be, 8&
what may be done in, 8'.
property in, 85.
right to, upon sale or dissolution, 86, 89.

GENERAL PARTNER (see LIMITED PABTNEBSHIP)

who is, 16.

GENERAL PARTNERSHIP

FRAUDas ground for dissolving partnershjp, 251, 253.

what constitutes, 15.

GOOD FAITH

duty of partners to exercise to each other, 112.

GENERAL PARTNER (see LDnTm> P ABTNEBSBIP)who is, 16.

GOOD WILL

what constitutes, 87.

as an asset, 88.

GENERAL PARTNERSIDPwhat constitutes, 15.

disposal of, on dissolution, 89.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 14:20 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9q23tv36
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

GUARANTY

partner no implied power to bind firm by, 188.

GUARDIANSHIP

dissolves partnership, 249.

HIRING PROPERTY

implied power of partner aa to, 181,

HOLDING OUT

liability as partner by, 69 et seq.

GOOD FAITHdut:r of partners to exercise to each other, 112.
GOOD WILLwhat constitutes, 87.
as an asset, 88.
~posal of, on dissolution, 89.

ILLEGAL OBJECTS

effect of, on partnership, 17-20.

IMPLIED POWERS

GUARANTYpartner no implied power to bind firm by, 188.

of partners, 165 et seq.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF SUCCESS

as ground for dissolution, 257.

INCOMING PARTNER

liability of, 218.

INDEMNITY

partner entitled to, when, 125-127.

action for not furnishing, 140.

INDISSOLUBLE PARTNERSHIP

can there be, 240 et seq.

269

GUARDIANSIDPdissolves partnership, 249.
HIRING PROPERTY implied power of partner as to, 181.
HOLDING OUTliability as partner by, 69 et seq.
ILLEGAL OBJECTS~
effect of, on partnership, 17-20.
IMPLIED POWE,R Sof partners, 165 et seq.
IMPOSSIBILITY OF SUCCESSas ground for dissolution, 257.
INCOMING PARTNERliability of, 219.
INDEMNITYpartner entitled to, when, 125-127.
action for not furnishing, 140.
INDISSOLUBLE PARTNERSHIPcan there be, 240 et seq.
269

INDEX.

Reference* are to Motions.

INFANT

may be a partner, 23.

powers of, as partner, 23.

dissolution by, 23.

ratification by, 23.

INJUNCTION

when granted in partnership controversies, 152.

INSANITY

effect on capacity to be partner, 24

dissolution of firm for, 246.

INSOLVENCY

as ground for dissolution, 247.

INSURANCE

implied powers of partner as to, 183.

INTENTION

as test of partnership, 43, 44, 64

INTEREST

on advances, partner not entitled to without agreement, 121.
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JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES

how different from partnership, 7.

JOINT TENANCY

how partnership differs from, 8.

JUDGMENT

against one partner bars action against firm, 210, 211.

LAND

right to take in firm name, 104-108.

interest of partners in, 108.

dower and inheritance in, 109.

liability of, to debts, 109.

bonafide purchaser from partner having legal title, 110.

interest of surviving partner in, 111.

LIABILITY OF PARTNERS

upon authorized contract of partners, 192.

INFANTmay be a partner, 23.
powers of, as partner, 28.
dissolution by, 28.
rat ification by, 23.
INJUNCTION when granted m partnership controversies, 153.
INSANITYeffect on capacity to be partner, 24..
dissolution of firm for, 246.
INSOLVENCYas ground for dissolution, 247.
INSURANCEimplied powers of partner as to, 183.
INTENTIONas test of partnership, 43, 44, ~
INTERESTon advances, partner not entitled to without agreement, 12L
JOINT-STOCK COMPANIEShow different from partnership, '7.
JOINT TENANCY how partnership differs from, 8.
JUDGMENTagainst one partner bars action against firm, 210, 211.

upon contracts made in partner's own name, 194-198.

upon contracts generally, 192-203.

extent of liability, 214

for torts, 204-206.

for partner's negligence, 204

for partner's malicious or criminal act, 20&

for partner's breach of trust, 206.

liability joint in contract, 209.

joint and several in tort, 213.

beginning and ending of, 218-220.

270

LANDright to take in firm name, 104-106.
interest of partners in, 108.
dower and inheritance in, 109.
liability of, to uebts, 109.
bona fide purchaser from partner having legal title, 110.
interest of surviving partner in, 111.
LIABILITY OF PARTNERSupon authorized contract of partners, 192.
upon contracts made in partner's own name, 194-198.
upon contracts generally, 192-203.
extent of liability, 214.
for torts, 204-206.
for partner's negligence, 204. .
for partner's malicious or criminal act, 20a.
for partner's breach of trust, 206.
liability joint in contract, 209.
joint and several in tort, 213.
beginning and ending of, 218-220.
270
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INDEX.
INDEX.

References are to section*

References are to seotiona.

LIEN

firm creditors no lien on assets of firm, 287.

partners have such a lien, 278, 2791

attaches to what, 280.

good against whom, 231.

secures what, 283.

how lost, 283, 299.

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

nature of, 310.

LIENft.rm creditors no lien on assets of firm, 287.
partners have such a lien, 278, 219.
attaches to what, 280.
good against whom, 28L
secures what, 282.
. how lost, 283, 299.

must be authorized by statute, 811,

statutory requirements, 312.

statute must be complied with, 311

conduct of business, 315.

for what business may be organized, 814

dissolution of, 316.

LIQUIDATING PARTNER

rights and powers of, 273.

LOSSES -
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sharing of, as test of partnership, 64

MAJORITY

power of, 189.

MANAGEMENT

right of each partner to participate in, 118.

MANAGING PARTNER

duty to exercise good faith, 112, 278.

MARRIAGE

when dissolves partnership, 248.

MARRIED WOMAN

capacity to be a partner, 25.

MISCONDUCT

of partner as ground for dissolution, 255.

MORTGAGE

power of partner to make, 183.

NAME (see FIRM NAME).

NEGLIGENCE

liability of partner to partners for, 114.

liability of firm for negligence of partners, 204

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (see BILLS AFD

NOMINAL PARTNER

who is, 16.

liability of, 19&

271

LIMITED PARTNERSHIPnature of, 310.
must be authorized by statute, 81L
's tatutory requirements, 312.
statute must be complied with, 81S.
conduct of business, 815.
for what business may be organized, 81~
dissolution of, 316.
LIQUIDATING PARTNERrights and powers of, 27S.
LOSSESsharing of, as test of partnership, ~
MA.JORITYpower of, 189.
MANAGEMENTright of each partner to participate in, 118.
MANAGING PARTNERduty to exercise good faith, 112, 27S.
M.ARRIAGEwhen dissolves partnership, 248.
MARRIED WOMAN capacity to be a partner, 25.
MISCONDUCTof partner as ground for dissolution, 255.
MORTGAGEpower of partner to make, 188.
NAME (see FIRM N..um).
NEGLIGENCEliability of parti:ier to partners for, 114.
liability of firm for negligence of partners, 204.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (see BluB AFD N<>Tlal).
NOMINAL PARTNERwho is, 16.
liability of, 19S.

lNDEL
INDEX.

Beferenoes are to sections.

Beferenoes are to seotiom.

NON-TRADING PARTNERSHIP

what is, 163.

power of partner to make bills and notes, 174

to buy, 176.

to borrow money, 175.

NOTICE

to partner as notice to firm, when, 184

NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION

necessity for, 258.

in what cases required, 2591

to whom given, 261.

how given, 262, 26&

who should give, 264

of limited partnership, 316.

NOVATION

new contract by, on dissolution of firm, 276.

OSTENSIBLE PARTNER

who is, 16.
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liability of, 75.

OSTENSIBLE PARTNERSHIP

distribution of assets where partnership is merely ostensible. 29SL

where partnership is actual but not ostensible, 299.

OUTGOING PARTNER

liability of, 220.

PARTIES (see ACTIONS).

PARTNERS

defined, 1.

how classified, 16.

who may be, 21.

number of, 28.

how persons become, 88-731

rights and duties of to each 'other, 118-127.

actions between, 128-156.

powers of, as between themselves, 158, 159.

as respects third persons, 160-190.

NON··T RADING PARTNERSHIPwhat is, 162.
power of partner to make bills and notes, 174..
to buy, 176.
to borrow money, 175.
NOTICEto partner as notice to firril. when, 184..
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION necessity for, 258.
in what cases required, 259.
to whom given, .261.
how given, 262, 263.
who should give, 26~
of limited pa~nership, 818.
NOVATION. new contract by, on dissolution of firm, 278.
OSTENSIBLE PARTNERwho is, 16..
liability of, 75..
OSTENSIBLE PARTNERSHIPdistribution of assets where partnership fs merely ostensible. ~
where partnership is actual but not ostensible, 299.
OUTGOING PARTNERliability of, 220.
PARTIES (see ACTIONS).

majority of, powers, 189.

who are bound by acts of, 191-206.

liability of, 208-220.

PARTNERSHIP

. defined,' 1.

essential elements of, 2.

is contract relation, 3.

273

PART~RS-

defined, 1.
how classified, 16.
who may be, 21.
number of, 28.
how persons become, SS-73.
rights and duties of to each'other, 11~12'7.
actions between, 128-156.
powers of, as between themselves, 158, 159.
as respects third persons, 160-190.
majority of, powers, 189.
who are bound by acts of, 191-206.
liability of, 208-220.
PARTNERSHIP. defined; 1.
essential elements of, S.
is contra.ct relation, 8.
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INDEX.

References are to •eotioDL

INDEX.

References are to Beotiona.

PARTNERSHIP (continued)whether a distinct entity, 4.
commercial conception of, 5.
how differs from corporation, 6.
from other associations, 7.
from joint tenancy and co-ownership, 8.
from joint purchasers of goods for resale, 9.
whether defectively organized corporation is, 10, 11.
promoters of companies not partners, 12.
when contemplated become consummated, 18, 14.
classification of, 15.
for what purposes created, 17-20.
who competent to enter into, 21-27.
what formalities required to create, 81.
how existence proven, 86.
what acts and contracts create, 88-78.
tests of, 45, 55.
·
distinction between partne~p inter ~ ~"'d as to third persons, 89.
by "holding out,." 69-78.
articles of, 75 et seq_.
property of, 93 et seq_.
name of, 82 et seq.
good-will of, 87 et seq_.
capital of, 90 et seq.
dissolution, 231 et seq_.

PARTNERSHIP (continued)

whether a distinct entity, 4,

commercial conception of, 5.

Low differs from corporation, 6.

from other associations, 7.

from joint tenancy and co-ownership, 8.

from joint purchasers of goods for resale, 9.

whether defectively organized corporation is, 10, 11.

promoters of companies not partners, 18.

when contemplated become consummated, 13, 14.

classification of, 15.

for what purposes created, 17-20.

who competent to enter into, 21-27.

what formalities required to create, 31.

how existence proven, 36.

what acts and contracts create, 38-73.

tests of, 45, 55.

distinction between partnership inter e -*M aa to third persona, 89.
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by "holding out," 69-7&

articles of, 75 et seq.

property of, 93 et seq.

name of, 82 et seq.

good-will of, 87 et seq.

capital of, 90 et seq.

dissolution, 231 et seq.

PARTNERSHIP ARTICLES

necessity for, 75.

how far conclusive, 76.

how construed, 77.

enlargement and waiver of provisions of, 7*

continuing under old, 79.

usual clauses in, 80.

how enforced, 81.

PARTNERSHIP ARTICLESnecessity for, 75.
how far conclusive, 76.
how construed, 77.
enlargement and waiver of provisions of, 7t
continuing under ol~ 79.
usual clauses in, 80.
how enforced, 81.

PAYMENT

implied power of partner to receive, 177.

implied power of partner to make, 185.

PERSONAL PROPERTY

what constitutes property of firm, 94.

may be held in firm name, 101.

or in name of one partner, 103.

title in firm collectively, 103.

interest of each partner, in, 98.

18 273

PAYME!'.{Timplied power of partner to receive, 177.
implied power of partner to make, 185.
PERSONAL PROPERTY what constitutes, property of firm, 94.
may be held in firm name, 101.
or in name of one partner, 102.
title in firm collectively, 103.
interest of each partner.in, 98.
18
273

.,

INDEX.
INDEX.

References are to sections.

PERSONAL TRUSTS

cannot be executed by partnership, 18.

PLEDGE

implied power of partner to, 188L

POWER OF PARTNER

as between the partners, 158, 159.

what implied, 159.

as respects third persons, 160 et seq.

limited by usage, 159.

limited by scope of business, 165.

implied powers in particular cases, 169-188.

after dissolution, 271.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY

when continuing and retiring partner stand as, 275.

PRIORITY

of firm creditors in individual assets, 289 et seq.

of individual creditors in individual assets, 293 et seq.

PROFITS
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sharing of, as test of partnership inter ae, 4&-S3.

as test of partnership as to third persons, 56-68.

PROMISSORY NOTE (see BILLS AND NOTES).

PROMOTERS

of corporations, not liable as partners, 121

PROPERTY OF PARTNERSHIP

what may be, 93.

what constitutes, 94

property bought by partner in his own name, 95.

property used by firm, 96.

interest of partners in, 97, 98.

to be applied to partnership debts, 12&

Beferenoes are to aeotiona.
PERSONAL TRUSTScannot be executed by partnership, 18.
PLEDGEhµ.plied power of partner to, 18&
POWER OF PARTNERas between the partners, 158, 159.
what impliied, 159.
as respects third persons, 160 et aeq_.
limited by usage. 109.
limited by scope of business, 1M.
impliied powers in particular cases, 169-188.
after dissolution, 271.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY when continuing and retiring partner stand as, 27li
PRIORITYof firm creditors in individual assets, 289 et aeq.
of individual creditors in individual assets, 298 d aeq.
PROFITSsharing of, as test of partnership inter se, 46-58.
as test of partnership as to third persons, 5B-68.
PROMISSORY NOTE (see Brr.Ls AND NOTES).

PUBLIC OFFICE

cannot be held in partnership, 18.

PUBLIC POLICY

purposes opposed to, 18.

PURCHASE

implied power of partner to, 178.

PURPOSE

for what partnerships may be organized, 17.

effect of illegal 20.

QUASI-PARTNERSHIP

what constitutes, 55 et seq.

274

PROMOTERSof corporations, not liable as partners, ta
PROPERTY OF PARTNERSHIPwhat may be, 93.
what constitutes, 94.
property bought by partner in his own name, 9li.
property used by firm, 96.
interest of partners in, 97, 98.
to be applied to partnership debts, m
PUBLIC OFFICE cannot be held in partnership, 18.
PUBLIC POLICY purposes opposed to, 18.
PURCHASEimplied power of partner to, 178.
PURPOSEfor what partnerships may be organized, 1'7.
effect of illegal, 20.
QUASI-PARTNERSHIPwhat constitutes, 55 et seq_•
. 274
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staudas.

*, 44

rations, not liable as paurtneia, 12,

^a

.

-3, It.

INDEX.

References are to sections.

RATIFICATION

by infant partner, 23.

by firm, of partners' acts, 190.

of the execution of sealed instruments, 180,

RF.AT, ESTATE (see LAND)

of partnership, 104-111.

interest of partners in, 108.

liability of, 106 et seq.

RECEIVER

appointment of, in partnership controversies, 155, 160.

REIMBURSEMENT (see CONTRIBUTION; INDEMNITY)

action for not reimbursing as agreed, 140.

REMEDIES (see ACTIONS).

RENEWAL OF PARTNERSHIP (see CONTINUINQ PABTNBBSHIP; LIM-

ITED PARTNERSHIP).

REPRESENTATIONS (see ADMISSIONS).

RESCISSION

of partnership contract for fraud, 891.
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RETIRING PARTNER

right to use old firm name, 88.

right to continue business, 88.

duty to give notice of, 264

liability of, 266.

SALE

implied power of partner to make, 188.

SCOPE OF BUSINESS

what is meant by, 166.

extending by conduct, 167.

limitations imposed on partners' power by, 165.

SEAL

partner no implied power to execute instruments under, 1801

ratification of, 180.

SECRET PARTNER

who is, 16.

liability of, 193.

action by and against, 229.

SEPARATE CREDITORS

right of, to have payment out of separate assets, 293 et geq.

SERVANTS

liability of firm for acts of, 207.

275

INDEX.

References are to sections.

SHARE OF PARTNER

what constitutes, 97, 98.

sale of, 99.

seizure on execution, 100.

SILENT PARTNER

who is, 16.

liability of, 193.

actions by and against, 229.

SPECIAL PARTNER (see LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; SPECIAL PARTNEB-

SHIP).

SPECIAL PARTNERSHIP (see LIMITED PARTNERSHIP)

nature of, 810.

must be authorized by statute, 311.

statutory requirements, 312.

necessity for complying with, 813.

for what business authorized, 314

conduct of business, 810.

dissolution of, 310.
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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

of partnership agreements, 149-15L

STATUS

whether partnership is, 3.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS

when requires partnership to be created by writing, 32.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

power of partner to waive, after dissolution, 272.

SUB-P ARTNERSHIP

what constitutes, 80.

rights and liabilities of members of, 80.

SUIT (see ACTIONS^

SURETY

one partner's implied power to bind firm as, 188.

SURVIVING PARTNER

right to use former firm name, 88.

rights and powers of, 268.

interest of, in real property, 111.

TENANCY IN COMMON

how differs from partnership, 8.

276
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1HDJEX.

Beferences are to section*.

nmn.

FBST OF PARTNERSHIP

as between partners themselves, 40-54.

as respects third person, 55-73.

sharing profits as, 46, 56.

TORT

liability of partners in, 204

liability in, joint and several, 218.

actions for, parties to, 226, 230.

IRADING FIRM

what is, 102.

power to make negotiable paper, 174

to borrow money, 175.

to buy property, 176.

TRANSFER OF SHARE

dissolves partnership, 99, 243.

UNIVERSAL PARTNERSHIP

what constitutes, 15.

USAGE
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effect on power of partners, 159.

WAIVER

of provisions of articles by conduct, 78.

WAR

dissolves partnership, 250.

WILL

continuing business under, 269.

WINDING UP (see ACCOUNTING; APPLICATKHI or

277

BeferenoM ue

to 890lilaall.

rEST OF PARTNERSIDPas between partnem themselves, 40-a
u respeot.s third person, M-78.
sharing profits as, 46, M.
roRTliability of partners in, 204-.
liability in, joint and several, 218.
actions for, parties t.o, 226, 230.
l'RADING FIRMwhat is, 102.
power to make negotiable paper, 174i.
to borrow money, 175.
to buy property, 176.
TRANSFER OF SHAREdissolves partnership, 99, 248.
UNIVERSAL PARTNERSHIPwhat constitutes. 15.
USAGEeffeot on power of partners, 159.
WAIVERof provisions of articles by conduct, 78.
WARdissolve11 partnership, 250. ·
WILLoontinuing business under, 269.
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FIRST SEMESTER SCHEDULE, 1913-1914

Instruction Beginning September 10th, 1913

FIRST SEMESTER SCHEDULE, 1913-1914

DAY SCHOOL

Instruction Beginning September 10th, 1913
DAY SCHOOL

'reshman

action 1.

Hour

Monday

Tuesday

Wednesday

Thursday

!18hman
:don I.
Hour

Monday

Tuesday

Wednesday

Thursday

Friday

Saturday

8:00 A. M.

Ele. Law

BailmPntfl

Ele. Law

B i.iJm,mts

Ele. L11w

Crim. Law

5:15 P. M.

~ra!ts~

Torts

Crim. Law

Torte

7:00 P. M.

(Sel'. I.)
Debating

Prac. Court

Friday

Saturday

8:00 A. M.

Ele. Law

Bailments

Ele. Law

B lilmeiits

Ele. Lw
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f Contracts'N

-

8:4.'>A. M.

10:15 A. M.
12:15 P. M.

/-"'Con tracts j

Torts

~

!18hman
:tion JI.

Crim. Law

5:15 P. M.

~

1:30 P. M.

Ele. Law

B.iilmPr1!L

l

...

Bailments

Contracts ~ J

Torts

Crim. Law

(Sec. II.)
Debating

7:00 P. M.

Ele. Law

Ele. Law
Torts

Contrac~

Crim. Law

(Sec. III.)
Debating

(Sec. IV.)

Debating

.

Prnc. Court

Crim. Law

Torts

nlor
:tlon I .

etne~

7:00 P. M.

R:(}l)A.M.

Com. L. Pl.

Real Prop.

Com. L. Pl.

5:15 P. M.

Wills

Eq ..Jur.

Wills

(Sep. I.)

Debating

Prac. Court

7:00 P. M.

Re'll Prop.

Eq. Jur.

Parl. Law

Pri. Corps

Pm<". Court

'reshman

lection II.

nlor
:tlon II.

8:45 A. M.

.

Ele. Law

-

-

10:15 A. M.

Wills

Real Prop

(.Partner~ip _)

Eq. Jur.

Wills

12:15 P. M.

Pri. Corps

Eq. Jur.

Com.L.PI.

Com.L. Pl.

Real Prop.

Ele. Law

5:15 P. M.

Par!. L .. w

Ele. Law

10:15 A. M.

Bailments

Bailments

Torts

~tlon

!

Prac. Court

7:00 P.M.

11lor

I.
A. M.

Evidence

Conf. of Laws

Eviden<'e

Con veyu1rni ng

EJidencc

5:15 P. M.

Code Pl.

Pub. Corps.

Eq. Pl.

Pub. Corps.

Code Pl.

~:00

Cont.

01

Laws

12:15 P. M.

^CJontracts^

Torts

Grim. Law

Contract|^x

Crim. Law

P rac. Court

7:00 P. M.

-

nlor
ctlon JI.
12:15 P. M.

Evidence

Evidence

Evidence

1:30 P. M.

(Sec. II.)

NIGHT SCHOOL

Debating

(Sec. III.)

Debating

(Sec. IV.)

Debating

7:00 P. M.

rst Year
Hour

-

Monday

Tuesday

Wednesday

7:00

~vntrac,<ts ~

Criminal Law

Ele.' Law

8:15

.b:Je. Law

Prac. Court

Pruo. Court

'unior

.ection I.

\

ContractS'',,

Friday

Thursday

I

Ele. Law
Criminal Law

cond Year
6:15

Debating

^artnersnii^

7:00

Wills

J. Real Prop.

Mining Law

8:15

J . Real Proµ.

Prac. Court

Wills

Pri. Corps.

Code PI.

Pu..>. Corµs

Com. L. Pl.

Conv~yancing

P~rl.

L ... w

Eq. Jur.

8:00 A. M.

Corn. L. PI.

1urth .Y ear

Real Prop.

Com. I,. PI.

Real Prop.

Pri. Corps

5:15 P. M.

Wills

Eq. Jur.

Wills

7:00
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